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Abstract
This research investigates how project contracts can coordinate the supply chain between
a project manager and contractor and if the solutions can be ensured as equitable. The main
features of this type of supply chain are the trade-offs between the selection of a higher rate
of resource consumption with a consequent higher cost to the contractor and a lower rate of
resource consumption leading to later delivery and a reduction of the project-reward to the
project manager. This broader problem could lead to a coordination problem for the overall
supply chain. This research proposed a solution to this broader problem in two different
scenarios: Take it or leave it scenario and negotiation scenario. Finally, the fair allocation
of the risks and benefits and the related decision-making issues are addressed as one of the
behavioural barriers to the supply chain coordination.
The coordination issues in a take it or leave it scenario are addressed using time-based
and fixed price project contracts using Stackelberg games. Models of coordination were
proposed with time-based contracts, but the fixed price contracts failed to coordinate. The
coordination problems in negotiation scenario are addressed with the Nash’s bargaining, the
Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining, and the utilitarian approach. A cost plus contract has been
found to dominate the solutions over any cost sharing contract and fixed price contract for
Nash’s bargaining and Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining cases. Finally, the issues of fairness of
allocation of risks and benefits as one of the challenges of supply chain coordination, have
been investigated. Among the various definitions, this research used the definition of fairness
as inequity aversion as proposed by Fehr & Schmidt (1999). The fixed price contracts were
found to coordinate the supply chain under consideration alongside the time-based contracts
if the members had fairness concern.
Some of the key features of this research include the incorporation of various probability
distributions for the project completion time and cost, the inclusion of various forms of risk
preference, and addressing the challenges of fair allocation in project supply chains.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“No man is an island”
John Donne
The quote by the English poet John Donne means everyone needs to rely on others to get
some of the jobs done for their day to day life. To put it in other words, people are dependent
on each other in society. This is also true for modern organizations as they depend on the
actions of the other organizations in the supply chain. However, these organizations have their
own goals and objectives, and so there are problems of misalignment and lack of coordination
of decisions. This research argues that this lack of coordination is not beneficial for either
individual organisations or for their overall sum. This research has the broad objective to find
the solutions for coordination problems for the organizations in a project supply chain.
A popular saying is that the nature of competition will increasingly not be between com-
panies, but rather between supply chains. Intense market competition, short product life
cycles, and increased customer service expectations prompt the need for ever more efficient
supply chain management through better coordination and cooperation among all members.
Coordination is very critical to the success of the performance of the entire supply chain as
poor coordination leads to increased inefficiency and costs. Due to this importance, it has
received considerable attention in the literature. However, most of the attention has been paid
to product supply chains with order quantities and price as the decision variables. Limited at-
tention has been paid to supply chains in the project settings where completion time and cost
are the key elements. The importance of coordination in project supply chains is no less than
in product supply chains. Various problems arise in absence of coordination in project supply
10
chains such as time and cost overrun. Therefore, this research focuses on the coordination
issues for project supply chains. A dyadic supply chain consisting of a project manager and
a contractor organization, is the basis for this research. Different forms of project contracts:
fixed-price, time-based, and cost-based, have been considered as the tools to achieve the co-
ordination. Concepts of game-theory have been used as the theoretical underpinning. The
first two objectives are to investigate how the project supply chain can be coordinated using
the contracts in a take it or leave it situation and a bargaining situation. The third objective
is to investigate the issues of fairness in allocation as one of the barriers to supply chain
coordination.
Before these objectives of the research are addressed, this chapter introduces the back-
ground theme of this research. The main discipline area for this research is supply chain
management. The area of supply chain coordination sits under the bigger umbrella of supply
chains and supply chain management. Hence, this chapter introduces supply chain coordi-
nation as an element of the broader paradigm of supply chain management, followed by its
importance and motivation, and the scope of this research.
1.1 Supply chain management and its elements
A supply chain comprises of all the players and all of their activities which are directly or
indirectly meeting the requirements of the end customer (Chopra & Meindl 2007), whereas
supply chain management is defined as a system approach to manage the entire flow of infor-
mation material, services and finance (Chase et al. 1998). The members of a supply chain can
operate in a centralized setting with a single decision maker or in a decentralized setting with
multiple decision makers. In the case of centralized settings, the goals, and objectives of the
members are aligned due to the presence of a single decision maker and they aim to optimize
the system-wide performance. In the case of decentralized settings, due to the presence of
multiple decision makers with multiple individual goals and objectives, the overall goals and
objectives may not be aligned and may be conflicting in nature (Li & Wang 2007). This leads
to sub-optimal overall benefit in comparison to the centralized settings. from this considera-
tion, centralization may be ideal situation to have. However, decentralized systems are very
common in the business environment due to the presence of various other benefits such as
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proximity to the market and a better understanding of the market (Lee & Whang 1999).
Each stage in the supply chain has a buyer-supplier relation between its members. Every
member except the end consumer adds value to the input procured from their supplier and
puts it forward to their respective customer. Thus, each individual pair is interlinked with
others in the form of a chain relationship with numerous activities (Cooper et al. 1997).
These activities can be classified into the following clusters (Wisener et al. 2005)
• Purchase Elements - Raw material procurement and supply management issues
• Production Elements Scheduling, capacity, and production techniques
• Distribution Elements Locations, transportation, logistics, warehousing and store
• Integration Elements- Collaboration in decision making, financial and non-financial
flow in order to improve overall profit and customer value delivery
Several authors have used the terms supply chain integration, collaboration, cooperation,
and coordination synonymously. However, authors including Camarinha-Matos et al. (2009)
and Cohen & Roussel (2005) have argued that these terms differ depending upon the degree
of integration. There seems to be a lack of unique definition of these terms. However, sum-
marizing these debates, it can be said that the integration continuum ranges from arm’s length
transaction based short term relationship to fully integrated long term relationships. This re-
search starts its investigation with the short to medium term integration approach (coordina-
tion) in a decentralized supply chain in order to identify mechanisms for the achievement of
long-term collaboration. It is important to note that it may be counter-productive to integrate
with all the members of the supply chain due to increased complexity (Lambert & Cooper
2000). These authors suggested the consideration of integration with the members who are
critical to the success of the organization of concern. Thus, the present research considers the
supply chain members who are critical to the success of the focal firm as well as the overall
supply chain.
In order to review the problem areas of supply chain coordination, the coordination of
supply chain is defined in the next subsection section followed by the justification of the
selection of this topic.
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1.2 Supply chain coordination and its importance
Malone & Crowston (1990, 1994) defined coordination in their coordination theory as man-
aging dependencies between activities. On a similar note, supply chain coordination has been
defined by several authors such as
• Supply Chain (SC) members taking actions jointly to improve the supply chain surplus
(Chopra & Meindl 2007).
• Two or more companies implementing a long-term collaborative approach in order
to create value, which could not have been possible working individually (Cohen &
Roussel 2005).
• Simatupang & Sridharan (2002) stated, “Two or more independent organizations work-
ing jointly to execute supply chain operations with a greater degree of success in com-
parison to operating SC in isolation” (p.19).
Summarizing all these definitions, supply chain coordination can be considered as two
or more independent organizations working in collaboration to achieve improvement in the
following areas in comparison to non-collaborative and isolated approach of working
• Value proposition to customers
• Reduction in overall supply chain cost
• Overall supply chain profit
Early researchers highlighted that the supply chain can be coordinated when it is cen-
tralized. This is due to the presence of a single decision maker who optimizes the risks and
benefits for the supply chain whereas, in a decentralized setting, every member would op-
timize their individual decisions. However, Cachon (2003) defined that if the coordination
mechanisms can encourage supply chain members to take decisions in a decentralized supply
chain such that the total benefit confirms to the benefits of a centralized supply chain with-
out compromising the optimal individual benefits, then the decentralized supply chain can be
considered as coordinated. This definition has been used as a working definition by many
authors in the literature for proposing mathematical models for supply chain coordination.
This research follows this as the working definition of supply chain coordination.
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As stated in the last sub-section, the concept of supply chain coordination is a contin-
uum from arms length or transaction-based relationships to close relationships (Cooper et al.
1997). Traditionally supply chain members have worked in an arm’s length relationship.
However, the modern day business environment has several challenges such as: an increased
cost of resources; shorter product life cycle; increased competition among business entities;
increased customer value expectations at a lower price; and changing external regulations.
These have created a need for the organizations to come up with a coordinated supply chain
system, which would not only exceed customer expectations, but also improve the profit fig-
ure. In addition, Simchi-Levi et al. (2003) have highlighted the need to effectively integrate
suppliers, manufacturers, warehouses, and stores, so that goods are produced and distributed
at the right time, in the right quantities, to the right locations and at the same time also to
minimize system-wide costs while satisfying service requirements and meeting environmen-
tal regulations. However, in the presence of various challenges, the collaborative efforts are
not always exercised in the decentralized settings. Many authors highlighted various barriers
of supply chain management. These barriers can be classified into five broad categories as
below
1. Incentive barriers: The existence of misaligned goals and objectives among mem-
bers leads to sub-optimum results. Quite often, the optimum solution requires one or
member of the supply chain to move away from their individual optimal solution. As a
result, members tend to make decisions as per the local optimum instead of the global
optimum. This leads to inefficiency in overall supply chain performance (Chopra &
Meindl 2007, Harland et al. 2007, Fawcett et al. 2008)
2. Financial barriers:. Lack of access to financial resources limits the acquisition of
other resources and investment opportunities to support coordination and ultimately
achieve long-term integration (Briscoe et al. 2004, Chopra & Meindl 2007, Harland
et al. 2007).
3. Behavioural and other decision-making barriers: Lack of trust among members,
relational barriers, fear of loss of control, resistance to change, lack of understanding
of benefits, and lack of top management commitment lead to further decision-making
problems. e.g.- lack of rationality while making decisions on sharing risk and benefits
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among members of supply chain (Cetindamar et al. 2005, Chopra & Meindl 2007,
Harland et al. 2007, Fawcett et al. 2008, Forslund & Jonsson 2009).
4. Information related barriers: The poor flow of information constrains decision mak-
ing and ultimately leads to sub-optimum results. This is contributed by many factors
such as: poor information system which leads to lack of end to end visibility; unwill-
ingness to information sharing; poor quality of shared information and so on (Barratt
2004, Chopra & Meindl 2007, Fawcett et al. 2008, Forslund & Jonsson 2009).
5. Operational barriers: Inconsistent processes and performance metric selections lead
to increased variability of the overall supply chain performance. In addition, oper-
ational problems in the form of: problems of longer lead time due to geographic
distance, inconsistent forecasting techniques, and poor inventory management further
leads to increased variability of the overall performance (Briscoe et al. 2004, Forslund
& Jonsson 2009).
Owing to these barriers, often the supply chains fail to coordinate properly and thereby
fail to reap the benefits of the coordination. Some of the impacts of a non-coordinated sup-
ply chain are realized in the form of certain phenomena such as the bullwhip effect, double
marginalization, overstocking and under-stocking (Simchi-Levi et al. 2003). The bullwhip
effect is the order amplification when it moves away from the demand generation point at
the end consumer end (Lee et al. 1997). Double-marginalization is the overall supply chain’s
profit reduction and final products price increase, due to the reservation of individual profit
by each member of supply chain (Simchi-Levi et al. 2003). As a result, organizations end up
with too much or too little stock, an inappropriate customer service level, and high cost.
The internal problems mentioned in the last paragraph makes the organizations vulnerable
in the uncertain business environment with a twofold problem of lesser profit and dissatisfied
customers, with few further repercussions. Some of the recent examples of such business
environmental threats are: Closure of production sites of Toyota after a recent earthquake
in south Japan (Kanaracus 2016), impact on the forecast growth figure of Nestle due to its
infamous product recall of Maggi noodles from Indian market (Gibbons 2016), raw mate-
rial shortage and lead time increase in BMWs plant (Automotive News, 2013); and loss of
supply chain control and horse meat scandal of British retailer Tesco (Johnson 2013). These
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external threats are not caused by the lack of coordination; but their existence makes supply
chains more vulnerable to these external threats if not coordinated (Chen et al. 2013). The
authors further argued that supply chain coordination can reduce the extent of vulnerabil-
ity of the supply chains to these external risks. The benefits of supply chain coordination
can be realized in the form of reduced overall supply chain cost, reduced overstocking and
understocking situations, improved customer service and improved quality (Wisener et al.
2005).
The supply chain coordination can be achieved using various means e.g. tools such as
joint decision-making, supply chain contracting (Arshinder & Deshmukh 2008), and infor-
mation sharing (Sahin & Robinson 2002, Arshinder & Deshmukh 2008). Several researchers
including (Yao et al, 2008; Savaskan et al, 2004; Baiman, 2000; Chen et al, 2000; Cachon and
Fisher, 2000; Chen, 1999) proposed coordination models with centralized and decentralized
supply chain settings with the above-mentioned coordination mechanisms. Vendor Man-
aged Inventory (VMI), Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment Techniques
(CPFR), Joint replenishment and Joint New Product development are few of the tools which
are used in modern day manufacturing and other related industries to facilitate supply chain
coordination (Arshinder et al, 2008). This research has selected contracting mechanisms for
the coordination of supply chain with a project manager and a contractor.
1.3 Motivation
Supply chain coordination has received considerable attention in the literature due to its enor-
mous importance as mentioned in earlier subsections. The literature survey (documented in
the next chapter) on supply chain coordination suggests the existence of two main streams
of research direction: the importance of the role of coordination in supply chain coordina-
tion (Fisher et al. 1994, Lee et al. 1997, Ramdas & Spekman 2000, Horvath 2001); and the
other one is the proposal of coordination mechanisms (Corbett et al. 2004, Giannoccaro &
Pontrandolfo 2004, Bernstein & Federgruen 2005a, Kim & Oh 2005, Chen et al. 2006, Ding
& Chen 2008). One of the most notable observations from these two research streams is the
lack of focus on one of the challenges of coordination of how to allocate the benefits after
coordination. Evidence from literature and practice suggests if mechanisms of coordination
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can not mitigate this challenge, then the benefits derived are not sustainable and are of a tem-
porary nature e.g. Termination of the contractual relation between Walmart Canada and Lego
group upon the rejection from Lego group to reduce the price in the Canadian market. Lego
group kept the price same as in the American market and reaped additional benefit due to
the appreciation of Canadian dollar (Georgiades 2008). Moreover, the failure of coordination
and the early termination of contractual relationship have been documented in the absence
of a proper fair allocation mechanism after coordination in the literature of Katok & Pavlov
(2013). In addition, Griffith et al. (2006) found evidence of a positive relation between fair
allocation mechanism and supply chain performance.
Another notable observation from the literature review is the emphasis on product supply
chains. Relatively little has been explored on supply chains in a project setting. The differ-
ence between these two settings are well differentiated in the work by Slack et al. (2010) in
the figure 1.3.
Figure 1.1: Different Process Types (Source: Slack et al. (2010))
It can be seen from this figure that the project process has got an unique and lowest
volume of output. In addition, the projects have a definite start and definite end period. Once
the project ends, the product operation begins.
The importance of projects is not a new phenomenon. Projects were present even in an-
cient time e.g. construction of pyramids during ancient Egyptian time (Kwon et al. 2010).
The notable characteristics of projects are the specific start time and finish time. Unlike its
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counterpart product based manufacturing supply chains, it does not have the perpetual opera-
tion as it will cease at some point of time. The majority of the concepts of project management
come from the construction projects and construction management. In fact, most of the tools
and techniques for effective project management reside in the literature of civil engineer-
ing such as Critical Path Method (CPM) and Project Evaluation Review Techniques (PERT)
(Kwon et al. 2010). However, while these tools can model uncertainty in project completion
time (Klastorin 2004), they cannot model how changing contract incentives can encourage or
discourage increasing the amount of resources allocated to the project contractor and hence,
the likely completion time. Moreover, these tools are deployed at organizational level. Each
organization involved in the project would have their own estimation of completion times
using the tools CPM or PERT. However, there is a paucity of application of these tools in lit-
erature and practice which could effectively manage supply chain issues in a project setting.
This is due to certain differences between the general product supply chains with the project
supply chains (Kwon et al. 2010). These are as follows
• The projects have a definite start and a definite end point. The operations which trans-
form the raw materials to a finished product, begin after that.
• The main source of uncertainty in product supply chain is the demand, whereas in
the case of project supply chains the completion time and costs are the sources of
uncertainty.
• The main decision variable in a product supply chain is the order quantity, whereas the
resource consumption rate is the main decision variable in the case of project supply
chains.
• The decision variable order quantity becomes visible in the case of product supply
chains. However, the resource consumption rate cannot be easily monitored in the case
of project supply chains.
Due to these basic differences, supply chain coordination in project settings is different from
the supply chain coordination in product setting. Relatively little attention has been paid to
the coordination issues in the project supply chains. However, the importance of coordination
is no less for project supply chains in comparison to the product supply chains as various
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problems are associated with the project supply chains in the absence of proper coordination.
Time and cost overrun are the two most prominent of them. Myriad examples can be found
where the project went over time with a significant cost overrun for e.g. significant time and
cost overrun in the rebuilding project of the Wembley stadium in UK (Moore 2009).
The above mentioned observations from literature and practice have been the main moti-
vation for this research. Hence, the next subsection entails the scope of this research.
1.4 Scope of this research
The research gaps mentioned in the last subsection are the motivation of this research. This
research seeks to propose a solution to the problems of supply chain coordination in a project
setting with the following aim: To propose the mathematical models of coordination in
project supply chain and finally to overcome the challenges of fair allocation of risks
and benefits.
This research aim will be achieved with three different objectives in this research. Project
contracts have been used as coordination mechanism and concepts from game theory have
been used to explain the underlying decision-making process.
• Obj.1: To investigate if supply chain coordination models in a take it or leave it sce-
nario using project contracts can be proposed.
• Obj.2: To investigate and propose optimal coordinating solutions in a bargaining sce-
nario.
• Obj.3: To investigate what is a fair allocation of risks and benefits when coordinating
the supply chain.
In all of these three objectives, a dyadic project supply chain consisting of a project man-
ager organization and a contractor organization have been considered. The applicability of
the derived models is explored with numerical examples. Construction projects have been
used as a case example. The numerical values that are used, are based on the prevailing
practice in the UK construction sector.
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1.5 Expected Contribution
By achieving the objectives mentioned above, this research tries to contribute in several areas.
The first objective will extend the existing models of supply chain coordination in a take it or
leave it type of project environment.This will bridge the gap of lack of use of project contracts
as a tool for coordination mechanisms for the supply chain.
The second objective will contribute to the coordination mechanism for the environment
with negotiation opportunities. Additionally, this is also expected to contribute to the applica-
tion of bargaining theories and models to the supply chain coordination which is a relatively
less addressed area in the literature.
The third objective is an attempt to extend the concepts of fair allocation from behavioural
economics to the supply chain coordination. The literature review presented in next chapter
reveals that behavioural & decision-making issues are one of the less addressed barriers of
supply chain coordination. This research attempts to bridge the gap of this less addressed
challenge by addressing the fair allocation issues.
Apart from the academic contributions, these objectives are also expected to contribute to
the practice of supply chain coordination principles in real life projects. The literature review
in later chapter reveals a reliance on a specific type of simple statistical distributions when
it comes to consider the deciding variables of projects such as the completion time and the
completion cost. This research is expected to bridge this gap by proposing solutions which
are more close to reality by selecting more applicable distributions.
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1.6 Summary of the thesis
This report is organized in the following manner
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Chapter 2
Research Backdrop
This chapter sets the background of this research. At first, the literature review is presented,
followed by the research gaps in the literature. Based on those research gaps, the focus of this
research is presented in the form of research questions, objectives, and relevant theoretical
underpinning.
2.1 Literature Review
This section reviews the existing research in the area of supply chain coordination in order
to identify the existing research gaps. This helps the development of the problem framework
for this research. This section will be subdivided into the following subsections:
• Arguments on different types of literature review
• Planning of the review
• Conducting the review
• Reporting the findings from the review
• A summary of literature to highlight the research gaps.
• Identified research gaps
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2.1.1 Arguments on different types of literature review
An effective literature review is one of the most important basic building blocks for any
academic research (Webster & Watson 2002). It creates the platform for knowledge advance-
ment and theory creation by linking the developments from past research to the present. Any
literature review process is of high scientific value in terms of knowledge creation when it is
thorough, fair and evidence-based (Adolphus, 2013; NUI Galaway, 2014). Literature could
be conducted in narrative format and systematic literature review format (Garg et al. 2008). A
systematic literature review provides more objective and evidence-based approach to identify
the literature. On the contrary, a narrative review is a more traditional approach which offers
a more theoretical and detailed overview of the research topic. Both of these methods have
shortcomings and benefits. The narrative method offers a more comprehensive review (Garg
et al. 2008). However, it lacks in the details of the underpinning method selected for the re-
view and thereby, it is less replicable. This shortcoming is overcome by systematic literature
review (Tranfield et al. 2003, Colicchia & Strozzi 2012) . However, this method is also not
a fool proof solution. One of the notable shortcomings of a systematic literature review is its
bias due to selective publication selection (Garg et al. 2008). Thus, the authors argued the
need for a more careful approach to the literature review to overcome these shortcomings. In
order to maintain a balance between unbiased nature of the review and replicable nature of
the review, this research would not be tied up with any particular label of doing the litera-
ture review. This research has borrowed some ideas of a systematic literature review as well.
At the same time, in order to avoid any bias of rejecting the relevant source of literature,
this research applied some ideas of narrative review. This research did not undertake any
meta-analysis.
As a starting point, the three step evidenced based approach of (Tranfield et al. 2003) is
followed. The authors suggested to conduct the literature review in three stages: Plan the
review, conduct the review, and report the findings.
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2.1.2 Plan of the review
Review Protocol
The review protocol was decided at this stage. It’s a detailed plan of steps to be taken for
conducting the review. The C (Context), I (Intervention), M (Mechanism), and O (Outcome)
logic suggested by Denyer & Tranfield (2009), has been considered for setting up the review
protocol. According to the authors, the CIMO logic should consist of the following
Context (C)
Individual, relationship, institutional settings or wider system being studied
Intervention (I)
Action or activity being studied
Mechanisms (M)
• Identification of conditions under which the interventions work.
• Identification of mechanisms that explain the relationships between interventions and
outcomes.
Outcome (O)
• Effects of interventions
• The measurement of the outcomes
• Any intended and unintended effects of the interventions
This research studied the context of supply chains coordination in the project setting.
However, to begin with, this research studied the context of supply chain coordination for
product supply chains and project supply chains. The intervening activities are the barriers to
the coordination and sources of uncertainty. Coordination mechanisms proposed by Arshin-
der & Deshmukh (2008) are the mechanisms. As a result of the intervention, finally, it was
analysed and found how the models of coordination fared with respect to the challenges and
under what type of uncertainty.
A review framework is derived based on the CIMO explained above.
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Figure 2.1: Literature Review Framework
The horizontal axis represents the barriers to supply chain coordination as described in
the introduction chapter of this thesis. The vertical axis represents the contractual mecha-
nisms. According to (Arshinder & Deshmukh 2008), the coordination can be achieved with
contracting, information system, information sharing, and joint planning/joint decision mak-
ing. This can be summarised as a continuum of formal contracting to informal relational
mechanisms such as information sharing and joint decision making. Thus, this research has
classified the mechanisms from two different dimensions: formal contractual mechanisms
and informal relational mechanisms.
Search Criteria
One of the first steps was to identify the search criteria. In order to maintain the high stan-
dard of findings, only published works from peer-reviewed journal articles were considered
in the search (Newbert, 2007; David and Han, 2004). For this purpose, the journals from
the latest ABS (Association of Business School) and AACSB (The Association to Advanced
Collegiate Schools of Business) Journal Ranking are considered. Any unpublished works
and conference proceedings are excluded from the search list. In order to maintain the high
standard quality of the review, this research has put a higher emphasis on the ABS 3* or 4*,
and AACSB A+ journals. However, in certain cases, depending on the requirement, impor-
tance, and relevance of the findings, published papers in the other peer-reviewed journals are
also selected for this review.
Another important criterion used for journal article selection was the date of publications.
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The objective of this study is based on the supply chain coordination in the vertical direction
of the supply chain and assessing how the challenges of coordination have been addressed.
Spengler (1950) is one of the first authors to analyse the issues of double marginalization in
a non-coordinated supply chain. This terminology identifies the reduction of overall profit of
the supply chain due to individual profit reservations by the members of the supply chain. As
a result, this causes incentive barriers. As per the knowledge of the author of this research, this
is the first published work that analysed the existence of barriers to supply chain coordination.
Thus, this research has selected published works post 1950 only. Although it was identified in
1950, the realisation of the importance of coordination started in mid-1980s and early 1990s.
In fact, from the late 1990s authors started to propose coordination mechanisms. Thus, most
of the selected papers and published works for this review are starting from that era to till
date with few exceptions as necessary.
Keyword selection
Parallel to the determination of the search criteria, a list of relevant keywords was identified.
In the first phase, 40 keywords were generated with the help of existing narrative literature
review articles, keywords from journal articles searched based on random keywords e.g. -
supply chain coordination. After careful consideration and relevancy, 10 keywords were
selected as below
1. Supply Chain Integration Or Supply Chain Coordination Or Supply Chain Cooperation
Or Supply Chain Collaboration Or Supply Chain Partnership Or Supply Chain Alliance
2. Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment Techniques or CPFR
3. Vendor Managed Inventory or VMI
4. Multistage or Multi-echelon Inventory
5. Supply Chain Contracting or Supply Chain Contracts
6. Information Sharing And Supply Chain
7. Joint Decision Making or Collaborative Decision Making and Supply Chain
8. Joint Cost Reduction in Supply Chain or Collaborative Cost Reduction in Supply Chain
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9. Joint Inventory Management or Collaborative Inventory Management and Supply Chain
10. Vertical Integration in Supply Chain
2.1.3 Conduct the review
Based on the research protocol identified in subsection 2.1.2, the literature review was con-
ducted through searching for journal articles using the selected 10 keywords. Web of Science
was the main search engine used for this purpose. In order not to miss any important existing
body of literature, the keywords/key-phrases were also searched from search engines includ-
ing Science Direct, Scopus, and Google scholar. At first, these searches generated over 5000
search results. This included conference proceedings and other unpublished works. This was
filtered by including only journal articles from the list of journals selected earlier. This gen-
erated 1017 articles. This was further filtered by carefully reading the abstracts. This resulted
in 388 screened articles. After reading the main body of the identified literature, several arti-
cles that are not directly relevant to the identified research question, are further screened out.
This resulted in a final selection of 206 papers. Out of these 206 papers identified, 23 of them
have been found to be describing a certain phenomenon of supply chain coordination or some
antecedent of the coordination mechanisms. These papers did not propose any coordination
mechanism as such. Hence, these are not included in the framework in fig 2.1. However, the
findings from these 23 papers are used to support the arguments proposed for this review.
The distribution of the papers by their source journal and years are presented in figures
2.2 and 2.3.
2.1.4 Report the findings
The findings from the set of selected literature are reported according to the classification
framework shown in fig. 2.1. The set of literature is classified according to the nature of
coordination mechanisms used in the paper. Then for each case, it was assessed how these
mechanisms have addressed the barriers.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Journals
28
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Years
Formal Contractual Mechanism
Contracting between supply chain members has been used as a form of coordination mech-
anism in order to motivate the involved members to take decision for the best interest of the
overall supply chain. Cachon (2003) presented a review with various contracts to coordinate
supply chain with incentive conflicts. There are two major groups of contract mechanisms
used in literature: Price only (Wholesale price contracts) and Price with risk sharing (Side
payment, Buyback, and Rebate) contracts. Authors including Chen et al. (2012) argued the
incapability of price only contracts to coordinate the supply chain and proposed a need for
using risk sharing contracts.
Side payment contract is one of the risks sharing contractual mechanisms used in litera-
ture. This contractual type has taken the form of revenue sharing, two part-tariff, and other
penalty based forms to coordinate the supply chain.
Revenue Sharing Contracts:
With a revenue sharing contract, the seller charges the buyer with a wholesale price and the
buyer also pays the seller a percentage of his(her) revenue (Cachon 2003). Revenue sharing
has been one of the popular contractual mechanisms used as a tool to coordinate a supply
chain for different structure for example: profit in a dyadic supply chain (Hou et al. 2009,
El Ouardighi & Kogan 2013, Saha 2013), three stage or a multi-stage supply chain (Gian-
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noccaro & Pontrandolfo 2004, Van Der Rhee et al. 2010, Zeng 2013, Moon et al. 2015), in
a competing supply chain with a common member (Geng & Mallik 2007, Zhang et al. 2012,
Cao et al. 2013, Cao 2014, Jiang et al. 2014, Xu et al. 2014) and without a common member
(Ai et al. 2012). Henry & Wernz (2015) used revenue sharing contract for a three level supply
chain using multi-scale decision theory. This allowed the model to address the uncertainty at
every stage of the supply chain rather than only at the final stage. Authors including Linh &
Hong (2009) and Chen & Wei (2012) used revenue sharing contract to propose a coordina-
tion mechanism for a multi-period supply chain. Coordination with the issues like demand
disruption (Zhang et al. 2012), and demand and cost disruption simultaneously (Cao et al.
2013) have been considered using the revenue sharing contracts as well. Revenue sharing
has also been considered to coordinate the supply chains where operating issues other than
profit have been considered as a decision variable such as optimal capacity utilization (Gupta
& Weerawat 2006, Geng & Mallik 2007, Ha & Tong 2008b), service quality with retail price
(Xiao et al. 2011), effort level (Ha & Tong 2008b), and corporate social responsibility issues
(Panda 2014, Panda et al. 2015). Gupta & Weerawat (2006) and Xiao & Jin (2011) used this
type of contracts in a “Make to Order” type of supply chains. Xiao & Jin (2011), Xiao et al.
(2011) considered quality assurance as another operating decision variable for coordination.
This type of contract has also been used to address reverse supply chain issues such as
optimal return Zeng (2013), Govindan & Popiuc (2014). Revenue sharing contract was found
to be the coordinating contract for a supply chain with sustainability investments under cap
and trade regulation (Dong et al. 2014). The revenue sharing contracts have also been used
in conjunction with the bargaining games (Hou et al. 2009, Li et al. 2009). This type of
contracts have also been used to in order to introduce the existence of informal relational
coordination mechanisms such as information sharing (Kong et al. 2013, Zhang & Chen
2013, Henry & Wernz 2015) or in conjunction with other coordinating mechanisms such
as demand information sharing (Zhou & Wang 2012), and vendor managed inventory (VMI)
Chen & Wei (2012), Chen (2013). The revenue sharing contract has also been used along with
other form of contracts such as payback mechanism (Tang & Kouvelis 2014) , rebate based
contracts (Hu et al. 2013, Saha 2013), cost sharing contracts (Kunter 2012) and cooperative
investment contract (Zhang et al. 2015). Khouja et al. (2010) used revenue sharing contracts
to address the coordination issues for price and profit in a rental information goods supply
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chain. Xiao & Jin (2011) used revenue sharing contract to coordinate a fashion apparel supply
chain under lead-time depended demand. Palsule-Desai (2013) proposed revenue depended
on revenue sharing contracts to coordinate the Bollywood film distribution supply chain.
Profit Sharing Contracts:
Profit sharing is another side payment form of contractual mechanism which has been used
in supply chain coordination literature. Wei & Choi (2010) used wholesale pricing with
profit sharing contract to coordinate a supply chain under mean -variance decision-making
framework. Yue et al. (2013) used the profit-sharing mechanism which can coordinate a
manufacturer-retailer supply chain with optimal price discount and advertising investment
decisions.
Two-part Tariff Contracts:
Two-part tariff is another form of side payment contract that has been used to coordinate
the supply chain. It is used for coordination of supply chains with different structures such
as: in a dual-channel supply chain (Chen et al. 2012), in a one retailer-two suppliers supply
chain (Lee & Yang 2013). This has even been used in a more complicated supply chain for
example in a complicated electricity distribution supply chain (Oliveira et al. 2013) and in a
serial supply chain (Majumder & Srinivasan 2006). It has also been used to coordinate with
multiple decision variables such as manufacturer induced quality and retailer induced effort
(Gurnani & Erkoc 2008, Ma et al. 2013). Two-part tariff contracts have also been used to
coordinate supply chain with environmental sustainability issues such as the greening effort
in the paper of Swami & Shah (2013a) and collection decisions in a closed loop supply chain
in the paper by Hong et al. (2015).
Other Side Payment Contracts:
There are some other forms of side payment contracts that have been used in literature to
coordinate a supply chain for example side payment with lead-time quotation (Xu et al. 2010),
modified revenue sharing to a profit sharing contract (Wang et al. 2012), and cost sharing
contract to outsource a financially constrained call centre unit of a focal company (Xu, Cheng
& Sun 2015). Penalty based contracts were also used as a form of side payment contracts in
literature for example late fee mechanism based contract in the literature of Cachon & Zhang
(2006), and penalty based service level contracts in the paper of Sieke et al. (2012).
All the models with side payment contracts mentioned in the papers in the last couple of
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paragraphs have either completely or near completely addressed the barriers of misaligned
incentives of the members of the supply chain. However, the major limitation with these pro-
posed side- payment contracts is the dependence of profit share/revenue share or any lump
sum payment on bargaining power. A further implication of this on the share and future de-
cision making of the players was mostly unexplored in these papers.
Price Discounts:
Discounts and rebates are another commonly used forms of contracting mechanisms in the
supply chain coordination literature. Price reduction can be depended on several forms of
price discounts such as price mark down (Cai et al. 2009, Wang & Webster 2009, Chung
et al. 2011), advanced purchase discount (Liu et al. 2014), price subsidy rate contract (Xiao
et al. 2005), discounting factor (Chaharsooghi et al. 2011), transportation cost (Cai et al.
2013), and returns (Chen 2011a). Zhou (2009) used price discounting to entice retailers in a
group of retailers to order as per a unified annual order quantity. These type of contracts have
been used for more complex structures of the supply chain such as supply chain with single
supplier-multi retailers supply chain (Bernstein & Federgruen 2005b). The authors proposed
the linear and the nonlinear price discount contracts to coordinate the supply chain.
Quantity Discount Contracts:
On the contrary, the quantity discounting contracts are designed in a form to encourage the
buyer to purchase higher quantity. The wholesale price is a function of quantity sold. It can
take all unit quantity discount where the wholesale price is a decreasing function of quan-
tity purchased (Cachon 2003). This contractual form has been used for a coordination of
different supply chain structures for example: a dyadic two-echelon supply chains (Corbett
& De Groote 2000, Hsieh et al. 2008, Xiao & Qi 2012, Zhang, Dong, Luo & Segerstedt
2014, Saha & Goyal 2015, Giri & Bardhan 2016), single buyer-multiple suppliers (Lee &
Yang 2013, Huang et al. 2015), one manufacturer-multiple retailers (Xiao et al. 2007, Chen
& Xiao 2009, Zhou 2009, Su & Mukhopadhyay 2012, Xing & Liu 2012, Ogier et al. 2013),
and multi-stage supply chain (Panda et al. 2015). The quantity discounting has addressed
several issues for coordination such as: influencing ordering behaviour and thereby reduc-
ing the overall supply chain cost (Corbett & De Groote 2000, Zissis et al. 2015); pricing
and environmentally- friendliness level of product (Giri & Bardhan 2016); avoidance of false
failure-return (Huang et al. 2011); return policy of a retailer in a closed loop supply chain
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(Yoo et al. 2015); ordering and pricing decision (Hsieh et al. 2008); allocation of purchase
orders among multiple suppliers (Huang et al. 2015); corporate social responsibility (Panda
et al. 2015) and enlarging lot size (Zhang, Dong, Luo & Segerstedt 2014). This type of
discounting has been used under different operating and business environmental conditions
for example asymmetric information (Corbett & De Groote 2000, Hsieh et al. 2008, Lee &
Yang 2013, Zissis et al. 2015), deterministic demand (Giri & Bardhan 2016), inventory and
retail price depended demand (Saha & Goyal 2015), price, delivery time and reliability of
delivery depended demand (Xiao & Qi 2012), and post demand disruptions (Xiao et al. 2007,
Chen & Xiao 2009). Quantity discounting contracts have been used in conjunction with other
forms of contractual parameters such as trade credit (Zhang, Dong, Luo & Segerstedt 2014).
Authors including Lu & Wu (2015) identified the different nature of contractual preferences
among the members of the supply chain. The authors identified a form quantity discount con-
tract that eliminated the conflict of interests among the members of the supply chain. Some
authors including Lau et al. (2012) used volume discounting to coordinate the supply chain
with price and sales effort sensitive demand.
Rebate Contracts:
Rebate is another form of discounting contract that has received attention in the supply chain
literature. It’s very popular when the retailer as a buyer further sells the items of the supplier
to another buyer. The retailer pays the supplier a wholesale price. However, the supplier
compensates the retailer by a rebate per unit once the quantity sold is above a certain thresh-
old limit (Cachon 2003). Taylor (2002) found a manufacturer-retailer supply chain could
be coordinated using a target sales rebate along with appropriately designed return contract.
However, Chiu et al. (2015) found that target rebate should be combined with fixed order
quantity to coordinate the supply chain. The rebate could take a form of a weather depended
rebate as well (Chen & Yano 2010). The authors used this to design Pareto improving con-
tracts to coordinate the supply chain. Target rebates have been used to address the issue of
false failure return by enticing the retailer to increase the effort to reduce false failure return
and thereby coordinating the supply chain Ferguson et al. (2006). This type of contract has
also been used in a multi-channel supply chain such as Xing & Liu (2012) designed a target
rebate contract in a single manufacturer with online and brick and mortar retailer. The author
used this contract to coordinate the supply chain by avoiding the decreasing effort level of
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the brick and mortar retailer due to the existence of online channel. Few authors used target
rebate in conjunction with other mechanisms to coordinate a supply chain such as: Chen
& Wei (2012) and Wong et al. (2009) used it along with vendor managed inventory (VMI);
Chiu et al. (2011) used it along with wholesale price and returns to coordinate a supply chain
facing price depended demands; Giri et al. (2016) used it alongside buy-back and penalty to
design a contract that can coordinate a three layer supply chain facing uncertain demand.
Coordination involving using buybacks, returns, and other reverse supply chain issues
have also received considerable attention in the literature.
Buy-back Contracts:
Pasternack (1985) is one of the pioneer authors who investigated the problems of sub-optimal
results in a supply chain with returns of unsold items. The authors used buy-back contracts
to coordinate the supply chain. Buy-back contracts need the retailer to purchase the items
at a fixed wholesale price. However, the supplier buys the unsold items at a less price than
the wholesale price at the end of the selling season (Cachon 2003). Buy-back is one of the
commonly devised contracts to coordinate the supply chains (Hou et al. 2010, He & Khouja
2011, O¨zen et al. 2012, Chung & Erhun 2013, Feng et al. 2015, Yan & Zaric 2016). This
contracting mechanism has been used for different supply chain structures such as dyadic
supply chain (Deng et al. 2013, Ruiz-Benitez & Muriel 2014), two supplier(one back up and
one main)-one buyer supply chain (Hou et al. 2010), and for two competing supply chains
(Wu 2013a). This contracting mechanism has been used under various different business
environmental conditions such as supply disruption (Hou et al. 2010), and consumer return
(Ruiz-Benitez & Muriel 2014, Xu, Li, Govindan & Xu 2015). The buy-back contracts have
been used to coordinate the supply chain under several operating conditions as constraints
such as budget constraint (Feng et al. 2015), products with limited shelf life (Chung & Erhun
2013), and information asymmetry (Deng et al. 2013). Wang & Webster (2007) proposed
a buyback model with risk neutral manufacturer-loss averse retailer with an assumption of
information symmetry of retailer’s loss aversion. This was extended by Chung & Erhun
(2013). Various issues have been considered for coordination with buy-back contracts for
example retailer’s effort (Krishnan et al. 2004, Yan & Zaric 2016), contract with a deadline
for consumer return (Xu, Li, Govindan & Xu 2015), to coordinate a dyadic supply chain with
consumer returns (Xiao et al. 2010) and others.
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The buy-back contracts have been used in conjunction with other coordination mecha-
nisms such as joint forecasting (O¨zen et al. 2012). The authors showed that a three parameter
buy -back contract with joint forecasting can coordinate the supply chain with a manufac-
turer and n no of retailers. Shreds of evidence were also found where the buy-back mecha-
nism has been combined with other contractual mechanisms such as revenue sharing (Feng
et al. 2015), with penalty and sales rebate (Giri et al. 2016), with promotional; cost-sharing
agreement (Krishnan et al. 2004), with quantity flexibility (Xiong et al. 2011), with quantity
discount (Yang et al. 2015). The notable limitations of these papers is the limited emphasis on
how to share the benefits of risk and benefit post coordination. This issue was addressed by
(Devangan et al. 2013). The authors designed an individually rational buy-back contract for
a supply chain with a retailer who faces inventory depended demand. Using Shapley value
from the cooperative game theory, the authors ensured the fairness of the shared benefits.
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Return Contracts:
Returns, recycling, and re-manufacturing are very common phenomena these days in any
product supply chain. In fact, literature in supply chain coordination has included a diverse
range of issues covered by return contract to coordinate the supply chain such as the re-
turn of unsold goods (Chen 2011a), consumer returns (Xiao et al. 2010) and product re-
manufacturing (Savaskan et al. 2004). Again this type of contract has been used for different
supply chain structures such as simple dyadic (Chen 2011a, He & Zhao 2012, Jeong 2012),
and three-level supply chain (Ding & Chen 2008). This has been considered for coordina-
tion under various operational issues such as including partial information asymmetry (Jeong
2012), and limited stochastic salvage capacity (Lee & Rhee 2007). Various business envi-
ronmental issues have been also used while coordinating the supply chain for example single
period demand uncertainty (Xiao et al. 2010), two-period demand uncertainty (Chen & Xiao
2011a), supply and demand uncertainty (He & Zhao 2012), and declining wholesale price
(Taylor 2001). return for recycling and re-manufacturing (Savaskan et al. 2004). Return con-
tracts have been used in conjunction with other contracts including rebates (Chiu et al. 2011),
and with buy-back contract contingent upon consumer return deadline (Xu, Li, Govindan &
Xu 2015). Authors including Ding et al. (2011) have even combined return policies with
information sharing to propose a coordination solution.
Trade Credit Contracts:
Trade credit is another form of supply contract that has been used in supply chain literature
for coordination. It is a short-term loan to the buyer from the seller which allows the seller to
delay or defer the payment to the seller (Lee & Rhee 2011). This type of coordination mech-
anism has been used to coordinate two-echelon dyadic supply chains (Jaber & Osman 2006,
Arkan & Hejazi 2012, Chen & Wang 2012, Du et al. 2013, Giri & Maiti 2013) and three
level supply chain (Moussawi-Haidar et al. 2014). It has been used in conjunction with other
mechanisms to coordinate the supply chains such as profit sharing (Jaber & Osman 2006,
Giri & Maiti 2013), discounted interest rate (Moussawi-Haidar et al. 2014), quantity dis-
count (Zhang, Dong, Luo & Segerstedt 2014), and wholesale price discount (Du et al. 2013).
Lee & Rhee (2010, 2011) found that some of the contractual mechanism are not sufficient
to coordinate the supply chain sufficient unless they re combined with trade credit provision.
The authors found if the retailers finance direct from financial institutes, then popular mecha-
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nisms such as quantity discounts, buy-back, two-part tariff, revenue sharing, and mark down
are not sufficient to coordinate the supply chain. Chen & Wang (2012) showed that using
trade credit with limited liability can coordinate a two-level supply chain with budget con-
straints. However, few of the cases trade credit was found to be incapable of coordinating
supply chain (Luo & Zhang 2012). The authors found the trade credit option to coordinate
the supply chain in the case of symmetric information. However, the trade credit failed to
coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric information case.
One of the major limitation of these studies is the limited exploration of the risks asso-
ciated with the trade credit. One of the major challenges is the establishment of credibility.
Besides this, these papers did not explicitly discuss how the benefits of the coordination are
shared among the members of the supply chain.
Quantity Flexibility Contracts:
Apart from flexibility regarding the time to pay in the form of trade credit, the members of the
supply chain can use flexible quantities arrangements to coordinate the supply chain. Tsay
(1999) is one of the pioneer authors who used this concept of quantity flexibility to coordi-
nate the supply chains. The author defined this as buyer’s commitment to buy no less than
certain percentage below forecast value and seller’s commitment to deliver not above forecast
value. This has been used in conjunction with other contractual mechanisms such as price
discountsChung et al. (2014), and buy-back contracts (Xiong et al. 2011). Quantity flexibility
contract has also been used to coordinate a supply chain with multi-objectives along with the
profit maximization (Shi & Chen 2008). The authors combined this quantity flexibility along
with whole sale price contracts to find out a Pareto optimal solution for the supply chain.
Other Contractual Forms:
Other notable form includes the inclusion of penalty in contract terms such as Cachon &
Zhang (2006) designed a menu of contracts consisting of simple contracts with a penalty in
the form of late fee and specified lead time requirements. The author found that this con-
tract can nearly coordinate a single buyer multi-supplier supply chain to minimize the total
procurement cost. Gan et al. (2005) proposed a risk-sharing contract that can coordinate the
supply chain with a risk neutral supplier and a down-side risk-averse retailer. Lee, Rhee &
Cheng (2013) designed a quality compensation contract that compensates the retailer for de-
fective items and this can achieve full coordination. Again, these papers did not highlight how
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the derived risks and benefits of coordination are shared among the members of the supply
chain. Authors including Ryu & Yu¨cesan (2010) used a fuzzy approach in conjunction with
multiple contracting mechanisms: quantity discounts, profit sharing, and buy-back contracts
to propose a coordination mechanism for a newsvendor supply chain. An option contract is
another form of coordination contracts used for supply chain coordination (Zhao et al. 2010).
Informal Relational Mechanism
In the introduction chapter of this thesis, the continuous development of supply chain rela-
tionship was discussed. It starts with arm’s length relationship and progresses over time to-
wards a more mutual collaborative relationship. Thus, it is more likely to start with a formal
contractual relationship. Over time, a trust-based relationship develops between the members
of the supply chain. This helps the supply chain members to achieve coordination using less
formal mechanisms for example information sharing (Cachon & Lariviere 2001, Fiala 2005,
Kong et al. 2013). The last subsection has reviewed the literature development in the area
of supply chain coordination using the formal mechanisms. This section explores the litera-
ture with more informal relational mechanisms of coordination including the deployment of
information technology, information sharing, and collaborative developments such as collab-
orative planning, collaborative forecasting, collaborative inventory management, and others.
Information technology as a Facilitator:
As stated in the paper of Fiala (2005), deployment of information technology tools is one
of the facilitators of information sharing. This was supported by Arshinder et al. (2007),
Fawcett et al. (2007). These authors identified information technology as one of the drivers
of information sharing in the supply chain. Information technology as a facilitator tool has
been widely used to promote information sharing and thereby to coordinate the supply chain
such as the deployment of enterprise resource planning (ERP) (Kelle & Akbulut 2005), Ra-
dio Frequency Identifier (RFID) (Szmerekovsky & Zhang 2008, Lei et al. 2015), and use of
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) (Hill & Scudder 2002). An important observation by Lei
et al. (2015) is the justification of RFID technology. In their study, the authors used RFID
technology in conjunction with revenue sharing contracts in order avoid inventory error and
further improve the benefits of coordination. If the importance of inventory error is not high
or the if the investment for RFID is very high, then the benefits derived is very marginal.
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Contractual Mechanisms as a Facilitator:
As mentioned earlier, the presence of formal contracting has been identified as one of the an-
tecedents of information sharing in supply chain (Cachon & Lariviere 2001, Kong et al. 2013,
Pezeshki et al. 2013, Zhang & Chen 2013). Few authors have identified the existence of a
formal contractual mechanism alongside information sharing as a necessary requirement or
as a complementary mechanism to coordinate the supply chain for example with risk sharing
contract (Chen et al. 2006, Wakolbinger & Cruz 2011), with subsidy contract (Gao 2015),
with two-part tariff contract (He et al. 2008), and with buy-back contract (Kurata & Yue
2008). These authors also addressed the issues of the impact of information sharing on the
double marginalization and the quality of shared information. However, these studies have
not revealed how derived risks and benefits are shared and the impact of that on supply chain
coordination. Other issues that are not explored, are behavioral and socio-cultural challenges
for information sharing in the literature of Kong et al. (2013) and Zhang & Chen (2013)
Other Antecedents of Information Sharing:
There are other antecedents and drivers of information sharing addressed in the literature for
example risk sharing rule (Xiao & Yang 2009), cost sharing rule with embedded trust (Han
& Dong 2015), and nature of strategic interaction (Xiao & Yang 2009, Du et al. 2012). Again
these authors did not explore how these benefits of information sharing are going to be shared
among the members of the supply chain. Other limitations are: cases with the service invest-
ment as private information (Xiao et al. 2010); and lack of focus on the willingness to share
information over time (Xiao et al. 2010, Du et al. 2012).
The challenge of willingness to share information has been addressed in the papers of Li
& Zhang (2008), O¨zer et al. (2011), and Voigt & Inderfurth (2012). Another driver of the
information sharing has been the trust based relationship among the members of the supply
chain as identified in the literature of O¨zer et al. (2011), Voigt & Inderfurth (2012), Inder-
furth et al. (2013), Hung et al. (2014), Han & Dong (2015). In fact, O¨zer et al. (2011) argued
with the help of controlled laboratory experiment that existence of trust and trustworthiness
can ensure cooperation and information sharing even in absence of reputation building com-
plex contracts. Li & Zhang (2008) explored the case in a one manufacturer-multi retailers
environment. The author concluded the existence of guaranteed confidentiality from manu-
facturer’s side would promote information sharing from the retailer’s end. Cai et al. (2010)
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identified how reciprocation of good and reliable behaviour can positively influence the in-
formation sharing in the Chinese supply chain context with the help of an empirically tested
framework. The major limitations of these studies (Cai et al. 2010, O¨zer et al. 2011) are:
the lack of generalization; and the selected research method. In addition, the challenges of
achievement of these antecedents of information sharing (trust, confidentiality) are not ex-
plored. Moreover, these studies also have not highlighted how the benefits of information
sharing can be shared among the members of the supply chain.
Information Sharing as a Mechanism:
Various methods have been used to measure the benefits of information sharing to coordi-
nate the supply chain such as linear programming (Albrecht & Stadtler 2015), Analytical
Hierarchy Process (AHP) along with fuzzy logic (Arshinder et al. 2007), simulation with
agent-based modelling (Datta & Christopher 2011), Markov decision process (Davis et al.
2011), and agent-based forecasting using Genetic Algorithm (GA) (Liang & Huang 2006)
Different types of information sharing method and different types of shared information
have been used for supply chain coordination such as primal information which deals with
input or withdrawal information of central resources (Albrecht & Stadtler 2015), negotiation
based information in a make to order supply chain (Chan & Chan 2009), set up and holding
cost information from supplier (Karabatı & Sayın 2008), demand forecast information (Liang
& Huang 2006), upstream product rollover information (Li & Gao 2008), production capacity
and resource constraints (Thomas et al. 2015), and inventory level information (Kulp et al.
2004).
The information sharing has been used for coordination of supply chain addressing var-
ious issues such as reducing inventory variance (Costantino et al. 2014), the impact of in-
formation sharing on different ordering policies (Costantino et al. 2015), to solve the huge
mismatch between actual and forecast demand (Datta & Christopher 2011), and the reduction
of cost and lost sales (Davis et al. 2011). In relation to these, Lee et al. (1997) have argued in-
formation sharing as one of the potential solutions for reducing the impact of order distortion
and order amplification across the supply chain known as the ”Bullwhip Effect”. The benefits
have been documented in greater detail in the papers by the authors including Wu & Katok
(2006), Croson & Donohue (2006), Ouyang (2007), and Bailey & Francis (2008). Croson &
Donohue (2006) found from the experimental evidence that the complete eradication of bull-
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whip effect is not possible. However, the presence of information sharing could reduce the
extent of bullwhip effect and there by improving the overall supply chain performance. How-
ever, these studies have not highlighted: the challenges of information sharing and truthful
information; and quality of shared information. In an extension, Li (2013) identified endoge-
nous mechanisms of bullwhip effects and established the importance of information sharing
on the reduction of this. Authors also highlighted uncertainty of having full information shar-
ing between supply chain members. However, this study did not reveal the optimum balance
of information to share and not to share. Moreover, one of the major limitations of the work
by Croson & Donohue (2006) and Wu & Katok (2006) is the selection of the research method
as laboratory experiment only.
There is a school of thought questioned the need for any information sharing (Cachon &
Lariviere 1999, Ha & Tong 2008a). In an earlier study, Cachon & Lariviere (1999), found
the inability of the supply chain to reach dominant equilibrium under the Pareto optimal or
individually responsive allocation mechanisms with truthfully shared information. Although
the results support order inflating behavior, the reasons behind such order inflating behavior
are mostly unexplored in these studies. Ha & Tong (2008a) argued whether information
sharing in the supply chain will be beneficial or not, depends on the investment required for
information sharing and the contract type. Despite all these, it has been found as a tool to
coordinate the supply chain in practice. In fact, experimental results show this method to be
the prerequisite for application of other informal coordination mechanisms (Spiliotopoulou
et al. 2015).
Information sharing has been one of the cornerstone for further development of relational
coordination mechanisms between the members of the supply chain in the form of several
collaborative developments and collaborative decision making such as vendor managed in-
ventory (VMI), collaborative planning, forecasting, and replenishment techniques (CPFR),
and collaborative planning.
Vendor Managed Inventory:
Vendor managed inventory is a supply chain initiative where the supplier is in charge of
maintaining a certain level of stock at buyer (retailer) location (C¸etinkaya & Lee 2000). This
allows the supplier to have a view of the actual demand or reduce the inconsistency of fore-
casting techniques across the supply chain. There are multiple benefits of implementation of
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VMI. These include: reduction of overall supply chain cost (Lee et al. 2016), clear visibility
of actual demand in downstream of the supply chain (Wong et al. 2009) and thus avoidance
of having distorted demand information, reduction of stock-outs (Gao 2015), reduction of
high inventory carrying cost (C¸etinkaya & Lee 2000), and increase in batch size and reduc-
tion in overall cycle time (Bazan et al. 2014, Chakraborty et al. 2015). In fact, these benefits
have been proposed as a solution to the bullwhip effect Lee et al. (1997). C¸etinkaya & Lee
(2000) proposed an analytical model for coordinating inventory and transportation decisions
in a VMI environment. Dong & Xu (2002) further argued that VMI could be more bene-
ficial to the individual members (supplier) in the longer run rather than in shorter run. The
authors including Lee & Ren (2011) further added that implementation of VMI helps the sup-
ply chains to avoid the negative impacts of external uncertainties. The authors showed that a
supplier-retailer supply chain can reduce a greater amount of cost with VMI in the presence
of exchange rate uncertainty than in the absence of the exchange rate uncertainty.
VMI has often been used to coordinate the supply chain in conjunction with the formal
contractual mechanisms such as: sales rebate contracts (Wong et al. 2009), revenue sharing
and side payment (Chen et al. 2010, Chen 2013, Xiao & Xu 2013), revenue sharing with
linear rebate (Chen & Wei 2012), holding cost subsidy contract (Nagarajan & Rajagopalan
2008), and all unit quantity discount and two-part tariff (Toptal & C¸etinkaya 2006). Other
mechanisms used alongside VMI include : lost sales cost sharing (Lee et al. 2016), and
consignment stock arrangement (Bazan et al. 2014). Various operating conditions have been
used while developing the coordinating solution with VMI such as limited storage capacity
(Lee et al. 2016), deteriorating conditions for goods (Chen & Wei 2012, Xiao & Xu 2013),
and for the product with shorter product life (Toptal & C¸etinkaya 2006). Various business
environmental conditions have also been considered in literature while deploying VMI as a
coordination tool for the supply chains such as deterministic demand (Mateen & Chatterjee
2015) and exchange rate uncertainty (Lee & Ren 2011).
The majority of the papers have considered various mathematical models to propose the
coordination model including dynamic programming with retailer led Stackelberg games
(Chen 2013), and Markov model along with dynamic programming (Gao 2015). Applica-
tion of the concepts of game theory has been another important cornerstone methodology of
these sets of literature. Concepts of Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg games and Pareto opti-
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mality are few of the frequently concepts as found in the literature of Wong et al. (2009),
Chen et al. (2010), Chen & Wei (2012), Chen (2013), and Xiao & Xu (2013).
Furthermore, authors including Yao et al. (2007) and Duan & Liao (2013) have extended
how the benefits of vendor managed inventory (VMI) are shared among the members of the
supply chain. The authors have proposed some side payment distribution to less benefited
members for uneven distribution cases. However, any impact of bargaining power on this
and issues related to an effective distribution of the benefits have not been highlighted.
Collaborative Forecasting Techniques:
Collaborative approaches in planning and forecasting techniques have been another popular
area of research in the supply chain. Aviv (2001) showed that the importance of the col-
laborative forecast tends to increase with the increase in diversity of the forecast techniques
in the supply chain. The author further argued that the benefits of collaborative forecasting
are more when it is combined with some other collaborative approaches such as efficient
consumer response (ECR). However, the author did not discuss the incentive parameters and
financial implications of the forecasts. Gao (2015) used collaborative planning forecasting
and implementation (CPFR) techniques to constantly monitor advance supply signals such
as operational viability and financial health and then manage the disruption risk. The author
then designed a contract in conjunction with CPFR to coordinate the supply chain. O¨zen et al.
(2012) studied the impacts of collaborative forecasting and forecast information sharing in a
single manufacturer-multi retailer supply chain. The authors found that if the retailers posses
some asymmetric information then, sharing forecast information may not be beneficial. How-
ever, in the presence of joint forecasting combined with a three parameter contract can co-
ordinate the overall supply chain. Information and communication technologies (ICT) have
also been considered for adopting to facilitate CPFR in the literature of (Danese 2006). The
authors used case study methods to study these phenomena. There are other methods used
to study the benefits of application of CPFR for such as Yang & Fan (2016) used simulation
to find out the benefits of using CPFR alongside information sharing to reduce the bullwhip
effect in a supply chain. Ramanathan & Gunasekaran (2014) used empirical methods by sur-
veying respondents from textile sector to find out the impact of CPFR to achieve long-term
collaborative relations between the supply chain members. Authors including Shin & Tunca
(2010) argued the possibility of over investment for forecasting techniques if the downstream
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retailers in the supply chain are at an arms race approach for forecasting in Cournot compe-
tition. The authors found the inability of normal market-based supply contracts to coordinate
the supply chain. The authors further proposed a uniform-price divisible good auction-based
contract to coordinate the supply chain.
Collaborative Planning Approaches:
Collaborative planning has also been used as a coordination mechanism. Zimmer (2002) pro-
posed a single period ordering and delivery plan to coordinate a supply chain in just in time
setting. Kaya et al. (2013) proposed a coordination policy between transportation and produc-
tion in a single supplier-single retailer deterministic inventory system. Bajgiran et al. (2016)
used mixed integer programming along with heuristic techniques to propose an integrated
annual planning that coordinates the harvesting, procurement, production, distribution, and
sale activities of the lumber supply chain. Dudek & Stadtler (2005, 2007) proposed a negotia-
tion based non-hierarchical plan to coordinate a supply chain using mathematical techniques.
Jung et al. (2008) proposed a framework for planning in a decentralized setting. The solutions
in this setting are close to the first best solutions from centralized setting and thus, these can be
considered as near optimal solutions. Kim & Ha (2003) proposed a coordinating lot-splitting
strategy to allow frequent small lot size deliveries of supply materials in a buyer-seller sup-
ply chain in just in time (JIT ) environment for the finite horizon. Puettmann & Stadtler
(2010) proposed a collaborative plan for intermodal transportation providers. Steinru¨cke
(2011) used a mixed integer decision-making model to achieve the coordination across the
production quantities and time for all the members of the supply chain in an aluminum sup-
ply chain network where the members are dispersed across the world. The authors proposed
heuristics techniques to propose the coordination model which represent the continuous plan-
ning period and minimizes the total transportation and production cost. Taghipour & Frayret
(2012) used mathematical programming techniques to propose a negotiation based planning
mechanism that can achieve near optimal solution for coordination. Zhao & Wang (2002)
used a simple forward algorithm to coordinate joint pricing-production/ordering decision in
a manufacturer-distributor supply chain for as finite horizon. Zhao et al. (2016) proposed
an optimal inventory coordination solution for inventory replenishment and achieving the
global optimal total cost across the multi-stage supply chain for an infinite horizon. Egri
& Va´ncza (2012) proposed a lot-sizing decision-making approach along with appropriate
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payment scheme to coordinate a supply chain under asymmetric information.
Other Collaborative Approaches:
There are other collaborative approaches used in literature where authors addressed solution
in the form of optimal inventory level or by having an optimal order cycle time. Cheung
& Lee (2002) proposed a model with shipment coordination and stock rebalancing together
in a single supplier multiple retailer supply chain. Glock (2011) proposed a mathematical
model with integrated inventory to coordinate single buyer-multi suppliers supply chain. The
model was shown to minimize the total procurement cost. Chen & Chen (2005) proposed
four decision-making models for optimal inventory replenishment and production policies in
two echelons of a supply chain. Jaber & Goyal (2008) proposed a model for coordinating
order quantities in a centralized three level supply chain with common order cycle time.
Saharidis et al. (2009) proposed a Markovian queueing model for coordinating a two-stage
supply chain with joint decision making on stocks. Jorinaldi & Zhang (2013) proposed an
integrated production and inventory control model for the whole manufacturing supply chain
system including reverse logistics, using mixed integer non-linear programming techniques.
However, the major limitation of these studies is not having any insight about issues and
relevant impacts of the risk and benefit sharing from these mechanisms.
2.1.5 Summary of the findings
In sections 2.1.4 the findings from the literature are presented. The main purpose of this
review was to assess how the selected papers have addressed the challenges in 2.1. This is
reported in figures 2.4 and 2.5. Several areas can be highlighted from these set of literature.
• Structure of the supply chain: Various forms including two level dyadic, two level
divergent, two level convergent, three-level linear, multi-level multiple members and
two competing supply chains, have been used in supply chain coordination literature.
• Variables for Coordination : Several supply chain related issues have been considered
for coordination. Profit and cost are the two most common of these variables. Other
variables found in the literature include: lead time, sales effort of retailers, greening
effort in an environmentally conscious supply chain, quality assurance, inventory level,
and corporate social responsibility effort.
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Figure 2.4: How barriers of coordination have been addressed in literature
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Figure 2.5: Literature Review Frame Work B
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• Method used: Diverse range of methods were found in the selected literature for de-
vising the appropriate coordination mechanisms for the supply chains. The most com-
monly used are mathematical modelling. In few cases, empirical studies with concep-
tual framework were used. However, these frameworks were mostly used to identify
any causal and mediating relation between variables that are associated with supply
chain coordination. Several concepts from game theory have been found to be used to
solve the coordination problems in these papers. Stackelberg games, Nash equilibrium,
Nash’s bargaining and Pareto optimality are among the most frequently used concepts.
It has been noticed that these game theory concepts were used for more simplified sup-
ply chain structures such as dyad, or triads (convergent, divergent, and linear). With
the increase in a number of supply chain echelons and number of members, the com-
plexity increases. More complicated optimization techniques such as mixed integer
programmming, other heuristics and meta-heuristics techniques have been used to find
near-optimal solutions in these complex supply chains.
• Sources of Uncertainty: The sources of uncertainty have been mostly observed to be
price, demand, and supply.
From the framework in figure 2.5, it is evident that majority of the coordination mecha-
nisms have addressed the incentive problems and thereby solved the problems of misalign-
ment of goals and objectives of the supply chain members. In figure 2.5, the boxes have been
highlighted in gray colour. Darker the shed is, higher the number of papers addressed that
particular barrier of the supply chain. The behavioural and decision-making challenges are
found to be one of least addressed barriers of supply chain coordination. these observations
led to the following research gaps in the literature
2.1.6 Research Gaps
Summary of the findings from the literature suggest a considerable amount of research in the
area of supply chain coordination. Despite of this, many a times members of the supply chains
struggle to coordinate. One of the possible reasons could be the barriers to coordination (As
identified in chapter 1). Analysis with the help of the frameworks presented in figures 2.1 and
2.5, the research gaps are identified. The observations from the summary of literature have
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helped to identify the following research gaps
• Majority of the literature have addressed the incentive barriers of supply chain coordi-
nation. However, limited shreds of evidence were found how to address the behavioural
and decision-making barriers. One such notable barrier is the allocation of risks and
benefits post-coordination of the supply chain. Authors have left this to be distributed
either arbitrarily or on the bargaining power of the members.
• There are other behavioural variables which have a direct or indirect effect on control-
ling the supply chain coordination mechanisms and thereby the supply chain coordina-
tion itself. As mentioned in the papers by O¨zer et al. (2011), Voigt & Inderfurth (2012),
Inderfurth et al. (2013), Hung et al. (2014), and Han & Dong (2015), existence of trust
between supply chain members is one of the essential variable for implementation of
one of the supply chain coordination mechanisms, information sharing. However, the
barriers of trust and how these are overcome for implementation of supply chain coor-
dination have been studied on very limited occasions.
• There are other soft issues such as lack of top management support (Briscoe et al. 2004,
Fawcett et al. 2008) , and resistance to change (Briscoe et al. 2004) have been identified
as barriers to supply chain collaborative relationship. Although their effects are real-
izable in the longer term, but their implication in the short term could be significant.
However, these have received limited attention while proposing the models of supply
chain coordination.
• Risk preference is another form of behavioural challenge which has received less atten-
tion in the literature. Most of the cases, authors have assumed the members to be risk
neutral. Only in limited occasions, authors have addressed the variable risk preferences
among the members of the supply chain such as Gan et al. (2005), Wang & Webster
(2007), Chen & Xiao (2009), Chen & Wang (2012), Deng et al. (2013), Zhang, Dong,
Luo & Segerstedt (2014), and Chiu et al. (2015).
• Financial constraints in the form lack of availability of financial resources to the mem-
ber of the supply chains have received relatively less attention in the literature. Few
papers including Xu, Cheng & Sun (2015) have addressed this issue. However, the
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authors suggested a need for more future research involving more complexity in the
situation. One such complexity is the combined challenges of risk aversion and lack of
access to the financial resources.
• The selected literature have a good mix of coordination mechanisms for deterministic
and stochastic environments. However, the main source of uncertainty has been con-
sidered as demand for the item(s) to be sold and sometimes its (their) price(s) i.e. the
majority of the papers have focussed on product supply chains. In a very limited oc-
casion, coordination issues have been explored for supply chains with time and cost as
sources of uncertainty such as in the case of project supply chains.
• In continuation to the last research gap identified, service supply chains have also re-
ceived relatively less attention in comparison to its counterpart physical good supply
chains.
These research gaps mentioned in this subsection have prepared the backdrop for this
present research. This research aims to address few of the relevant research gaps. Thus, the
next section discusses where the research is positioned, why it is important to pay attention
to those research gaps, followed by research question and objectives and finally a framework
to explain the input areas for this research.
2.2 Research Positioning
In last subsection, this research summarized the research gaps and limitations based on the
literature review conducted. This research aims to address the following research gaps
• Supply chain coordination with time and cost as sources of uncertainties
• The allocation problem post-coordination for the risk and benefits
• Variable risk preference of the members of the supply chain.
2.2.1 Importance of the research gaps
Proper allocation of risk and benefits of supply chain coordination is very critical to the
success of the supply chains for survival. Katok & Pavlov (2013) and Wu (2013b) found
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evidence of negative impact in absence of proper fairness considerations in risk and benefit
sharing on the supply chain coordination with behavioural experiment with human partici-
pants. In fact, Katok & Pavlov (2013) found termination of the contractual relation between
the members of the supply chain. Even in practice, lack of fairness in the allocation of risk
and benefits led to the termination of the contractual relationship, for example, the early ter-
mination of the contractual relation between Walmart Canada and Lego group (Georgiades
2008). Liu et al. (2012) cited the termination of the contractual relationship between Chinese
home appliance Gome and Air Conditioner manufacturer Gree due to the unfair promotional
price being charged by the retailer during summer time. In addition to the problems, Griffith
et al. (2006) found a positive relation between supply chain performance and fairness. Due
to these importances, this research would address this research gap.
Time and cost over run are two most frequently cited reasons for project failures. In
fact the projects with members in a non-coordinated supply chain run into time and cost
overrun very often, for example, Denver airport’s new baggage system installation project
ran into over time and over budget (Moore 2009). The authors cited poor information flow
and misaligned incentives as two most important reasons behind this failure. This research
has already identified less emphasis of supply chain coordination literature considering and
time and cost as sources of uncertainty. Thus, this present research aims to address this
research gap. The research will address the research gap with the help of the construction
supply chain. The reason for selection of the construction industry is justified because of its
enormous importance and very limited research on addressing challenges and proposing a
proper mechanism to achieve supply chain coordination for the long term.
On this backdrop with the research gap areas presented, the next subsection highlights the
research aim, research question, and the objectives.
2.2.2 Research Question, and Objectives
This section identifies the research question and defined research aims and objectives. Re-
search gaps presented at the beginning of section 2.2 suggest the existence of opportunities
for knowledge creation. The research gaps selected for this research presents certain research
input areas.
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Identification of Research Inputs
The first is Supply chain coordination with time and cost as sources of uncertainties. Supply
chains in project environment fit this description best. Hence, this research has selected a
dyadic supply chain in a project set up with one main project manager organization and a
contractor organization. In section 2.1.4, two broad categories of coordination mechanisms
(Formal contracts and Informal relational mechanism) have been identified for supply chains.
It was also argued that implementation of informal relational mechanisms are possible after
formal contractual mechanisms. Although O¨zer et al. (2011) argued that existence of trust
even in absence of contractual mechanisms can promote information sharing, but majority of
the authors supported the need for formal contractual relation in first place. In fact Arshinder
et al. (2007) presented a framework that highlights how the coordination mechanisms are
devised in different stages of the coordination over time as shown in figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Coordination Mechanisms in the Supply Chain Processes (Source: Arshinder
et al. (2007)
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Based on this observation, this research has selected contractual mechanisms to test if the
supply chain under consideration can be coordinated or not. The need for use of contractual
mechanisms to coordinate the supply chains was highlighted in the literature of Kwon et al.
(2010) and Lippman et al. (2013). The authors have highlighted the limited shreds of evi-
dence of use of project contracts to coordinate the project supply chains. Kwon et al. (2010)
used a time-based project contract to coordinate a dyadic supply chain in a take it or leave
it situation with completion time as a source of uncertainty. On the contrary, Lippman et al.
(2013) investigated the problems in a bargaining situation. Moreover, Lippman et al. (2013)
used differential preferences for risk perception between the members. The relevant litera-
ture review on project supply chains is presented in chapter 4 and chapter 5. These models
are restricted by the choice of the selected nature of probability distributions such as the ex-
ponential distribution of time (Kwon et al. 2010) and normally distributed completion cost
(Lippman et al. 2013). It is discussed in chapter 4 and 5 that the completion time and comple-
tion cost can take various other forms of probability distribution in practice. This renders a
question mark on the applicability of the existing models. The present research is positioned
to derive coordination models for different possible probability distributions of completion
time and completion cost.
The concept of fairness is a popular phenomenon in Economics more precisely behavioural
economics. However, the application of the concepts of the fairness is relatively new in sup-
ply chain coordination. As per the best knowledge of the author, Cui et al. (2007) were one
of the pioneer authors who used the concepts of fairness for channel coordination. Again, the
relevant literature review is presented in chapter 6.
Research Question
Combining the research gaps presented, this research aims to answer the research question
presented in fig. 2.7. The research question is highlighted in the black box in figure 2.7.
This question is designed with inputs from various areas mentioned in the gray boxes above
it with arrows pointing towards it. The output of this research contributes to several areas
highlighted in the white boxes underneath the research question.
This research used mathematical models as input and generate mathematical models as
output. Mathematical models tend to break down due to complexity with network kind of
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Figure 2.7: Research Question
structures with multiple supply chain members (Huang et al. 2003). That is why a two-stage
supply chain is selected. The research question highlighted in fig. 2.7 is answered with the
following research aim
To investigate the coordination in a project supply chain using mathematical models
and finally to overcome the challenges of fair allocation of risks and benefits.
This aim is broken down into three objectives
• Obj.1: To investigate and propose supply chain coordination models in a take it or
leave it scenario using project contracts. This research extended the models proposed
by Bayiz & Corbett (2005) and Kwon et al. (2010).
• Obj.2: To investigate and propose optimal coordinating solutions in a bargaining sce-
nario. This research extended the models proposed by Lippman et al. (2013).
• Obj.3: To investigate if the supply chain can be coordinated with fairly allocated risks
and benefits in the scenarios mentioned in objective 1 and 2.
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Chapter 3
Research Methodology
In chapter 2, this research has identified the research question, research aim, and research
objectives. In order to answer the research question and fulfill the objectives, this chapter ex-
plains which research method(s) can achieve this. For this purpose, this research has referred
to several journal articles which have discussed the issues around the selection of research
method. Based on the findings from these journal articles and considering the research ques-
tion, this research has designed the research method in this section.
This section is divided into three main subsections explaining the phases of this research
as highlighted in fig. 3.1.
The research design is explained in the second phase.
3.1 Phase 1: Understanding the context
In the first phase of this research, research gaps and areas, where the proposed research can
contribute to the knowledge base, are identified. Funded projects with existing problem area
from the research institute in concern, industry-sponsored projects with existing problems and
extensive literature reviews are generally used for identification of research gaps (Webster et
al, 2002). This research has conducted an extensive literature review for this purpose. At
the beginning, broad ideas were generated from the previous background knowledge on this
subject area. This was followed by an initial literature review which narrowed the focus to
particular research gaps in the area of supply chain management. After careful consideration,
a very broad objective was decided. Keeping this broad objective in mind, based on further
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Figure 3.1: Different Phases of Present Research
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literature review, generated ideas and with the help of pre-existing literature review articles
(Cooper et al. 1997, Kanda et al. 2008), taxonomical framework for literature classification
were identified (mentioned in fig. 2.1). This framework helped organize the literature. From
an extensive literature review, several ideas were generated to identify the research gaps. In
order to maintain a consistency and coherency in the gaps identified, idea screening was car-
ried out. The screened, coherent and consistent ideas helped the formulation of the research
question presented in figure 2.7 in chapter 2. In order to answer this research question, a
set of objectives were identified, which will serve the objectives of this research project. All
these findings were documented in the literature review chapter of this report.
3.2 Phase 2: Research Design
In order to effectively design any particular research, an understanding of the research paradigm
is the first step (Frankel et al. 2005, Meredith et al. 1989). Thus, this research investigates the
issues around the research paradigm and then proceeds to the research design. The research
paradigm has been defined from various perspectives (Meredith et al. 1989, Frankel et al.
2005, Matthews & Ross 2010). Considering these views, this research has considered it as a
set of common beliefs, practices and shared norms among researchers from a particular area
to look into the problems of the world pertinent to that area. The paradigm should contain
three main elements: Ontology, Epistemology, and Methodology (Denzin & Lincoln 1994,
Frankel et al. 2005). Ontology refers to how the reality exists; epistemology refers to how
researchers perceive knowledge (Matthews & Ross 2010). These two elements of paradigm
influence the third element methodology, which explains how researchers gain knowledge
(Frankel et al. 2005). Several possible classifications of paradigms have been identified:
based on techniques used to collect data; methods used to analyze the data; the immediate
purpose of the research; nature of units being studied; time/duration of data collection and
others (Meredith et al. 1989). The authors proposed a framework based on some previous
work on a two-dimensional framework: rational to existential (R/E continuum) in one di-
mension which explains the epistemological elements; and the other one is from natural to
artificial (N/A continuum) in another dimension to explain how the reality exists(fig. 3.2).
The framework is chosen for its thoroughness. The R/ E dimension explains more of philo-
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Figure 3.2: Framework for research method (Source: Meredith et al. (1989))
sophical aspects of the research paradigm and the degree of dependence of the research on its
context. It has four stages: Axiomatic, logical positivist, interpretive and critical theory. On
the other hand, the N/A dimension explains how the information is used in the research. This
dimension is divided into three stages: Direct observation, people’s perception, and artificial
construction (Craighead et al. 2007, Dunn et al. 1994, Meredith et al. 1989). These stages are
briefly explained as follows based on the definitions of Craighead et al. (2007), Dunn et al.
(1994), and Meredith et al. (1989).
R/E Dimension
Axiomatic: The dimension is most rational and scientific with the theorem proved research.
Logical Positivist: This presents a perspective in which the research can be isolated from
the research context. The research is objective in nature.
Interpretive: The researchers consider the human being studied and the context as insep-
arable part of the study. This is more subjective in nature.
Critical theory: This perspective transcends the research beyond the positivist and inter-
pretive dichotomy and tries to establish an interrelationship between these two perspectives.
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N/A Dimension
Direct observation: Researchers observe reality directly. This is considered as the most nat-
ural and objective in the framework.
People’s perception: This allows the use of information from another person’s perspective
and is presented as mid-range perspective in this dimension between the most natural and
most artificial.
Artificial Construction: This has been considered to be the most artificial perspective on this
dimension of this framework. This perspective allows the researchers to collect and use the
information from the artificial model building and by simulating the reality.
The findings of research conducted in logistics and supply chain management as reported
by Craighead et al. (2007) and Dunn et al. (1994) are presented in fig 3.2. The most notable
finding from their study is the predominant use of logical positivist paradigm in supply chain
research. This supports the findings of Meredith et al. (1989); the authors presented the
historic developments of the research paradigm in operations management and showed how
this area has historically been influenced by operations research and management science
streams. Using the framework of Meredith et al. (1989) for research paradigm, the next
subsection highlights the research paradigm and method selection for this research.
Research Paradigm
(Frankel et al. 2005) suggested four factors on which the selection of research methodology
depends based on previous researchers’ findings. These are: Format of the research question
(What, Why, Who, How etc.); Nature of the phenomenon under study (Contemporary or
Historical); Extent of control required over behavioral events; and researcher’s philosophical
stance. The philosophical view of this research is more rational than existential. The reason
for that is the nature of the research problem:
• Can contracting mechanisms coordinate the decentralized project supply chain in a take
it or leave it situation?
• Can contracting mechanisms coordinate the decentralized project supply chain in a
bargaining situation?
• Can fairness in risk and benefit sharing be incorporated in these mechanisms?
The nature of these research questions, highlight the need for a more objective and con-
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text independent inquiry into these areas. Moreover, Dunn et al. (1994) argued the need for
a scientific and objective inquiry into logistics and supply chain studies with latent variables
(variables measured indirectly with the measure of some other direct variables) such as the
measure of supply chain integration. That is why this research will follow the rationalist
paradigm. As stated earlier, this paradigm will allow this research to isolate the research
from its context.
Method Selection
This research used axiomatic quantitative methods. According to Bertrand & Fransoo (2002),
the quantitative models are derived based on a set of variables over a specific domain. At
the same time, these models establish the causal quantitative relation between the variables.
There are several benefits of using this approach for this research.
• It allows the research to study the underlying phenomenon independent of the context.
(Meredith et al. 1989)
• It allowed this research to control the phenomenon, the relationship between variables
and the observations.
• It helped this research in explaining the outcome and how that outcome is derived. This
makes, the results more verifiable and reliable with greater precision.
However, there are some disadvantages of the quantitative modelling method e.g.
• The interpretation of results would be restricted to the model or in other words the
abstract nature of the model limits the applicability of the method (Meredith et al.
1989, Bertrand & Fransoo 2002)
• The effect of the human factor on the results gets ignored (Bertrand & Fransoo 2002)
• The lack of applicability as the counterpart empirical theory may be tested with real
data. (Kaipia 2007, Swamidass 1991)
According to Bertrand & Fransoo (2002), the axiomatic research works tend to have got less
documented research methodology section unlike its counterpart empirical research works.
65
However, the authors identified an early research by Mitroff et al. (1974) to clearly docu-
menting the research method used in axiomatic research. The framework by Mitroff et al.
(1974) is presented below. According to Bertrand & Fransoo (2002), the Mitroff’s model has
Figure 3.3: Research model by (Mitroff et al. 1974) (Source: Mitroff et al. (1974))
got four phases
• Conceptualization
• Modeling
• Model solving
• Implementation
Mitroff et al. (1974) mentioned that any research can start at any of these stages and ends
at any of these stages. However, the authors highlighted some of the short cut methods
such as conceptual ”modeling-model solving- narrow feedback”. Authors highlighted that
sometimes researchers make the mistake of considering model solving for the process of im-
plementation. In addition, the authors also highlighted ”conceptualization-narrow feedback-
implementation” as another short-cut cycle. The researchers tend to make the mistake of
considering conceptualization for modeling.
Mitroff et al. (1974) suggested four methods : Axiomatic Descriptive, Axiomatic Nor-
mative, Empirical Descriptive, and Empirical Normative. With axiomatic descriptive, re-
searchers use existing conceptual models to generate scientific models. Modeling becomes
66
central to this methodology. On the contrary, with axiomatic normative methods, model solv-
ing is central to the research method.
Despite various criticisms, axiomatic modelling has been the predominant research method-
ology in the logistics and supply chain research. This is due to the strong influence on the op-
erations management research paradigm from operations research and management (Golicic
& Davis 2012, Spens & Kova´cs 2006, Meredith et al. 1989). In fact, some of the shortcom-
ings of the axiomatic modelling approach have already been addressed in a model proposed
by Mitroff et al. (1974) in figure 3.3.
This research adopts the axiomatic normative modeling approach. One of the main con-
structs of this research is the supply chain coordination. The introduction chapter of this
research has highlighted the debates over the definition of supply chain coordination. It was
also mentioned that this research is following the definition of supply chain coordination pro-
posed by Cachon (2003). The literature review section has explained how this conceptualized
definition has been widely used to propose and generate solutions in the form of models for
supply chain coordination in the literature of Cachon & Zhang (2006), Lee & Rhee (2007),
Ding & Chen (2008), Cai et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2012), Chen & Wei (2012), Ma et al.
(2013), Cao et al. (2013),Saha (2013), Cao (2014) and many others. Moreover, these models
were shown to be capable of allowing full coordination for the supply chain. Thus, this re-
search also follows the axiomatic approach for addressing the objectives addressed in chapter
2.
Game theoretic models were identified as one of the input blocks for the research ques-
tion. The concepts of game theory are at the cross road of mathematics and economics.
It has got a wide application in economics. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
are credited as the father figures of modern game theory (Cachon & Netessine 2004). Any
decision-making process involving multiple decision makers with each of them dependent on
each other can be effectively analyzed by the tools of game theory (Osborne 2004, Cachon &
Netessine 2004). Game theory is especially beneficial if a decision-making process involves
multiple decision makers with each of them having a possible set of actions. The game the-
oretic models capture the interaction between the decision makers Osborne (2004). Apart
from the above-mentioned requirements to have multiple decision makers with each having
their own set of decisions, if the decision makers have a preference for a certain set of actions
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over others, then the concepts of strategic games can analyse the situations (Osborne 2004,
Cachon & Netessine 2004).
The concepts of game theory have been very popular in the supply chain literature. The
supply chain decision making often involves multiple decision makers. They have a set of
decisions and a preferred set of decisions among the entire set for implementation. Due this
basic fit the with requirements, the concepts of game theory have been widely applied in
supply chain decision-making problems. Any interested readers may find a detailed survey
about the use of game theory in supply chain management in the book chapter by Cachon
& Netessine (2004). There are various possible classifications for the applications of game
theory. However, this research followed the classification by Cachon & Netessine (2004).
This research has two decision makers: a project manager organization and a contractor
organization. Both of them have a set of actions/decisions. However, they would be inclined
to take the decision that would optimize their profit or utility depending on the case. In
other words, they have a preferred set of decisions to make. This research investigated three
different decision-making problems in a supply chain which are explained in there different
objectives in the next few chapters. It is assumed that both the members of the supply chain
(the project manager and the contractor) have got the full knowledge about the variables
which could affect the decisions making such as cost, profit, and others except for the resource
consumption rate.
Methods for Objective 1:
The first objective was to propose coordination mechanisms in take it or leave it situations.
This research has considered a two-level dyadic project supply chain. The sequence of the
solution procedure is explained in figure 3.4
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Figure 3.4: Sequence of solution
As explained in the figure 3.4, the benchmark solutions are derived from the centralized
supply chain. In the centralized setting, the project manager and the contractor both belong
to the same organization with the same goals and objectives. Thus, a single decision maker
is assumed to optimize the profit and the resource consumption rate for the overall supply
chain.
In the decentralized setting, the project manager and the contractor belong to different
organizations. For the first objective, they are assumed to have the objectives of maximizing
their individual profit given certain constraints. Hence, their objectives may not be aligned
and coordination mechanisms might be required to coordinate these. Stackelberg games from
game theory are one of the most popularly used concepts for similar situations in the literature
selected in the chapter 2 of this thesis (Lee & Rhee 2007, Karabatı & Sayın 2008, Chen et al.
2012, Chen & Wei 2012, Lau et al. 2012, Hong et al. 2015, Giri & Bardhan 2016). Strategies
are announced as a sequence in Stackelberg game move game (Simaan & Cruz Jr 1973).
There is a first mover who moves first as a leader with a certain strategic offer that maximizes
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(minimizes) his or her profit (cost). If the follower agrees, then the leader and the follower
needs to perform their respective tasks as agreed during the game. On the contrary, if the
follower disagrees to the offer from the leader, then the game terminates and they end up
having the profit (cost) if they don’t participate in the agreement (Osborne 2004). The first
objective only explores the situations with take it or leave it conditions. The project manager
is considered to be the more powerful member (in terms of bargaining power and power
position in the supply chain) than the contractor. The project manager has a project. Some
parts of the project need to be outsourced. Thus, the project manager (she) moves first with an
offer to the contractor (he). If the contractor, agrees, then they reach an agreement; otherwise,
they go their separate ways. Due to the similarity of the sequence of actions, this research has
adopted the Stackelberg games for solving the coordination problem for this take it or leave
it situation. It is also assumed that the project manager is the leader and the contractor is the
follower.
As a first mover, the project manager could offer a zero profit, grab everything on offer
and maximize her benefits. However, this may not be accepted as the contractor would have
some minimum expectations of profit to be earned from outside this project. This imposes
a constraint to the project manager to offer at least what the contractor expects to earn from
outside options. The project manager envisages this minimum value of the profit which she
needs to offer to the contractor. In fact, any offer from the project manager equal to or above
the minimum which the contractor can get outside this contract, would entice the contractor to
accept the contract. However, for any value above this minimum value, the contractor would
accept the contract, but it would reduce the profit of the project manager. Hence, those values
are not the best response of the project manager. Given the constraints, the best response for
the project manager is to offer the minimum the contractor can expect to earn to outside this
contract. Given this offer, the contractor would select a resource consumption rate that allows
them to earn equal to what they can earn outside this contractual offer. This becomes the
best response for the contractor. This also satisfies the definition of Pareto optimal solution.
Tadelis (2013), suggests a solution would be Pareto optimal if none of the players of a game
can be better off without worsening at least one of the players.
The act of envisaging the minimum expected profit required to entice the contractor to
agree to the offered contract is called the backward induction method. Cachon & Netessine
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(2004) supported this point of view that dynamic games including Stackelberg games use
these backward induction methods to solve these games. Thus, this research also followed
the backward induction method to solve the games with the concepts of Stackelberg’s leader-
follower games.
Methods for Objective 2:
The second objective is to investigate if coordination mechanisms can be proposed for the
supply chain under consideration where negotiation and renegotiation of contractual agree-
ment are possible. Unlike the take it or leave it situations, if the contractual offer is rejected
by the contractor, then the project manager has the options for re-offering the contracts. That
means the game is not terminated after one round of rejection, rather renegotiated.
Negotiation is represented by a bargaining process. Bargaining process can be modelled
by cooperative games (Cachon & Netessine 2004, Nagarajan & Sosˇic´ 2008). The authors
argued that cooperative game theory has received relatively less attention in supply chain
literature than in comparison to non-cooperative game theory. Several bargaining models are
proposed in the literature. The cooperative games, unlike non-cooperative games, allow the
processes to be studied that leads to the outcomes (Nagarajan & Sosˇic´ 2008).
Two or more players have a got a set of feasible outcomes and any one of these will be
implemented if it is agreed unanimously by all the players. On the contrary, the players will
reach a disagreement point outcome if they fail to reach an agreement. Nagarajan & Sosˇic´
(2008) suggested if there are feasible outcomes better than disagreement point payoff, then
the members have the incentive to reach an agreement to achieve that outcome. The author
further added, if at least two players differ regarding the outcome, then the bargaining may
take place.
The present research has got only two players as two members of the supply chain. In
objective 1, if the players differ in their preferred outcome, then the game was considered
to be terminated. However, the second objective relaxed this restriction. Hence, the mem-
bers of the supply chain under consideration i.e. the project manager and the contractor can
engage in a bargaining process to reach a unanimously agreed outcome which gives them
a better outcome than terminating the game and reaching the disagreement point outcome.
There are several bargaining models which can capture this situation. However, Nagarajan &
Sosˇic´ (2008) argued that Nash bargaining is one of the most popularly used bargaining pro-
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cesses. In fact, the authors further argued that the experimental bargaining theory suggests
the stronger empirical evidence of the existence of Nash bargaining theory. Moreover, few of
the available studies from the set of literature selected in chapter 2 have used Nash bargaining
as a bargaining model (He & Zhao 2012). Thus, this research used Nash bargaining as the
staring point of the bargaining games. The models proposed in the literature of Lippman et al.
(2013) are used for further extension. In addition, the bargaining models proposed by Kalai-
Smorodinsky and Utilitarian models are also used to see if the results have any similarity to
what is achieved using the Nash bargaining games.
Nagarajan & Sosˇic´ (2008) highlighted the main results of Nash bargaining in a two player
bargaining problem, with F as a closed convex feasible set of IR2 and d = (d1, d2) as a dis-
agreement vector. According to the author, the feasible outcome selected as solution satisfies
the following axioms
1. Symmetry : Identical players should receive an identical allocation.
2. Feasible: Sum total of the allocation of the players should not be higher than what is
on offer.
3. Pareto optimal: As explained earlier, no player can be better off without making other
players worse off
4. Linear Transformation : The solutions can also be presented with a linear change of
scale by a factor
5. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: If the alternative solutions that are not selected
as optimal, are removed, then the bargaining solution won’t change
With the above axioms, the Nash bargaining solution will satisfy the following
arg max
x=(x1,x2)∈F,x≥d
: (x1 − d1)(x2 − d2)
Methods for Objective 3:
The objective 3 is to investigate the solutions proposed in objective 1 and objective 2 in
the presence of fairness consideration. This research has followed a definition of fairness
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as inequity aversion proposed by Fehr & Schmidt (1999). This is one of the most popular
models of fairness used in the literature. The citation count as per Web of Science is around
2000.
It is further assumed that the member of the supply chain (the project manager or the
contractor) would be a utility maximizer which might include some non-profit component
depending on the case.
For the take it or leave it situations, the sequence of solutions is slightly modified as
shown in figure 3.5
Figure 3.5: Sequence of Solutions for Take It or Leave it Situation with fairness consideration
Again like in objective 1, the situation can be best explained by Stackelberg games.
3.3 Numerical Analysis
After the model development and model solving phase is over, the numerical analysis con-
ducted. The proposed models can be applied in any project context with the selection of
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suitable variable and parameter values. However, this research has prepared the numerical
example section based on construction supply chains from the UK.
Now the question is why there is a need for these kinds of collaborative supply chain prac-
tices in the construction sector? According to UKCG (2012), the construction sector value
chain worth around 14% of the total UK’s GDP. According to this report, it had contributed
around £1203 mn. surplus to the UK’s economy between the years 2009-11. The report also
says that every £1 invested in the construction sector generates £2.84 mn economic activ-
ity. Due to its huge importance, it has even featured in the top three sectors for government
support just after railway and health.
Despite the importance of the construction sector in UK economy, the report published
by ECLLP (2013), states that construction supply chain integration is still an area which
needs careful attention and improvement. This conclusion was based on a survey conducted
among the UK construction practitioners by the Business Innovation and Skills department
UK. The main purpose of the survey was to identify how the UK construction companies are
performing with respect to the suggested supply chain integration approaches in the Latham
report published in 1994. However, the responses suggest the supply chain integration as
one of the lesser highlighted areas of construction projects. In chapter 1, this research has
explained certain barriers of supply chain coordination. In chapter 4, this research further
elaborated the different nature of project supply chains with respect to product supply chains
with a special reference to the construction supply chain.
The relevant information such as project value duration etc. was collected from the ex-
isting case studies as secondary data sources from the Association of Project Management,
UK (https://www.apm.org.uk/). However, there are certain variables/parameters whose val-
ues are confidential in nature and are not shared as publicly available data. These values are
assigned/assumed as relevant.
There are certain distribution specific parameters used in the models proposed in this
research. Again, some realistic and relevant values were assumed while preparing the numer-
ical examples.
The next three chapters highlighted how the identified objectives have been addressed in
this research. Each of these chapters consists of the details of the backdrop of the objectives,
the proposed models, and their numerical analysis results.
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Chapter 4
Supply Chain Coordination using Project
Contracts in Take it or Leave it situations
The importance of supply chain coordination was highlighted in chapter 1, and the related
development in the literature was presented in chapter 2. These previous chapters also high-
lighted that there are various problems associated with the projects in absence of the proper
supply chain coordination. Time and cost overruns are the two main problems which arise in
the absence of proper supply chain coordination. A few real-life projects such as Wembley
stadium renovation project and Denver airport baggage handling system installation project
were cited as cases of projects with subsequent time and cost overruns (Moore 2009). In
fact, the Denver airport project was quoted by the author to have a significant coordination
problem. On the contrary, there are few examples from practice that can be referred with
coordination among the members of the supply chain as the key to the project success such
as Turner and Townsend set an example of proper coordination of supply chain activities to
complete the construction project of the University of Exeter’s newly developed Business
School. This helped the project management team of Turner and Townsend to complete the
project within the budget of £14 million, and approximately three years estimated time.
The focus of this chapter is to address the first objective of this research. That is how
project contracts can coordinate the supply chains for a more general set of distributions. The
steps of solving the coordination problem were explained in chapter 3. As decided, earlier in
chapter 1, the supply chain in the decentralized setting would be considered coordinated when
total benefits conforms to the maximum benefits which can be derived from the centralized
75
setting as defined by Cachon (2003)
In a supply chain context, contracts can specify parameters such as order quantity, price,
time and delivery (Kanda et al. 2008). Due to this specificity, supply chain contracts can help
the total supply chain achieve coordination (Giannoccaro et al. 2004). Based on the principle
proposed by Cachon (2003), several authors proposed coordination models for supply chain
as discussed in the literature review in chapter 2. In all of these papers, the authors used
certain contractual terms as incentives to motivate the members of the supply chain to take
decisions that are aligned with the overall goals and objectives. These contractual terms can
take the form of flexible payments such as trade credit (Chen & Wang 2012), side payments
such as a two-part tariff (Corbett et al. 2004), revenue sharing (Giannoccaro et al. 2004),
discounting contractual terms such as price discount (Bernstein & Federgruen 2005a, Chen
2011b), quantity discount (Li & Liu 2006), price plus subsidy rate (Xiao et al. 2005), dis-
counting using reverse supply chain conditions such as buy back (Chen 2011b), and returns
(Chen & Xiao 2011b). However, these models are limited to the demand being the source of
the uncertainty and the order quantity/price being the decision variable to be optimized.
Very little is known about coordination in project supply chains. In a project supply chain
(with a project manager and a contractor), the project manager can verify the project com-
pletion time and the cost upon completion. However, it is difficult for the project manager to
verify the resource consumption rate of the contractor when the members belong to different
organizations. This could lead to a misalignment of contractor’s selected resource consump-
tion rate and the optimal resource consumption rate. As a result, it could lead to time and
cost overruns.
Tools and techniques used for effective project management mainly reside in the litera-
ture of civil engineering as its origin is from there (Kwon et al. 2010). As mentioned earlier,
some commonly used tools from project management such as CPM and PERT work under
deterministic to low uncertainty, but not in more uncertain environments (Klastorin 2004).
Moreover, only a limited amount of research evidence has been found in the supply chain
coordination literature with cost and time as the sources of uncertainty such as project supply
chain. However, the importance is not negligible in this case. In a survey study, Akintoye
et al. (2000) identified supply chain coordination as one of the key requirements for the suc-
cess of the construction sector in the UK, but project supply chains often fail to coordinate.
76
A few authors have proposed conceptual models for coordinating construction supply chains
such as an inter-organizational learning model (Love et al. 2002), a framework to influence
co-development of decisions (Crespin-Mazet & Ghauri 2007), and a system-wide informa-
tion system (Hadaya & Pellerin 2010). However, none of these models are quantitative in
nature. Recently, Bayiz & Corbett (2005), Kwon et al. (2010) and Lippman et al. (2013)
proposed coordination models using project contracts for the project supply chains. How-
ever, these models assumed specific functional forms for the project completion time and the
completion cost: an exponential function for completion time (Bayiz & Corbett 2005, Kwon
et al. 2010) and a normal distribution for completion cost (Lippman et al. 2013). However,
in practice, project completion times are often modelled as the uniform distribution in simu-
lation (Lee, Arditi & Son 2013), the beta distribution (Golenko-Ginzburg 1988), the gamma
distribution (Roy & Roy 2013), and the Weibull distribution (Abdelkader 2004). It has been
not investigated in detail if the existing models will work with these distributions or not.
Therefore, there is a need to explore if coordination models can be proposed for project sup-
ply chains. To address this issue, this research aims to fulfill the first objective as mentioned
before.
Objective 1. To extend the coordination model proposed by Kwon et al. (2010) with a
general set of continuous distributions for project completion time in a Stackelberg model
with ultimatum games.
This research considered the basic model proposed by Kwon et al. (2010) and Bayiz and
Corbett (2005) for the extension. The following are the main features of the extensions to the
existing model
• Model proposed by Kwon et al. (2010) used exponentially discounted cash-flows.
Bayiz & Corbett (2005) used a linearly decreasing cash-flow. In this research, both
exponential and non-exponential discounted cash-flows (linear, quadratic and so on)
are considered for modelling.
• Unlike the existing models, this research considers an additional cost (Co). This is
independent of the resource consumption rate
• The models proposed in this research are not restricted by the nature of the distribution
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function for the completion time and the completion cost.
The existing models are extended for various forms of continuous distributions for project
completion time. It is analysed with take it or leave it (TIOLI) contracts with the help of
concepts from Stackelberg games and ultimatum games.
4.1 Problem description
A dyadic supply chain is considered with a project manager and a contractor. The project
manager is referred as she and the contractor is referred to as he. The project manager can
verify the completion time and cost, but not the resource consumption rate selected by the
contractor. Thus, in the absence of proper incentives, it may be in the contractor’s interest to
select a resource consumption rate that leads to a non-optimal overall project completion time
and cost. To avoid this, the project manager offers a contract P(T,C), where T is the project
completion time and C is the cost to the contractor. As mentioned in chapter 3, Stackelberg
games from game theory are used to analyse the situation.
The project manager has a project value of q (q = q0 in the beginning) that decreases with
time. The reduction in project value comes from two factors. Firstly if a project is delivered
late, its effective lifetime may be shortened, for example, if a software project is delivered
late, then the benefits that would have accrued from an earlier delivery may be lost. This
is modelled as a polynomial, usually taking it to be a linear loss of value. On the contrary,
there are some projects where the product life does not change and the end of life is a fixed
time from the date of completion of the project e.g. power plant and bridge projects. The
second loss of value stems from discounting the project value. For short and medium-term
projects, the discounting will be very small and does not have a significant effect. However,
for a long-term project, the time value of the money can have a considerable impact on the
cash flow. Thus, any cash-flow in the long term project is exponentially discounted to take
into account the time value of money. A continuous exponential discounting is considered
to take into account the time value of money. The discounting factor can be calculated with
the help of the prevailing discounting rate suggested by the country under consideration. For
presentational simplicity, it is assumed that both the project manager and the contractor use
the prevailing discounting rate.
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The project manager needs to outsource some part of the project to an external contractor.
Thus, she offers a contract P(T,C) to the contractor. The contractor can decide either to accept
or reject the contract. If he rejects the contract, then the game terminates. Hence, the game
is considered as an ultimatum game with a take it or leave it contract. In practice, there is a
possibility that the contractual terms would be subjected to further bargaining. However, this
case is not part of this chapter and is discussed in next chapter. If the contractor accepts the
contract, then he needs to select the resource consumption rate (λ) to complete the project.
This rate is assumed as constant throughout the project once selected. Upon completion, the
project manager verifies the completion cost and time and makes the payment according to
the contractual agreement.
In a centralized setting, the project manager and the contractor, belong to the same orga-
nization with the same goals and objectives. The profit is calculated as the difference between
the expected value of the project and the expected cost of the project. The project manager
would select the resource consumption rate (λ0) that maximizes this profit. As suggested in
Cachon (2003), these optimal values of resource consumption rate (λ0) and the corresponding
supply chain profit (pi0) have been considered as the first best solutions of the supply chain
under consideration.
However, in a decentralized setting, the contractor, and the project manager belong to
different organizations, and so they have different goals and objectives. The contractor would
select the value of the resource consumption rate (λ) that would maximize his profit. This
value of the resource consumption rate may not be aligned with the optimal value (λ0). This
would lead to a non-optimal overall profit as an outcome for the entire supply chain. However,
Cachon (2003) defined that the supply chains could be coordinated if this is avoided through
properly designed contracts. Thus, to avoid this moral hazard of selecting a non-optimal
λ, the contract P(T,C) needs to be designed properly. Central to the contract design is the
incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. The incentive compatibility
constraint ensures the maximization of the profit for the member given the selected resource
consumption rate (λ). The individual rationality constraint ensures the participation in the
contractual agreement. This means members are better off in terms of profit by selecting the
contract under consideration than selecting any outside contract.
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4.2 Model terminologies
The proposed model requires three main variables: the project value, the cost incurred by the
contractor, and the resource consumption rate.
The contractor’s resource consumption rate is λ. The project completion time depends on
λ and its probability density function is denoted as fλ(T ). Mean completion time (µ) depends
on the resource consumption rate (λ). This dependency is modelled as
µλ =
µ1
λA
[Where, 0 < A ≤ 1] (4.1)
The restriction on A is because it is assumed that increasing the resource consumption rate
does not improve the efficiency at the same rate.
As mentioned earlier, the loss of project value from the late delivery is modelled as having
two components: A polynomial element from a shortened operating life and a discounting
element. For short-term projects, the discounting element is not significant. This situation is
followed in the next sub-section. Then, the following section looks at long term projects with
exponential discounting with and without polynomial reduction as well.
4.2.1 Polynomial reduction of project rewards
The project value is reduced as a polynomial function of the completion time to model the lost
income from the late delivery as the project manager is not able to benefit from the project
during [0,T].
q(T ) = q0(1− ψTm) [where m is an integer and m ≥ 1] (4.2)
Thus, the expected value of the project is
E(q) =
∞∫
0
q0(1− ψTm)fλ(T )dT = q0[1− ψ.E{Tm}] (4.3)
The project cost (C) depends on the resource consumption (λ). In prior research in the areas
of reverse supply chain returns (Savaskan & Van Wassenhove 2006), and green supply chain
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management (Swami & Shah 2013b), the authors used C = kλ2. In order to maintain a
generalizable form, the cost per unit time is assumed as kλn. The value of n satisfies n > 1,
as increasing the resource consumption rate leads to an extra cost.
For short-term projects, the effects of discounting monetary values are very low and so
these are disregarded and the exponential discounting is not applied. Thus, the expected total
cost of the project is
E(C) =
∞∫
0
 T∫
0
kλndt
 fλ(T )dT = kλnE(T ) (4.4)
As mentioned in the section 4.1, the project manager outsources a part of the project to the
contractor. This means the project manager incurs some additional costs that do not depend
on λ such as raw material costs, and overhead costs. These costs all together are denoted by
Co.
Hence, the expected overall profit for the project is
pi = E(q)− E(C)− C0 = q0[1− ψE{Tm}]− kλnE(T )− Co (4.5)
In the centralized setting, λ is chosen to maximise the project’s profit and the resulting profit
is denoted by pi0. In the decentralized setting, the project manager offers a time-based contract
P(T,C) = g-hT. The first term of the contract g is the base term. The second term h is a penalty
for the completion time. Although the time penalty can take other forms, Kwon et al. (2010)
stated that a linear form is most popular in practice. Using equations (4.3) and (4.4), the
project manager’s and the contractor’s profits are derived as respectively
pipm = E(q)− E{(P (T,C)} − Co
=
∞∫
0
q(T )fλ(T )dT −
∞∫
0
P (T,C)fλ(T )dT − Co
= q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − {g − hE(T )} − Co (4.6)
pico = E{P (T,C)} − E(C) = {g − hE(T )} − {kλnE(T )} (4.7)
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4.2.2 Exponential Discounting of cash-flows
For long-term projects, the cash-flows decrease continuously with a discounting parameter
(α), where α > 0. Thus, the expected project value upon completion for projects with
recoverable product life upon completion is
E(q) =
∫ ∞
0
(q0e
−αTfλ(T )dT = q0E{e−αT} (4.8)
The expected project value upon completion for projects with irrecoverable product life upon
completion (i.e. polynomial reduced) is
E(q) = q0
1− ψ ∞∫
0

T∫
0
tm−1e−αtdt
 fλ(T )dT
 (4.9)
In practice, the loss of revenue due to project delay is more likely to be linear i.e. m = 1 (the
best case of no loss of revenue is equation 4.8) and so this case is analysed further. Thus, the
expected value of the project in equation (4.9) becomes
E(q) = q0[1− ψ
α
+
ψ
α
E{e−αT}] (4.10)
The exponential discounting is used for the expected cost as used by (Kwon et al. 2010). The
expected cost is calculated as below
E(C) =
∫ ∞
0
kλnfλ(T )
(∫ T
0
e−αtdt
)
dT =
kλn
α
[
1− E{e−αT}] (4.11)
As before, the project manager will incur some additional costs which are independent of the
resource consumption rate. It is assumed that these costs are incurred straight away by the
project manager and so Co is not discounted. Hence, the overall profit is
pi = E(q)− E(C)− Co
=
q0E{e
−αT} − kλn
α
[
1− E{e−αT}]− Co for recoverable product life
q0[1− ψα + ψαE{e−αT}]− kλ
n
α
[
1− E{e−αT}]− Co for irrecoverable product life with m=1
(4.12)
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Again in a centralized setting. λ is chosen to maximize pi and the resulting pi will be denoted
by pi0. As mentioned earlier, the project manager would offer a contract P(T,C) =g-hT to the
contractor in the decentralized setting. The profit function for the project manager and the
contractor are as follows
pipm = E(q)− E{(P (T,C)e−αT} − Co
=

q0E{e−αT} −
∞∫
0
P (T,C) e−αTfλ(T )dT − Co for recoverable product life
q0[1− ψα + ψαE{e−αT}]−
∞∫
0
P (T,C) e−αTfλ(T )dT − Co for irrecoverable product life
(4.13)
pico = E{P (T,C)e−αT} − E(C) =
 ∞∫
0
P (T,C) e−αTfλ(T )dT
− kλn
α
[
1− E{e−αT}]
(4.14)
4.3 Models without cash discounting
For short term projects, the polynomial reduction of project reward is considered as men-
tioned in the section 4.2.1. Four different forms of probability distributions (uniform, gamma,
beta, and Weibull) for the completion time are investigated.
4.3.1 Centralized Setting
In the centralized setting, λ is chosen to maximise the profit function in equation (4.5). This
gives the first best solutions for the resource consumption rate (λ0) and the profit (pi0). These
first best solutions form the benchmark for assessing the decentralized setting. Equation (4.5)
involves the mth moment of the probability density function (PDF) of the completion time.
The PDF value fλ(T ) of the uniform, gamma, beta, and Weibull distributions are as follows
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(Evans et al. 1993)
fλ(T ) =
1
θ
for uniform distributed time with 0 ≤ T ≤ θ
Tw−1e−
T
θ
Γ(w)θw
for gamma distributed time with scale parameter θ and shape parameter w
Tu−1(θ−T )v−1
θu+v−1B(u,v) for beta distributed time with 0 < T ≤ θ and u & v as shape parameters
sT s−1
θs
e−(T/θ)
s for Weibull distributed time with scale parameter θ and shape parameter s
(4.15)
For these PDF s, the expected value of the mth moment E(Tm) can be calculated in terms of
the scale parameter θ of the distributions as E(Tm) =
∞∫
0
Tmfλ(T )dT (Evans et al. 1993).
Using the values of fλ(T )
E(Tm) =

{
θm
(m+1)
}
For uniform distributed time
θm
m∏
i=1
(w + i− 1) For gamma distributed time
θm
m∏
i=1
(
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
)
For beta distributed time
θm
[
Γ
(
1 + m
s
)]
For Weibull distributed time
(4.16)
Using the values of the first moment of each distribution i.e µ (Evans et al. 1993) and the
observation from equation (4.1), the expected value of the mth moment can be expressed in
terms of λ as below
E(Tm) =

{
(2µ1)m
(m+1)λmA
}
For uniform distributed time
µm1
wmλmA
m∏
i=1
(w + i− 1) For gamma distributed time
µm1
( uu+v )
m
λmA
m∏
i=1
(
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
)
For beta distributed time
µm1
{Γ(1+ 1s)}mλmA
[
Γ
(
1 + m
s
)]
For Weibull distributed time
(4.17)
Proof. Using the value of PDF for gamma distributed function from the equation 4.15, the
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expected value of mth moment for gamma distributed time becomes
E(Tm) =
(
θmΓ(m+ w)
Γ(w)
) ∞∫
0
Tm+w−1e−
T
θ
Γ(m+ w)θm+w
dT
=
θmΓ(m+ w)
Γ(w)
=
θm(m+ w − 1)!
(w − 1)!
= θm
m∏
i=1
(w + i− 1)
=
µm1
wmλmA
m∏
i=1
(w + i− 1)
[From the equation 4.1,wθ =
µ1
λA
]
For the beta distributed time,
E(Tm) =
(
θmB(u+m, v)
B(u+ v)
) ∞∫
0
Tm+u−1(θ − T )v−1
θu+m+v−1B(u+m, v)
dT
=
θmB(u+m, v)
B(u, v)
= θm
Γ(u+m)Γ(v)
Γ(u+m+ v)
Γ(u+ v)
Γ(u)Γ(v)
= θm
m∏
i=1
(
u+ i− 1
u+ v + i− 1
)
=
µm1(
u
u+v
)m
λmA
m∏
i=1
(
u+ i− 1
u+ v + i− 1
)
[From the equation 4.1,
θu
u+ v
=
µ1
λA
]
For the Weibull distributed time, it is assumed that
(
T
θ
)s
= x. By taking derivative both side,
it can also be shown that sT s−1dT = θsdx. It can also be shown that Tm = θmx
m
s . Thus,
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using these values in the expected value of the mth moment
E(Tm) =
∞∫
0
Tm
{
sT s−1
θs
e−(T/θ)
s
dT
}
=
∞∫
0
θmx
m
s e−xdx
By definition
∞∫
0
x(1+
m
s
)−1e−xdx = Γ(1 + m
s
). Hence, E(Tm) = θmΓ(1 + m
s
).
Substituting the values from equation (4.17) into the equation (4.5), the following expres-
sion for the centralized profit are derived
pi =

q0 − (q0ψ)
[
(2µ1)m
(m+1)λmA
]
− kµ1λN − Co for uniform distributed time
q0 − q0ψ
[
µm1
wmλmA
m∏
i=1
(w + i− 1)
]
− kλNµ1 − Co for gamma distributed time
q0 − (q0ψ)
[
µm1
( uu+v )
m
λmA
] [
m∏
i=1
(u+i−1)
(u+v+i−1)
]
− kλNµ1 − Co for beta distributed time
q0 − (q0ψ)
(
µm1
{Γ(1+ 1s)}mλmA
) [
Γ(1 + m
s
)
]− kλNµ1 − Co for Weibull distributed time
(4.18)
[whereN = n− A]
The optimal value λ0 of the resource consumption rate can be found by differentiating the
above equation (4.18) and setting the results equal to zero:
λ0 =

[
2mmAq0ψµ
m−1
1
kN(m+1)
] 1
mA+N
for uniform distributed timemAq0ψµm−11 m∏i=1(w+i−1)
kNwm
 1mA+N for gamma distributed time
[
mAq0ψµ
m−1
1
kN( uu+v )
m
{
m∏
i=1
(u+i−1)
(u+v+i−1)
}] 1
mA+N
for beta distributed time[
mAq0ψµ
m−1
1 {Γ(1+ms )}
kN{Γ(1+ 1s}m
] 1
mA+N
for Weibull distributed time
(4.19)
Substituting the values of λ0 from the above equation (4.19) into equation (4.18), gives the
first best solution of the profit pi0. In this section, the project duration is considered as short
to medium. Thus, the impact of completion time is not very high on cash-flows. However, to
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account for the impact of time on cash-flows, the project value has been considered as a de-
creasing function of time as mentioned in equation (4.3). In the next few subsection, models
are prepared with these considerations for : uniform, gamma, beta, and Weibull distributed
time function T in a decentralized setting.
4.3.2 Decentralized Setting with Time Based Contracts
In the decentralized settings, the contractor would select a resource consumption rate (λ)
that maximizes his profit in equation (4.7). The project manager cannot verify the selected
resource consumption rate of the contractor (λ). As mentioned in section 4.1, it may be the
case that λ 6= λ0. To avoid this misalignment, the project manager needs to offer a contract
P(T,C) to the contractor that satisfies the incentive compatibility and individual rationality
constraints explained in section 4.1.
For a time-based contract, P(T,C) = g-hT, the optimal conditions for the contract parame-
ters are derived in the following proposition
Proposition 1. The parameters h* and g* of an optimally coordinated time-based contract
P(T,C)=g-hT satisfy the following
h∗ =

kN
A
[
2mmAq0ψµ
m−1
1
kN(m+1)
] N+A
mA+N
[T is uniform between 0 and θ]
kN
A
mAq0ψµm−11 m∏i=1(w+i−1)
kNwm
 N+AmA+N [T is gamma distributed with parameters (w, θ)]
kN
A
[
mAq0ψµ
m−1
1
kN( uu+v )
m
{
m∏
i=1
(u+i−1)
(u+v+i−1)
}] N+A
mA+N
[T is beta with parameters (u,v)]
kN
A
[
mAq0ψµ
m−1
1 {Γ(1+ms )}
kN{Γ(1+ 1s )}m
] N+A
mA+N
[T is Weibull distributed with (s, θ)]
(4.20)
g∗ = m(N + A)
mA+N
q0 −
[
m(N + A)
mA+N
pi0 − piout
]
− m(N + A)
mA+N
Co (4.21)
[For any continuous distributed time function]
Proof. The contract offered by the project manager to the contractor takes a linear form of
P(T,C) = g- hT. The profit functions of the members follow the equations (4.6) and (4.7) .
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The values of E(T) are same as mean value (µ) in equation (4.1). This gives us the following
pico = g − h
( µ1
λA
)
− kλNµ1 [Where N = n-A] (4.22)
Now differentiating this pico with respect to λ, setting that equal to zero and finally rearranging
the terms, the value of λ is derived in terms of h, namely λN+A = hA
kN
. This value of resource
consumption rate (λ) would maximize the contractor’s profit in the decentralized setting. The
project manager envisages this by backward induction method. Thus, she would require to
offer a contract that makes this resource consumption rate equal to the first best solution (λ0).
Hence, equating this λ with the λ0 (equation 4.19), the optimal conditions for h for uniform,
gamma, beta, and Weibull distributed project completion time are derived in conditions in
equation (4.20).
The individual rationality constraint requires the contract to ensure a minimum profit
(piout) for the contractor. This is the profit that can be earned by the contractor in the event this
contract not materialized. The optimal values of h from equation (4.20) are used in the profit
equations of the contractor (equation 4.22). Now using the value of λ0 for each distribution,
the contractor’s profit function can easily be shown as pico = g − kλN0 µ1
[
N
A
+ 1
]
. This
equation is bounded by a value at least equal to the piout. That is
g − kλN0 µ1
[
N
A
+ 1
]
≥ piout (4.23)
For each distribution, from the first best value of resource consumption rate (λ0) from equa-
tions (4.19), the ψq0 values are rearranged as a function of λ0. Then, these rearranged val-
ues are used to replace of ψq0 in the equations of the first best profit conditions in equa-
tion (4.18) for respective distributions. From these, it can be easily shown that kλN0 µ1 =
(q0 − pi0 − Co)
(
mA
mA+N
)
. Using this observation in equation (4.23), the coordinating condi-
tion for g are derived as
g ≥ m(N + A)
mA+N
q0 −
[
m(N + A)
mA+N
pi0 − piout
]
− m(N + A)
mA+N
Co (4.24)
[For any continuous distributed time function]
This coordinating condition above should also optimize the profit of the project manager men-
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tioned in equation (4.6). The h value is bound by the equal sign in the equation. However,
for any value of g at least equal to the right-hand side of equation (4.24), the coordinating
conditions are satisfied. Thus, multiple values of g can coordinate the supply chain. In equa-
tion (4.6), any increase in value of g would reduce the profit of the project manager. Thus,
to optimize the profit of the project manager, the g value has to be restricted to a minimum
value that coordinates the supply chain. From this requirement, the optimal condition g* in
equation (4.21) is derived.
4.3.3 Decentralized Setting with Fixed Price Contracts
For a fixed price contract, the offered contract becomes P(T,C) = f. This value of P(T,C) is
used in the profit functions for the project manager (4.6) and the contractor (4.7). From the
above equation of the contractor’s profit, it can be easily shown that λ = 0 for the contractor
to maximize his profit i.e. the completion time would be very large. Hence, the project
manager’s profit would be negative. Using this observation, the following is proposed
Proposition 2. A fixed price contract P(T,C) = f, fails to coordinate the supply chain when
q = q0(1−ψTm) and the project completion time T follows any form of continuous distribu-
tion.
4.4 Model with exponential discounting
In the last section, the models of supply chain coordination are derived for the short term
projects with a polynomial reduction of the project-reward. This section extends the models
of coordination to long term projects with and without this polynomial reduction i.e. in
both the cases, exponential discounting is used to take into account the time value of money
over the project term. This section used the basic model proposed by (Bayiz & Corbett
2005) and Kwon et al. (2010) for the extension. As before, the models are extended to other
continuous distributions of completion times that are commonly used for project completion
times: uniform, gamma, beta, and Weibull distributions. As mentioned in section 4.2.2, two
cases are considered: when delay causes irrecoverable revenue loss and when it does not.
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4.4.1 Centralized Setting
The first best solutions of the centralized supply chain are taken as the benchmark solutions.
The profit function follows from equation (4.12). From this equation, the first best solutions
for profit (pi0) and resource consumption rate (λ0) can be derived. Equation (4.12) contains
the term E[e−αT ]. For the uniform, gamma, beta, and Weibull distributed time, these are
(Evans et al. 1993)
E{e−αT} =
∞∫
0
e−αTfλ(T )dT
=

(
1−e−αθ
αθ
)
for uniform distributed time(
1
1+αθ
)w for gamma distributed time
1 +
∞∑
m=1
θm
(
m∏
i=1
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
)[
(−α)m
m!
]
for beta distributed time
1 +
∞∑
m=1
θm
[
Γ(1 + m
s
)
] [ (−α)m
m!
]
for Weibull distributed time
(4.25)
Projects with recoverable product life upon completion with delay
Using this value of discounted time in equation (4.12), the total supply chain profits for
recoverable product life are (The values of θ are replaced in terms of λ from the first moment
of each distribution. Please see the proof below.)
pi =

q0λ
A
[
1−e−αθ
2µ1α
]
− [kλn
α
]
+
[(
kλn+A
2µ1α2
)
(1− e−αθ)
]
− Co
for uniform distributed time
q0
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w
− (Kλn
α
) [
1−
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w]
− Co
for gamma distributed time[
q0 +
kλn
α
] [
1 +
∞∑
m=1
{
µ1(u+v)
uλA
}m( m∏
i=1
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
){
(−α)m
m!
}]
− kλn
α
− Co
for beta distributed time[
q0 +
kλn
α
] [
1 +
∞∑
m=1
{
µ1
λAΓ(1+ 1s)
}m {
Γ(1 + m
s
)
}{
(−α)m
m!
}]
− kλn
α
− Co
for Weibull distributed time
(4.26)
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Proof. The mean values for the distributions are as below
µ =

θ
2
for uniform distributed time with 0 < T ≤ θ
wθ for gamma distributed time with shape parameter w and scale parameter θ
θu
u+v
for beta distributed time with shape parameters u,v and 0 < T ≤ θ
θ Γ
(
1 + 1
s
)
for beta distributed time with shape parameter s and scale parameter θ
The mean value (µ) is replaced as a function of resource consumption rate (λ) in equation
(4.1). From there, the θ is expressed as a function of λ and replaced in the values of E{e−αT}
in the equation (4.25). and finally in the equation (4.26)
Differentiating equation (4.26), the first order condition for λ , with uniform distributed
time can be derived as
(
q0A
λ
)[
λA(1− e−αθ)
2µ1α
− e−αθ
]
−
[
knλn−1
α
− (n+ A)(1− e
−αθ)(kλn+A−1)
2µ1α2
+
kAe−αθλn−1
α
]
= 0 (4.27)
Again differentiating the above equation (4.26), the first order condition for λ with a gamma
distributed time can be derived as below
[
q0Aw
w+1αµ1λ
Aw−1
(wλA + αµ1)w+1
]
+
[
Kλn−1{(nwλA + αnµ1 + Aαµ1w)( wλAwλA+αµ1 )w − nwλA − αnµ1}
α(wλA + αµ1)
]
= 0 (4.28)
Differentiating (4.26) with respect to λ for a beta distributed time. the first order condition
can be derived as
(
knλn−1
α
)[ ∞∑
m=1
{
µ1(u+ v)
uλA
}m( m∏
i=1
u+ i− 1
u+ v + i− 1
){
(−α)m
m!
}]
+
[
q0 +
kλn
α
] [ ∞∑
m=1
{
(−mA)µ1(u+ v)m
umλmA+1
}( m∏
i=1
u+ i− 1
u+ v + i− 1
){
(−α)m
m!
}]
= 0
(4.29)
Differentiating (4.26) with respect to λ for a Weibull distributed time. the first order condi-
91
tion can be derived as
(
knλn−1
α
)[ ∞∑
m=1
{
µ1
λAΓ
(
1 + 1
s
)}m{Γ(1 + 1
s
)}{
(−α)m
m!
}]
+
[
q0 +
kλn
α
][ ∞∑
m=1
{
(−mA)µm1(
Γ(1 + 1
s
)
)m
λmA+1
}{
Γ
(
1 +
m
s
)}{(−α)m
m!
}]
= 0 (4.30)
Solving, the value of λ from the equations (4.27), (4.28), (4.29) and (4.30) gives the value
of the first-best optimal value of resource consumption rate λ0 for uniform, gamma, beta, and
Weibull distributed time in this case. Using these value of λ0 in the equation (4.26) gives the
first best profit function (pi0) for the supply chain under consideration
It can be seen that the first order conditions for beta and the Weibull distributed time do
not give a closed form solution for λ0. Hence, the first best profit function for the beta and
Weibull distributed time are not a closed form solution
Projects with irrecoverable product life upon completion with delay
Using the value of discounted time from equation (4.25) in the equation (4.12), the profit
function can be derived for the projects with outputs whose product life can not be extended
upon completion of the project. (The values of θ are replaced in terms of λ from the first
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moment of each distribution as shown earlier)
pi =

q0
[
1− ψ
α
+ ψ
α
λA{1−e−αθ
2µ1α
}
]
− (kλn
α
) +
[
(kλ
n+A
2µ1α2
)(1− e−αθ)
]
− Co
for uniform distributed time
q0
[
1− ψ
α
+ ψ
α
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w]
− (Kλn
α
) [
1−
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w]
− Co
for gamma distributed time[
q0ψ
α
+ kλ
n
α
] [
1 +
∞∑
m=1
{
µ1(u+v)
uλA
}m( m∏
i=1
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
){
(−α)m
m!
}]
+q0
[
1− ψ
α
]− kλn
α
− Co
for beta distributed time[
q0ψ
α
+ kλ
n
α
] [
1 +
∞∑
m=1
{
µ1
λAγ(1+ 1s)
}m {
Γ(1 + m
s
)
}{ (−α)m
m!
}]
+q0
[
1− ψ
α
]− kλn
α
− Co
for Weibull distributed time
(4.31)
Differentiating equation (4.31), the first order condition for λ , with uniform distributed
time, can be derived as
(
q0ψA
λα
)[
(1− e−αθ)λA
2µ1α
− e−αθ
]
−
[
knλn−1
α
− (n+ A)(1− e
−αθ)(kλn+A−1)
2µ1α2
+
kAe−αθλn−1
α
]
= 0 (4.32)
Similarly differentiating the profit equation for gamma distributed time in equation (4.31),
we can derive the first order condition for λ , with gamma distributed time, as
[
q0ψAw
w+1µ1λ
Aw−1
(wλA + αµ1)w+1
]
+
[
Kλn−1{(nwλA + αnµ1 + Aαµ1w)( wλAwλA+αµ1 )w − nwλA − αnµ1}
α(wλA + αµ1)
]
= 0 (4.33)
Again solving the equations (4.32) and (4.33) gives the first best optimal conditions for the
resource consumption rate (λ0) for the uniform and the gamma distributed time. Using the
value of λ0 in the equation (4.31), the first best profit functions can be derived. Similar to the
case of projects with recoverable operational product life, beta and gamma distributed project
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completion times do not give a closed form solution in this case of projects with irrecoverable
operational product life.
4.4.2 Decentralized Setting with Time Based Contracts
In the decentralized setting, the project manager offers a contract P(T,C)= g-hT to the con-
tractor. The equations (4.13) and (4.14) give the profit functions for the project manager and
the contractor. The contractor would select a λ that maximizes his profit in equation (4.14).
In a similar way to section 4.3.2, differentiating equation (4.14) and setting the results equal
to zero, gives the conditions for λ. Equating this value with the first best solution derived
from the centralized setting, the optimal conditions for g and h can be derived. Using these
conditions along with the individual rationality conditions, the optimal conditions can be de-
rived. For the uniform and gamma distributed time with probability density function (PDF)
in equation (4.15), the following lemmas 1 and 2, are derived
Lemma 1. With the monetary reward discounted with (α), a time-based contract with P(T,C)=g-
hT, (Where T is uniformly distributed between time 0 and θ) can coordinate the decentralized
project supply chain when the contract parameters g and h satisfy
g =

(
h
α
) [λA{1−e−αθ(αθ+1)}−2µ1α2θe−αθ
(1−e−αθ)λA−2µ1αe−αθ
]
+ q0 for recoverable product life(
h
α
) [λA{1−e−αθ(αθ+1)}−2µ1α2θe−αθ
(1−e−αθ)λA−2µ1αe−αθ
]
+ q0
(
ψ
α
)
for irrecoverable product life
(4.34)
and
h ≤

(
α
λA0
)
(pi0 − piout + Co)
[
{(1−e−αθ)λA0 }−(2µ1αe−αθ)
e−αθ(αθ−1−e−αθ)
]
For recoverable products(
α
λA0
) [
pi0 − piout + Co + q0(ψα − 1)
] [{(1−e−αθ)λA0 }−(2µ1αe−αθ)
e−αθ(αθ−1+e−αθ)
]
For irrecoverable products
(4.35)
Proof. The profit function for of the contractor for a time based contract P(T,C) = g - hT,
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where T is uniform distributed (PDF mentioned in equation 4.15) as mentioned earlier is
pico =
∞∫
0
(g − hT )e−αTfλ(T )dT − kλ
n
α
[1− E{e−αT}]
(From equation 4.14)
=
(
λAg
2µ1α
)
(1− e−αθ)−
(
λAh
2µ1α2
)
[1− e−αθ(αθ + 1)]− kλ
n
α
[1− E{e−αT}] (4.36)
Replacing the value of E{e−αT} from the equation (4.25), then differentiating the equation
(4.36) with respect to λ and then setting that expression equal to zero, the following condition
is derived(
gA
2µ1αλ
)[{
(1− e−αθλA}− (2µ1αe−αθ)]− ( Ah
2µ1α2λ
)[
λA{1− e−αθ(αθ + 1)} − 2µ1α2θe−αθ
]
−
[
knλn−1
α
− (n+ A)(1− e
−αθ)(kλn+A−1)
2µ1α2
+
kAe−αθλn−1
α
]
= 0
(4.37)
The above equation gives the value of λ that would maximize the profit of the contractor.
In this expression, the value of dE(C)
dλ
is replaced from the first order condition of λ0 from
equations (4.27) and (4.32) for the cases of projects with recoverable product life and ir-
recoverable product life respectively. Rearranging the terms, the condition for g in equation
(4.34) in lemma 1 can be derived.
By the individual rationality constraint, the present contract should ensure a minimum
profit of piout for the contractor. Thus,(
λAg
2µ1α
)
(1− e−αθ)−
(
λAh
2µ1α2
)
[1− e−αθ(αθ + 1)]− kλ
n
α
[1− E{e−αT}] ≥ piout
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The values of g from the equation (4.34) is used in the above condition.
[(
h
α
) [λA{1−e−αθ(αθ+1)}−2µ1α2θe−αθ
(1−e−αθ)λA−2µ1αe−αθ
]
+ q0
] (
λA
2µ1α
)
(1− e−αθ)
−
(
λAh
2µ1α2
)
[1− e−αθ(αθ + 1)]− kλn
α
[1− E{e−αT}] ≥ piout For recoverable products
[(
h
α
) [λA{1−e−αθ(αθ+1)}−2µ1α2θe−αθ
(1−e−αθ)λA−2µ1αe−αθ
]
+ q0
(
ψ
α
)] (
λA
2µ1α
)
(1− e−αθ)
−
(
λAh
2µ1α2
)
[1− e−αθ(αθ + 1)]− kλn
α
[1− E{e−αT}] ≥ piout For irrecoverable products
The value of E(C) i.e kλ
n
α
[1 − E{e−αT}] is replaced from the profit equations (4.26) and
(4.31). Now rearranging the terms, the coordinating conditions for h in equation (4.35) in
lemma 1.
Lemma 2. A time-based contract with P(T,C) = g - hT, (where T is gamma distributed
with(w,θ)) can coordinate the decentralized project supply chain when the monetary reward
is discounted exponentially with (α), and the contract parameters satisfy
g =

q0 + h
[
w(µ1α−λA)
α(wλA+αµ1)
]
For recoverable product life
q0(
ψ
α
) + h
[
w(µ1α−λA)
α(wλA+αµ1)
]
For irrecoverable product life
(4.38)
h ≤

(pi0 − piout + Co)
{
α(wλA+αµ1)w+1
(ww+1)(λAw+A0 )
}
For recoverable product life
[pi0 − piout + Co + q0(ψα − 1)]
{
α(wλA+αµ1)w+1
(ww+1)(λAw+A0 )
}
For irrecoverable product life
(4.39)
Proof. The profit function for of the contractor for a time based contract P(T,C) = g - hT,
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where T is uniform distributed (PDF mentioned in equation 4.15) as mentioned earlier is
pico =
∞∫
0
(g − hT )e−αTfλ(T )dT − kλ
n
α
[1− E{e−αT}] (From equation 4.14)
= gE{e−αT} − h
∞∫
0
Te−αTfλ(T )− kλ
n
α
[1− E{e−αT}]
= gE{e−αT} − h
∞∫
0
Te−αTfλ(T )− kλ
n
α
[1− E{e−αT}]
It is defined that 1
θ
= φ. Replacing this in fλ(T ) in the equation (4.15) and using this in the
equation above gives
pico = gE{e−αT} − h
∞∫
0
Te−αT
[
φwe−φTTw−1
Γ(w)
]
dT − kλ
n
α
[1− E{e−αT}]
= gE{e−αT} − h
[
Γ(w + 1)
Γ(w)
] [
φw
(α + φ)w+1
] ∞∫
0
(α + φ)w+1e−(α+φ)TTw+1−1
Γ(w + 1)
dT
− kλ
n
α
[1− E{e−αT}]
= gE{e−αT} − h
[
Γ(w + 1)
Γ(w)
] [
φw
(α + φ)w+1
] ∞∫
0
(α + φ)w+1e−(α+φ)TTw+1−1
Γ(w + 1)
dT
− kλ
n
α
[1− E{e−αT}]
By definition of the gamma distribution,
∞∫
0
(α+φ)w+1e−(α+φ)TTw+1−1
Γ(w+1)
dT = 1
pico = gE{e−αT} − h
[
Γ(w + 1)
Γ(w)
] [
φw
(α + φ)w+1
]
− kλ
n
α
[1− E{e−αT}]
= gE{e−αT} − hw
[
φw
(α + φ)w+1
]
− kλ
n
α
[1− E{e−αT}]
Replacing the value of φ in terms of θ, then finally in terms of λ and using the value of
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E{e−αT} from the equation (4.25),
pico = g
(
wλA
wλA + µ1α
)w
− h
[
µ1w
w+1λAw
(µ1α + wλA)w+1
]
− kλ
n
α
[
1−
(
wλA
wλA + µ1α
)w]
(4.40)
Now differentiating the equation (4.40) with respect to λ and then setting that expression
equal to zero, the following condition is derived
[
gAµ1αw
w+1λAw−1
(wλA + µ1α)w+1
]
−
[
Ahww+2µ1λ
Aw−1(µ1α− λA)
(wλA + µ1α)w+2
]
+
[
Kλn−1{(nwλA + αµ1n+ Aαµ1w)( λAλA+αR)w − nwλA − µ1αn}
α(λA + αR)
]
= 0 (4.41)
The above equation gives the value of λ that would maximize the profit of the contractor.
In this expression, the value of dE(C)
dλ
is replaced from the first order condition of λ0 from
equations (4.28) and (4.33) for the cases of projects with recoverable product life and ir-
recoverable product life respectively. Rearranging the terms, the condition for g in equation
(4.38) in lemma 2 can be derived.
Again, by the individual rationality constraint, the present contract should ensure a mini-
mum profit of piout for the contractor. Thus,
g
(
wλA
wλA + µ1α
)w
− h
[
µ1w
w+1λAw
(µ1α + wλA)w+1
]
− kλ
n
α
[
1−
(
wλA
wλA + µ1α
)w]
≥ piout
The values of g from the equation (4.38) is used in the above condition.
[
q0 + h
{
w(µ1α−λA)
α(wλA+αµ1)
}](
wλA
wλA+µ1α
)w
− h
[
µ1ww+1λAw
(µ1α+wλA)w+1
]
− kλn
α
[
1−
(
wλA
wλA+µ1α
)w]
≥ piout
For recoverable products
[
q0(
ψ
α
) + h
{
w(µ1α−λA)
α(wλA+αµ1)
}](
wλA
wλA+µ1α
)w
− h
[
µ1ww+1λAw
(µ1α+wλA)w+1
]
− kλn
α
[
1−
(
wλA
wλA+µ1α
)w]
≥ piout
For irrecoverable products
The value of E(C) i.e kλ
n
α
[1 − E{e−αT}] is replaced from the profit equations (4.26) and
(4.31). Now rearranging the terms, the coordinating conditions for h in equation (4.39) in
lemma 2.
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The coordinating conditions in lemmas 1 and 2 should again optimize the profit of the
project manager mentioned in equation (4.13). The g value has a specific bound with the
equal sign and is a function of h in the equations (4.34) and (4.38) in lemma 1 and 2 re-
spectively. However, multiple values of h can coordinate the supply chain. For any h value
at most equal to the right-hand side of the equations (4.35) and (4.39) would coordinate the
supply chain. In the profit equation of the project manager (equation 4.13), any reduction in
the value of ”h” would reduce the profit of the project manager and vice versa. Thus, the
value of h is restricted to a maximum value that optimizes the profit of both the members,
given the constraints in the equations (4.35) and (4.39). Thus, considering the optimizing
conditions of all the members, the following are proposed:
Proposition 3. The contract parameters g* and h*, of an optimal time-based contract P(T,C)
= g - hT, (T is uniformly distributed between time 0 and θ) satisfy the following when cash-
flows are exponentially discounted with (α)
g∗ =

(
pi0−piout+Co
λA0
) [
λA0 {1−e−αθ(αθ+1)}−(2α2µ1θe−αθ)
e−αθ(αθ−1+e−αθ)
]
+ q0
For recoverable product life(
pi0−piout+Co+q0(ψα−1)
λA0
) [
λA0 {1−e−αθ(αθ+1)}−(2α2µ1θe−αθ)
e−αθ(αθ−1+e−αθ)
]
+ q0(
ψ
α
)
For irrecoverable product life
(4.42)
and
h∗ =

(
α
λA0
)
(pi0 − piout + Co)
[
{(1−e−αθ)λA0 }−(2µ1αe−αθ)
e−αθ(αθ−1−e−αθ)
]
For recoverable products(
α
λA0
) [
pi0 − piout + Co + q0(ψα − 1)
] [{(1−e−αθ)λA0 }−(2µ1αe−αθ)
e−αθ(αθ−1−e−αθ)
]
For irrecoverable products
(4.43)
Proof. As mentioned in section 4.4.2, any h value less than or equal to the right hand side
of the equation (4.35) would entice the contractor to participate in the game. However, any
reduction in h value means a reduction in the profit for the project manager and thus the results
will not be Pareto optimal and not in equilibrium. Thus, consideration of the equilibrium
solution would lead to the h* values in equation (4.43) in proposition 2. Using these values
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of h* in equation (4.34), the coordinating conditions for g in equation (4.42) in proposition 2
can be derived.
Similar to the case of uniform distributed time, the following is proposed for the gamma
distributed time
Proposition 4. The contract parameters g* and h*, of an optimally coordinated time-based
contract P(T,C)=g-hT, (T is gamma distributed with (w,θ)) satisfy the following when the
cash-flows are exponentially discounted with (α)
g∗ =

q0 + (pi0 − piout + Co)
[
(wλA0 +αµ1)
w(αw−λA0 )
(ww)(λAw+A0 )
]
For recoverable product life
q0(
ψ
α
) + [pi0 − piout + Co + q0(ψα − 1)]
[
(wλA0 +αµ1)
w(αw−λA0 )
(ww)(λAw+A0 )
]
For irrecoverable product life
(4.44)
and
h∗ =
(pi0 − piout + Co)
{
α(wλA+αµ1)w+1
(ww+1)(λAw+A0 )
}
For recoverable product life
[pi0 − piout + Co + q0(ψα − 1)]
{
α(wλA+αµ1)w+1
(ww+1)(λAw+A0 )
}
For irrecoverable product life
(4.45)
Proof. Following the same set of steps as shown in the case of uniform distribution, the
coordinating conditions for g and h can be derived for gamma distributed time with PDF in
equation (4.15) in a similar way to the uniform distributed time.
The values of E{e−αT} were shown in the section 4.4.1 to take a non-closed form for a
beta and a Weibull distributed times. Based on this, the following is proposed
Proposition 5. For a beta or Weibull distributed project completion time T with exponentially
discounted cash-flows, the closed form of coordinating conditions are not available.
4.4.3 Decentralized Setting with Fixed Price Contracts
A fixed price contract P(T,C) = f is used to derive the models when cash-flows are exponen-
tially discounted. This value of P(T,C) is used in the equations (4.13) and (4.14). Differen-
tiating the profit function of the contractor with respect to λ, and setting that equal to zero,
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the optimal value of λ is solved. Equating this value with the first best solution, the required
coordinating condition is derived as f ≥ q . If f = q, then the profit to be earned by the
project manager would be zero. Thus, the following is proposed:
Proposition 6. If cash-flows are exponentially discounted and the project completion
time is a decreasing function of resource consumption rate (λ), then a fixed price contract
cannot coordinate the project supply chain under consideration. This also supports the find-
ings of Kwon et al. (2010). This is applicable for project completion time with any form of
continuous distributions.
4.5 Numerical Analysis and Results
In this section, the models proposed in the last few sections are illustrated with numerical
values. The proposed models can be illustrated with the data from any project supply chain.
However, in this research, the models are mostly illustrated to be fit in with the data from the
construction sector. This is because of the enormous importance of the construction sector
to the economy. As per the UK Contractor Group (2012), every £1 spent in the construction
sector, generates £2.84 in output. Moreover, the construction sector value chain is worth 14%
of UK’s overall GDP (UKCG, 2012).
4.5.1 For polynomial discounted cash-flows
It is assumed that the project value follows the following equation q(T ) = 30− 1.5T where
ψ = 0.05 and q0 = £ 30,000. In practice, the value of A in equation (4.1) would usually be
less than 1 with a maximum value of 1, but for simplicity, it is assumed that A = 1 in this
numerical analysis. The resource cost per unit time has been considered as kλn. Following
Savaskan & Van Wassenhove (2006) and Swami & Shah (2013b), we assume that n = 2. k
can be considered as the resource price per unit per unit time. Assuming an average wage
of £10 per hour, with 20 hours. per week, the approximate value of k is assigned as £ 200
per week. In the existing literature by Kwon et al. (2010), the authors did not consider the
costs incurred by the project manager which are independent of λ. According to Potts &
Ankrah (2014), these costs can vary between 50-70 percent of the overall cost. The Co value
is considered as £ 15,000. The minimum profit to be earned by the contractor if the current
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contract fails, is assumed piout = £1,800. The value of λ was derived as resource unit per
week.
For polynomial discounting, if m=1, then the project reward is discounted linearly. From
equations (4.18) and (4.19), we get the unique set of solutions for the first best profit and
first best resource consumption rate for the uniform, gamma, beta and Weibull distributed
completion time as pi0 = q0 − q0.ψ
[
µ1
λA0
]
− kµ1λN0 − Co and λ0 =
[
Aq0ψ
kN
] 1
A+N respectively.
The optimal values of h* and g* from equations (4.20) and (4.21) are: h∗ = q0ψ and g∗ =
q0 − (pi0 − piout) − Co . The profits are presented in figure 4.1 and in table D.1 (in appendix
D). An increase in the value of h while keeping g constant reduces(increases) the profit of
Figure 4.1: Profit values and Efficiency for polynomial discounted cash-flows with m=1
the contractor (project manager) and vice-versa. The total profit increases at first. Then, it
reaches the maximum first best solution for profit value of 6.24 at g = 10.56 and h = 1.5. After
that, it starts to decline. This can be explained by setting the value of h=0. When h attains
a value of zero, the contract becomes a fixed price contract equivalent. It yields a value of
selected resource consumption rate (λ) as zero and the profit functions become undefined (-
∞). This fails to coordinate the supply chain. This supports the findings from the proposition
2. Thus, any positive entry of h above zero would increase the profit of both the members of
the supply chain and eventually total profit at first. However, further increasing h reduced the
contractor’s profit and increased the project manager’s profit. In the beginning, the increase
in project manager’s profit overcomes the decrease in contractor’s profit. As a result, the total
profit increased slowly until it reached the first best solution. After that, the reduction of
contractor’s profit was found to be substantial. As a result, the total profit starts to drop from
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the maximum value with every positive increment of h.
On the contrary, keeping h constant at the optimal value of 1.5, changing the g values was
found to have no impact on the total profit of the decentralized setting. However, this has an
impact on the individual profit share of the members in the decentralized setting. Increasing
g while keeping h constant increases (reduces) the profit of the contractor (project manager)
and vice-versa. Thus, setting h constant at the optimal solution, multiple values of g can
yield the total decentralized profit equal to the first best solution. However, if the members of
the supply chain can earn a minimum profit outside the present contract, then there exists an
individual rationality constraint. This makes some of the solutions to be invalid in the given
context.
Furthermore, the values of the exponent m are changed. λ0 was found to be increasing
with the increase in increase in m. This caused a decrease in first best profit pi0. In fact, after
m started attaining some higher values of 3 or 4 or above, the optimal pi0 values, started to
become negative. On those, cases the proposed model would become invalid for the supply
chain under consideration. The results are presented in table D.2 in Appendix D.
4.5.2 For exponential discounted cash-flows
For the numerical example, the effective value of project reward is assumed as q0 = £4 million.
α is the continuous discounting rate. According to the Govt. of UK., Cabinet Office (2015),
the present discount rate in practice is 3.5%. This research assumed the value as 0.04. Co is
assumed as £2 million. It is also assumed that µ1 is 10 years and piout = £0.25 million.
Furthermore, the per hour wage for the work is assumed as £15. The worker will be
employed for 150 hours each month of the year. This approximates to a value of k = 0.03 per
year. n is assumed to be 2 as before (to be consistent with the previous literature) and again
A is assumed as 1
For recoverable product life
In this case, it was assumed that the product life is recoverable upon completion of the
projects. Thus, any project reward reduction due to anticipated revenue loss is not considered.
The results for the profits are presented in figures 4.2 and 4.3.
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Figure 4.2: Profit values for Uniform Distribution with exponential cash-flows and time-
based contracts
Figure 4.3: Profit values for Gamma Distribution with exponential cash-flows and time-based
contracts
Once again in the decentralized setting, keeping g as constant at the optimal value (1.55
for uniform, and 1.54 for gamma), increasing h was found to be reducing (increasing) the
profit of the contractor (project manager) and vice-versa. Again the total profit increased at
first. Then, it reached the maximum first best solution of the profit value (0.77 for uniform
and 0.78 for gamma) for the optimal values of h (0.13 for bothe the distributions). After that,
these values started to decline.
Similar results are found as found in section 4.5.1 while keeping h constant at the optimal
values and changing g. Changing g was not found to have any considerable impact on the
overall profit.
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For irrecoverable product life
Similar results were derived for this case as for the case with recoverable product life. The
product life of the outcome of the project cannot be recovered if there is any delay in com-
pletion. Thus, a polynomial reduction of project reward was considered with the discounting
factor ψ = 0.05 times the project value per unit time. The results are presented in the figures
4.4 and 4.5.
Figure 4.4: Profit values for uniform distributed time with exponential cash-flows and time-
based contracts for irrecoverable product life
Figure 4.5: Profit values for gamma distributed time with exponential cash-flows and time-
based contracts for irrecoverable product life
Once again in the decentralized setting, keeping g as constant at the optimal value (1.72
for uniform, and 1.71 for gamma), increasing h was found to be reducing (increasing) the
profit of the contractor (project manager) and vice-versa. Again the total profit increased at
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first. Then, it reached the maximum first best solution of profit value (0.61 for uniform and
0.62 for gamma) for optimal values of h (0.17 for both the distributions). After that, these
values started to decline.
Comparing the results of the two scenarios of the long-term projects in sections 4.5.2
and 4.5.2, there are similar results for both the distributions. Both the contract parameters
have increased in the case of the polynomial reduction in comparison to the nonreduction.
However, the first best profit has decreased in the case of the polynomial reduction of project
reward in comparison to the case with no reduction of reward.
4.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the contractual solution to the problems of non-coordination in a
project supply chain with the help of Stackelberg leader-follower games in a take it or leave it
situation. The project manager was considered as a leader and the contractor was considered
as a follower. Starting from the models proposed by Bayiz & Corbett (2005) and Kwon et al.
(2010) as a reference, this chapter proposed the models to cover distributions more commonly
used for project completion times (Uniform, Gamma, Beta, and Weibull).
For short-term projects, the irrecoverable loss of revenue from delayed completion was
considered as the motivating factor for the early completion of the projects. The proposed
models with polynomial reduction of project reward with respect to time is an extension of
the linear reduction proposed by Bayiz & Corbett (2005). The contractual conditions for g
and h were found to be similar irrespective of the nature of the distribution. On the one hand,
the condition for g depends on the pi0, piout, Co, m,n, and A. The pi0 value would change
depending upon the nature of the distribution. On the other hand, the optimal conditions for
h depend on k, m, N, A, and λ0. The value of λ0 would change depending on the type of
distribution. Accordingly, the expressions for g and h would change depending on the nature
of the distribution.
Similarities among the solutions were also found in some other forms. The uniform
distributed T was found as a special case of beta distributed T with u=1 and v=1. This
was also supported by the same optimal conditions for g* and h* by putting u=1 and v=1
and using other numerical values. Similarly if w=1, then the gamma distributed T would
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become exponential. Similarly, when s=1, the Weibull distribution becomes an exponential
distribution.
Interestingly, for m = 1, i.e. for the case of linear reduction of project value with respect to
time, the optimal coordinating conditions for g and h were found to be the same irrespective
of any distribution. This was derived from the numerical analysis of the models. It was also
found that with the increase in the value of m, the first best profit (pi0) decreases for any
distribution of project completion time. This was due to the rapid increase in the resource
consumption rate to avoid high penalty of delay. As a result, the coordination opportunities
became restrictive. In fact, after the m value started attaining values such as 3 or 4, the first
best profit became negative. The proposed models may mathematically ensure the contracts
to achieve the same profit as the first best profit. However, in practice, this is never a solution
due to the profits being negative.
The models for long-term projects were derived with polynomial reduction of project re-
ward alongside the exponential discounting. The exponential discounting of the cash-flows
were considered to take into account the time value of money. As an extension to the paper of
(Kwon et al. 2010), this research considered two cases: one with the recoverable operational
life upon project completion and the other with irrecoverable operational life upon project
completion. In both these cases, a wider range of distribution of completion times (Uniform,
Gamma, Beta, and Weibull) was considered. For the case of irrecoverable operational product
life upon project completion, a reduction of project reward as a polynomial function of com-
pletion time was considered. In addition, all the cash-flows were exponentially discounted.
However, for the case of recoverable operational product life, any reduction of project reward
was not considered, but only exponential discounting of cash-flows to take into account the
time value of money. The tractable optimal solutions for a uniform and gamma distributed
time were found. However, the closed form of solutions was not found for beta and Weibull
distributed.
The optimal coordinating conditions of the parameters g and h of a time-based contract
were found to be different for the different distributions. However, using the values of w=1,
µ1, A=1 and Co = 0, the optimal conditions for gamma distribution converts to the optimal
conditions of an exponential distribution proposed in the original research of Kwon et al.
(2010).
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The fixed price contracts failed to coordinate (in any of the cases this research explored)
the project supply chain under consideration in the Stackelberg game settings. This supports
the findings of Kwon et al. (2010). However, the fixed price contracts are still very popular
in practice due to their simplicity in application.
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Chapter 5
Supply Chain Coordination using Project
Contracts: With Bargaining Games
In chapter 4 of this thesis, the supply chain coordination models were presented with Stack-
elberg games. The two main features of these type of models were: the nature of the game
as a take it or leave it situation and the first mover’s advantage. The project manager was
the first mover in those games. She offered a take it or leave it type of contract to the con-
tractor. If the contractor disagreed with the offered contract, the game terminated. Moreover,
the project manager had the first mover’s advantage due to the bargaining power she had.
This type of situation is very common in projects in practice such as construction projects.
However, pieces of evidence of bargaining in project setting from practice were found in the
study of Bajari et al. (2009). The authors mentioned about the negotiated contracts in the
North California building construction sector region during 1995-2000. Most of the building
contracts in Dubai were re-negotiated post economic downturn in 2008 (Bertenshaw 2012).
The application of bargaining models in supply chain management (with special refer-
ence to supply chain coordination) has received relatively less attention in comparison with
other approaches of game theoretic models. As mentioned earlier, most empirical evidence
indicates that the solutions of the bargaining process approaches the Nash’s bargaining solu-
tion. This bargaining concepts have been used in the literature of Gan et al. (2011), Gjerdrum
et al. (2002), He & Zhao (2012), He & Zhao (2012), Hezarkhani & Kubiak (2010), Huang
& Li (2001), Li et al. (2009), Nagarajan & Bassok (2008), Yan (2011), and Ye & Xu (2010).
Nash bargaining has been used for several supply chain issues such as optimization of in-
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ventory (Gjerdrum et al. 2002, Ye & Xu 2010), cooperative advertising (Huang & Li 2001),
cost sharing (Ye & Xu 2010), and profit sharing (Li et al. 2009, Yan 2011). The extended
version of Nash bargaining model has also been used in different supply chain structures
with more than two members such as multi-echelon supply chain (He & Zhao 2012), and
single assembler-n supplier assembly supply chain (Nagarajan & Bassok 2008). One of the
limitations of supply chain coordination literature identified in chapter 2 is the less focus on
the risk preference of the members of the supply chain. Members have been assumed as
risk neutral. However, authors including Gan et al. (2011), He & Zhao (2012), and Huang
& Li (2001) used a Nash bargaining approach to propose optimal solutions with differential
risk preference of the members of the supply chain. As an extension to Nash bargaining,
authors including Hezarkhani & Kubiak (2010) and Lin et al. (2010) used generalized Nash
bargaining which takes into account the differential bargaining power of the supply chain
members. The notable feature of these supply chains is that they are supply chains with prod-
uct demand as a decision variable. Other notable use of bargaining models in supply chain
includes Rubinstein bargaining model (Zhang, Wang & Ren 2014) and a few other non-zero
sum bargaining algorithm Sucky (2005, 2006) .
In contrast to the supply chains mentioned in last paragraph, the application of bargaining
concepts in a project setting is very limited. Chapter 4 highlighted the limited research on
the supply chain coordination in a project setting (Kwon et al. 2010, Lippman et al. 2013).
The few models which exist are based on take it or leave it situations (Bayiz & Corbett 2005,
Kwon et al. 2010, Lippman et al. 2013). It is highlighted in chapter 4 that very few models
of supply chain coordination exist in the literature. (Bayiz and Corbett, 2005; Kwon et al,
2010; Lippman et al., 2013). Most importantly models with project contracts in bargaining
situations are very rare. To the best knowledge of the author of the present research, only
the models proposed by Lippman et al. (2013) have considered bargaining games between
the members of the supply chain. However, these models are also restricted by the nature
of the statistical distributions for the cost variable. The authors used a normally distributed
cost function for their model. However, in practice, cost data usually have high Skewness
and Kurtosis values. This has been supported in the literature of Back et al. (2000) where the
authors used a triangular distribution. Thus, the existing model proposed by (Lippman et al.
2013) might not work correctly with a cost function distributed as a non-normal continuous
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distributions. This has motivated the present research to investigate and extend the model
proposed by (Lippman et al. 2013) with the cost data following other continuous distributions.
These are investigated with the help of Nash bargaining models primarily. This is because of
its reputation of usage in supply chain literature as a tool. Moreover, chapter 3 highlighted
that mostly of the empirical bargaining solutions approach Nash bargaining. In addition,
this research also investigated the models with Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining approach and
Utilitarian bargaining approach.
5.1 Problem Description
A dyadic supply chain with one project manager and one contractor is considered. As men-
tioned in chapter 4, the project manager is referred as she and the contractor is considered as
he. Similar to chapter 4, this research assumes the project manager and the contractor both as
risk neutral in the first case. However, there are cases in practice (particularly in construction
projects) where the situation is different. The project manager belong to a large scale organi-
zation with financial ability to take risks from projects whereas, their counterpart contractor
belong to a small scale organization with limited ability to take risk. Thus, in this context,
the project manager is considered to be risk neutral and the contractor is considered as risk
averse. Thus, this research assumes the project manager as risk neutral and the contractor is
assumed as risk neutral at first. Then, the models are also derived with risk averse contractors
as well. In order to maintain consistency with the existing literature, the bargaining models
are analysed using the utility maximizing supply chain members.
By definition from the investment management theory, the utility function for a risk neu-
tral member should have a constant marginal return (Haugen 2001, Levy & Levy 2002) i.e.
it should satisfy the following d
2ui
dz2
= 0 [where ui(z) is the utility function of member i and
z is the wealth value]. This requirement is satisfied by a linear form of utility function with
respect to wealth. Thus for, the risk neutral project manager and the risk neutral contractor,
the utility functions are as follows
upm(z) = z (5.1)
uco(z) = z (5.2)
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From the expected utility theory proposed by Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) as mentioned
in (Von Neumann & Morgenstern 2007), a risk averse contractor’s utility function should
satisfy the diminishing marginal return (Haugen 2001, Levy & Levy 2002, Davies & Satchell
2007), i.e. the utility function should satisfy d
2uco
dz2
< 0. This condition can be satisfied as
long as the utility function is concave in nature (Levy & Levy 2002). This can be achieved
by using: logerthemic form, exponential form, and quadratic form (Haugen 2001). However,
the decreasing exponential form of utility function among the other concave forms is the
most common one (Corner & Corner 1995). Use of exponential form of risk averse utility
function yields the constant Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient. This would ensure
no change in the risk premium with respect to the absolute risk aversion. Thus, the utility
function for the contractor is assumed as below
uco(z) = 1− e−ηz (5.3)
The sequence of events are as follows
• The project manager has a project of value q
• She needs to outsource the project to an external contractor. So she offered a cost based
contract P.
• The contractor can either accept or reject the contract.
• If he rejects the contract, then unlike the ultimatum game in chapter 4, the game doesn’t
terminate. The game would be subjected to bargaining.
• When he accepts the contract, then he needs to select a resource consumption rate as
mentioned earlier in chapter 4. It can be easily shown that for optimal conditions, the
resource consumption rate is not affected by the the contract parameters of a cost based
contract or it doesn’t affect the optimal contract parameters of the cost based contract.
• Upon completion, the project manager verifies the cost of completion and makes the
payment to the contractor.
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5.1.1 For cost based contracts
For a cost based contract, P takes the form of P = a+ bX; where X is the cost function to the
contractor. The cost based contract has two parameters a and b. It is assumed that a > 0
and b ∈ [0, 1]. a is the fixed component of the contract. b is the variable component of the
contract. When b=0, the cost based(sharing) contract is equivalent to a fixed price contract.
When b=1, the contract is equivalent to a cost plus contract. For ease of exposition, the
time value of money is ignored from this model. Thus, the expected utility functions can be
derived as follows from the equations (5.1, (5.2), and (5.3)
For the project manager
Upm = E[q − (a+ bX)] = q − a− bE(X) (5.4)
For a risk neutral contractor
Uco = E[(a+ bX)−X] = a− (1− b)E(X) (5.5)
For a risk averse contractor
Uco = 1− e−η{(a+bX)−X}
= 1− E[e−η{a−(1−b)X}]
= 1− e−ηaE[eη(1−b)X ] (5.6)
[Where the X is the cost function (a random variable)].
5.1.2 For time based contracts
It is assumed that the time based contract takes the form of P=g-hT. g is the fixed element of
the contract and h is the variable element of the contract that entices the contractor to finish
early. It was also shown in chapter 4 that the cost incurred by the contractor depends on
the resource consumption rate λ and takes the form kλn per unit time and a total of kλnT
over time T. The expected time taken to complete the project as µ1 if one unit of resource
is deployed (as assumed before in chapter 4). Thus, the average time for completion of the
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project becomes µT = µ1λA . Using this, the cost of the contractor becomes
[
k
(
µ1
µT
)N
A
T
]
. The
utility functions of the project manager and the contractor are derived as below
For the project manager
Upm = E[q − (g − hT )] = q − g + hE(T ) (5.7)
For a risk neutral contractor
Uco = E[(g − hT )− kλnT ] = g − hE(T )− E
{
k
(
µ1
µT
) n
A
T
}
= g − hE(T )− ΩµT (5.8)[
where Ω = k
(
µ1
µT
) n
A
]
For a risk averse contractor
Uco = 1− E[e−η{(g−hT )−kλnT}] = 1− e−ηgE[eηhT ]E
[
e
ηk
(
µ1
µT
) n
A T
]
= 1− e−ηgE[eηhT ]E [eηΩT ] (5.9)
T is assumed as a random variable in all the above cases. Now µT is the expected value of T
i.e. µT = E(T ). Thus, taking the expectation of the expectation becomes constant number
which is no longer a random variable. Thus, taking expected value for these will be the value
itself. Hence, these are considered as constant. Thus, Ω becomes constant.
5.2 Bargaining Models of Supply Chain Coordination with
Cost Based Contracts: Nash’s Bargaining
Given b ∈ [0, 1], the project manager and the contractor would maximize the Nash product
N(a,b) as below
N∗ = max : N(a, b) (5.10)
where
N(a, b) = UPM(a, b) ∗ Uco(a, b) (5.11)
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5.2.1 For risk neutral project manager and risk neutral contractor
For risk neutral project manager and contractor, the optimal Nash’s product becomes
max
a,b∈[0,1]
N(a, b) = {q − a− bµ}{a− (1− b)µ} [whereµ= E(x) ] (5.12)
Differentiating the equation (5.12) with respect to a and setting equal to zero, the first order
condition for a can be derived as below
a =
q + (1− 2b)µ
2
(5.13)
Thus, for a fixed price contract with b = 0, the optimal a0 satisfies a0 = q+µ2 . Using these
values, the utility for the project manager and the contractor become
For the project manager
Upm = q − q + µ
2
=
q − µ
2
(5.14)
For the contractor
Uco =
q + µ
2
− µ = q − µ
2
(5.15)
On the contrary, for a cost plus contract with b =1, the optimal a1 satisfies a1 = q−µ2 . Using
these observation in the utility equations of the project manager and the contractor, it can be
shown that their utilities are the same as those found in equations (5.14) and (5.15).
Thus, the optimal utilities derived from Nash’s bargaining for a risk neutral project man-
ager and risk neutral a contractor are equal and half of the value of the maximum possible
value of the utility. More importantly, the the solution is same for fixed price and cost plus
contracts in this case. Due to simplicity of implementation, fixed price contracts may be
preferred by the members in practice in these cases.
5.2.2 For risk neutral project manager and risk averse contractor
As mentioned in the problem description, there are situations in practice where the contractors
belong to a small organization in comparison to the project manager. Due to this financial
constraint, the contractor would be more risk averse in comparison to the project manager.
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Thus, this subsection considers the project manager as risk neutral and the contractor as risk
averse. The utility functions for the project manager and contractor are as defined in the
equations (5.4) and (5.6). Lippman et al. (2013) used a normally distributed cost function
X. However, this is very unlikely in practice. Thus, this research extends the model with
different forms of probability distribution for cost function X including: gamma, exponential,
beta; and Weibull.
As defined earlier, the expected valueE(X) = µ. Furthermore, it is defined thatE[e−η(1−b)X ] =
W . As mentioned by Lippman et al. (2013), this research also assumes the term ”W” repre-
sents the expected risk exposure of the contractor. Thus, using these values in the equation
(5.11) gives
N(a, b) = (q − a− bµ)(1− e−ηaW ) (5.16)
In order to get the optimal first best value, differentiating equation (5.16) with respect to a
and setting that equal to zero gives the first order condition as
ηW (−a− bµ+ q)e−ηa +We−ηa − 1 = 0 (5.17)
On the one hand, with b =0, the contract becomes a fixed price contract. On the other hand,
with b=1, the contract becomes pure cost plus contract. Thus,
a = a0 and W = W0 for fixed price contractsa = a1 and W = W1 for cost plus contracts
It can be easily shown when b = 1, W1 = 1 . Both these contract’s (fixed price and cost plus)
parameters should satisfy the first best condition in equation (5.17). Thus, using the values
of a and W from above, the following conditions can be derived
For fixed price
W0 [η(−a0 + q) + 1] e−ηa0 − 1 = 0 (5.18)
For cost plus
[η(−a1 − µ+ q) + 1]e−ηa1 − 1 = 0 (5.19)
The W value can be calculated based on the concepts of moment generating functions as
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below
W = E[etX ] =

1
(1−φt)ω
gamma distributed cost with shape parameterω and scale parameterφ
1
(1−φt)
exponential distributed cost with scale parameterφ
1 +
∞∑
i=1
(
φi
i−1∏
r=0
c+r
c+d+r
)
ti
i!
beta distributed cost with shape parameters c & d and scaleφ
1 +
∞∑
i=1
[
tiφi
i!
Γ
(
1 + i
S
)]
Weibull distributed cost with shape parameter s and scale parameterφ
(5.20)
where t = η(1− b)
Thus, for a fixed price contract with b = 0 and a cost plus contract with b=1, the following
can be derived
W = W0 =

1
(1−ηφ)ω
gamma distributed cost following equation (5.20)
1
(1−ηφ)
exponential distributed cost following equation (5.20)
1 +
∞∑
i=1
(
φi
i−1∏
r=0
c+r
c+d+r
)
ηi
i!
beta distributed cost following equation (5.20)
1 +
∞∑
i=1
[
ηiφi
i!
Γ
(
1 + i
S
)]
Weibull distributed cost following equation (5.20)
and
W = 1 for cost plus contracts with b=1 for all the selected distributions (5.21)
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Thus, the mean value µ for the cost functions are as follows
µ =

ωφ gamma distributed cost with shape parameterω and scale parameterφ
φ exponential distributed cost with scale parameterφ
φ
(
c
c+d
)
beta distributed cost following equation (5.20)
φΓ
(
1 + 1
s
)
Weibull distributed cost with shape parameter s and scale parameterφ
(5.22)
Using these values of W (Including W0) and µ in equation (5.17), the optimal condition for
the contract parameter a can be determined for the selected distributions of cost function.
This is summarised in the following lemmas.
Lemma 3. The optimal value of contract parameter a0 of a cost based contract P= a+bX
that maximizes the Nash product, satisfies the following conditions if b = 0

[
1
(1−ηφ)ω
]
[η(−a0 + q) + 1] e−ηa0 − 1 = 0 for a gamma distributed cost
[
1
(1−ηφ)
]
[η(−a0 + q) + 1] e−ηa0 − 1 = 0 for an exponentially distributed cost
[
1 +
∞∑
i=1
(
φi
i−1∏
r=0
c+r
c+d+r
)
ηi
i!
]
[η(−a0 + q) + 1] e−ηa0 − 1 = 0 for a beta distributed cost
[
1 +
∞∑
i=1
{
ηiφi
i!
Γ
(
1 + i
S
)}]
[η(−a0 + q) + 1] e−ηa0 − 1 = 0 for an Weibull distributed cost
(5.23)
Lemma 4. The optimal value of contract parameter a1 of a cost based contract P= a+bX
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that maximizes the Nash product, satisfies the following conditions if b = 1

[η(−a1 − ωφ+ q) + 1] e−ηa1 − 1 = 0 for a gamma distributed cost
[η(−a1 − φ+ q) + 1] e−ηa1 − 1 = 0 for an exponentially distributed cost[
η(−a1 − φcc+d + q) + 1
]
e−ηa1 − 1 = 0 for a beta distributed cost[
η
{−a1 − φΓ (1 + 1s)+ q}+ 1] e−ηa1 − 1 = 0 for an exponential distributed cost
(5.24)
Lippman et al. (2013) proposed a method to identify the optimal value of b for b ∈ [0, 1].
However, this method is difficult to be applied when X follows a non-normal continuous
distribution. Thus, an alternate method proposed in their literature is used in this research.
The alternate method is based on sign tests of the derivatives. Using this alternate method,
Nash product or the individual utility functions of the members of the supply chain can be
shown as either increasing or decreasing in b. Accordingly, it can be concluded whether fixed
price, cost based or cost plus contract dominates the solution. Thus, differentiating equation
(5.11) with respect to b
dN(a, b)
db
= Uco
(
dUPM
db
)
+ UPM
(
dUco
db
)
(5.25)
Differentiating equation (5.4) with respect to b, and using the value of E(x) = µ
dUPM
db
= −da
db
− µ (5.26)
Rearranging the terms from equation (5.17),
(q − a− bµ) = 1− e
−ηaW
ηe−ηaW
=
1− A
ηA
[where A = e−ηaW ] (5.27)
Differentiating equation(5.27)
−da
db
− µ = − 1
ηA2
dA
db
(5.28)
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Now
dA
db
= −ηe−ηaW da
db
+ e−ηA
dW
db
(5.29)
Using this values of W and dA
db
from (5.29) in equation (5.28)
− da
db
− µ = − 1
ηA2
[
−ηAda
db
+
A
W
dW
db
]
or[
−da
db
− µ
] [
1 +
1
A
]
=
[
−
(
1
ηAW
)
dW
db
−
(
1
A
µ
)]
or[
−da
db
− µ
] [
1 +
1
A
]
= − 1
A
[(
1
ηW
)
dW
db
+ µ
]
(5.30)
As mentioned earlier, Uco = 1 − e−ηaW . Based on the assumption made in equation (5.27),
Uco = 1− A. Thus, differentiating both side with respect to b
dUco
db
= −dA
db
(5.31)
Thus, the signs of dUpm
db
and dUco
db
depend on the signs of dW
db
and dA
db
respectively. The sign
tests of these derivatives depend on the nature of distribution of the cost function X. Thus, the
next few subsections analyse the case for gamma, exponential, beta, and Weibull distributed
cost functions.
Gamma Distributed Cost
dW
db
= − ηφω{1− ηφ(1− b)}ω+1 = −
Wηφω
{1− ηφ(1− b)} (5.32)
As assumed before, η > 0. It can also be shown that q − a0 > 0; otherwise the project
manager’s utility would be negative and she would never participate in the bargaining. From
the equation (5.23), it can be shown that 1
(1−ηφ)ω > 0 when η and φ both are positive. Thus,
ηφ < 1.
It is also assumed before that 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. This leads to 0 ≤ ηφ(1 − b) < 1 and
1− ηφ(1− b) > 0. Thus, the value of dW
db
is negative. This means W is a decreasing function
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of b.
Now using the value of µ from the equation (5.22) and the value of dW
db
from equation (5.32)
in equation (5.30),
[
−da
db
− ωφ
](
1 +
1
A
)
= − 1
A
[(
1
ηW
){ −ηWφω
1− ηφ(1− b)
}
+ ωφ
]
= −ωφ
A
[−1 + 1− ηφ(1− b)
{1− ηφ(1− b)}
]
=
[
ωηφ2(1− b)
A{1− ηφ(1− b)}
]
or
[
−da
db
− ωφ
]
=
(
1
1 + A
)[
ωηφ2(1− b)
{1− ηφ(1− b)}
]
(5.33)
In the equation (5.33), the right hand side of the equation is positive with 0 ≤ b < 1 and zero
with b =1. Thus, the value of the term (−da
db
− ωφ) is: positive with 0 ≤ b < 1 ; and zero
with b =1 for a gamma distributed cost function X. Using this observation in equation (5.26),
UPM is found to be increasing in b in the range 0 ≤ b < 1 and attains the maximum with b =
1. This means q − a1 − bωφ > q − a0 i.e. a1 + ωbφ < a0.
Rearranging the terms from equation(5.28) and using the value of µ,
[
−da
db
− ωφ
] (
ηA2
)
= −dA
db
From equation (5.33), −da
db
− ωφ > 0 with 0 ≤ b < 1 and zero with b =1. It is also
assumed earlier that η > 0. Thus, −dA
db
> 0. This leads to the conclusion that
dUco
db
≥ 0
This means Uco is increasing in b with 0 ≤ b < 1 and attains the maximum with b=1.
Using these above observations in equation (5.25), it can be shown that dN
db
> 0 [for
0 ≤ b < 1] and dN
db
= 0 [for b=1]. These observations are summarized in the following
lemma
Lemma 5. With a cost based contract P=a+bX (where cost function X follows a gamma dis-
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tribution), The Nash product and the utility functions of the project manager & the contractor
are higher under cost plus contract than under the fixed price contract or any cost sharing
contract (0 < b < 1).
Exponential Distributed Cost
Similar to the case in gamma distributed cost, following the same argument, it can be shown
that (1 − ηφ) > 0 or ηφ < 1, otherwise the project manager would never participate in the
bargaining. It is also assumed before that 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. Thus, 0 ≤ 1− η(1− b)φ ≤ 1
Now
dW
db
= − ηφ{1− ηφ(1− b)}2 = −ηφW
2 (5.34)
As assumed earlier, η > 0 and φ > 0. Thus, the value of dW
db
is negative. This means W is a
decreasing function of b and from the observation in the beginning of the section, W ≥ 1.
Similar to the calculations with gamma distributed cost, using this value of dA
db
, W and µ
in equation (5.30) and rearranging the terms, it can be shown that
[
−da
db
− φ
]
=
(
1
1 + A
)[
ηφ2(1− b)
{1− ηφ(1− b)}
]
(5.35)
In equation (5.35), the right hand side of the equation is positive with 0 ≤ b < 1 and zero
with b =1. Thus the term −da
db
− φ > 0 with 0 ≤ b < 1 ; and zero with b =1 for an
exponentially distributed cost function. Using the observation from equation (5.26), Upm is
found to be increasing in the range 0 ≤ b < 1 ; and maximum with b =1. This means
q − a1 − bφ > q − a0 or a1 + bφ < a0
Similar to the gamma distributed cost function, using the observation from equation (5.35)
in equation (5.28), it can be shown that −dA
db
≥ 0. This leads to the conclusion that for an
exponentially distributed cost,
dUco
db
≥ 0
This means Uco is increasing in b with 0 ≤ b < 1 and attains the maximum with b = 1.
Using these above observations in equation (5.25), it can be shown that dN
db
> 0 [for
0 ≤ b < 1] and dN
db
= 0 [for b=1]. These observations are summarized in the following
lemma
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Lemma 6. With a cost based contract P=a+bX (where cost function X follows an exponen-
tial distribution), The Nash product and the utility functions of the project manager & the
contractor are higher under a cost plus contract than under a fixed price contract or any cost
sharing contract (0 < b < 1).
Beta Distributed Cost
Differentiating the equation (5.20) with respect to b for the beta distributed cost gives
dW
db
= −
∞∑
i=1
{
i−1∏
r=0
φi
(
c+ r
c+ d+ r
)}
iηi(1− b)i−1
i!
(5.36)
As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 and η > 0. Thus, the value of dW
db
is
negative with 0 ≤ b < 1, and becomes zero with b = 1. By taking the second derivative of
W with respect to b, d
2W
db2
would become positive. This means W is a convex and decreasing
function of b with 0 ≤ b < 1 and attains the minimum value of one with b = 1.
Using the value of µ of beta distributed cost from equation (5.22) in equation (5.30)
[
−da
db
− φc
c+ d
](
1 +
1
A
)
= − 1
A
[
1
ηW
(
dW
db
)
+
(
φc
c+ d
)]
(5.37)
Expanding the values from equation (5.36)
dW
db
= −
(
ηφc
c+ d
)
−
(
2η2(1− b)φ2c(c+ 1)
2!(c+ d)(c+ d+ 1)
)
−
(
3η3(1− b)2φ3c(c+ 1)(c+ 2)
3!(c+ d)(c+ d+ 1)(c+ d+ 2)
)
− · · ·
= −
(
ηφc
c+ d
)[
1 +
(
η(1− b)φ(c+ 1)
(c+ d+ 1)
)
+
(
η2(1− b)2φ2(c+ 1)(c+ 2)
2!(c+ d+ 1)(c+ d+ 2)
)
+ · · ·
]
(5.38)
Using this value of dW
db
in the right hand side of the equation(5.37)
− 1
A
[
1
ηW
(
dW
db
)
+
(
φc
c+ d
)]
=
(
ηφc
c+d
) [
1 +
(
η(1−b)φ(c+1)
(c+d+1)
)
+
(
η2(1−b)2φ2(c+1)(c+2)
2!(c+d+1)(c+d+2)
)
+ · · ·
]
ηAW
− 1
A
(
φc
c+ d
)
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or
− 1
A
[
1
ηW
(
dW
db
)
+
(
φc
c+ d
)]
=
1
A
(
φc
c+ d
) 1 +
(
η(1−b)φ(c+1)
(c+d+1)
)
+
(
η2(1−b)2φ2(c+1)(c+2)
2!(c+d+1)(c+d+2)
)
+ · · ·
1 + η(1− b) [ φc
c+d
]
+ η
2(1−b)2
2!
[
φ2c(c+1)
(c+d)(c+d+1)
]
+ · · ·
− 1

[expanding W]
or
− 1
A
[
1
ηW
(
dW
db
)
+
(
φc
c+ d
)]
=
1
A
(
φc
c+ d
)η(1− b)φ
(
(c+1)
(c+d+1)
− c
c+d
)
+ η
2(1−b)2φ2
2!
(
(c+1)(c+2)
(c+d+1)(c+d+2)
− c(c+1)
(c+d)(c+d+1)
)
+ · · ·
1 + η(1− b) [ φc
c+d
]
+ η
2(1−b)2
2!
[
φ2c(c+1)
(c+d)(c+d+1)
]
+ · · ·

or
− 1
A
[
1
ηW
(
dW
db
)
+
(
φc
c+ d
)]
=
η(1− b)φ2
A
(
c
c+ d
)
(
d
(c+d)(c+d+1)
)
+ η
2(1−b)2θ2
2!
(
2d(c+1)
(c+d)(c+d+1)(c+d+2)
)
+ · · ·
W

[converting the denominator to W]
As shown before, the denominator in the above equation (W) is positive. The parameters η,
c, and d are all positive. It is also shown that A is positive. Thus, when 0 ≤ b < 1, the left
hand side of the equation becomes positive. When b=1, the left hand side is zero. Using this
observation in equation (5.37), it can be shown that −da
db
− φc
c+d
≥ 0 with 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. This
again concludes that UPM is increasing in b with 0 ≤ b < 1 and attains the maximum value
with b = 1. This means q − a1 − θuu+v > q − a0 or a1 + θuu+v < a0.
Using the observations above in the last paragraph in equation (5.28), it can be shown
−dA
db
≥ 0 for b ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, similar to the calculations of the gamma and exponential
distributions, it can be shown dUco
db
> 0 for 0 ≤ b < 1 and attains the maximum at b = 1 i.e.
Uco is increasing for any b ∈ [0, 1].
Using these observations in the equation (5.25), it can be shown that dN
db
> 0 for 0 ≤ b < 1
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and is maximum at b = 1. These observations are summarized in the following lemma
Lemma 7. With a cost based contract P=a+bX (where cost function X follows a beta distri-
bution), The Nash product and the utility functions of the project manager & the contractor
are higher under cost plus contract than under the fixed price contract or any cost sharing
contract (0 < b < 1).
Weibull Distributed Cost
Differentiating the equation (5.20) with respect to b
dW
db
= −
∞∑
i=1
φi
{
iηi(1− b)i−1
i!
}
Γ
(
1 +
i
S
)
(5.39)
As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. Thus, the value of dW
db
is negative with
0 ≤ b < 1, and becomes zero with b=1. By taking the second derivative of W with respect to
b, d
2W
db2
would become positive. This means W is a convex and decreasing function of b with
0 ≤ b < 1 and attains the minimum value of one with b=1.
Using the value of µ for Weibull distributed cost in equation (5.30)
−
[
da
db
+ φ
{
Γ
(
1 +
1
s
)}](
1 +
1
A
)
= − 1
A
[
1
ηW
(
dW
db
)
+ φ
{
Γ
(
1 +
1
s
)}]
(5.40)
Expanding the right hand side of the equation (5.39)
dW
db
= −ηφ
{
Γ
(
1 +
1
S
)}
−2η
2φ2(1− b)
2!
{
Γ
(
1 +
2
S
)}
−3η
3φ3(1− b)
3!
{
Γ
(
1 +
3
S
)}
− · · ·
(5.41)
Using this value of dW
db
and the value of W from equation (5.20) in the right hand side of the
equation(5.40)
−
[
da
db
+ φ
{
Γ
(
1 +
1
s
)}](
1 +
1
A
)
= − 1
A
[
−ηφ{Γ (1 + 1
s
)}− 2η2θ2(1−b)
2!
{
Γ
(
1 + 2
s
)}− · · ·
ηW
+ φ
{
Γ
(
1 +
1
s
)}]
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or
−
[
da
db
+ φ
{
Γ
(
1 +
1
s
)}](
1 +
1
A
)
=
1
A
[
φ
{
Γ
(
1 + 1
S
)}
+ ηφ
2(1−b)
1!
{
Γ
(
1 + 2
S
)}
+ · · ·
1 + ηφ(1− b){Γ (1 + 1
S
)}
+ η
2φ2(1−b)2
2!
{
Γ
(
1 + 1
S
)}
+ · · ·
− φ
{
Γ
(
1 +
1
S
)}]
or
−
[
da
db
+ φ
{
Γ
(
1 +
1
S
)}]
(1 +A)
=
[
η(1− b)φ2 {Γ (1 + 2S )− Γ (1 + 1S )Γ (1 + 1S )}+ η2(1−b)2φ32! {Γ (1 + 3S )− Γ (1 + 1S )Γ (1 + 2S )}+ · · ·
1 + ηφ(1− b){Γ (1 + 1S )}+ η2φ2(1−b)22! {Γ (1 + 2S )}+ · · ·
]
or
−
[
da
db
+ φ
{
Γ
(
1 +
1
S
)}](
1 +
1
A
)
=
η(1− b)φ2
A
[{
Γ
(
1 + 2S
)− Γ (1 + 1S )Γ (1 + 1S )}+ η(1−b)θ2! {Γ (1 + 3S )− Γ (1 + 1S )Γ (1 + 2S )}+ · · ·
W
]
As shown before, the denominator in the above equation (W) is positive. The parameters η,
φ, and S are all positive. It is also shown that A is positive. Furthermore, numerically, it can
be shown that all the terms on the numerator consisting of difference between two Gamma
functions are also positive. Thus, when 0 ≤ b < 1, the left hand side of the equation becomes
positive. When b = 1, the left hand side is zero. Using this observation in equation (5.40), it
can be shown that
−da
db
− φ
{
Γ
(
1 +
1
s
)}
≥ 0 with 0 ≤ b ≤ 0
Using this observation in equation(5.26), it can further be shown UPM is increasing in b with
0 ≤ b < 1 and attains the maximum value with b=1.
Using the above observations from the last paragraph in equation (5.28) for the Weibull
distributed case, it can be shown that −dA
db
> 0 for b ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, similar to the other
distributions, it can be shown dUco
db
> 0 for 0 ≤ b < 1 and and attains a maximum value at b
= 1 i.e. Uco is increasing in b, for b ∈ [0, 1]. Using these observations in the equation (5.25),
it can be shown that dN
db
> 0 for 0 ≤ b < 1 and maximum at b = 1. These observations are
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summarized in the following lemma
Lemma 8. With a cost based contract P=a+bX (where cost function X follows a Weibull dis-
tribution), The Nash product and the utility functions of the project manager & the contractor
are higher under cost plus contract than under the fixed price contract or any cost sharing
contract (0 < b < 1).
Similarly, the calculations can be extended for cost functions following other continuous
distributions and it can be shown that cost sharing contracts are capable of offering a domi-
nating solution to ensure a win-win solution. Hence, combining the findings from lemmas 5,
6, 7, and 8, the following is proposed
Proposition 6. With a cost based contract P=a+bX (where cost function X follows any non-
normal skewed continuous distribution), the Nash product and the utility functions of the
project manager & the contractor are higher under cost plus contract than under the fixed
price contract or any cost sharing contract (0 < b < 1). The optimal condition for the fixed
parameter satisfies the condition in the equation (5.24) in lemma (4)
Generalized Nash’s Bargaining Set
In the last sub-section, the bargaining power of the members of the supply chain were con-
sidered to be equal. However, in practice this is very unlikely. Members are likely to have
differential bargaining power in the supply chain. It is assumed that the bargaining power of
the project manager is τ and the contractor is (1− τ). Thus, the generalized Nash’s product
would be
GN = U τpm · U1−τco (5.42)
Upm, and Uco are calculated from the equations (5.4), and (5.6) respectively.
Thus to identify the optimal condition for a, the equation (5.42) is differentiated with
respect to a as below
dGN
da
=
d
da
[
U τpm · U1−τco
]
= τ
(
Uco
Upm
)1−τ
dUpm
da
+ (1− τ)
(
Upm
Uco
)τ
dUco
da
= τ
(
1− e−ηaW
q − a− bµ
)1−τ
(−1) + (1− τ)
(
q − a− bµ
1− e−ηaW
)τ (
ηe−ηaW
)
127
Thus, for the first order condition
τ
(
1− e−ηaW
q − a− bµ
)1−τ
(−1) + (1− τ)
(
q − a− bµ
1− e−ηaW
)τ (
ηe−ηaW
)
= 0
or
q − a− bµ = τ
1− τ
[
1− e−ηaW
ηe−ηaW
]
=
τ
1− τ
[
1− A
ηA
]
(5.43)
[As assumed earlierA = e−ηaW ]
The contract parameter b follows the condition 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. In order to identify the optimal
value within this range, the equation (5.42) is differentiated with respect to b as below
dGN
db
=
d
db
[
U τpm · U1−τco
]
= τ
(
Uco
Upm
)1−τ
dUpm
db
+ (1− τ)
(
Upm
Uco
)τ
dUco
db
(5.44)
To find out the optimal value, the sign test of the first order derivative is required. Thus, the
right hand side of the equation (5.44) is analysed for each and individual element.
As assumed earlier, 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. Thus, neither τ nor (1− τ) can be negative. Uco and Upm
both have to be positive, otherwise the members of the supply chain would not participate in
the bargaining. Thus, the sign of the derivative dGN
db
depends on the signs of dUpm
db
and dUco
db
.
Differentiating both side of the equation (5.43) with respect to b
[
−da
db
− µ
]
=
1
η
(
τ
1− τ
)[(
− 1
A2
)
dA
db
]
(5.45)
Using the value of dUpm
db
from equation (5.26),
dUpm
db
=
1
η
(
τ
1− τ
)[(
− 1
A2
)
dA
db
]
As mentioned earlier, both τ and (1− τ) are positive. The value of [(− 1
A2
)
dA
db
]
depends on
the nature of distribution. Earlier in this section (5.2.2), the value of
[(− 1
A2
)
dA
db
]
is shown as
positive with 0 ≤ b < 1 and as zero with b=1 for gamma, exponential, beta and Weibull dis-
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tributed cost respectively. Thus, it can be shown that dUpm
db
≥ 0. This leads to the conclusion
that the utility of the project manager is increasing for b ∈ [0, 1) and is maximum at b=1.
As explained in section 5.2.2, Uco = 1−A and dUcodb = −dAdb . Rearranging the terms from
equation (5.45) (
1
ηA2
)(
−da
db
− µ
)(
1− τ
τ
)
= −dA
db
As assumed earlier, η > 0. Thus, the right hand side of the above equation is positive for the
same reasons mentioned for the project manager. Thus dUco
db
is increasing in 0 ≤ b < 1 and
maximum at b = 1. Thus, similar to the project manger, the utility of the contractor is positive
for b ∈ [0, 1) and maximum at b = 1 for the cost functions with gamma, exponential, beta,
and Weibull distributed.
Using the above observations in equation (5.44), it can be shown that dGN
db
≥ 0 for b ∈
[0, 1]. this means the generalized Nash product is increasing in b for b ∈ [0, 1] and maximum
at b=1. Thus, similar to the case of Nash’s bargaining, the cost plus contract dominates the
solutions of any cost sharing contracts (for 0 < b < 1) and the solution of the fixed price
contract.
Proposition 7. With a cost based contract P=a+bX (where cost function X follows any non-
normal skewed continuous distribution), the generalized Nash product and the utility func-
tions of the project manager & the contractor are higher under cost plus contract than under
the fixed price contract or any cost sharing contract (0 < b < 1). The optimal condition for
the fixed parameter satisfies the optimal condition below
a1 =

ηe−ηa1(1− τ)(q − a1 − ωφ)− τ(1− e−ηa1) = 0 gamma distributed cost
ηe−ηa1(1− τ)(q − a1 − φ)− τ(1− e−ηa1) = 0 exponential distributed cost
ηe−ηa1(1− τ)(q − a1 − φcc+d)− τ(1− e−ηa1) = 0 beta distributed cost
ηe−ηa1(1− τ){q − a1 − φΓ
(
1 + 1
S
)} − τ(1− e−ηa1) = 0 Weibull distributed cost
(5.46)
Proof. The optimal value of a for the generalized Nash baragianing satisfies the equation
(5.43). Using the values of W, a, and µ for b = 1 i.e. W = 1, a = a1, and µ from the equation
(5.22) into the equation (5.43) and rearranging the terms leads to the first order condition for
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a1 in the proposition 7.
5.3 Bargaining Models of Supply Chain Coordination with
Cost Based Contracts: Kalai and Smorodinsky Bar-
gaining
The utility functions for the project manager and the contractor remain the same as described
in equations (5.4) and (5.6) respectively. According to the Kalai Smorodinsky rule (Kalai and
Smorodinsky, 1975), the optimal solution is
K(Z, d) = arg max
zi
{
min
(i∈1,2)
zi − di
ai(Z, d)− di
}
(5.47)
Where i denotes either the project manager or the contractor; zi is the pay off to the member i;
di is the disagreement pay-off; and ai(Z, d) is the aspiration pay-off to the member i. ai(Z, d)
is defined as below
ai(Z, d) = arg max(zi) (5.48)
Thus, the Kalai Smorodinsky solution K(Z,d) maximizes the individually rational pay-off
normalized with respected to the aspiration point pay off.
It is assumed before that di is zero. In other words the disagreement pay-off for both the
members are assumed as zero. The aspiration point for the project manager and the contractor
are respectively as follow
For a project manager
apm(Z, d) = q − E(X) = q − µ (5.49)
For a risk neutral contractor
aco(Z, d) = q − µ (5.50)
For a risk averse contractor
aco(Z, d) = 1− e−ηqE{eηX} = 1− e−ηqV (5.51)
[where µ = E(X) and V = E{eηX}]
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5.3.1 For a risk neutral project manager and a risk neutral contractor
In order to satisfy the condition for optimal K, the minimum of the normalized utilities of the
project manager and the contractor should be maximized. When the minimum of values of
these two fractions are maximized, they become equal in value. If they are unequal at their
maximum values, then that violates the conditions for Kalai Smorodinsky’s basic condition.
Thus, at an optimal solution
q − a− bµ
q − µ =
a− (1− b)µ
q − µ
or
a+ bµ =
q + µ
2
(5.52)
For a fixed price contract with b=0, the optimal a0 becomes a0 = q+µ2 and for a cost plus
contract with b = 1, the optimal a1 becomes a1 = q−µ2
Using these values of a0, a1, and b in the utility equations of the project manager and the
risk neutral contractor, it can easily be shown that Upm = Uco = q−µ2 .
This is same for fixed price and cost plus contract. Thus, similar to the case of Nash’s
bargaining with risk neutral members, for Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining, the maximum util-
ity is equally split amongst the members. Like Nash’s bargaining, this is same for fixed price
and cost plus contract. Thus, due to simplicity, the fixed price contract may be preferred over
the cost plus contract in practice with this similar situation.
5.3.2 For a risk neutral project manager and a risk averse contractor
Using these values of aspiration point, the normalized individual rationalities of the members
of the supply chain are as follows
For the project manager
Upmn =
q − a− bµ
q − µ (5.53)
For the contractor
Ucon =
1− e−ηaW
1− e−ηqV [W follows equation (5.20)] (5.54)
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In order to satisfy the condition for optimal K, the minimum values of the two fractions on
the right hand side of the equations (5.53) and (5.54) should be maximized. As mentioned in
the last sub-section, when the minimum of these two fractions are maximized, they become
equal in values. Thus, at the optimal solution
q − a− bµ
q − µ =
1− e−ηaW
1− e−ηqV (5.55)
As defined earlier in section (5.2), b = 1, a = a1 for a cost plus contract; and W = 1. On the
contrary, b = 0, a = a0 for a fixed price contract; and W = W0. Thus using these values in
the optimal condition for Kalai Smorodinsky Solution in equation (5.55) goves
For fixed price contracts
q − a0
q − µ =
1− e−ηa0W0
1− e−ηqV (5.56)
For cost plus contracts
q − a1 − µ
q − µ =
1− e−ηa1
1− e−ηqV (5.57)
In order to identify if the solution with the fixed price or the cost plus contract dominates, the
sign tests for the first order derivative dUpm
db
and dUco
db
are required. To determine the sign on
the right hand side of the above equation, both sides of the equation (5.55) are differentiated
with respect to b
(
−da
db
− µ
)(
1
q − µ
)
=
[
ηe−ηaW
da
db
− e−ηadW
db
](
1
1− e−ηqV
)
or
(
−da
db
− µ
)
=
[
ηe−ηaW
da
db
− e−ηadW
db
](
q − µ
1− e−ηqV
)
or
(−da
db
− µ)(1 + ηe−ηaWB) =
[
−e−ηadW
db
− ηe−ηaWµ
]
B (5.58)
[where B = q−µ
1−e−ηqV ]
Now the term B is positive as the maximum possible utilities of the members have to be
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positive for participation of the members. The values of W and dW
db
would change depending
on the nature of distribution of X. Thus, the next few subsections discuss how the Kalai
Smorodinsky solutions work for different types of probability distributions of cost X.
Gamma Distributed Cost
As mentioned earlier, for a gamma distributed cost X, W satisfies the condition mentioned
in the equation (5.20). Using the values of dW
db
from equation (5.32) in equation (5.58) and
rearranging the value in terms of W gives
(−da
db
− µ)(1 + ηe−ηaWB) = B
[
e−ηa
{
ηωφW
(1− η(1− b)φ
}
− {ηe−ηaWµ}
]
= Bηe−ηaW
[
ωφ− µ+ ηµ(1− b)φ
(1− η(1− b)φ
]
= Bηe−ηaW
[
ηµ(1− b)φ
(1− η(1− b)φ
]
or
(−da
db
− µ) =
Bηe−ηaW
[
ηµ(1−b)φ
{1−η(1−b)φ}
]
(1 +Bηe−ηaW )
(5.59)
For a gamma distributed cost with parameters (scale : φ and shape: ω), it is shown in section
5.2.2 that 1 − η(1 − b)φ > 0 for 0 ≤ b < 1 and becomes zero for b = 1. W was also shown
as positive in the case of models with Nash’s bargaining. Thus, the right hand side of the
above equation (5.59) is positive. Using this observation with the equation (5.26), it can be
concluded that Upm is increasing in b, for 0 ≤ b < 1 and attains a maximum value for b = 1.
In the equation (5.58), the right hand side represents B
(
dUco
db
)
. It was already shown in
the last paragraph that this is positive for 0 ≤ b < 1 and zero at b = 1. Thus, Uco is increasing
in b , for 0 ≤ b < 1 and attains the maximum value at b = 1. These observations lead to the
following lemma
Lemma 9. With a cost based contract P = a+bX (where X follows a gamma distribution
with shape parameter ω and scale parameter φ), the Kalai Smorodinsky value K, and the
utility functions of the project manager and the contractor are higher under the cost plus
contract (b = 1) than under the fixed price contract (b = 0) or any other cost sharing contracts
(0 < b < 1).
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Exponential Distributed Cost
Using the values of dW
db
from the equation (5.34) and W from the equation (5.20) in equation
(5.58)
(−da
db
− µ)(1 +Bηe−ηaW ) = B [e−ηa {ηφW 2}− {ηe−ηaWµ}]
= Bηe−ηaW
[
µ− µ+ ηµ(1− b)φ
(1− η(1− b)φ
]
= Bηe−ηaW
[
ηµ(1− b)φ
(1− η(1− b)φ
]
or
(−da
db
− µ) =
Bηe−ηaW
[
ηµ(1−b)φ
(1−η(1−b)φ
]
(1 +Bηe−ηaW )
(5.60)
For an exponentially distributed cost ( with scale parameter: φ), it is shown in section 5.2.2
that 1 − η(1 − b)φ > 0 for 0 ≤ b < 1 and becomes zero for b = 1. W was also shown
as positive in the case of models with Nash’s bargaining. Thus, the right hand side of the
above equation (5.60) is positive. Using this observation with the equation (5.26), it can be
concluded that Upm is increasing in b, for 0 ≤ b < 1 and attains a maximum value for b = 1.
Similar to the case of gamma distributed cost, the right hand side in the equation (5.58)
represents B
(
dUco
db
)
. Thus, Uco is increasing in b , or 0 ≤ b < 1 and attains the maximum
value at b = 1.
These observations lead to the following lemma
Lemma 10. With a cost based contract P = a+bX (where X follows an exponential distri-
bution with scale parameter φ), the Kalai Smorodinsky value K, and the utility functions of
the project manager and the contractor are higher under the cost plus contract (b = 1) than
under the fixed price contract (b = 0) or any other cost sharing contracts (0 < b < 1).
Beta Distributed Cost
Using the value of dW
db
from equation (5.38) and the expanded form of W from equation (5.20)
in equation (5.58) [For a beta distributed cost X (0 < X < φ; where φ is the scale parameter)
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with shape parameters c and d.]
(−da
db
− µ)(1 +Bηe−ηaW )
= −Be−ηa
[
ηφc
c+ d
{
1 +
η(1− b)φ(c+ 1)
(c+ d+ 1)
+
η2(1− b)2φ2(c+ 1)(c+ 2)
2!(c+ d+ 1)(c+ d+ 2)
+ · · ·
}]
−Bηe−ηaµ
[
1 +
ηφ(1− b)c
(c+ d)
+
η2φ2(1− b)2c(c+ 1)
2!(c+ d)(c+ d+ 1)
+ · · ·
]
= Be−ηaηµ
[
η(1− b)φ
{
(c+ 1)(c+ d)− c(c+ d+ 1)
(c+ d)(c+ d+ 1)
}]
+Be−ηaηµ
[
η2(1− b)2φ2
2!
{
(c+ 1)(c+ 2)(c+ d)− c(c+ 1)(c+ d+ 2)
(c+ d)(c+ d+ 1)(c+ d+ 2)
}]
+ · · ·
= e−ηaηµ
[
η(1− b)φ
{
d
(c+ d)(c+ d+ 1)
}
+
η2(1− b)2φ2
2!
{
(c+ 1)2d
(c+ d)(c+ d+ 1)(c+ d+ 2)
}]
From the above equation, it can be shown that the right hand side of the equation is positive.
This is because c and d are both assumed as positive. Following the steps shown in gamma
and exponential distributed cost, it can be again shown that dUpm
db
> 0 and dUco
db
> 0 for
0 ≤ b < 1 and zero at b = 1. This leads to the following lemma
Lemma 11. With a cost based contract P = a+bX (where X follows a beta distribution with
scale φ, and shape parameters c & d), the Kalai Smorodinsky value K, and the utility func-
tions of the project manager and the contractor are higher under the cost plus contract (b =
1) than under the fixed price contract (b = 0) or any other cost sharing contracts (0 < b < 1).
Weibull Distributed Cost
Using the value of dW
db
from the equation (5.41) and the expanded form of W from the equa-
tion (5.20) in equation (5.58) [For a Weibull distributed cost with shape parameter S and scale
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parameter φ]
(−da
db
− µ)(1 +Bηe−ηaW )
= −e−ηaB
[
−ηφ
{
Γ
(
1 +
1
S
)}
− 2η
2θ2(1− b)
2!
{
Γ
(
1 +
2
S
)}
− · · ·
]
−Bηe−ηaµ
[
1 +
(
η(1− b)φ
1!
)
Γ
(
1 +
1
S
)
+
η2(1− b)2φ2
2!
Γ
(
1 +
2
S
)
+ · · ·
]
= Bηe−ηa
[
η(1− b)φ2
{
Γ
(
1 +
2
S
)
− Γ
(
1 +
1
S
)
Γ
(
1 +
1
S
)}]
+Bηe−ηa
[
η2(1− b)2φ3
2!
{
Γ
(
1 +
3
S
)
− Γ
(
1 +
1
S
)
Γ
(
1 +
2
S
)}]
+ · · ·
It was assumed earlier that η > 0; and W and B were shown as positive for the requirement
of participation in the bargaining game. Based on the derivation mentioned in the sub-section
(5.2.2), the right hand side of the above equation can be numerically shown as positive for
0 ≤ b < 1 and zero with b=1. This, leads to the conclusion that −da
db
− µ > 0 for 0 ≤ b < 1
and −da
db
− µ = 0 for b=1. Following the steps shown in gamma and exponential distributed
cost, it can be again shown that dUpm
db
> 0 and dUco
db
> 0 for 0 ≤ b < 1 and zero at b = 1. This
leads to the following lemma
Lemma 12. With a cost based contract P = a+bX (where X follows a Weibull distribution
with scale φ, and shape parameter S), the Kalai Smorodinsky value K, and the utility functions
of the project manager and the contractor are higher under the cost plus contract (b = 1) than
under the fixed price contract (b = 0) or any other cost sharing contracts (0 < b < 1).
Similar to the calculations for gamma, exponential, Beta, and Weibull distributed cost
functions, it can shown that the solutions from the cost plus contracts dominate the solutions
and are able to offer win-win solutions for the project manager and the contractor. Hence,
combining the findings from lemmas 9, 10, 11, and 12, the following is proposed
Proposition 8. Using the Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining with a cost based contract P =
a+bX (where X can follow any non-normal continuous distribution, and a & b are contract
parameters), the solutions for the Kalai Smorodinsky value K, and the utilities of the project
manager & the contractor are the dominant solution for a cost plus contract (b = 1). This
dominates the solutions from any cost sharing contract (0 < b < 1) and fixed price contract
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(b = 0). The optimal value of contract parameter a1 satisfies the following
a1 =

q−a1−ωφ
q−ωφ − 1−e
−ηa1
1−e−ηq 1
(1−ηφ)ω
= 0 for a gamma distributed cost
q−a1−φ
q−φ − 1−e
−ηa1
1−e−ηq 1
(1−ηφ)ω
= 0 for an exponential distributed cost
q−a1− φcc+d
q− φc
c+d
− 1−e−ηa1
1−e−ηq
[
1+
∞∑
i=1
(
φi
i−1∏
r=0
c+r
c+d+r
)
ηi
i!
] = 0 for and beta distributed cost
q−a1−φΓ(1+ 1S )
q−φΓ(1+ 1S )
− 1−e−ηa1
1−e−ηq
[
1+
∞∑
i=1
{
ηiφi
i!
Γ(1+ iS )
}] = 0 for a Weibull distributed cost
(5.61)
Proof. Since the cost plus contract dominates the other solutions, thus the optimal value is b
= 1. Hence, the optimal value for a is a = a1. The optimal condition for a1 should satisfy the
condition in equation (5.55). The value of µ was replaced using equation (5.22). As defined,
W = E
(
eη(1−b)X
)
. Thus, (for b = 0), V = W0 as V is assumed as E(eηX). Replacing the
values of V for the selected distributions from the equations (5.21), the optimal conditions
for a1 in the proposition 8 can be derived.
5.4 Bargaining Models of Supply Chain Coordination with
Cost based Contracts: Utilitarian Approach to Bargain-
ing
According to the Utilitarian rule, the sum of the utilities during the bargaining is maximized.
Thus,
U(Z, d) = arg max
u∈Z
2∑
i=1
ui (5.62)
This research derives the model for two cases: in the first case with both risk averse members;
and in the second case with a risk neutral project manager and a risk averse contractor. The
analysis is shown in the next two sub-sections.
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5.4.1 For a Risk Neutral Project Manager and a Risk Neutral Contrac-
tor
As mentioned earlier, the utility functions for the project manager and the risk neutral con-
tractor follow equations (5.4) and (5.5). Thus, the equation (5.62) for the case of both risk
neutral members is as follows
U(ψ, d) = argmax
u∈ψ
[(q − µ)] (5.63)
Thus, differentiating the above equations with respect to either contract parameters a or b,
would yield the first order condition as zero. This means, that for the utilitarian approach with
both risk neutral members, the solution is indifferent for fixed price or cost plus contracts.
Due to the simplicity of the application, members of the supply chain might be inclined to
use fixed price contracts in practice.
5.4.2 For a Risk Neutral Project Manager a Risk Averse Contractor
Using the utility functions from the equations 5.4 and 5.6 in the equation (5.62)
U(S, d) = argmax
u∈S
[
(q − a− bµ) + (1− e−ηaW )] (5.64)
In order to get the optimal solutions for contract parameters a, the equation (5.64) is differ-
entiated with respect to a and set it equal to zero as below.
dU(S, d)
da
= −1 + ηe−ηaW = 0
Rearranging the terms of the above equation, the first order condition for a is as follows
a =
1
η
loge(η) +
1
η
loge(W ) (5.65)
In order to find the optimal conditions for b (0 ≤ b ≤ 1), the equation (5.64) is differentiated
with respect to b and rearranging the terms
dU(S, d)
db
=
(
da
db
)(
ηe−ηaW − 1)− µ− e−ηa(dW
db
)
(5.66)
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Now
da
db
=
1
ηW
(
dW
db
)
(5.67)
Thus, using this value of da
db
the equation (5.66) becomes
dU(S, d)
db
= − 1
ηW
(
dW
db
)
− µ (5.68)
The values of W and dW
db
would vary depending on the nature of distribution. Thus, the next
few subsections discuss how the model would work for different distributions of cost function
X.
Gamma Distributed Cost
Using the values of W for gamma distribution from the equation (5.20) and dW
db
from equation
(5.32) in equations (5.66) and (5.67)
da
db
= − φω
1− η(1− b)φ (5.69)
and
dU(S, d)
db
= − φω{1− η(1− b)φ}
[
ηe−ηa
{1− η(1− b)φ}ω − 1
]
− µ+
[
e−ηaηωφW
{1− η(1− b)φ}
]
=
−φωηe−ηa + {1− η(1− b)φ}ω(ωφ)− µ{1− η(1− b)φ}ω+1 + e−ηaηωφ
{1− η(1− b)φ}ω+1
=
{1− η(1− b)φ}ωµ [1− {1− η(1− b)φ}]
{1− η(1− b)φ}ω+1
=
µη(1− b)φ
{1− η(1− b)φ} (5.70)
As mentioned earlier, {1 − ηφ(1 − b)} > 0. Thus, the the U(S,d) is increasing in b in this
model for 0 ≤ b < 1 and zero at b = 1.
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Now differentiating Upm with respect to b
dUpm
db
= −da
db
− µ
=
φω
1− η(1− b)φ − µ
=
µη(1− b)φ
1− η(1− b)φ [using the value ofµ for the gamma distributed cost] (5.71)
Using the observation from equation (5.70), this can be shown that right hand side of equation
(5.71) is positive for 0 ≤ b < 1 and zero at b = 1. Thus, Upm is increasing in b for 0 ≤ b < 1
and maximum at b =1.
Differentiating Uco with respect to b dUcodb = ηe
−ηaW da
db
− e−ηa dW
db
. Using the value of
da
db
from equation (5.67), it can be shown that dUco
db
= 0. This also means the second order
derivative is also zero. Thus, this leads to inconclusive findings regarding the movement of
Uco with respect to b. Thus, for an utilitarian bargaining approach, the utility of the contractor
is neither increasing nor decreasing as b moves from 0 to 1.
Thus, summarising the above observations, the following lemma is proposed
Lemma 13. With a cost based contract P = a+bX (where X follows a gamma distribution
with scale φ, and shape parameter ω), the Utilitarian sum U, and the utility functions of the
project manager are higher under the cost plus contract (b = 1) than under the fixed price
contract (b = 0) or any other cost sharing contracts (0 < b < 1). However, the contractor’s
utility doesn’t change for any values of b for b ∈ [0, 1].
Exponential Distributed Cost
Using the values of W from equation (5.20) and dW
db
from equation (5.34) in equations (5.66)
and (5.67) gives
da
db
= − φ
1− η(1− b)φ = −φW (5.72)
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and
dU(S, d)
db
= −φW [ηe−ηaW − 1]− µ+ [e−ηaηφW 2]
= φW − µ
= µ
[
1
{1− η(1− b)φ} − 1
]
[Replacing the mean value,µ = φ]
=
µη(1− b)φ
{1− η(1− b)φ} (5.73)
Thus, similar to the gamma distributed cost, the U(S,d) is increasing in b for 0 ≤ b < 1 and
zero for b = 1.
Now, differentiating Upm with respect to b
dUpm
db
= −da
db
− µ
=
φ
1− η(1− b)φ − µ
=
µη(1− b)φ
1− η(1− b)φ (5.74)
Using the observation from equation (5.73), it can be seen that the right hand side of equation
(5.74) is positive for 0 ≤ b < 1 and zero at b = 1. Thus, Upm is increasing in b for 0 ≤ b < 1
and zero at b = 1.
Similar to the gamma distributed case, it can be easily shown dUco
db
= 0. That means Uco
doesn’t change for any change in b ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, summarising the above observations, the following lemma is proposed
Lemma 14. With a cost based contract P = a+bX (where X follows an exponential distribu-
tion with scale φ), the Utilitarian sum U, and the utility functions of the project manager are
higher under the cost plus contract (b = 1) than under the fixed price contract (b = 0) or any
other cost sharing contracts (0 < b < 1). However, the contractor’s utility doesn’t change
for any values of b in b ∈ [0, 1].
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Beta Distributed Cost
Using these values of W for the beta distribution from equation (5.20) and dW
db
from equation
(5.36) or (5.36) in equations (5.66) and (5.67)
da
db
= − µ
W
{
1 +
η(1− b)φ(c+ 1)
(c+ d+ 1)
+
η2(1− b)2φ2(c+ 1)(c+ 2)
2!(c+ d+ 1)(c+ d+ 2)
+ · · ·
}
(5.75)
[The mean value of beta distributed cost µ = φc
c+d
]
and
dU(S, d)
db
= − µ
W
{
1 +
η(1− b)φ(c+ 1)
(c+ d+ 1)
+
η2(1− b)2φ2(c+ 1)(c+ 2)
2!(c+ d+ 1)(c+ d+ 2)
+ · · ·
}[
ηe−ηaW − 1]
− µ+ e−ηa
[
ηµ
{
1 +
η(1− b)φ(c+ 1)
(c+ d+ 1)
+
η2(1− b)2φ2(c+ 1)(c+ 2)
2!(c+ d+ 1)(c+ d+ 2)
+ · · ·
}]
=
µ
[{
1 + η(1−b)φ(c+1)
(c+d+1)
+ η
2(1−b)2φ2(c+1)(c+2)
2!(c+d+1)(c+d+2)
+ · · ·
}
−W
]
W
=
µ
[{
1 + η(1−b)φ(c+1)
(c+d+1)
+ η
2(1−b)2φ2(c+1)(c+2)
2!(c+d+1)(c+d+2)
+ · · ·
}
−
{
1 + ηφ(1−b)c
c+d
+ η
2φ2(1−b)2c(c+1)
2!(c+d)(c+d+1)
+ · · ·
}]
1 + ηφ(1−b)c
c+d
+ η
2φ2(1−b)2c(c+1)
2!(c+d)(c+d+1)
+ · · ·
From subsection 5.2.2, it can be shown that the right hand side of the above equation is
positive for 0 ≤ b < 1 and zero for b = 1. This leads to the conclusion that U(S, d) is
increasing in b for 0 ≤ b < 1 and reaches a maximum at b = 1.
Now, differentiating Upm with respect to b
dUpm
db
= −da
db
− µ
=
µ
W
{
1 +
η(1− b)φ(c+ 1)
(c+ d+ 1)
+
η2(1− b)2φ2(c+ 1)(c+ 2)
2!(c+ d+ 1)(c+ d+ 2)
+ · · ·
}
− µ
=
dU(S, d)
db
Thus, dUpm
db
> 0 for 0 ≤ b < 1 and zero at b = 1. Thus, the utility of the project manager
increases for b ∈ [0, 1) and maximum at b = 1. It is also interesting to see that dU(S,d)
db
= dUpm
db
.
That means dUco
db
= 0 and so the utility of the contractor does not change for any change in
b ∈ [0, 1].
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Thus, summarising the above observations, the following lemma is proposed
Lemma 15. With a cost based contract P = a+bX (where X follows a beta distribution with
scale φ and shape parameters c & d), the Utilitarian sum U, and the utility functions of the
project manager are higher under the cost plus contract (b = 1) than under the fixed price
contract (b = 0) or any other cost sharing contracts (0 < b < 1). However, the contractor’s
utility doesn’t change for any values of b for b ∈ [0, 1].
Weibull distributed cost
Using the values of W and dW
db
from equations (5.20) and (5.41) in equations (5.66) and
(5.67)
dU(S, d)
db
=
1
η
 ηφ{Γ (1 + 1S )}+ 2η2φ2(1−b)2! {Γ (1 + 2S )}+ 3η3φ3(1−b)3! {Γ (1 + 3S )}+ · · ·
1 +
(
η(1−b)φ
1!
)
Γ
(
1 + 1S
)
+ η
2(1−b)2φ2
2! Γ
(
1 + 2S
)
+ η
3(1−b)3φ3
3! Γ
(
1 + 3S
)
+ · · ·
− [φ{Γ(1 + 1
S
)}]
=
[
η(1− b)φ2 {Γ (1 + 2S )− Γ (1 + 1S )Γ (1 + 1S )}+ η2(1−b)2φ32! {Γ (1 + 3S )− Γ (1 + 1S )Γ (1 + 2S )}+ · · ·
1 + ηφ(1− b){Γ (1 + 1S )}+ η2φ2(1−b)22! {Γ (1 + 2S )}+ · · ·
]
As mentioned in the section (5.2.2), the right hand side of the above equation can be shown to
be positive numerically in the interval 0 ≤ b < 1. and becomes zero with b=1. Thus, U(S,d)
is increasing in b for 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 and attains the maximum value at b = 1. Thus, similar to
the cases with gamma, exponential and beta distributed costs in sub-section (5.4.2), it can be
shown that dUpm
db
= dU(S,d)
db
and dUco
db
= 0. Thus, similar to the cases with other distributions,
the project manager’s utility is increasing for 0 ≤ b < 1 and becomes maximum at b = 1.
However, for the contractor, the utility remains remains unchanged for b ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, summarising the above observations, the following lemma is proposed
Lemma 16. With a cost based contract P = a+bX (where X follows a Weibull distribution
with scale φ and shape parameters S), the Utilitarian sum U, and the utility functions of the
project manager are higher under the cost plus contract (b = 1) than under the fixed price
contract (b = 0) or any other cost sharing contracts (0 < b < 1). However, the contractor’s
utility doesn’t change for any values of b for b ∈ [0, 1].
Combining the findings from lemmas 13, 14, 15, and 16, the following is proposed
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Proposition 9. Using the utilitarian bargaining approach with a cost based contract P=a+bX,
the solutions derived from a cost plus contract (b = 1) dominates the utilitarian sum U(S,d)
and the utility value of the project manager over the solutions derived from any other cost
based contract (0 < b < 1) or fixed price contract (b = 0). However, the utility value for
the contractor remains same for b ∈ [0, 1]. The optimal value of a satisfies the condition in
equation (5.65). The W value in the equation (5.65) satisfies the conditions in the equation
(5.20).
It can be easily shown that the contractor would earn a higher profit with the fixed price
contract in this case. As a result, it can not be clearly said if the contractor would be better
off with a cost plus contract in this case. Moreover, another important shortcomings of this
bargaining approach is that it does not conform to the individual rationality constraint.
5.5 Bargaining Models of Supply Chain Coordination with
Time Based Contracts: Nash’s Bargaining
With a given contract P= g- hT, (where T is a random time variable), if the project manager
and the contractor would negotiate based on the Nash bargaining, then they would maximize
the Nash product as below
N(g, h) = UPM(g, h) ∗ Uco(g, h) (5.76)
5.5.1 For a Risk Neutral Project Manager and a Risk Neutral Contrac-
tor
The utility functions of the project manager and the contractor follow equations (5.7) and
(5.8) respectively. These are substituted to the equation (5.76) Differentiating this equation
with respect to g gives
q + (2h+ Ω)µT − 2g = 0 (5.77)
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From this, g∗ = q+(2h+Ω)µT
2
. Hence, dg∗
dh
= µT . Using this in
dUpm
dh
= − dg
dh
+ µT , it
can be shown that dUpm
dh
= 0. Similarly, it can be shown dUco
dh
= dg
dh
− µT = 0. Hence,
the utilities of the project manager and the contractor are not changing with respect to any
change in h. Using these observations in dN(g,h)
dh
, it could be shown the Nash product also
remains unchanged with respect to any change in h. Thus, selection of either fixed price
or time based contracts would not make any difference to either the project manager or the
contractor. However, the fixed price contracts are easy to implement and hence, the members
of the supply chain would be inclined to use that.
5.5.2 For a Risk Neutral Project Manager and a Risk Averse Contractor
The utility values from the equations (5.7) and (5.9) are substituted to equation (5.16). Then,
differentiating with respect to g and setting that equal to zero is the first order condition
dN(g, h)
dg
= e−ηgWT {η(−g + hµT + q) + 1} − 1 = 0 (5.78)
[where WT = E{eη(h+Ω)T}].
The WT value can be considered as the risk exposure of the contractor and can be calcu-
lated based on the concepts of moment generating functions as below
WT = E[e
tT ] =

1
(1−θt)w
gamma distributed cost with shape parameter θ and scale parameter w
1
(1−θt)
exponential distributed cost with scale parameter θ
1 +
∞∑
m=1
(
θm
m−1∏
j=0
u+j
u+v+j
)
tm
m!
beta distributed cost with shape parameters u & v and scale θ
1 +
∞∑
m=1
[
tmθm
m!
Γ
(
1 + m
s
)]
Weibull distributed cost with shape parameter s and scale parameter θ
(5.79)
where t = η(h+ Ω)
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Differentiating the equation (5.76) with respect to h
dN(g, h)
dh
= Uco
(
dUPM
dh
)
+ UPM
(
dUco
dh
)
(5.80)
Differentiating equation (5.7) with respect to h, and using the value of E(x) = µT
dUPM
dh
= −dg
dh
+ µT (5.81)
Rearranging the terms from equation (5.78),
(q − g + hµT ) = 1− e
−ηgWT
ηe−ηgWT
=
1− AT
ηAT
[where AT = e−ηgWT ] (5.82)
Differentiating equation (5.82)
−dg
dh
+ µT = − 1
ηA2T
dAT
dh
(5.83)
Now
dAT
dh
= −ηe−ηgWT dg
dh
+ e−ηAT
dWT
dh
= −ηAT dg
dh
+ e−ηAT
dWT
dh
(5.84)
Using the values ofWT from the equation (5.79) and the value of dATdh from (5.84) in equation
(5.83)
− dg
dh
+ µT = − 1
ηA2T
[
−ηAT dg
dh
+
AT
WT
dWT
dh
]
or[
−dg
dh
+ µT
] [
1 +
1
AT
]
=
[
−
(
1
ηATWT
)
dWT
dg
+
(
µT
AT
)]
or[
−dg
dh
− µT
] [
1 +
1
AT
]
= − 1
AT
[(
1
ηWT
)
dWT
dh
− µT
]
(5.85)
As mentioned earlier, Uco = 1− e−ηgWT . Based on the assumption made in equation (5.82),
Uco = 1− AT . Thus, differentiating both side with respect to h
dUco
dh
= −dAT
dh
(5.86)
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Thus, the signs of dUpm
dh
and dUco
dh
depend on the signs of dWT
dh
, and dAT
dh
respectively. The sign
tests of these derivatives depend on the nature of distribution of the time function T.
Differentiating the value of WT for gamma distributed time with respect to h gives
dWT
dh
=
ηwθ
{1− ηθh}w+1 =
ηwθWT
{1− ηθ(h+ Ω)} (5.87)
As assumed before, η > 0. It can also be shown that q − g + hµT > 0; otherwise the project
manager’s utility would be negative and she would never participate in the bargaining. Hence,
from the equation (5.78), it can be shown that WT = 1{1−ηθ(h+Ω)}w > 0. This true for any
positive w. Hence, dWT
dh
is positive. Thus, the risk exposure of the contractor increases with
increase in h.
Based on the calculations from chapter 4, µT = wθ and the value of dWTdh from equation
(5.87) in equation (5.85),
[
−dg
dh
+ wθ
](
1 +
1
AT
)
= − 1
AT
[(
1
ηWT
){
ηwθWT
1− ηθ(h+ Ω)
}
− wθ
]
= −wθ
AT
[
1− 1 + ηθh
{1− ηθh}
]
= −
[
wηθ2(h+ Ω)
AT{1− ηθ(h+ Ω)}
]
or
[
−dg
dh
+ wθ
]
= −
(
1
1 + AT
)[
wηθ2(h+ Ω)
{1− ηθ(h+ Ω)}
]
(5.88)
In the equation (5.88), the right hand side of the equation is negative. Thus, the value of the
term (− dg
dh
+wθ) is negative for a gamma distributed time T when h is positive and zero at h
=0.
Rearranging the terms from equation (5.83) and using the value of µ,
[
−dg
dh
− wθ
] (
ηA2T
)
= −dAT
dh
Differentiating both side of the equation (5.88) with respect to h, it can be shown that
− d2g
dh2
< 0. Now d
2Upm
dh2
= − d2g
dh2
. Using this observation in equation (5.81), UPM is found to
be concave and decreasing in h. This leads to the conclusion that dUco
dh
< 0 for any positive h
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and zero at h = 0.
It is shown − dg
dh
− wθ < 0 for any positive h value and η > 0. Thus, −dAT
dh
< 0. It can
also be shown that d
2Uco
dh2
< 0. This means Uco is concave and decreasing in any positive h.
Using these above observations in equation (5.80), it can be shown that dN(g,h)
dh
< 0 for
any positive value of h and zero at h = 0.
Similar to this case of gamma distributed time, it can be shown that the utilities and
the Nash product are maximum at h=0 and decreasing at any positive value of h for other
continuous time distribution. This leads to the following proposition
Proposition 10. With a time based contract P=g-hT (where time function T follows any
continuous distribution), the Nash product and the utility functions for project manager &
the contractor are maximum under a fixed price contract (with h = 0). These values decrease
with the increase in positive h values. In other words the solution for the fixed price contracts
dominates the solutions of the time based contracts
5.6 Bargaining Models of Supply Chain Coordination with
Time Based Contracts: Kalai and Smorodinsky Bar-
gaining
The utility functions for the project manager and the contractor remain the same as described
in equations (5.7) and (5.8) for the risk neutral case and (5.9) for the risk averse case respec-
tively.
The Kalai Smorodinsky model mentioned in the equation (5.47) is applied to the time
based contract (with P= g- hT) case. Thus, the aspiration point for the project manager and
the contractor are respectively as follow
For the project manager
apm(Z, d) = q − ΩµT (5.89)
For the risk neutral contractor
aco(Z, d) = q − ΩµT (5.90)
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For the risk averse contractor
aco(S, d) = 1− E[e−η{q−k
(
µ1
µT
) n
A T}
] = 1− e−ηqE{eηΩT} as assumed earlier
= 1− e−ηqρ where ρ = E{eηΩT} (5.91)
5.6.1 For a risk neutral project manager and a risk neutral contractor
The utility functions of the project manager and the contractor follow equations (5.7) and
(5.8). As shown in the case of the cost based contracts, the normalized utilities of the project
manager and the contractor are equal at the optimal value. Hence,
q − g + hµT
q − ΩµT =
g − hµT − ΩµT
q − ΩµT (5.92)
From the above equation, the optimal condition for g becomes, g∗ = q+(2h+Ω)µT
2
. This is the
same solution as found in the case of Nash bargaining with time based contracts (Shown in
section 5.5.1). Hence, it follows from the section 5.5.1 that dUpm
dh
= 0 , and dUco
dh
= 0. It can
be easily shown that dK(Z,d)
dh
= 0. Thus, the selection of either the fixed price or the time
based contract would not make any difference to either the project manager or the contractor.
As stated earlier, due to simplicity, the members of the supply chain (the project manager and
the contractor) would be inclined to use the fixed price contract.
5.6.2 For a Risk Neutral Project Manager and a Risk Averse Contractor
Similar to the analysis for cost based contracts, the Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining solutions
should satisfy the condition mentioned in the equation (5.47). Using these values of aspiration
point, the normalized individual rationality of the members of the supply chain are as follows
For the project manager
Upmn =
q − g + hµT
q − ΩµT (5.93)
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For the contractor
Ucon =
1− e−ηgρWT
1− e−ηqρ (5.94)
[The utility before normalization follows equation (5.9)and WT = E{eη(h+Ω)T}]
In order to satisfy the condition for optimal K, the minimum values of the two fractions on
the right hand side of equations (5.53) and (5.54) should be maximized. As mentioned earlier
in the case of cost based contracts, when the minimum of these two fractions are maximized,
they become equal in value. Thus, at the optimal solution
q − g + hµT
q − ΩµT =
1− e−ηgρWT
1− e−ηqρ (5.95)
In order to identify if the solution with fixed price or time based contract dominates, it is
required to identify how the utility functions of the project manager and the contractor and
the K value performs with respect to the movement of h .
To determine this, both sides of equation (5.95) are differentiated with respect to h.
(
−dg
dh
+ µT
)(
1
q − ΩµT
)
=
[
ηe−ηgρWT
dg
dh
− e−ηgρdWT
dh
](
1
1− e−ηqρ
)
or
(
−dg
dh
+ µT
)
=
[
ηe−ηgρWT
dg
dh
− e−ηgρdWT
dh
]
BT where
[
BT =
(
q − ΩµT
1− e−ηqρ
)]
or
(−dg
dh
+ µT )(1 + ηe
−ηaρWTBT ) =
[
−e−ηgρdWT
dh
+ ηe−ηgρWTµT
]
BT (5.96)
Now the term BT is positive as the maximum possible utilities of the members have to be
positive for participation of the members. The values of WT and dWTdh change depending on
the nature of the distribution of T.
For a gamma distributed time with scale parameter θ and shape parameter w, the WT sat-
isfies the condition mentioned in the equation (5.79) Using the values of dWT
dh
from equation
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(5.87) in equation (5.96) and rearranging the value in terms of WT
(−dg
dh
+ µT )(1 + ηe
−ηaρWTBT ) = BT
[
−e−ηaρ
{
ηwθWT
(1− η(h+ Ω)θ)
}
+ {ηe−ηgρWTµT}
]
= BTηe
−ηgρWT
[−wθ + µT − ηµT (h+ Ω)θ
(1− η(h+ Ω)θ)
]
= −BTηe−ηgρWT
[
ηµT (h+ Ω)θ
(1− ηhθ)
]
or
(−dg
dh
+ µT ) = −
BTηe
−ηgρWT
[
ηµT (h+Ω)θ
(1−η(h+Ω)θ)
]
(1 + ηe−ηaρWTBT )
(5.97)
For a gamma distributed time with parameters (scale : θ and shape: w), it is shown in section
5.5 that (1 − η(h + Ω)θ > 0). WT was also shown as positive. Thus, the right hand side of
the above equation (5.97) is negative for any positive value of h and becomes zero when h =
0. Thus, it can be concluded that Upm is decreasing in h for any positive value of h.
In the equation (5.96), the right hand side represents BT
(
dUco
dh
)
. It has already been
shown in the last paragraph that this is negative for any positive value of h and zero when h
= 0. Hence, it can be shown that Uco is decreasing in h.
Similar to the case of gamma distributed time, it can be shown the utilities of the project
manager and the contractor and the Kalai Smorodinsky value K decreases with increase in
any positive h. Hence, the following is proposed
Proposition 11. With a time based based contract P = g-hT (where T follows any continuous
distribution), the Kalai Smorodinsky value K, and the utility functions of the project manager
& the contractor are higher under the fixed price contract (h = 0) than under any of the time
based contract.
5.7 Bargaining Models of Supply Chain Coordination with
Time based Contracts: Utilitarian Approach to Bar-
gaining
In this case, the total utility is maximized according to the equation (5.62). As described
earlier, this research derives the model for two cases: in the first case with both risk averse
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members; and in the second case with a risk neutral project manager and a risk averse con-
tractor. The analysis is shown in the next two sub-sections.
5.7.1 For a Risk Neutral Project Manager and a Risk Neutral Contrac-
tor
As mentioned earlier, the utility functions for the project manager and the risk neutral con-
tractor follow the equations (5.7) and (5.8). Thus, with a time based contract P =g - hT,
equation (5.62) for the case of both risk neutral members is as follows
U(Z, d) = argmax
u∈Z
[(q − ΩµT )] (5.98)
Thus, differentiating the above equations with respect to the either contract parameters g or
h, yields the first order condition as zero. This means, that for the utilitarian approach with
both risk neutral members, the solution is indifferent for fixed price or time based contracts.
Due to the simplicity of the application, the members of the supply chain would be inclined
to use fixed price contracts in practice.
5.7.2 For a Risk Neutral Project Manager and a Risk Averse Contractor
With the utility functions of the project manager and the contractor following equations (5.7)
and (5.9), the optimization problem becomes
U(Z, d) = argmax
u∈Z
[
(q − g + hµT ) + (1− e−ηgρWT )
]
(5.99)
In order to get the optimal solutions for contract parameters g, equation (5.99) is differentiated
with respect to g and the equation is set to zero.
dU(Z, d)
dg
= −1 + ηe−ηgρWT = 0
Rearranging the terms of the above equation, the first order condition for g is as follows
g∗ = 1
η
loge(η) +
1
η
loge(WT ) +
1
η
loge(ρ) (5.100)
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In order to find the optimal conditions for b (0 ≤ b ≤ 1), equation (5.64) is differentiated
with respect to b and rearranging the terms gives
dU(Z, d)
dh
=
(
dg
dh
)(
ηe−ηgρWT − 1
)
+ µT − e−ηgρ
(
dWT
dh
)
(5.101)
Now from equation (5.100)
dg
dh
=
1
ηWT
(
dWT
dh
)
(5.102)
Thus, using this value of dg
dh
equation (5.102) becomes
dU(Z, d)
dh
= − 1
ηWT
(
dWT
dh
)
+ µT (5.103)
The values of WT and dWTdb would vary depending on the nature of distribution. Using the
values of WT for gamma distributed time from equation (5.79) and dWTdh from equation (5.87)
in equations (5.102) and (5.103)
dg
dh
=
wθ
1− η(h+ Ω)θ (5.104)
and
dU(S, d)
db
= − wθ
1− η(h+ Ω)θ + wθ = −
µTη(h+ Ω)θ
{1− η(h+ Ω)θ} [UsingµT = wθ] (5.105)
Now differentiating Upm with respect to h
dUpm
dh
= −dg
dh
+ µT = − wθ
1− η(h+ Ω)θ + µT = −
µTη(h+ Ω)θ
{1− η(h+ Ω)θ} [UsingµT = wθ]
(5.106)
Thus, it is observed that dU(Z,d)
dh
= dUpm
dh
. Thus, dUco
dh
= 0. Moreover, it can be argued that
the utility of the project manager and the utilitarian sum U(Z,d) is negative for any positive
value of h and zero with h = 0. Thus, the utility of the project manager and the utilitarian sum
are decreasing functions of h. However, the utility of the contractor would not change in h as
dUco
dh
= 0.
Similar to the gamma distributed time, similar results can de derived for time functions
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with other form of continuous probability distributions. This leads to the following proposi-
tion
Proposition 12. With a time based contract P = g-hT (where T follows a continuous time
distribution), the Utilitarian sum U, and the utility functions of the project manager are higher
under the fixed price contract (h = 0) than under any time based contract (h > 0). However,
the contractor’s utility does remain the same for any h value. Thus, the fixed price contracts
was found to dominate any time based contracts using the utilitarian bargaining approach.
5.8 Numerical Example
The last few sections have presented the models of supply chain coordination using bargain-
ing games. This section tests the models numerically.
5.8.1 Nash Bargaining
It is assumed the value of the project upon completion is, q = £10. The models are derived
for gamma, exponential, beta and Weibull distributed cost. The parameter η is assumed as
0.2 in the beginning. The other distribution specific values are assumed as below
• For a gamma distributed cost, the following are assumed
– shape parameter ω = 2
– scale parameter φ = 2
Thus, the mean value of the cost, µ = £4.
Firstly, the value of W is calculated for the gamma distribution using the numeric val-
ues. Using the conditions from equations (5.18) and (5.19), the optimal value of a is
calculated for b=0, 0.5 and 1. Using these values, the values of Upm, Uco and Nash
product N are calculated. The results are presented in figure 5.1 below and in table E.1
in appendix E.1.
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Figure 5.1: Individual Utilities/Nash Product vs. ”b” values: gamma distributed cost
• For an exponential distributed cost, the shape parameter ω = 1. Assuming the scale
parameter φ = 2, the values of W, a, Upm, Uco and Nash product N are calculated for
b = 0, 0.5 and 1 . The results are presented in figure 5.2 below and in table E.2 in
appendix E.1.
Figure 5.2: Individual Utilities/Nash Product vs. ”b” values for exponential distributed cost
• For a beta distributed cost, shape parameters are assumed as c = 2 and d = 3. The scale
is assumed as φ = 7. Using these values, the values of W, a, Upm, Uco and Nash product
N are calculated for b = 0, 0.5 and 1. The results are presented in figure 5.3 below and
in table E.3 in appendix E.1.
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Figure 5.3: Individual Utilities/Nash Product vs. ”b” values: beta distributed cost
Figure 5.4: Individual Utilities/Nash Product vs. ”b” values: Weibull distributed cost
• For a Weibull distributed cost, it is assumed the shape parameter S = 2 and scale
φ = 6. Again using these observations, the values of W, a, Upm, Uco and Nash product
N are calculated for b = 0, 0.5 and 1. The results are presented in figure 5.4 below and
in table E.4 in appendix E.1.
It can be seen from tables E.1, E.2, E.3, and E.4 that the values of Upm, Uco, and Nash product
are highest for in b = 1, followed by b = 0.5, and then b = 0. Similar is the observation from
figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. The values of Upm, Uco, and Nash product are increasing in b
for b ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the results of a cost plus contract dominates the solutions for fixed price
contract and any cost sharing contract with 0 < b < 1. This supports the original findings
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from the models.
5.8.2 Kalai Smorodinsky Bargaining
The values of q and η are assumed as before similar to the case of Nash’s bargaining. Numeric
examples were prepared for gamma distributed cost, exponential cost, beta distributed cost,
and Weibull distributed cost. The shape parameters (ω, c, d, and S as applicable to the case)
and the scale parameter φ are assumed as the same value as in the case of Nash’s bargaining.
Using these, the values of W, a, Upm, Uco, and the Kalai Smorodinsky Function K are
determined for b=0, 0.5 and 1. The results are presented in distributed cost figures 5.5, 5.6,
5.7, and 5.8 below and tables E.5, E.6, E.7, and E.8 in appendix E.2.
Figure 5.5: Individual Utilities/Kalai Smorodinsky value K vs. b values for gamma dis-
tributed cost
Similar to the observation in the case of Nash’s bargaining, the values of Upm, Uco, and
K are found to be increasing in the value of b, with b ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, once again the results
of a cost plus contract dominates the solutions from a fixed price contract and from any cost
sharing contract with 0 < b < 1. This once again supports the original findings from the
model.
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Figure 5.6: Individual Utilities/Kalai Smorodinsky value K vs. b values for exponential
distributed cost
Figure 5.7: Individual Utilities/Kalai Smorodinsky value K vs. b values for beta distributed
cost
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Figure 5.8: Individual Utilities/Kalai Smorodinsky value K vs. b values for Weibull dis-
tributed cost
5.8.3 Utilitarian Bargaining
Using the optimal value of a from equation (5.65) in the equation of utility function of the
contractor and rearranging the terms
Uco = 1− 1
η
(5.107)
As mentioned earlier, Uco > 0, otherwise contractor won’t participate in the bargaining. Thus,
for the utilitarian bargaining approach η > 1. Thus, unlike the case of Nash’s bargaining and
Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining, the risk aversion parameter η can not take lower values. To
put it in other words, the utilitarian approach can be applicable for more risk averse members.
q is assumed as 5 units. η is assumed as 1.2. Again, the analysis was conducted for
gamma, exponential, beta, and Weibull distributed cost.
• For a gamma distributed cost, the scale parameter is assumed as φ = 0.4 and the shape
parameter is assumed as ω = 2. This leads to the mean value of cost as 0.8 units.
• For an exponential distribution, the scale parameter is assumed φ = 0.8. Thus, the mean
value of the cost is 0.8 units.
• For a beta distributed cost, the shape parameters c and d are assumed as 2 and 3 as
before. The scale (φ) is assumed as 2. The mean value becomes 0.8 units
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• For a Weibull distributed cost, the shape parameter (s) is assumed as 2 and scale (φ) as
0.9
Figure 5.9: Individual Utilities/Utilitarian sum value U Product vs. b values for gamma
distributed cost
Figure 5.10: Individual Utilities/Utilitarian sum value U Product vs. ”b” values for exponen-
tial distributed cost
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Figure 5.11: Individual Utilities/Utilitarian sum value U Product vs. b values for beta dis-
tributed cost
Figure 5.12: Individual Utilities/Utilitarian sum value U Product vs. b values for Weibull
distributed cost
5.8.4 Comparison among the results
The last few subsections have presented the results of the numerical applications using the
proposed bargaining models. There are notable similarities in the results from different bar-
gaining models. Both the Nash and Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining applications to the supply
chain under consideration yields similar results. In both cases, the fixed price contract solu-
tions are dominated for both the members of the supply chain. The project manager and the
contractor both were found to have higher utility with the increase in the deciding contract
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parameter b ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the cost plus contract with b=1 was found to dominate any other
solutions in both Nash and Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining cases. Apart from individual util-
ities, Nash product in the case of Nash bargaining or the Kalai Smorodinsky value K in the
case of Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining case were also found to dominate the solutions in the
case of cost plus contracts with b=1.
In comparison to the Nash bargaining and Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining, the Utilitarian
approach was found to have some distinctly different features. The sum utility function U was
found to have a dominating solution for the cost plus contract with b=1 for all the distribution
selected. This was mainly due to the existence of the dominating solutions of the utility
function of the project manger at b = 1 (Cost plus contract) than in comparison to the solutions
with b = 0.5 and b = 0.0. However, the utility of the contractor was found to be same for any
values in the range b ∈ [0, 1]. In fact the utility of the contract was found to be independent of
the nature of the probability distribution of the project cost. This can be explained from the
equation (5.107). As evident from the equation, the Uco was found to be independent of any
distribution specific parameters of the cost function. The utility of the contractor was found
to be dependent only on the parameter η.
5.9 Chapter Summary
This chapter has investigated how to reach the optimal solution to coordinate supply chain
with negotiation between the project manager and the contractor. This chapter used
• A cost based contract P= a+bX (Where X is a continuous cost function; a is the fixed
component of the contract; and b is the variable part of the contract with b ∈ [0, 1]).
• A time based contract with P=g-hT (where g is the fixed part and h is the penalty per
unit to entice the contractor for early completion)
• In either of the above contracts, if the variable part becomes zero (b or h), it becomes a
fixed price contract
The bargaining approach used includes Nash bargaining, Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining, and
Utilitarian approach. The models were prepared for two different situations: both the mem-
bers are risk neutral, and the project manager is risk neutral and the contractor is risk averse.
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For the case when both the supply chain members (the project manager and the contractor)
are risk neutral, no clear dominance of solutions were observed by comparing the fixed price
with either time based or cost based contracts. This, may entice the members of the supply
chain under consideration to implement fixed price contract instead of implementing any
complicated contracts.
On the contrary, if the project manager is risk neutral and the contractor is the risk averse,
then the results are different and a dominance of solutions were observed. In comparison be-
tween the time based and the fixed price contracts, the solutions from the fixed price contract
were found to dominate the solutions from any time based contracts. In comparison between
the cost based contract, and the fixed price contract, the results from the cost based contracts
were found to dominate the results from the fixed price contracts. In fact, the cost plus con-
tract with b = 1 was found to dominate any other cost sharing contracts with 0 < b < 1. This
dominance was found to be strictly dominating for the case of Nash and Kalai Smorodinsky
bargaining for all the members of the supply chain under consideration and the respective
bargaining parameters (the Nash product N and the Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining value K).
However, the contractor’s utility was found to be independent of the variable part of the of-
fered contract (either b or h depending on the case) in the case of Utilitarian approach of
bargaining. Hence, the utility of the contractor remained unchanged with respect to the fixed
price contract in the utilitarian bargaining approach.
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Chapter 6
Fairness and Fair Allocation in Project
Supply Chain
This research has addressed the issue of supply chain coordination in take it or leave it situ-
ation in chapter 4 and extended it to bargaining situations in chapter 5. However, issues on
the allocation of risk and benefits of supply chain coordination were not discussed. Chapter
2 highlighted the problems arise in absence of fair allocation of risk and benefits.
Justice or fairness has been conceptualized since the time of Aristotle and Plato (Liu
et al. 2012). However, the authors concluded based on past research evidence how justice
or fairness has been perceived differently in different contexts. The concept of fairness or
justice has been studied for a long time in various economic and social exchange (Adams
1965, Lind & Tyler 1988, Greenberg & Cropanzano 1993).Various studies in economics and
marketing have addressed the importance of fairness in the social exchange (Frazier 1983,
Heide & John 1988, Corsten & Kumar 2005).
Liu et al. (2012) highlighted how four dimensions of justice have been developed in the
literature over the last few decades. These are distributive, procedural, interpersonal and
informational. The authors considered the first two dimensions as part of structural fairness
and the last two as part of social fairness.
Despite its importance and long rooted existence in the economics and other social sci-
ence related literature, the applications in supply chain related exchanges is relatively new.
As per the knowledge of the author of the present research, Cui et al. (2007) is one of the
pioneer authors who investigated the issues of distributive fairness in supply chain coordina-
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tion. Following their study, authors including Loch & Wu (2008), Caliskan-Demirag et al.
(2010), and Ho et al. (2014) proposed various models of supply chain coordination with fair-
ness considerations. However, these studies were conducted with product supply chains with
supply contracts and the quantity demanded as the decision variable. This chapter presents
the models as an extension to the early studies in the project supply chain setting with the
project contracts.
The question is what is the importance of fairness in the context of supply chain coordi-
nation. The distributive and procedural fairness have been found to have a positive impact on
long term relation between a firm and its distributor in a supply chain and ultimately on the
overall performance (Griffith et al. 2006). Absence of fairness has been found as one of the
factors leading to the failure of supply chain coordination relationship in some recent stud-
ies. Katok & Pavlov (2013) explored the reasons leading to the termination of coordinated
contractual relationships in a supply chain using behavioural laboratory experiments. The
authors found lack of inequality aversion, incomplete information and bounded rationality as
three reasons for this failure. This finding also supports the findings of Wu (2013b) where the
authors found rejecting behaviours from retailers in a supply chain when experiencing unfair
offers from the suppliers. Some of the examples from practice corroborate the importance of
the need for the fair allocation of the risks and benefits in the coordinated relationship such
as the termination of the contractual relationship between Walmart Canada and Lego group
upon rejection by Lego group to reduce the price in the Canadian market. Lego group kept
the price same as in the American market and reaped additional benefits due to the appre-
ciation of Canadian dollar (Georgiades 2008). Similar was the case with the breakdown of
contractual relationships between Chinese home appliance retailer Gome and air condition
manufacturer Gree (Liu et al. 2012).
Traditionally, it used to be believed that the participants only care about the rational profit
maximization as their objective in contractual agreements. However, some experimental
studies have shown the existence of fairness considerations from the participants (Loch &
Wu 2008, De Bruyn & Bolton 2008). More interestingly, this kind of caring behaviour has
been observed not only in the take it or leave it environments, but also in the bargaining en-
vironments as well (Camerer 2003). The classification of justice or fairness in buyer-seller
relationship by Liu et al. (2012) provides the basic starting point. The interesting fact is the
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consideration of distributive fairness as one of the forms of fairness consideration in supply
chain literature. Authors including Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Bolton & Ockenfels (2000), and
Charness & Rabin (2002) have defined fairness from somewhat different perspectives. Fehr
& Schmidt (1999) defined fairness from an inequity aversion perspective, whereas the authors
in two other studies defined fairness from reciprocity perspective. This has been supported in
the literature of Falk & Fischbacher (2006). Some other notable extensions have been doc-
umented in literature specific to the supply chain coordination such as peer-induced fairness
(Ho et al. 2014). In a recent study by Du et al. (2014), the authors were critical of the models
proposed by Fehr & Schmidt (1999) from applicability point of view. The authors used Nash
bargaining solution as the fairness reference point solution. This research summarises this
debate by the existence of context-specific nature of fairness consideration. This has been
supported in the literature by Liu et al. (2012).
This research has used the definition of fairness proposed by Fehr & Schmidt (1999) as
the reference for the take it or leave it situations and in some case for bargaining situations
as well. One of the main reasons is its ability to best describe the context of the coordination
problem considered for this research. Based on the definition by Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Cui
et al. (2007) identified that simple wholesale price contracts can coordinate a manufacturer-
retailer supply chain when members are fairness concerned. This model of Cui et al. (2007)
has been extended in various different directions such as: models with non-linear demand
(Caliskan-Demirag et al. 2010); and when the supplier’s fairness concerns are private infor-
mation in a supplier-retailer supply chain (Katok et al. 2014). The authors found that under
this situation the wholesale price contract can coordinate the supply chain as it did in the case
of information symmetry in the models of Cui et al. (2007). Voigt & Inderfurth (2012) used
the concepts of inequity aversion in a similar context with asymmetric holding cost informa-
tion. There are other supply chain contexts where fairness in allocation has been considered
such as cooperative advertising (Yang et al. 2013).
This research did not find any evidence of any supply chain coordination model including
fairness consideration alongside profit maximizing objective in the project settings. Thus,
this chapter addresses the third objective of this research
Objective 3. To investigate if the supply chain can be coordinated with fairly allocated
risks and benefits in the scenarios mentioned in objectives 1 and 2.
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The first part presents the analysis in take it or leave it situations with Stackelberg games. The
approach proposed by Cui et al. (2007) has been used as the reference for this. The second
part follows this up with some analysis of fairness considerations in bargaining situations.
6.1 Problem Description
As described earlier in chapter 4, the coordination problem is analysed with Stackelberg
leader-follower games in the take it or leave it situation. The project manager is considered
as the leader and the contractor is considered as the follower. In the supply chain literature, by
Cui et al. (2007) and Caliskan-Demirag et al. (2010), the authors used a fixed wholesale price
contract to see if it can coordinate the supply chain under consideration with the existence of
the fairness concern. This research uses a fixed price contract to investigate if it can achieve
the coordination requirements in the event of the presence of fairness concern.
Following the definition of the fairness in Fehr & Schmidt (1999) and the approach by
Cui et al. (2007), the utility equation of the member i in a two member supply chain (with
member i and member j) is
Ui(λ, P (T,C)) = pii +Di(λ, P (T,C)); i ∈ {pm, co} (6.1)
The first part of the equation (6.1) corresponds to the monetary profit of the member i of the
supply chain. The second part of the equation i.e. Di(λ, f) is the member i’s disutility due
to inequity or unfairness. As per this model, the member would incur some disutility if (s)he
earns more than or less than the profit (s)he believes is fair or equitable. This fair equitable
profit perceived by the member is compared against the profit of the other member. Let
γpipm and δpico are the equitable profit as perceived by the contractor and the project manager
respectively in the supply chain under consideration (where γ > 0 and δ > 0). Based on
the suggestion of Caliskan-Demirag et al. (2010), these factors γ and δ are exogenous to the
members and are calculated based on the outside options available to the members of the
supply chain under consideration. αi and βi (i ∈ {pm, co}) are the disutility to the member
per unit due to earning less (disadvantageous inequity) and more (advantageous inequity) in
comparison to the other member. Authors including Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Cui et al. (2007)
and Caliskan-Demirag et al. (2010), suggested based on previous research that the member is
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more sensitive to disadvantageous inequity (earning less) than advantageous utility (earning
more). Thus, it is assumed that αi ≥ βi. It is also assumed that 0 < βi < 1 in accordance with
the existing literature. Thus, based on the definition of Fehr & Schmidt (1999), the disutility
due to inequity or unfairness is defined as below
Dpm(λ, P (T,C)) = −αpm[max{(δpico − pipm), 0}]− βpm[max{(pipm − δpico), 0}] (6.2)
and
Dco(λ, P (T,C)) = −αco[max{(γpipm − pico), 0}]− βco[max{(pico − γpipm), 0}] (6.3)
where αpm ≥ βpm; 0 < βpm < 1; αco ≥ βco; and 0 < βco < 1.
As mentioned in the chapter 4, the coordination problem is solved using backward induction
method from game theory. Given an offer of a contract price of P(T,C), the contractor would
select a resource consumption rate λ that maximizes his profit if the contractor does not
have any fairness concern. However, in the event of the presence of a fairness concern, the
contractor will select a λ that maximizes his utility as below
Uco = pico − αco[max{(γpipm − pico), 0}]− βco[max{(pico − γpipm), 0}] (6.4)
The project manager would incorporate this requirement of λ in her take it or leave it offer
and selects the value of P(T,C) that maximizes her profit (if she is not fairness concerned)
given the constraint of λ. In the event, the project manager is fairness concerned, she selects
a value of P(T,C) that maximizes her utility as below
Upm = pipm − αpm[max{(δpico − pipm), 0}]− βpm[max{(pipm − δpico), 0}] (6.5)
The next few subsections explore the coordination problems with fairness concerned mem-
bers for different types of contracts used in chapter 4.
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6.2 Supply Chain Coordination with Fixed Price Contracts
in a Take it or Leave it Situation under Fairness Con-
cern
In the literature of Fehr & Schmidt (1999) and Caliskan-Demirag et al. (2010), authors used
wholesale price contract in a retail supply chain with fairness concerned members to coordi-
nate the supply chain. The authors argued if a simple wholesale price contract can coordinate
a supply chain with fairness concerned members, then there is a limited need to go for com-
plicated contracts.
As mentioned in chapter 4, the contractor then selects the resource consumption rate λ
after the project manager offered him a contract P(T,C). However, a fixed price contract with
P(T,C)= f was found to fail to coordinate the supply chain as shown in the 4. Here in this
chapter, the same set of approaches would be repeated, but with the presence of fairness
concerns of the members of the supply chain (the project manager or the contractor). The
utility of the contractor following equation (6.1) is as below
6.2.1 For Short Term Projects
As mentioned in the chapter 4, the first best supply chain profit in the centralized setting
follows the following equation
pi0 = q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − kλN0 µ1 − Co (6.6)
As mentioned in chapter 4, the project manager and the contractor’s profit in decentralized
setting are
pipm = q0 [1− ψE(Tm)]− f − Co (6.7)
pico = f − kλnE(T )
= f − kλNµ1 (6.8)
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The E(Tm) values satisfy the equation (4.17) and the λ0 values satisfy the conditions in the
equation (4.19) from chapter 4.
Fairness Concern Contractor and Profit Maximizing Project Manager
The fairness concern contractor will chose a resource consumption rate λ that maximizes
his utility. As mentioned earlier in chapter 4, this resource consumption rate λ can not be
monitored by the project manager. The game is solved using backward induction.
Using these values of profits from above, the utility function of the contractor becomes
Uco =

(f − kλNµ1)− αco[γ{q0 − q0ψE(Tm)− f − Co} − (f − kλNµ1)]
for {f − kλNµ1} < γ[q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − f − Co]
(f − kλNµ1)− βco[(f − kλNµ1)− γ{q0 − q0ψE(Tm)− f − Co}]
for {f − kλNµ1} ≥ γ[q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − f − Co]
(6.9)
The first case corresponds to disadvantageous disutility case, equitable case, and the second
one for the advantageous inequity case. As mentioned earlier, the contractor would select
a resource consumption rate λ that maximizes his utility. Thus, when {f − kλNµ1} <
γ[q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − f − Co], the contractor would select a λ that satisfies
dUco
dλ
= −kNλN−1µ1 − αco
[
−γq0ψdE(T
m)
dλ
+ kNλN−1µ1
]
= 0 (6.10)
The values of E(T) and E(Tm) depend on the nature of selected distribution.
From the equation (4.17), the value of dE(T
m)
dλ
is derived as
dE(Tm)
dλ
=

− mA(2µ1)m
(m+1)λmA+1
For uniform distributed time
− mAµm1
wmλmA+1
m∏
i=1
(w + i− 1) For gamma distributed time
− mAµm1
( uu+v )
m
λmA+1
m∏
i=1
(
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
)
For beta distributed time
− mAµm1{Γ(1+ 1s)}mλmA+1
[
Γ
(
1 + m
s
)]
For Weibull distributed time
(6.11)
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Using the values from (6.11) in the equation (6.10)
dUco
dλ
=
−kNλN−1µ1 − αco
[
γq0ψ
mA(2µ1)m
(m+1)λmA
+ kNµ1λ
N−1
]
= 0 For uniform distributed time
−kNλN−1µ1 − αco
γq0ψmAµ
m
1
m∏
i=1
(w+i−1)
wmλmA+1
+ kNµ1λ
N−1
 = 0 For gamma distributed time
−kNλN−1µ1 − αco
γq0ψmAµm1 m∏i=1( u+i−1u+v+i−1)( uu+v )mλmA+1 + kNµ1λN−1
 = 0 For beta distributed time
−kNλN−1µ1 − αco
{
γq0ψ
mAµm1 [Γ(1+ms )]
{Γ(1+ 1s)}mλmA+1 + kNµ1λ
N−1
}
= 0 For Weibull distributed time
(6.12)
Rearranging the terms from the above equation, it can be shown (for the case of uniform
distribution) that λm+A = − αcoγq0mA
(1+αco)(m+1)kNµ1
. Hence, solving the equation (6.12), the root
of the equation either becomes negative or the real roots of the equation can not be found.
Thus, if the contractor experiences a disadvantageous inequity, then the contractor’s practical
best option is to select λ = 0. This could never be able to coordinate the supply chain under
consideration. Based on this observation, the following is proposed
Proposition 13. A fixed price contract fails to coordinate a project supply chain with a fair-
ness concerned contractor and a profit maximizing project manager, if the contractor experi-
ences disadvantageous inequity.
In the second case from equation (6.9) when, {f − kλNµ1} ≥ γ[q0{1−ψE(Tm)}− f −
Co], the selected resource consumption rate should satisfy the following
dUco
dλ
= (−kNλN−1µ1)− β
[
(−kNλN−1µ1) + γq0ψdE(T
m)
dλ
]
= 0 (6.13)
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Using the values of dE(T
m)
dλ
from the equation (6.11) in the equation (6.13),
dUco
dλ
=

−kNλN−1µ1 − βco
[
−γq0ψ mA(2µ1)m(m+1)λmA+1 − kNµ1λN−1
]
= 0
For uniform distributed time
−kNλN−1µ1 − βco
−γq0ψmAµ
m
1
m∏
i=1
(w+i−1)
wmλmA+1
− kNµ1λN−1
 = 0
For gamma distributed time
−kNλN−1µ1 − βco
−γq0ψmAµm1 m∏i=1( u+i−1u+v+i−1)( uu+v )mλmA+1 − kNµ1λN−1
 = 0
For beta distributed time
−kNλN−1µ1 − βco
{
−γq0ψ mAµ
m
1 [Γ(1+ms )]
{Γ(1+ 1s)}mλmA+1 − kNµ1λ
N−1
}
= 0
For Weibull distributed time
(6.14)
Rearranging the terms of the above equation (6.14) in terms of λ
λ =

[
γβcomAq0ψ(2µ1)m
kNµ1(m+1)(1−βco)
] 1
mA+N
For uniform distributed timeγβcomAq0ψµ
m
1
m∑
i=0
(w+i−1)
wmkNµ1(1−βco)

1
mA+N
For gamma distributed time
γβcomAq0ψµm1 m∑i=1( u+i−1u+v+i−1 )
( uu+v )
m
kNµ1(1−βco)
 1mA+N For beta distributed time
{
γβcomAq0ψµm1 Γ(1+ms )
{Γ(1+ 1s})mkNµ1(1−βco)
} 1
mA+N
For Weibull distributed time
(6.15)
Now taking the second order derivative of Uco with respect to λ,
d2Uco
dλ2
= {−kN(N − 1)λN−2µ1} − βco
[
(−kN(N − 1)λN−2µ1) + γq0ψd
2E(Tm)
dλ2
]
= {−kN(N − 1)λN−2µ1}(1− β)− βcoγq0ψd
2E(Tm)
dλ2
(6.16)
As assumed before 0 ≤ βco < 1. It can be easily shown that the second order derivative of the
E(Tm) are positive for the uniform, gamma, beta and Weibull distributed completion times.
Thus, d
2Uco
dλ2
< 0. This means the values of λ found in the equation (6.15) would maximize
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the utility function of the fairness concerned contractor in the decentralized setting.
As mentioned earlier, in order to coordinate the supply chain, λ = λ0. Hence, the follow-
ing must be satisfied
[
γβmAq0ψ(2µ1)
m
kNµ1(m+ 1)(1− β)
] 1
mA+N
=
[
mAq0ψ(2µ1)
m
(m+ 1)KNµ1
] 1
mA+N
[For uniform distributed time]
γβcomAq0ψµ
m
1
m∑
i=0
(w + i− 1)
wmkNµ1(1− βco)

1
mA+N
=
mAq0ψµ
m−1
1
m∑
i=0
(w + i− 1)
wmkN

1
mA+N
[For gamma distributed time]
γβcomAq0ψµ
m
1
m∑
i=1
( u+i−1
u+v+i−1)(
u
u+v
)m
kNµ1(1− βco)

1
mA+N
=
mAq0ψµ
m−1
1
m∑
i=1
( u+i−1
u+v+i−1)(
u
u+v
)m
kN

1
mA+N
[For beta distributed time]
[
γβcomAq0ψµ
m
1 Γ
(
1 + m
s
){
Γ
(
1 + 1
s
})m
kNµ1(1− βco)
] 1
mA+N
=
[
mAq0ψµ
m−1
1 Γ
(
1 + m
s
){
Γ
(
1 + 1
s
})m
kN
] 1
mA+N
[For Weibull distributed time]
From these above equations, it can be shown
β =
1
1 + γ
(6.17)
The project manager takes into account the possible selected value of λ as calculated in (6.15)
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in her profit function. Thus, her optimization problem becomes
max
f
: Upm = pipm = q0
[
1− ψ (2µ1)
m
(m+ 1)λmA
]
− f − Co
St.
f ≥ γ[q0{1− ψE(T
m)} − Co] + kλNµ1
1 + γ
(6.18)
f ≥ −γβco[q0{1− ψE(T
m)} − Co] + kλNµ1(1− βco)
1− βco − βcoγ (6.19)
It can be easily shown that γ[q0{1−ψE(T
m)}−Co]+kλNµ1
1+γ
− −γβco[q0{1−ψE(Tm)}−Co]+kλNµ1(1−βco)
1−βco−βcoγ =
γpi0
(1+γ)(1−βco−βcoγ) . Since this is positive, the constraint condition in (6.19) is redundant. Thus,
the project manager selects a value of f that maximizes her profit given the constraints in
equation (6.18) i.e.
dUpm
df
= −1 < 0 (6.20)
As the first order condition is negative, the project manager’s utility decreases with f. Now
applying the constraint from equation (6.18), any value f more than or equal to the right hand
side maximizes the utility of the contractor. However, the project manager would select the
value of f that maximizes her utility (profit in this case). Considering all these, and replacing
the values of E(Tm) the following is proposed
Proposition 14. A fixed price contract can coordinate the project supply chain under consid-
eration with a fairness concerned contractor and a profit maximizing project manager, if the
contractor’s monetary profit is more than the equitable profit expectation of the contractor
and the following conditions are satisfied
β =
1
1 + γ
(6.21)
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f =

γ[q0{1− ψ(2µ1)
m
(m+1)λmA0
}−Co]+kλN0 µ1
1+γ
for uniform distributed time
γ[q0{1− ψµ
m
1
wmλmA0
m∏
i=1
(w+i−1)}−Co]+kλN0 µ1
1+γ
for gamma distributed time
γ[q0{1− ψµ
m
1
( uu+v )
m
λmA0
m∏
i=1
( u+i−1u+v+i−1)}−Co]+kλN0 µ1
1+γ
for beta distributed time
γ[q0{1− ψµ
m
1{Γ(1+ 1s)}mλmA0 [Γ(1+
m
s )]}−Co]+kλN0 µ1
1+γ
for Weibull distributed time
(6.22)
Fairness Concern Contractor and Project Manager
This subsection explores how the optimal condition changes if the project manager also be-
comes fairness concerned. Again, the coordination problem is solved using the backward
induction method. The contractor would select the resource consumption rate λ that maxi-
mizes his utility in the equation (6.9). Thus, as mentioned in the section (6.2.1), the contractor
selects λ = 0 in the case of advantageous inequity mentioned in proposition 13. In the second
case with advantageous inequity, the λ value again should satisfy the values in the equation
(6.15). The optimal condition to achieve the coordination should satisfy the equation (6.21)
in proposition 14.
Now, unlike the case of profit maximizing project manager, the fairness concerned project
manager would maximize her utility mentioned in (6.5). Replacing the values of pipm and pico
from the equations (6.7) and (6.8), the utility function becomes
Upm =
Upm1 = [q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − f − Co]− αpm[δ(f − kλNµ1)− {q0(1− ψE(Tm))− f − Co}]
when {q0(1− ψE(Tm))− f − Co} − δ(f − kλNµ1) < 0
Upm2 = [q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − f − Co]− βpm[{q0(1− ψE(Tm))− f − Co} − δ(f − kλNµ1)]
when {q0(1− ψE(Tm))− f − Co} ≥ δ(f − kλNµ1)
(6.23)
where βpm ≤ αpm, 0 ≤ βpm < 1. Similar to Cui et al. (2007), the profit maximizing project
manager is a special case of the above with αpm = 0 and βpm = 0.
The contractor considers γpipm as the equitable profit and the project manager considers
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δpico as the equitable profit. This means the contractor and the project manager consider
γ
1+γ
pi0 and δ1+δpi0 as their equitable share of the supply chain profits respectively. As defined
in Cui et al. (2007), the sum of these two pay-offs is considered as the equity capable channel
payoff (ECCP) i.e. ECCP = γ
1+γ
pi0 +
δ
1+δ
pi0 =
(
γδ+γ+δ+γδ
γδ+γ+δ
)
pi0.
Again as defined in Cui et al. (2007), when δγ > 1 i.e. ECCP > pi0, the supply chain
is considered as acrimonious channel with the members together expect to generate more
monetary payoff the supply chain is capable of producing. Thus, there will be some inequity
in existence. On the contrary, with δγ ≤ 1 i.e. ECCP ≤ pi0, the channel is considered as
harmonious channel (Cui et al. 2007).
Thus, the fairness concerned project manager’s maximization problem for the case of
disadvantageous inequity becomes
max
f
: Upm1 = [q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − f − Co]− αpm[δ(f − kλN0 µ1)− {q0(1− ψE(Tm))− f − Co}]
St.
f ≥ γ[q0{1− ψE(T
m)} − Co] + kλNµ1
1 + γ
(6.24)
Again, the project manager will select a value of f that maximizes her utility function Upm1
i.e.
dUpm1
df
= −1− αpm(δ + 1) < 0 (6.25)
Thus, again the utility function of the project manager is a decreasing function of f. Thus
applying the constraint from the equation (6.24), the optimal value of f would satisfy
f ∗a =
γ[q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − Co] + kλNµ1
1 + γ
(6.26)
Now in order for the project manager to incur disadvantageous inequity, the following should
be satisfied
{q0(1− ψE(Tm))− f − Co} − δ(f − kλNµ1) < 0 (6.27)
Now replacing these values of f from equation(6.26) and λ0 in the expression (6.27), it can
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be shown
{q0(1− ψE(Tm))− f − Co} − δ(f − kλNµ1) = pi0
[
1− δγ
1 + γ
]
< 0
Since pi0 is positive in order for the participation of the members of the supply chain, the
project manager to incur disadvantageous inequity when δγ > 1 . In other words, the project
manager would incur disadvantageous inequity in acrimonious supply chain. The project
manager would select the f = f ∗a value as long as her utility is non-negative. Thus,
Upm1
= [q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − f − Co]− αpm[δ(f − kλN0 µ1)− {q0(1− ψE(Tm))− f − Co}] ≥ 0
=
[
q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − γ[q0{1− ψE(T
m)} − Co] + kλNµ1
1 + γ
− Co
]
+ αpmpi0
[
1− δγ
1 + γ
]
≥ 0
=
pi0
1 + γ
{1 + αpm(1− δγ)} ≥ 0
or
αpm ≤ 1
δγ − 1 (6.28)
From the above observations, the optimal condition for the project manager is summarised in
the following lemma
Lemma 17. If both the project manager and the contractor are fairness concerned, the supply
chain is coordinated with the fixed price contract satisfying the condition in the equation
(6.26) when the following are satisfied
βco ≥ 1
1 + γ
,
δγ > 1, and αpm ≤ 1
δγ − 1 (6.29)
On the contrary to the disadvantageous inequity, the project manager incurs advantageous
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inequity when when the following is satisfied,
{q0(1− ψE(Tm))− f − Co} − δ(f − kλNµ1) ≥ 0 (6.30)
Thus, the optimization problem of the project manager becomes
max
f
: Upm2 (6.31)
= [q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − f − Co]− βpm[{q0(1− ψE(Tm))− f − Co} − δ(f − kλN0 µ1)]
St.
f ≥ γ[q0{1− ψE(T
m)} − Co] + kλNµ1
1 + γ
(6.32)
The value of f that maximizes project manager’s utility in the above equation should satisfy
dUpm2
df
= −1 + βpm(1 + δ) (6.33)
If −1 + βpm(1 + δ) ≤ 0, then dUpmdf ≤ 0. This means the project manager’s utility would be a
decreasing function of f. Thus, the project manager selects the minimum value that satisfies
the constraint in the equation (6.32) i.e. f ∗h =
γ[q0{1−ψE(Tm)}−Co]+kλNµ1
1+γ
. Moreover, the
conditions mentioned in equation (6.21) in proposition 14 is applied to the λ for the purpose
of coordination. Using these values of f and λ in the utility function of the project manager,
it can easily be shown that the project manager would incur this advantageous inequity in
the event of pi0
[
1−δγ
1+γ
]
≥ 0 i.e. δγ ≤ 1. This means, the project manager would incur
advantageous inequity in the harmonious supply chain. Summarising these, the optimization
conditions are presented in the following lemma
Lemma 18. If both the project manager and the contractor are fairness concerned, the supply
chain is coordinated with the fixed price contract
f ∗h =
γ[q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − Co] + kλNµ1
1 + γ
(6.34)
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when the following are satisfied
βco ≥ 1
1 + γ
, δγ ≤ 1 and βpm ≤ 1
1 + δ
(6.35)
If [−1 + βpm(1 + δ)] > 0 i.e βpm > 11+δ , then dUpmdf > 0. This means, the utility of the
project manager would increase with f. Thus, higher the value of f, higher the utility of the
fairness concerned project manager and there is no upper bound to the optimal solution for f.
However, the profit of the project manager decreases with any increase in f. As a result after
a certain higher values of f, the profit of the project manager would become exactly the same
as her expected fair profit and further increase in f would make the profit negative.It can be
easily shown from the lemma 18 that pico = γpi01+γ at the offered value of contract f
∗
h . This is
the fair allocation of the profit for the contractor. Hence, increasing the value of f after this
would never be able to allocate the profit fairly. Thus, this research won’t consider this case.
Combining the findings from lemmas 17 and 18, and using the expected values of the mth
moments of the completion time for different distributions from the equation (4.17) in the
optimal contract price, the following is proposed
Proposition 15. In a fairness concerned supply chain (with both the project manager and
the contractor are fairness concerned), the project manager can coordinate the supply chain
with the following fixed price
f ∗ =

γ[q0{1− ψ(2µ1)
m
(m+1)λmA0
}−Co]+kλN0 µ1
1+γ
for uniform distributed time
γ[q0{1− ψµ
m
1
wmλmA0
m∏
i=1
(w+i−1)}−Co]+kλN0 µ1
1+γ
for gamma distributed time
γ[q0{1− ψµ
m
1
( uu+v )
m
λmA0
m∏
i=1
( u+i−1u+v+i−1)}−Co]+kλN0 µ1
1+γ
for beta distributed time
γ[q0{1− ψµ
m
1{Γ(1+ 1s)}mλmA0 [Γ(1+
m
s )]}−Co]+kλN0 µ1
1+γ
for Weibull distributed time
(6.36)
if and only if the contractor has a non-zero positive disutility parameter βco, that βco ≥ 11+γ
and when any of the following is satisfied
1. δγ > 1, and αpm ≤ 1δγ−1
2. δγ ≤ 1, and βpm ≤ 11+δ .
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Fairness concerned project manager and profit maximizing contractor
The coordination problem is again solved using backward induction method. For a given
value of fixed price contract f, the contractor selects a resource consumption rate λ that maxi-
mizes his profit. The project manager would anticipate this value of λ by backward induction
and would offer a fixed price f that maximizes her own utility. This should also satisfy the
constraint to achieve the λ that maximizes the contractor’s profit.
Similar to the calculation shown in chapter 4, the λ that maximizes the contractor’s profit
in equation (6.8), should satisfy −kNµ1λN−1 = 0. In other words, the selected value of
resource consumption rate would be zero. This leads to the following proposition
Proposition 16. A supply chain with a fairness concerned project and a profit maximizing
contractor, can not be coordinated using a fixed price contract with the resource consumption
rate as the decision making variable.
6.2.2 For Long Term Projects
As described in chapter 4, there could be two different types of scenario for the long term
projects: the projects with recoverable operational life of the product, and the projects with
irrecoverable operational life of the product, in the event the project completion is delayed.
Chapter 4 analysed the scenario for profit maximizing project manager and profit maximizing
contractor. This section extends that analysis to fairness concerned members. As described
in chapter 4, the profit functions in the centralized setting satisfy the condition in the equation
4.12. The first best resource consumption rate λ = λ0 satisfies the following
dpi
dλ
=q0
dE{e−αT }
dλ
− knλn−1
α
[
1− E{e−αT}]+ kλn
α
[
dE{e−αT }
dλ
]
= 0 for recoverable product life(
q0ψ
α
) dE{e−αT }
dλ
− knλn−1
α
[
1− E{e−αT}]+ kλn
α
[
dE{e−αT }
dλ
]
= 0 for irrecoverable product life
(6.37)
In the decentralized setting, the project manager offers a contract P(T, C) = f to the contractor.
Thus, their individual profits become (Using the observations from the equations 4.13 and
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4.14)
pipm =

q0E{e−αT} −
∞∫
0
P (T,C) e−αTfλ(T )dT − Co for recoverable product life
q0[1− ψα + ψαE{e−αT}]−
∞∫
0
P (T,C) e−αTfλ(T )dT − Co for irrecoverable product life
(6.38)
pico =
 ∞∫
0
P (T,C) e−αTfλ(T )dT
− kλn
α
[
1− E{e−αT}] (6.39)
Since the fixed price contract is used, P(T,C) = f. Thus, the expected value becomes
E{P (T,C)e−αT} = f
∞∫
0
e−αTfλ(T ) = fE{e−αT} (6.40)
Using this value of E{P (T,C)e−αT} in equations (6.38) and (6.39), the following modified
profit functions of the project manager and the contractor in the decentralized supply chain
are derived
pipm =
q0E{e
−αT} − fE{e−αT} − Co for recoverable product life
q0[1− ψα + ψαE{e−αT}]− fE{e−αT} − Co for irrecoverable product life
(6.41)
pico = E{P (T,C)e−αT} − E(C) = f{e−αT} − kλ
n
α
[
1− E{e−αT}] (6.42)
where E{(P (T,C)e−αT} =
 ∞∫
0
P (T,C) e−αTfλ(T )dT

As shown in chapter 4, the E{e−αT} values can be derived from the equation (4.25) (Evans
et al. 1993).
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Fairness Concern Contractor and Profit Maximizing Project Manager
If the contract is fairness concerned, the he selects a resource consumption rate λ in the
decentralized setting which maximizes his utility function as below
Uco =
[
fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}]
−αco
[
γ
{
q0E{e−αT} − fE{e−αT} − Co
}− {fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}]+
−βco
[{
fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}− γ {q0E{e−αT} − fE{e−αT} − Co}]+
for recoverable product life
[
fE{e−αT} − kλ
n
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}]
− αco[γ{q0{1− ψ
α
+
ψ
α
E(e−αT )} − fE{e−αT} − Co} − {fE(e−αT )− kλ
n
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}]+
− βco[{fE{e−αT} − kλ
n
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}} − γ{q0{1− ψ
α
+
ψ
α
E(e−αT )} − fE{e−αT} − Co}]+
for irrecoverable product life
(6.43)
Similar to the case of short term project, this utility function can be broken into two cases.
The disadvantageous inequity occurs when

[{
fe−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}]− [γ {q0E{e−αT} − fE{e−αT} − Co}] < 0
for recoverable product life[{
fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}]− [γ {q0[1− ψα + ψαE{e−αT}]− fE{e−αT} − Co}] < 0
for irrecoverable product life
(6.44)
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The utility function becomes Uco = Uco1, where
Uco1 =
[
fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}]
−αco
[
γ
{
q0E(e
−αT )− fE(e−αT )− Co
}− {fE(e−αT )− kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}]
for recoverable product life[
fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}]
−αco
[
γ
{
q0(1− ψα + ψαE(e−αT ))− fE(e−αT )− Co
}− {fE(e−αT )− kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}]
for irrecoverable product life
(6.45)
For an offered value of f, the fairness concerned contractor will select a resource consumption
rate λ that maximizes the utility mentioned in the equation (6.45). Thus, the selected λ
satisfies the following
dUco1
dλ
=

(1 + αco)
[
f dE{e
−αT }
dλ
−
(
knλn−1
α
){
1− E(e−αT )}+ (kλn
α
) dE{e−αT }
dλ
]
−αco
[
γ
{
q0
dE{e−αT }
dλ
− f dE{e−αT }
dλ
}]
= 0
for recoverable product life
(1 + αco)
[
f dE{e
−αT }
dλ
−
(
knλn−1
α
){
1− E(e−αT )}+ (kλn
α
) dE{e−αT }
dλ
]
−αco
[
γ
{(
q0ψ
α
) dE{e−αT }
dλ
− f dE{e−αT }
dλ
}]
= 0
for irrecoverable product life
(6.46)
In order to coordinate the supply chain, this selected λ should be at least equal to the first best
solution λ0 i.e. λ ≥ λ0. Thus replacing the value of dE(C)dλ i.e. the term[
−
(
knλn−1
α
){
1− E(e−αT )}+ (kλn
α
) dE{e−αT }
dλ
]
from the equation (6.37) in the equation
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(6.46) and rearranging the terms, the following conditions are derived
dUco1
dλ
=
(1 + αco + γαco)
dE(e−αT )
dλ
(f − q0) = 0 for recoverable product life
(1 + αco + γαco)
dE(e−αT )
dλ
(f − q0ψ
α
) = 0 for irrecoverable product life
(6.47)
Differentiating the E{e−αT} with respect to λ, it can be shown that dE(e−αT )
dλ
> 0 for the
statistical distributions selected for this research. Thus, in order to achieve coordination, the
offered contract has to be at least equal to the project value at the start of the project i.e.
f ≥ q0 for a project with recoverable product life upon completion, and f ≥ q0ψα for a project
with irrecoverable product life upon completion. It is assumed earlier that ψ > α in order to
make sure that the impact of any project delay is taken into consideration.Thus, summarising
the above observation, the following is proposed
Proposition 17. A fixed price contract fails to coordinate a supply chain with a profit maxi-
mizing project manager and a fairness concerned contractor when the cash-flows are expo-
nentially discounted and the contractor experiences any disadvantageous inequity.
On the contrary, the advantageous inequity occurs when the following are satisfied

[{
fE(e−αT )} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}− γ {q0E(e−αT )− fE(e−αT )− Co}] ≥ 0
for recoverable product life[{
fE(e−αT )− kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}− γ {q0 (1− ψα + ψα (e−αT ))− fE(e−αT )− Co}] ≥ 0
for irrecoverable product life
or
f ≥

γq0E(e−αT )+ kλ
n
α {1−E(e−αT )}−γCo
(1+γ)E{e−αT } for recoverable product life
γq0[1−ψα+ψαE{e−αT }]+ kλ
n
α {1−E(e−αT )}−γCo
(1+γ)E{e−αT } for irrecoverable product life
(6.48)
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The utility function becomes Uco = Uco2, where
Uco2 =
[
fE(e−αT )− kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}]
−βco
[{
fE(e−αT )− kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}− γ {q0E(e−αT )− fE{e−αT} − Co}]
for recoverable product life[
fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}]
−βco
[{
fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}− γ {q0(1− ψα + ψαE(e−αT ))− fE(e−αT )− Co}]
for irrecoverable product life
(6.49)
Again, the contractor selects a λ that maximizes his utility function in the equation (6.49).
Thus, it should satisfy
dUco2
dλ
=

(1− βco)
[
f dE{e
−αT }
dλ
−
(
knλn−1
α
){
1− E(e−αT )}+ (kλn
α
) dE(e−αT )
dλ
]
+βco
[
γ
{
q0
dE{e−αT }
dλ
− f dE(e−αT )
dλ
}]
= 0
for recoverable product life
(1− βco)
[
f dE(e
−αT )
dλ
−
(
knλn−1
α
){
1− E(e−αT )}+ (kλn
α
) dE{e−αT }
dλ
]
+βco
[
γ
{(
q0ψ
α
)
dE(e−αT )
dλ
− f dE(e−αT )
dλ
}]
= 0
for irrecoverable product life
(6.50)
Again for the purpose of the coordination the selected λ should be at least equal to the first
best solution λ0 i.e. λ ≥ λ0. Thus replacing dE(C)dλ i.e. the term−
(
knλn−1
α
){
1− E(e−αT )}+(
kλn
α
) dE{e−αT }
dλ
from the equation (6.37) in the equation (6.50)
dUco2
dλ
=
(1− βco − γβco)
dE(e−αT )
dλ
(f − q0) = 0 for recoverable product life
(1− βco − γβco)dE(e−αT )dλ (f − q0ψα ) = 0 for irrecoverable product life
(6.51)
It can be easily shown that dE(e
−αT )
dλ
> 0. For the coordination to be achieved, (f−q0) < 0. If
βco =
1
1+γ
, then dUco
dλ
= 0. For λ ≥ λ0, dUcodλ ≥ 0. Thus, (1− βco − βcoγ) ≤ 0. i.e. βco ≥ 11+γ .
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The project manager anticipates these requirements of f in order to entice the contractor
for coordination. Thus, she takes it into consideration before offering the contract f and her
optimization problem becomes
max
f
: pipm =
q0E{e
−αT} − fE{e−αT} − Co for recoverable product life
q0[1− ψα + ψαE{e−αT}]− fE{e−αT} − Co for irrecoverable product life
(6.52)
St.
f ≥

γq0E(e−αT )+ kλ
n
α {1−E(e−αT )}−γCo
(1+γ)E{e−αT } for recoverable product life
γq0[1−ψα+ψαE{e−αT }]+ kλ
n
α {1−E(e−αT )}−γCo
(1+γ)E{e−αT } for irrecoverable product life
(6.53)
The project manager selects a λ that maximizes her profit, i.e. dUpm
dλ
= dpipm
dλ
= −E{e−αT} <
0. This is true for for both recoverable and irrecoverable product life.
Thus, again similar to the case of of short term projects with no discounting of cash-
flows, the project manager’s utility is a decreasing function of f. Thus, in order to maximize
the profit, given the constraints in the equation (6.53), the optimal value of f should satisfy
condition in the following lemma
Lemma 19. A fixed price contract can coordinate the project supply chain when the cash-
flows are exponentially discounted, with a fairness concerned contractor and a profit maxi-
mizing project manager, if the contractor experiences advantageous inequity, the cash-flows
are exponentially discounted and the following conditions are satisfied
βco ≥ 1
1 + γ
(6.54)
f ∗ =

γq0E(e−αT )+ kλ
n
α {1−E(e−αT )}−γCo
(1+γ)E{e−αT } for recoverable product life
γq0[1−ψα+ψαE{e−αT }]+ kλ
n
α {1−E(e−αT )}−γCo
(1+γ)E{e−αT } for irrecoverable product life
(6.55)
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For the values βco > 11+γ , the utility of contractor might increase, but at the same time
his monetary profit would keep on decreasing and after a certain increase in λ, it would
become negative, but the overall utility will still increase due aversion of to high per unit
price of advantageous inequity. This research avoids this type of scenario due to practicality
considerations. Using the value of the moment generating functions of the distributions, the
following are proposed
Proposition 18. A fixed price contract can coordinate the project supply chain when the
cash-flows are exponentially discounted, with a fairness concerned contractor and a profit
maximizing project manager, if the contractor’s monetary profit is more than the equitable
profit expectation of the project manager and the following conditions are satisfied
βco =
1
1 + γ
(6.56)
1. for an uniform distributed time
f =

γq0λA
(
1−e−
2µ1α
λ
2αµ1
)
+ kλ
n
α
{
1−λA
(
1−e−
2µ1α
λ
2αµ1
)}
−γCo
(1+γ)λA
(
1−e−
2µ1α
λ
2αµ1
) for recoverable product life
γq0[1−ψα+ψαλA
(
1−e−
2µ1α
λ
2αµ1
)
+ kλ
n
α
{
1−λA
(
1−e−
2µ1α
λ
2αµ1
)}
−γCo
(1+γ)λA
(
1−e−
2µ1α
λ
2αµ1
) for irrecoverable product life
(6.57)
2. for a gamma distributed time
f =

γq0
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w
+ kλ
n
α
{
1−
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w}
−γCo
(1+γ)
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w for recoverable product life
γq0[1−ψα+ψα
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w
+ kλ
n
α
{
1−
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w}
−γCo
(1+γ)
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w for irrecoverable product life
(6.58)
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3. for beta distributed time
f = (6.59)
(γq0− kλnα )
[ ∞∑
m=1
{
µ1(u+v)
uλA
}m( m∏
i=1
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
){
(−α)m
m!
}]
+ kλ
n
α
−γCo
(1+γ)
[ ∞∑
m=1
{
µ1(u+v)
uλA
}m( m∏
i=1
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
)
{ (−α)mm! }
] for recoverable prod life
γq0(1−ψα)+(
q0ψ
α
− kλn
α )
[ ∞∑
m=1
{
µ1(u+v)
uλA
}m( m∏
i=1
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
){
(−α)m
m!
}]
+ kλ
n
α
−γCo
(1+γ)
[ ∞∑
m=1
{
µ1(u+v)
uλA
}m( m∏
i=1
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
)
{ (−α)mm! }
] for irrecoverable prod life
(6.60)
4. for Weibull distributed time
f = (6.61)
(γq0− kλnα )
[
1+
∞∑
m=1
{
µ1
λAΓ(1+ 1s )
}m{Γ(1+ms )}{ (−α)mm! }]+ kλnα −γCo
(1+γ
[
1+
∞∑
m=1
{
µ1
λAΓ(1+ 1s )
}m{Γ(1+ms )}{ (−α)mm! }] for recoverable prod life
γq0(1−ψα)+(ψα− kλ
n
α )
[
1+
∞∑
m=1
{
µ1
λAΓ(1+ 1s )
}m{Γ(1+ms )}{ (−α)mm! }]+ kλnα −γCo
(1+γ)
[
1+
∞∑
m=1
{
µ1
λAΓ(1+ 1s )
}m{Γ(1+ms )}{ (−α)mm! }] for irrecoverable prod life
(6.62)
Fairness Concern Contractor and Project Manager
This subsection explores how the optimal condition changes if the project manager also be-
comes fairness concerned. Again, the coordination problem is solved using the backward
induction method. The contractor would select the resource consumption rate λ that maxi-
mizes his utility in the equation (6.43). Thus, as mentioned earlier the contractor would still
select λ = 0 when he experiences disadvantageous inequity (As mentioned in proposition
17). In the second case with advantageous inequity, the λ value again should satisfy the val-
ues in the equations (6.50) and (6.51) and the optimal condition βco ≥ 11+γ in order to achieve
the coordination. The optimnal condition for f mentioned in the equation (6.53) satisfies this
requirement.
Now, again unlike the case of profit maximizing project manager, the fairness concerned
project manager would maximize her utility mentioned in (6.5). Now replacing the values of
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pipm and pico from the equations (6.7) and (6.8), the utility function becomes
Upm =

[
fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}]
−αpm
[
δ
{
fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}− {q0E{e−αT} − fE{e−αT} − Co}]+
−βpm
[{
q0E{e−αT} − fE{e−αT} − Co
}− δ {fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}]+
for recoverable product life[
fE(e−αT )− kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}]− αpm[δ {fE{e−αT} − kλnα {1− E (e−αT )}}
−{q0[1− ψα + ψαE{e−αT}]− fE{e−αT} − Co}]+ − βpm[{q0(1− ψα + ψαE(e−αT ))
−fE(e−αT )− Co} − δ
{
fE(e−αT )− kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}]+
for irrecoverable product life
(6.63)
[where βpm ≤ αpm, 0 ≤ βpm < 1 as before].
As mentioned in the section 6.2.1, the contractor and the project manager consider γ
1+γ
pi0
and δ
1+δ
pi0 as their equitable share of the supply chain profits respectively. As defined in Cui
et al. (2007), the equity capable channel payoff is ECCP =
(
γδ+γ+δ+γδ
γδ+γ+δ
)
pi0.
When the following are satisfied, the project manager incurs disadvantageous inequity

{
q0E{e−αT} − fE{e−αT} − Co
}− δ {fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}} < 0
for recoverable product life{
q0[1− ψα + ψαE{e−αT}]− fE{e−αT} − Co
}− δ {fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}} < 0
for irrecoverable product life
(6.64)
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Then, the the project manager’s utility becomes
Upm1 =

[{q0E{e−αT} − fE{e−αT} − Co]
−αpm
[
δ
{
fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}− {q0E{e−αT} − fE{e−αT} − Co}]
for recoverable product life[
q0{1− ψα + ψαE(e−αT )} − fE{e−αT} − Co
]
−αpm[δ
{
fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}
−{q0[1− ψα + ψαE{e−αT}]− fE{e−αT} − Co}]
for irrecoverable product life
(6.65)
Thus, the fairness concerned project manager’s maximization problem becomes
max
f
: Upm = Upm1 [whereUpm1 follows the equation (6.65)]
Sub. to
f satisfying the equation in (6.53) (6.66)
Again, the project manager will select a value of f that maximizes her utility function Upm1
i.e. dUpm1
df
= −1− αpm(δ + 1) < 0;
Thus, again the utility function of the project manager is a decreasing function of f. Now
applying the constraint from the equation (6.66), the optimal value of f would satisfy the
optimal condition of f mentioned in equation (6.55). Now replacing these values of f and λ0
in the expression (6.64), it can be shown that pi0
[
1−δγ
1+γ
]
< 0.
Proof. Using the optimal value of f from the equation (6.55) and λ = λ0 in the left hand side
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of the equation (6.64)
[
q0E(e
−αT )− γq0E(e
−αT )− γCo + kλn{1− E(e−αT )}
(1 + γ)E(e−αT )
E(e−αT )− Co
]
− δ
[
γq0E(e
−αT )− γCo + kλn{1− E(e−αT )}
(1 + γ)E(e−αT )
E(e−αT )− kλn0{1− E(e−αT}
]
=
[
q0E(e
−αT )− kλn0{1− E(e−αT )} − Co
] [1− δγ
1 + γ
]
= pi0
[
1− δγ
1 + γ
]
Similar to the case of short term projects with no cash discounting, pi0 is positive for the
long term projects with cash discounting in order for the participation of the members of
the supply chain. Thus,the project manager incurs disadvantageous inequity when δγ > 1.
In other words, the project manager would incur disadvantageous inequity in acrimonious
supply chain (based on the definition in Cui et al. (2007)). The project manager would select
the optimal f value from the equation (6.55) as long as her utility is non-negative. Thus, using
thsi optimal f value in the equation (6.65) and using the observation in the proof above.
Upm1 =

[
q0E(e
−αT )− γq0E(e−αT )+
kλn0
α
{1−E(e−αT )}−γCo
(1+γ)E(e−αT ) E(e
−αT )− Co
]
− αpmpi0
[
δγ−1
1+γ
]
≥ 0
for recoverable product life[
q0{1− ψα + ψαE(e−αT )} −
γq0E(e−αT )+
kλn0
α
{1−E(e−αT )}−γCo
(1+γ)E(e−αT ) E(e
−αT )− Co
]
−αpmpi0
[
δγ−1
1+γ
]
≥ 0
for irrecoverable product life
or
Upm1 =

[q0E(e−αT )−kλn0 {1−E(e−αT )}−Co]
1+γ
− αpmpi0
[
δγ−1
1+γ
]
≥ 0 for recoverable product life
[q0{1−ψα+ψαE(e−αT )}−kλn0 {1−E(e−αT )}−Co]
1+γ
− αpmpi0
[
δγ−1
1+γ
]
≥ 0 for irrecoverable product life
or
Upm1 =
pi0
1 + γ
{1− αpm(δγ − 1)} ≥ 0
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or
αpm ≤ 1
δγ − 1 [∵ pi0 > 0, and (1 + γ) > 0]
From all the above observations, the optimal condition for the project manager is summarised
in the following lemma
Lemma 20. The supply chain with a fairness concerned project manager and a fairness
concerned contractor is coordinated with the fixed price contract below when cash-flows are
discounted exponentially
f ∗a =
γq0E(e
−αT )− γCo + kλnα {1− E(e−αT )}
(1 + γ)E(e−αT )
(6.67)
In addition, the following conditions must satisfied
βco ≥ 1
1 + γ
, δγ > 1, and αpm ≤ 1
δγ − 1 (6.68)
On the contrary to the disadvantageous inequity, when the following is satisfied, the
project manager incurs advantageous inequity when

{
q0E{e−αT} − fE{e−αT} − Co
}− δ {fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}} ≥ 0
for recoverable product life{
q0[1− ψα + ψαE{e−αT}]− fE{e−αT} − Co
}− δ {fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}} ≥ 0
for irrecoverable product life
(6.69)
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Thus, the optimization problem of the project manager becomes
max
f
: Upm = Upm2 = (6.70)
[{q0E{e−αT} − fE{e−αT} − Co]
−βpm
[{
q0E{e−αT} − fE{e−αT} − Co
}− δ {fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}]
for recoverable product life[
q0{1− ψα + ψαE(e−αT )} − fE{e−αT} − Co
]
−βpm
[{
q0[1− ψα + ψαE{e−αT}]− fE{e−αT} − Co
}− δ {fE{e−αT} − kλn
α
{
1− E (e−αT )}}]
for irrecoverable product life
(6.71)
Sub.to
f satisfying the equation in (6.53) (6.72)
In order to find the optimal value of f, the first order derivative of the project manager’s is
derived as below
dUpm2
df
= [−1 + βpm(1 + δ)]E(e−αT ) (6.73)
Since E(e−αT ) ≥ 0, so if −1 + βpm(1 + δ) ≤ 0, then dUpmdf ≤ 0. This means the project
manager’s utility would be a decreasing unction of f. Thus, the project manager will select the
minimum value that satisfies the constraint in the equation (6.53). Moreover, the conditions
mentioned in equation (6.56) in lemma 18 is applied to the resource consumption rate to
satisfy λ = λ0 for the purpose of coordination. Using theses value of f and λ, in the utlity
function of the project manager, it can easily be shown that the project manager would incur
this advantageous inequity in the event of pi0
[
1−δγ
1+γ
]
≥ 0 i.e. δγ ≤ 1. This means, the project
manager would incur advantageous inequity in the harmonious channel. Summarising these,
the optimization conditions are presented in the following lemma
Lemma 21. If both the project manager and the contractor are fairness concerned, the supply
chain is coordinated with the fixed price contract with cash-flows are discounted exponen-
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tially if
f ∗h =

γq0E(e−αT )+ kλ
n
α {1−E(e−αT )}−γCo
(1+γ)E{e−αT } for recoverable product life
γq0[1−ψα+ψαE{e−αT }]+ kλ
n
α {1−E(e−αT )}−γCo
(1+γ)E{e−αT } for irrecoverable product life
(6.74)
when the following are satisfied
βco ≥ 1
1 + γ
, δγ ≤ 1 and βpm ≤ 1
1 + δ
(6.75)
Similar to the case of short term projectrs with no cash discounting, at the above optimal
value of the contractor would earn a fair profit of γpi0
1+γ
and the project manager would earn
pi0
1+γ
.
If [−1 + βpm(1 + δ)] > 0 i.e βpm > 11+δ , then dUpmdf > 0. This means, the utility of the
project manager would increase with increase in f. Thus, higher the value of f, higher the
utility of the fairness concerned project manager and there is no upper bound to the optimal
solution for f. After a certain higher values of f, the profit of the project manager would
become negative, but due to higher value of disutility aversion per unit due to advantageous
inequity would compensate this. It is also not very logical to increase the value of f after the
value mentioned in the above lemma as it would never allocate the profit fairly. Thus, this
research does not consider this case. Combining the findings from lemmas 20 and 21, and us-
ing the expected values of the mth moments of the completion time for different distributions
from the equation (4.17) in the optimal contract price, the following is proposed
Proposition 19. In a fairness concerned supply chain (with both project manager and the
contractor are fairness concerned), the project manager can coordinate the supply chain
with the following fixed price when the cash-flows are discounted
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1. for an uniform distributed time
f ∗ =

γq0λA
(
1−e−
2µ1α
λ
2αµ1
)
+ kλ
n
α
{
1−λA
(
1−e−
2µ1α
λ
2αµ1
)}
−γCo
(1+γ)λA
(
1−e−
2µ1α
λ
2αµ1
) for recoverable product life
γq0[1−ψα+ψαλA
(
1−e−
2µ1α
λ
2αµ1
)
+ kλ
n
α
{
1−λA
(
1−e−
2µ1α
λ
2αµ1
)}
−γCo
(1+γ)λA
(
1−e−
2µ1α
λ
2αµ1
) for irrecoverable product life
(6.76)
2. for a gamma distributed time
f ∗ =

γq0
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w
+ kλ
n
α
{
1−
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w}
−γCo
(1+γ)
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w for recoverable product life
γq0[1−ψα+ψα
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w
+ kλ
n
α
{
1−
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w}
−γCo
(1+γ)
(
wλA
wλA+αµ1
)w for irrecoverable product life
(6.77)
3. for beta distributed time
f ∗ =

(γq0−kλnα)
[ ∞∑
m=1
{
µ1(u+v)
uλA
}m( m∏
i=1
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
){
(−α)m
m!
}]
+ kλ
n
α
−γCo
(1+γ)
[ ∞∑
m=1
{
µ1(u+v)
uλA
}m( m∏
i=1
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
)
{ (−α)mm! }
]
for recoverable prod
γq0(1−ψα)+(q0 ψα− kλ
n
α )
[ ∞∑
m=1
{
µ1(u+v)
uλA
}m( m∏
i=1
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
){
(−α)m
m!
}]
+ kλ
n
α
−γCo
(1+γ)
[ ∞∑
m=1
{
µ1(u+v)
uλA
}m( m∏
i=1
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
)
{ (−α)mm! }
]
for irrecoverable prod
(6.78)
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4. for Weibull distributed time
f ∗ =

(γq0− kλnα )
[
1+
∞∑
m=1
{
µ1
λAΓ(1+ 1s )
}m{Γ(1+ms )}{ (−α)mm! }]+ kλnα −γCo
(1+γ
[
1+
∞∑
m=1
{
µ1
λAΓ(1+ 1s )
}m{Γ(1+ms )}{ (−α)mm! }]
for recoverable prod
γq0(1−ψα)+(
q0ψ
α
− kλn
α )
[
1+
∞∑
m=1
{
µ1
λAΓ(1+ 1s )
}m{Γ(1+ms )}{ (−α)mm! }]+ kλnα −γCo
(1+γ)
[
1+
∞∑
m=1
{
µ1
λAΓ(1+ 1s )
}m{Γ(1+ms )}{ (−α)mm! }]
for irrecoverable prod
(6.79)
if and only if the contractor has a non-zero positive disutility parameter βco, such that βco ≥
1
1+γ
and when any of the following is satisfied
1. δγ > 1, and αpm ≤ 1δγ−1
2. δγ ≤ 1, and βpm ≤ 11+δ .
Fairness concerned project manager and profit maximizing contractor
The coordination peroblem is again solved using backward induction method. For a given
value of fixed price contract f, the contractor selects a resource consumption rate λ that max-
imizes his profit. The project manager anticipates this value of λ by backward induction
and offers a fixed price f that maximizes her own utility as well as satisfies the constraint to
achieve the λ that maximizes the contractor’s profit.
Similar to the calculation shown in chapter 4, the λ that maximizes the contractor’s profit
in equation (6.39), should satisfy f = q0. This means the project manager need to offer the
contractor a contract value that leaves her with zero profit. Thus, it is proposed
Proposition 20. A supply chain with a fairness concerned project manager and a profit max-
imizing contractor, can not be coordinated using a fixed price contract with the resource
consumption rate as the decision making and the cash-flows are expoinentially discounted.
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6.3 Supply Chain Coordination with Time Based Contracts
in a Take it or Leave it Situation under Fairness Con-
cern
In last section, the models were derived for fixed price contracts. The supply chain under
consideration can be coordinated with fairness concerned members under certain consider-
ations. However, there are limitations to it as shown in the last section. Thus, it would be
worthy to explore how incorporation of fairness changes the profit allocation when the fixed
price contract fails to coordinate despite the existence of fairness consideration.
This section analyses the impact of fairness concern on supply chain coordination when
the offered contract takes a linearly decreasing function of time (as described in chapter 4)
i.e. P (T,C) = g − hT .
6.3.1 For Short Term Projects
Fairness Concern Contractor and Profit Maximizing Project Manager
The fairness concern contractor selects a resource consumption rate λ that maximizes his
utility. As mentioned earlier in chapter 4, this resource consumption rate λ is not visible and
can not be monitored by the project manager. The game is solved using backward induction.
As mentioned in chapter 4, the project manager and the contractor’s profit in decentralized
setting follow the equations (4.6) and (4.7) respectively. Using these values of profits, the
utility function of the contractor converts to the following
Uco =

(g − h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1)− αco[γ{q0 − q0ψE(Tm)− g + h µ1λA − Co} − (g − h µ1λA − kλNµ1)]
for {g − h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1} < γ[q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − g + h µ1λA − Co]
(g − h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1)− βco[(g − h µ1λA − kλNµ1)− γ{q0 − q0ψE(Tm)− g + h µ1λA − Co}]
for {g − h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1} ≥ γ[q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − g + h µ1λA − Co]
(6.80)
The first case corresponds to the disadvantageous inequity case, and the second case corre-
sponds to the advantageous inequity case. As mentioned earlier, the contractor would select
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a resource consumption rate λ that maximizes his utility. Thus, when {g−h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1} ≤
γ[q0{1 − ψE(Tm)} − g + h µ1λA − Co] i.e. when the contractor experiences disadvantageous
inequity, the contractor would select a λ that satisfies
dUco
dλ
=
[
hAµ1
λA+1
− kNλN−1µ1
]
− αco
[
−γq0ψdE(T
m)
dλ
− γhAµ1
λA+1
− hAµ1
λA+1
+ kNλN−1µ1
]
= 0
(6.81)
Using the values of dE(T
m)
dλ
from (6.11) in the equation (6.81)
dUco
dλ
=

hAµ1
λA+1
{1 + αco(1 + γ)} − kNλN−1µ1(1 + αco)− αco
[
γq0ψ
mA(2µ1)m
(m+1)λmA+1
]
= 0
For uniform distributed time
hAµ1
λA+1
{1 + αco(1 + γ)} − kNλN−1µ1(1 + αco)− αco
γq0ψmAµm1 m∏i=1(w+i−1)wmλmA+1
 = 0
For gamma distributed time
hAµ1
λA+1
{1 + αco(1 + γ)} − kNλN−1µ1(1 + αco)− αco
γq0ψmAµm1 m∏i=1( u+i−1u+v+i−1)( uu+v )mλmA+1
 = 0
For beta distributed time
hAµ1
λA+1
{1 + αco(1 + γ)} − kNλN−1µ1(1 + αco)− αco
[
γq0ψ
mAµm1 [Γ(1+ms )]
{Γ(1+ 1s)}mλmA+1
]
= 0
For Weibull distributed time
(6.82)
For the purpose of coordination, λ = λ0. Using the values of λ0 from the equation (4.19)
dUco
dλ
=
hAµ1
λA+10
{1 + αco(1 + γ)} − kNλN−10 µ1(1 + αco)− αco
[
γkNλN−10 µ1
]
= 0 (6.83)
Solving the equation (6.83), the optimal condition for h is derived as below
h =
kNλN+A0
A
(6.84)
Apart from maximizing the contractor’s utility, the offered contract P(T,C) = g- hT should
also satisfy the positive utility requirement of the contractor i.e. Uco ≥ Uout, where Uout
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is the minimum utility contractor is expected to achive in the event he moves out of this
contractual agreement. For the purpose of simplicity, this research assumes this Uout = 0.
Thus,
(g − h µ1
λA0
− kλN0 µ1)− αco[γ{q0 − q0ψE(Tm)− g + h
µ1
λA0
− Co} − (g − h µ1
λA0
− kλN0 µ1)] ≥ 0
or
g ≥
αcoγ[q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − kλN0 µ1 − Co] + h µ1λA0 {1 + αco + αcoγ}+ kλ
N
0 µ1(1 + αco + αcoγ)
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
using the values of pi0 and h
g ≥ αcoγpi0
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
+ kλN0 µ1
(
N + A
A
)
(6.85)
Rearranging the terms from the equation (6.6)
kλN0 µ1 = q0 − q0ψE(Tm)− Co − pi0 (6.86)
Now replacing the value of E(Tm) from the equation (4.19) in the equation of (4.17)
E(Tm) =
kNλN0 µ1
q0ψmA
(6.87)
Using this observation from (6.87) in the equation (6.86) and rearranging the terms, it can be
shown
kλN0 µ1 = (q0 − Co − pi0)
(
mA
mA+N
)
(6.88)
Replacing the value of kλN0 µ1 from the equation (6.88) in the equation (6.85)
g ≥ αcoγpi0
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
(6.89)
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From the requirement of the disadvantageous inequity,
{g − h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1} ≤ γ[q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − g + h µ1
λA
− Co] (6.90)
or
g(1 + γ) ≤ γ [q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − kλN0 µ1 − Co]+ h µ1λA (1 + γ) + kλN0 µ1(1 + γ)
or
g ≤ γ
1 + γ
pi0 + h
µ1
λA
+ kλN0 µ1 (6.91)
Using the optimal condition of h and the value of kλNµ1 from the equation (6.88)
g ≤ γ
1 + γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
(6.92)
Thus, combining the observations, of the optimal values of h from equation (6.84), and the
values of g from the equations (6.89) and (6.92), the following lemma is derived
Lemma 22. A time based contract P(T,C) =g-hT, can maximize the utility function of the
fairness concerned contractor in the equation (6.80) when the contractor encounters disad-
vantageous inequity if the following are satisfied
h =
kNλN+A0
A
(6.93)
where the values of λ0 follows the equation (4.19)
and
g ∈
[
αcoγpi0
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
,
γ
1 + γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}]
(6.94)
The project manager anticipates this by the backward induction process and would offer
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a contract P(T,C) =g-hT that maximizes her profit. Thus, her optimization problem becomes
max
g,h
Upm = pipm = q0 [1− ψE(Tm)]− [g − hE(T )]− Co (6.95)
Sub. to.
where g is satisfying the conditions in equation (6.94) (6.96)
where h is satisfying the conditions in equation (6.93) (6.97)
The constraint for the parameter h has equal sign in the equation (6.93). However, the g value
could vary in the given range mentioned in the equation (6.94). The value of ∂Upm
∂g
= −1 < 0.
Thus, the project manager’s profit is a decreasing function of g. Hence, for the optimization
purpose, the project manager would select the minimum g value in the given constraint in the
equation (6.94). Based on this observation, the following is proposed
Proposition 21. The optimal conditions of a time based contract that maximizes the profit
of the project manager and the utility of the fairness concerned contractor, and achieves the
optimal coordinating conditions for the over all supply chain, satisfy the following
h∗ =
kNλN+A0
A
(6.98)
g∗ =
αcoγpi0
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
(6.99)
Proof. In the equation (6.94), the difference between the values
[
γ
1+γ
pi0
]
and
[
αcoγpi0
(1+αco+αcoγ)
]
is γpi0
(1+γ)(1+αco+αcoγ)
. This is a positive number. Hence, it can be shown that
[
αcoγpi0
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}]
<
[
γ
1 + γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}]
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Using these optimal values g∗ and h∗, the profits of the contractor becomes
pico = g
∗ − h∗ µ1
λA
− kλN0 µ1
=
αcoγpi0
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
− kλN0 µ1
(
N + A
A
)
Using the observation kλN0 µ1 from the equation (6.88) in the above equation
pico =
αcoγpi0
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
(6.100)
Thus, the profit of the project manager becomes
pipm = pi0 − αcoγpi0
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
=
(1 + αco)pi0
1 + αco + αcoγ
(6.101)
Thus, none of the profits are the one’s with equitable distribution.
On the contrary to the disadvantageous inequity case, the contractor experiences an ad-
vantageous inequity when {g−h µ1
λA
−kλNµ1} ≥ γ[q0{1−ψE(Tm)}−g+h µ1λA −Co]. Thus
again, the selected resource consumption rate, λ should satisfy the following (By differenti-
ating Uco from the equation 6.80 with respect to λ)
dUco
dλ
=
(
h
Aµ1
λA+1
− kNλN−1µ1
)
(1− βco) + βcoγ
{
q0ψ
dE(Tm)
dλ
−
(
h
Aµ1
λA+1
)}
= 0
(6.102)
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Using the values of dE(T
m)
dλ
from equation (6.11) in equation (6.102),
dUco
dλ
=

(
h Aµ1
λA+1
)
(1− βco − γβco)− kNλN−1µ1(1− βco) + βcoγq0ψ mA(2µ1)m(m+1)λmA+1 = 0
For uniform distributed time(
h Aµ1
λA+1
)
(1− βco − γβco)− kNλN−1µ1(1− βco) + βcoγq0ψ
mAµm1
m∏
i=1
(w+i−1)
wmλmA+1
= 0
For gamma distributed time(
h Aµ1
λA+1
)
(1− βco − γβco)− kNλN−1µ1(1− βco) + βcoγq0ψ
mAµm1
m∏
i=1
( u+i−1u+v+i−1)
( uu+v )
m
λmA+1
= 0
For beta distributed time(
h Aµ1
λA+1
)
(1− βco − γβco)− kNλN−1µ1(1− βco) + βcoγq0ψ mAµ
m
1 [Γ(1+ms )]
{Γ(1+ 1s)}mλmA+1 = 0
For Weibull distributed time
(6.103)
Again for the purpose of coordination, λ = λ0. Thus, using the values of λ0 from the equation
(4.19) in the above equation (6.103)
(
h
Aµ1
λA+10
)
(1− βco − γβco)− kNλN−10 µ1(1− βco − βco) = 0
or
h =
kNλN+A0
A
(6.104)
Now taking the second order derivative of Uco with respect to λ,
d2Uco
dλ2
= {−kN(N − 1)λN−2µ1} − βco
[
(−kN(N − 1)λN−2µ1) + γq0ψd
2E(Tm)
dλ2
]
= {−kN(N − 1)λN−2µ1}(1− β)− βcoγq0ψd
2E(Tm)
dλ2
(6.105)
As assumed before 0 ≤ βco < 1. The second order derivative of the E(Tm) are positive for
the uniform, gamma, beta and Weibull distributed completion times. Thus, it can be shown
that d
2Uco
dλ2
< 0. This means for the values of λ found in the equation (6.103) would maximize
the utility function of the fairness concerned contractor.
As mentioned the equation in the case of disadvantageous inequity, the offered contract
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should ensure the contractor to earn a non-negative utility i.e. Uco ≥ 0. Thus,
(g − h µ1
λA0
− kλN0 µ1)− βco[(g − h
µ1
λA0
− kλN0 µ1)− γ{q0 − q0ψE(Tm)− g + h
µ1
λA
− Co}] ≥ 0
or
g ≥ h
µ1
λA
(1− βco − βcoγ) + kλN0 µ1(1− βco − βcoγ)− βcoγ{q0 − q0ψE(Tm)− kλN0 µ1 − Co}
(1− βco − βcoγ)
Using the value of h from (6.104) and rearranging the terms
g ≥ kλN0 µ1
(
1 +
N
A
)
− βcoγ
1− βco − βcoγpi0
Replacing the value of kλN0 µ1 from the equation (6.88) in the above inequity
g ≥ (q0 − pi0 − Co)m(N + A)
mA+N
− βcoγ
1− βco − βcoγpi0 (6.106)
From the requirement of the advantageous inequity to take place,
{g − h µ1
λA0
− kλN0 µ1} ≥ γ[q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − g + h
µ1
λA
− Co]
Based on the calculations in the case of disadvantageous inequity to derive the condition
shown in inequity (in equation 6.92), it can be shown
g ≥ γ
1 + γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
(6.107)
Thus, combining the requirements from (6.106) and (6.107)
g ≥ max :
{
(q0 − pi0 − Co)m(N + A)
mA+N
+
βcoγ
βco + βcoγ − 1pi0 ,
γ
1 + γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)m(N + A)
mA+N
}
(6.108)
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Now the difference between the above two values
(q0 − pi0 − Co)m(N + A)
mA+N
+
βcoγ
βco + βcoγ − 1pi0 −
γ
1 + γ
pi0 − (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
=
{
γpi0
(1 + γ)(βco + βcoγ − 1)
}
If (1+γ)(βco+βcoγ−1) > 0 i.e. βco > 11+γ , then g ≥ (q0−pi0−Co)m(N+A)mA+N + βcoγβco+βcoγ−1pi0.
On the contrary, if (1 + γ)(βco + βcoγ − 1) < 0 i.e. βco < 11+γ , then g ≥ γ1+γpi0 + (q0−Co−
pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
The optimization problem for the project manager becomes
max
g,h
Upm = pipm = q0 [1− ψE(Tm)]− [g − hE(T )]− Co
Sub. to
h satsifies the condition in the equation 6.104 (6.109)
g satsifies the condition in the equation 6.108 (6.110)
Again, the h constraint for the project project manager is bound by the equal sign. However,
the g constraint is bound by inequal sign. dUpm
dg
= −1 < 0 i.e. the project manager’s utility is
decreasing in g. Thus, when (1 + γ)(βco + βcoγ − 1) > 0 i.e. βco > 11+γ , then the constraint
for g in the equation (6.108) becomes
g ≥ (q0 − pi0 − Co)m(N + A)
mA+N
+
βcoγ
βco + βcoγ − 1pi0
Since the project manager’s utility decreases in g, the minimum offer from the project man-
ager is
g = (q0 − pi0 − Co)m(N + A)
mA+N
+
βcoγ
βco + βcoγ − 1pi0
Using this value of g, the value of h from the equation (6.104), and using the observation
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from the equation (6.88) the contractor’s profit becomes
pico = g − h µ1
λA
− kλN0 µ1
= (q0 − pi0 − Co)m(N + A)
mA+N
+
βcoγ
βco + βcoγ − 1pi0 −
{
kNλN+A0
A
}( µ1
λA
)
− kλN0 µ1
=
βcoγ
βco + βcoγ − 1pi0
Thus, the project manager’s profit becomes
pipm = pi0 − βcoγ
βco + βcoγ − 1pi0
=
βco − 1
βco + βcoγ − 1pi0
Since (βco+βcoγ−1) > 0, and 0 ≤ βco < 1, the project manager can not earn a non-negative
profit in this case Thus, the possibility of coordination is non existent if βco > 11+γ .
On the contrary, if (1 + γ)(βco + βcoγ − 1) < 0 i.e. βco < 11+γ then constraint for g in the
equation (6.108) becomes g ≥ γ
1+γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
.
Since the project manager’s utility decreases in g, the minimum offer from project man-
ager is
g =
γ
1 + γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
The offer for h from the project manager is still be the same as shown in the equation (6.104).
Thus, the contractor’s profit becomes
pico = g − h µ1
λA
− kλN) µ1
=
γ
1 + γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
− kNλ
N+A
0
A
− kλN0 µ1
=
γ
1 + γ
pi0
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Thus, the project manager’s profit becomes
pipm = pi0 − γ
1 + γ
pi0 =
1
1 + γ
pi0
Thus, summarising these above observations, the following is proposed
Proposition 22. The optimal conditions for a time based contract that maximizes the profit
of the project manager, utility of the fairness concerned contractor and thereby achieves the
optimal coordinating conditions for the over all supply chain, satisfy the following
h∗ =
kNλN+A0
A
g∗ =
γ
1 + γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
(6.111)
with βco < 11+γ and λ0 follows the equation (4.19)
Unlike, the case of disadvantageous inequity for the contractor, the contractual conditions
here not only coordinates the supply chain, but also ensure the equitable share of the profit.
Now summarising the findings from the propositions 21 and 22, the following corollary
is derived
Corollary 1. Comparing the equations (6.99) and (6.111), the project manager earns a lower
profit in the later case. Hence, chances of offering a contract with the term g higher than
the value mentioned in the equation (6.99) is very unlikely from a profit maximizing project
manager. Hence, the existence of the optimal solution presented in the equation (6.111) in
proposition22 is unlikely.
Proof. It can be shown
αcoγpi0
1 + αco + αcoγ
− γpi0
1 + γ
=
−γpi0
(1 + αco + αcoγ)(1(1 + γ)
< 0
Using this observation in the comparison between the values of g from the equations From
the equations (6.99) and (6.111), the above mentioned corollary can be proved.
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Fairness Concern Contractor and Project Manager
This subsection explores how the optimal condition changes if the project manager also be-
comes fairness concerned. Again, the coordination problem is solved using the backward
induction method. The contractor selects the resource consumption rate λ that maximizes his
utility in the equation (6.80).
Now, unlike the case of profit maximizing project manager, the fairness concerned project
manager maximizes her utility mentioned in (6.5). Now replacing the values of pipm and pico
from the equations (4.6) and (4.7), the utility function becomes
Upm =

Upm1 = [q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − g + h µ1λA − Co]
−αpm[δ(g − h µ1λA − kλNµ1)− {q0(1− ψE(Tm))− g + h µ1λA − Co}]
when {q0(1− ψE(Tm))− g + h µ1λA − Co} ≤ δ(g − h µ1λA − kλNµ1)
Upm2 = [q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − g + h µ1λA − Co]
−βpm[{q0(1− ψE(Tm))− g + h µ1λA − Co} − δ(g − h µ1λA − kλNµ1)]
when {q0(1− ψE(Tm))− g + h µ1λA − Co} ≥ δ(g − h µ1λA − kλNµ1)
(6.112)
where βpm ≤ αpm, 0 ≤ βpm < 1.
Similar to the explanation in the case of the analysis with the fixed price contracts, the
contractor considers γpipm as the equitable profit and the project manager considers δpico as
the equitable profit. As defined ealier in Cui et al. (2007), the sum of these two pay-offs
is considered as the equity capable channel payoff (ECCP) i.e. ECCP =
(
γδ+γ+δ+γδ
γδ+γ+δ
)
pi0.
Again as defined in Cui et al. (2007), when δγ > 1 i.e. ECCP > pi0, the supply chain
is considered as acrimonious channel and when δγ ≤ 1 i.e. ECCP ≤ pi0, the channel is
considered as harmonious channel (Cui et al. 2007).
Thus, if the contractor experiences a disadvantageous inequity, the fairness concerned
project manager’s maximization problem in the case of her disadvantageous inequity be-
comes
max
g,h
: Upm1 = [q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − g + h µ1
λA
− Co]
− αpm[δ(g − h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1)− {q0(1− ψE(Tm))− g + h µ1
λA
− Co}] (6.113)
208
Sub. to
h =
kNλN+A0
A
(6.114)

g ∈
[
αcoγpi0
(1+αco+αcoγ)
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
, γ
1+γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}]
if the contractor experiences a disadvantageous inequity
g ≥ max :
(
(q0 − pi0 − Co)m(N+A)mA+N + βcoγβco+βcoγ−1pi0 ,
γ
1+γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
})
if the contractor experiences an advantageous inequity
(6.115)
Again, the project manager will select a value of f that maximizes her utility function Upm1
i.e. dUpm1
dg
= −1 − αpm(δ + 1) < 0. Thus, again the utility function of the project manager
is a decreasing function of g. Thus, the project manager selects the minimum g value in the
constraints in the equation (6.115). Based on the calculation shown earlier, it can be shown
that when the contractor encounters a advantageous inequity and βco + βcoγ − 1 > 0 i.e.
βco >
1
1+γ
, then profit of the contractor and the project manager become
pico =
βcoγ
βco + βcoγ − 1pi0
pipm = − 1− βco
βco + βcoγ − 1pi0 (6.116)
Thus, for the utility maximizing project manager, her utility becomes
Upm1 = pipm − αpm[δpico − pipm]
= − 1− βco
βco + βcoγ − 1pi0 − αpm
[
δβcoγ
βco + βcoγ − 1pi0 +
1− βco
βco + βcoγ − 1pi0
]
< 0
Thus, the cases with βco > 11+γ cannot coordinate the supply chain and are not considered.
Based on the calculation shown earlier , the values of the contract parameter the project
manager would select given the constraints
h value satisfies the equation (6.114) (6.117)
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and
g∗ =

αcoγpi0
(1+αco+αcoγ)
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
when the contractor encounters a disadvantageous inequity
γ
1+γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
when the contractor encounters an advantageous inequity and βco < 11+γ
(6.118)
Now in order for the project manager to incur disadvantageous inequity, the following should
be satisfied
{q0(1− ψE(Tm))− g + h µ1
λA
− Co} − δ(g − h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1) ≤ 0 (6.119)
Now replacing these values of g from the equation (6.118) & h from equation (6.114) and
λ0 from the equation (4.19) in the expression (6.119) when the contractor experiences
disadvantageous inequity
[
q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − αcoγpi0
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
− (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
+
kNλN+A0 µ1
A
− Co
]
− δ
[
αcoγpi0
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
− kNλ
N
0 µ1
A
− kλN0 µ1
]
≤ 0
or
[
pi0 − αcoγpi0
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
− (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
+
kNλN+A0 µ1
A
+ kλN0 µ1
]
− δ
[
αcoγpi0
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
− kλN0 µ1
N + A
A
]
≤ 0
or
{1 + αco(1− δγ)}pi0
1 + αco + αcoγ
≤ 0 (6.120)
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when the contractor experiences advantageous inequity
{q0(1− ψE(Tm))− γ
1 + γ
pi0 − (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
+
kNλN0 µ1
A
− Co}
− δ( γ
1 + γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
− kNλ
N
0 µ1
A
− kλNµ1) ≤ 0
or
[
pi0 − γ
1 + γ
pi0 − (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
+
kNλN0 µ1
A
+ kλN0 µ1
]
− δ
[
γ
1 + γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
− kλN0 µ1
(
N + A
A
)]
≤ 0
or
pi0(1− δγ)
1 + γ
≤ 0 (6.121)
Since pi0 is positive in order for the participation of the members of the supply chain, and
αco is also assumed as positive, the project manager incurs disadvantageous inequity when
δγ > 1 . In other words, the project manager would incur disadvantageous inequity in
acrimonious supply chain.
The selected contract parameters should ensure a non-negative utility for the project man-
ager i.e. Upm1 ≥ 0. Using the values of the contract parameters from the equations (6.114) ,
& (6.118), in the utility function of the project manager in the equation (6.112) and based on
the calculations above in the conditions in (6.120) and (6.121)
Upm1 =

[q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − αcoγpi0(1+αco+αcoγ) − (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
+
kNλN0 µ1
A
− Co]
−αpm {−1+αco(δγ−1)}pi01+αco+αcoγ ≥ 0 when the contractor experiences a disadvantageous inequity
[q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − γpi0(1+γ) − (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
+
kNλN0 µ1
A
− Co]
−αpm pi0(δγ−1)1+γ ≥ 0 when the contractor experiences an advantageous inequity and βco < 11+γ
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or
Upm1 =

[pi0 − αcoγpi0(1+αco+αcoγ) − (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
+
kNλN0 µ1
A
+ kλN0 µ1]
−αpm {−1+αco(δγ−1)}pi01+αco+αcoγ ≥ 0 when the contractor experiences a disadvantageous inequity
[pi0 − γpi0(1+γ) − (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
+
kNλN0 µ1
A
+ kλN0 µ1]− αpm pi0(δγ−1)1+γ ≥ 0
when the contractor experiences an advantageous inequity and βco < 11+γ
Replacing the value of kλN) µ1 from the equation (6.88) in the above conditions and rearrang-
ing the terms
Upm1 =

(1+αco)−αpm{−1+αco(δγ−1)}
1+αco+αcoγ
pi0 ≥ 0
when the contractor encounters a disadvantageous inequity
1−αpm(δγ−1)
1+γ
pi0 ≥ 0
when the contractor encounters an advantageous inequity and βco < 11+γ
(6.122)
From the conditions mentioned in (6.122), and using the optimality conditions mentioned in
equations ((6.118)) and (6.114), the following lemma is derived
Lemma 23. If both the project manager and the contractor both are fairness concerned, the
optimal conditions of the time based contracts contract should satisfy the following in an
acrimonious supply chain i.e. δγ > 1
1. h value satisfies the condition in the equation (6.114).
and
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2. (a)
g∗ =
αcoγpi0
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
(6.123)
with δγ > 1, αpm ≤ 1 + αco{αco(δγ − 1)− 1} & αco >
1
δγ − 1
(b)
g∗ =
γ
1 + γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
(6.124)
with δγ > 1, βco <
1
1 + γ
& αpm ≤ 1
δγ − 1
On the contrary to the disadvantageous inequity, the project manager experiences advan-
tageous inequity in a harmonious supply chain when δγ < 1. The sum of the overall expected
fair profit of the members of the supply chain for this case is less than overall maximum profit
the supply chain can generate. If the following is satisfied, the project manager incurs advan-
tageous inequity
{q0(1− ψE(Tm))− g + h µ1
λA
− Co} − δ(g − h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1) ≥ 0 (6.125)
Thus, the optimization problem of the project manager becomes
max
g,h
: Upm2 = [q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − g + h µ1
λA
− Co]
− βpm[{q0(1− ψE(Tm))− g + h µ1
λA
− Co} − δ(g − h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1)] (6.126)
Sub.to
h =
kNλN+A0
A
(6.127)
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
g ∈
[
αcoγpi0
(1+αco+αcoγ)
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
, γ
1+γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}]
if the contractor experiences a disadvantageous inequity
g ≥ max :
{
(q0 − pi0 − Co)m(N+A)mA+N + βcoγβco+βcoγ−1pi0 ,
γ
1+γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}}
if the contractor experiences an advantageous inequity
(6.128)
The value of first derivative of the project manager’s utility is
dUpm2
dg
= −1 + βpm(1 + δ) (6.129)
If −1 + βpm(1 + δ) ≤ 0, i.e. βpm ≤ 11+δ , then dUpmdg ≤ 0. This means the project manager’s
utility would be a decreasing function of g. Thus, the project manager would select the
minimum value that satisfies the constraint in the equation (6.128). Thus, when the contractor
experiences disadvantageous inequity, then, the project manger selects g = αcoγpi0
(1+αco+αcoγ)
+
(q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
. On the contrary, if the contractor experiences an advantageous
inequity, then it depends on the sign of the expression βco + βcoγ − 1 (As shown before). If
βco+βcoγ−1 > 0 i.e βco > 11+γ , then (q0−pi0−Co)m(N+A)mA+N + βcoγβco+βcoγ−1pi0 ≥
γ
1+γ
pi0 +(q0−
Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
. It was shown earlier if βpm ≥ 1−βco(1−βco)+δβcoγ , then the project manager’s
utility is non-negative when βco > 11+γ . However, as shown in the equation (6.116), the profit
of the project manager is negative. The utility is positive due to higher inequity aversion.
Hence, again, like previous cases, the situation βco > 11+γ is not considered. Thus, in a
fairness concerned supply chain, with both the members experience advantageous inequity,
the optimal g value is g = γ
1+γ
pi0 + (q0−Co− pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
. This satisfies the constraint in
the equation (6.128) and maximizes the project managers’ utility . Thus, summarising these
above observations, when −1 + βpm(1 + δ) ≤ 0, i.e. βpm ≤ 11+δ , the project manager selects
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the optimal h* that satisfies the equation (6.114)and g values as below
g∗ =

αcoγpi0
(1+αco+αcoγ)
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
if the contractor experiences a disadvantageous inequity
γ
1+γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
if the contractor experiences an advantageous inequity and βco < 11+γ
(6.130)
These values of g and h should ensure a non-negative utility for the project manager i.e.
Upm2 ≥ 0. Thus,
Upm2 =

[q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − αcoγpi0(1+αco+αcoγ) − (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
+
kNλN0 µ1
A
− Co]
−βpm[{q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − αcoγpi0(1+αco+αcoγ) − (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
+
kNλN0 µ1
A
− Co}
−δ( αcoγpi0
(1+αco+αcoγ)
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
− kNλN0 µ1
A
− kλN0 µ1)] ≥ 0
if the contractor experiences a disadvantageous inequity
[q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − γ1+γpi0 − (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
+
kNλN0 µ1
A
− Co]
−βpm[{q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − γ1+γpi0 − (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
+
kNλN0 µ1
A
− Co}−
δ( γ
1+γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
− kNλN0 µ1
A
− kλN0 µ1)] ≥ 0
if the contractor experiences an advantageous inequity and βco < 11+γ
Using the observations from (6.120) and (6.121) in the above inequities
Upm2 =

[pi0 − αcoγpi0(1+αco+αcoγ) − (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
]
−βpm {1+αco(1−δγ)}pi01+αco+αcoγ ≥ 0
if the contractor experiences a disadvantageous inequity
[pi0 − γ1+γpi0 − (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
]
−βpm pi0(1−δγ)1+γ ≥ 0
if the contractor experiences an advantageous inequity and βco < 11+γ
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or
Upm2 =

[ (1+αco)pi0
(1+αco+αcoγ)
]− βpm {1+αco(1−δγ)}pi01+αco+αcoγ ≥ 0
if the contractor experiences a disadvantageous inequity
pi0
1+γ
− βpm pi0(1−δγ)1+γ ≥ 0
if the contractor experiences an advantageous inequity and βco < 11+γ
It can be shown from the above inequities that the project manager would experience non-
negative inequity when
βpm ≤ 1 + αco
1 + αco(1− δγ) if the contractor experiences a disadvantageous inequity
βpm ≤ 1
1− δγ if the contractor experiences an advantageous inequity and βco <
1
1 + γ
The prerequisite for applying the optimal g and h values from the equation (6.130) is βpm ≤
1
1+δ
. Now it can be easliy shown that for positive values of αco, βco, βpm, δ, and γ, 11+δ <
1+αco
1+αco(1−δγ) and
1
1+δ
< 1
1−δγ . This means , for βpm ≤ 11+δ , the optimal value of g and h in
equation (6.130) would ensure a positive utility for the project manager. Summarising these,
the optimization conditions are presented in the following lemma
Lemma 24. If the project manager and the contractor both are fairness concerned, the opti-
mal conditions of the time based contracts contract should satisfy the following in a harmo-
nious supply chain when the cash flows are not discounted
1. The h value satisfies the conditions in the equation(6.114) and
2. (a)
g∗ =
αcoγpi0
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
+ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
(6.131)
with δγ < 1, βpm <
1
1 + δ
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(b)
g∗ =
γ
1 + γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
(6.132)
with δγ < 1, βco <
1
1 + γ
& βpm <
1
1 + δ
If [−1 + βpm(1 + δ)] ≥ 0 i.e βpm ≥ 11+δ , then dUpm2dg > 0. This means, the utility of
the project manager would increase with g. Thus, higher the value of g, higher the utility of
the fairness concerned project manager. Hence, with the contractor experiencing the disad-
vantageous inequity, the project manager would select the maximum possible value of g in
constraint in equation (6.128). Thus, with βpm > 11+δ and the contractor experiencing disad-
vantageous inequity, the project manager would select g = γ
1+γ
pi0+(q0−pi0−Co)
{
m(N+A)
mA+N
}
.
As shown before, βpm ≤ 11−δγ in order to get a positive utility using this optimal value. If
the contractor experiences advantageous inequity, then the optimal value of h should be sat-
isfying the condition in point 1 and g should be satisfying the condition for g in point 2b
in lemma 24. At these values, the contractor achieves his perceived fair profit. There is no
upper limit for g (from equation 6.128). Thus after this values from lemma 24 are attained,
any further increase in g values would fail to allocate any fair profit for the members. After
certain the profit of the project manager becomes negative.Thus, these cases are excluded.
These observations are summarized in the following lemma
Lemma 25. If both the project manager and the contractor both are fairness concerned,
the optimal conditions of the time based contracts contract should satisfy the following in a
harmonious supply chain
h∗ =
kNλN+A0 µ1
A
and
g∗ =
γ
1 + γ
pi0 + (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A)
mA+N
}
(6.133)
with δγ < 1,
1
1 + δ
≤ βpm ≤ 1
1− δγ
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Summarisng the findings from lemmas 23, 24, and 25, the following is proposed
Proposition 23. In a fairness concerned supply chain (with both project manager and the
contractor are fairness concerned), the project manager can coordinate the supply chain
with the following time based contracts in the following cases
h∗ =
kNλN+A0
A
and any of the following
1. g satisfying the condition in the equation (6.123) with δγ > 1, αpm ≤ 1+αco{αco(δγ−1)−1} & αco >
1
δγ−1
2. g satisfying the condition in the equation (6.124) and δγ > 1, βco < 11+γ & αpm ≤
1
δγ−1
3. g satisfying the condition in the equation (6.131) with δγ < 1, βpm < 11+δ
4. g satisfying the condition in the equation (6.132) with δγ < 1, βco < 11+γ & βpm <
1
1+δ
5. g satisfying the condition in the equation (6.133) with δγ < 1, 1
1+δ
≤ βpm ≤ 11−δγ
From the proposition 23, the following corollary is deduced
Corollary 2. Comparing the findings from 23, it can shown that some of the solutions may
not exist. These are summarised in the following corollary
1. In the acrimonious channel, the project manager experiences the disadvantageous in-
equity. The Upm is a decreasing function of g. Thus, the project manager would most
like to offer the contractor a minimum possible g value in option 1 in proposition 23
and thus, the occurrence of advantageous inequity to the contractor is less likely.
2. In the harmonious channel, the project manager experiences the advantageous in-
equity. Again, the project manager’s utility is a decreasing function of g when βpm <
1
1+δ
and would select the minimum possible value which ensures a positive utility and
λ = λ0. Thus, the project manager is likely to select the g value in option 3 again and
the contractor is unlike to experience any advantageous inequity.
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For coordination of the supply chain, again the contractor should also select a λ = λ0
which is possible when the condition mentioned in equation (6.54) in proposition 14 is satis-
fied.
Fairness Concerned Project Manager and Profit Maximizing contractor
The game is again solved using backward induction method. For a given value of time based
contract contract P(T,C) =g-hT, the contractor selects a resource consumption rate λ that
maximizes his profit. The project manager would anticipate this value of λ by backward
induction and would offer a contract P(T,C) =g-hT that maximizes her own utility as well as
satisfies the constraint to achieve the λ that maximizes the contractor’s profit.
Similar to the calculation shown in chapter 4, the λ that maximizes the contractor’s profit
in equation (4.7), should satisfy
dpico
dλ
=
hAµ1
λA+1
− kNλN−1µ1 = 0
From this, it can be shown h = kNλ
N+A
A
. In order to coordinate the supply chain, h should
ensure that λ = λ0. Thus h∗ =
kNλN+A0
A
The offered contract should also ensure the contractor to earn a minimum profit of piout.
Thus,
g − kNλ
N+A
0
A
− kλN0 µ1 ≥ piout
From the calculations shown earlier, the value of kλN0 µ1 can be replaced from the equation
(6.88) in the above inequity as below
g − (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A
mA+N
}
≥ piout
or
g ≥ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A
mA+N
}
+ piout
These above values of g and h would become constraint for the fairness concerned project
manager who maximizes her utility. The utility of the project manager follows the equation
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(6.112). Thus, her optimization problem becomes
max
g,h
Upm =

Upm1 = [q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − g + h µ1λA − Co]
−αpm[δ(g − h µ1λA − kλNµ1)− {q0(1− ψE(Tm))− g + h µ1λA − Co}]
when {q0(1− ψE(Tm))− g + h µ1λA − Co} < δ(g − h µ1λA − kλNµ1)
Upm2 = [q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − g + h µ1λA − Co]
−βpm[{q0(1− ψE(Tm))− g + h µ1λA − Co} − δ(g − h µ1λA − kλNµ1)]
when {q0(1− ψE(Tm))− g + h µ1λA − Co} ≥ δ(g − h µ1λA − kλNµ1)
St
g ≥ (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A
mA+N
}
+ piout
h =
kNλN+A0
A
(6.134)
In the case of advantageous inequity, the project manager selects a g that maximizes Upm1.
Thus,
dUpm1
dg
= −1− αpm(δ + 1) < 0
Again, the project manager’s utility is a decreasing function of g. Thus, the project manager
selects the minimum g value in the above constraint in the equation (6.134). Thus the optimal
solutions are presented in the following lemma
Lemma 26. The optimal contractual parameters of a time based contract satisfies the fol-
lowing in a supply chain with fairness concerned project manager and a profit maximizing
contractor when the project manager experiences a disadvantageous inequity.
g = (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A
mA+N
}
+ piout (6.135)
h =
kNλN+A0
A
(6.136)
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In the event, the project manager incurs advantageous inequity, the project manager se-
lects a g that maximizes his utility Upm2. Thus,
dUpm2
dg
= −1 + βpm(1 + δ)
Thus, if −1 + βpm(1 + δ) ≤ 0 i.e. βpm ≤ 11+δ , then project manager’s utility would be a
decreasing function of g and the results follow the lemma 26.
On the contrary, if−1+βpm(1+δ) > 0 i.e. βpm > 11+δ , then the project manager’s utility
becomes and increasing function of g. Thus, any increase in g would keep on increasing the
value of the utility of the project manager. At the same time, the profit of the project manager
keep on decreasing with any increase in the value of g and after a certain value is reached,
the profit becomes negative. As mentioned earlier, these cases are not considered for this
research. However, if an upper bound can be set for this value g, then a realistic solution
can be achieved. Since the constraint for g doesn’t have any upper bound in the equation
(6.134), additional constraint is required to set a bound. It is further assumed that g can be
maximized up to a value that ensures the fair share of the profit to both the project manager
and the contractor as per the project manager. At this point, the profits are pico = pi01+δ and
pipm =
δpi0
1+δ
. Thus replacing the value of pico from the equation (6.100),
g − h µ1
λA
− kλN0 µ1 =
1
1 + δ
pi0
Even at this stage, the optimal h value remains unchanged as it has got an equal sign at the
constraints in (6.134). Hence, the optimal value of h is used in the above equation and it
becomes
g − kNλ
N
) µ1
A
− kλN0 µ1 =
1
1 + δ
pi0
g − kNλN0 µ1
(
N + A
A
)
=
1
1 + δ
pi0
g =
1
1 + δ
pi0 + kNλ
N
0 µ1
(
N + A
A
)
As shown earlier, the value of kNλN0 µ1 is replaced from the equation (6.88) in the above and
221
the optimal of g that ensures the equitable profit for the contractor and the project manager
g =
1
1 + δ
pi0 + (q0 − pi0 − Co)m(N + A)
mA+N
(6.137)
Thus, the optimization problem of the project manager becomes
max
g,h
Upm2 = [q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − g + h µ1
λA
− Co] (6.138)
− βpm[{q0(1− ψE(Tm))− g + h µ1
λA
− Co} − δ(g − h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1)] (6.139)
when {q0(1− ψE(Tm))− g + h µ1
λA
− Co} ≥ δ(g − h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1)
St
g ∈
[
(q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A
mA+N
}
+ piout ,
1
1 + δ
pi0 + (q0 − pi0 − Co)m(N + A)
mA+N
]
h =
kNλN+A0
A
(6.140)
Now the constraint for g in the above equation (6.140, has got two limits within which the
g would be increasing leading to increase in Upm2. In order to have the non-empty set, it is
assumed
(q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A
mA+N
}
+ piout <
1
1 + δ
pi0 + (q0 − pi0 − Co)m(N + A)
mA+N
piout <
1
1 + δ
pi0
If piout > 11+δpi0, then there won’t be any change in the solution mentioned in lemma 26.
Since βpm > 11+δ and the project manager’s utility is increasing in g, the project manager
would be selecting the maximum value of g in the constraint above. These are summarised
in the following lemma
Lemma 27. The optimal contractual parameters of a time based contract satisfies the follow-
ing with fairness concerned the project manager and with the profit maximizing contractor
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when the project manager experiences advantageous inequity
h =
kNλN+A0
A
(6.141)
g =
g = (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N+A
mA+N
}
+ piout if βpm ≤ 11+δ
g = 1
1+δ
pi0 + (q0 − pi0 − Co)m(N+A)mA+N if βpm > 11+δ
(6.142)
Summarisng the findings of lemmas 26 and 27, the following is proposed
Proposition 24. A supply chain consisting of a fairness concerned project manager and a
profit maximizing contractor could be coordinated with a time based contract P(T,C) = g-hT,
if
h =
kNλN+A0
A
(6.143)
and
1.
g = (q0 − Co − pi0)
{
m(N + A
mA+N
}
+ piout (6.144)
when the project manager experiences a disadvantageous inequity or advantageous
inequity with very lower utility loss per unit due to earning more than the contractor,
with βpm ≤ 11+δ .
2.
g =
1
1 + δ
pi0 + (q0 − pi0 − Co)m(N + A)
mA+N
(6.145)
if 1
1+δ
pi0 > piout when the project manager experiences a considerable utility loss per
unit due to earning more than the contractor so that βpm > 11+δ .
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In the above proposition 24, the first optimal condition can coordinate the supply chain
and ensure the contractor to earn a minimum profit of piout as it was found in the case of
a supply chain without any fairness consideration. In fact, the optimal conditions are same
as found in chapter 4. This certainly can not guarantee the fair solution unless piout = pi01+δ .
In fact in the second case, it was assumed that piout < pi01+δ to allow the project manager to
increase her offer of g in order to improve her utility and pushing the solution to the fair one.
6.3.2 For long term projects
As described in chapter 4, there could be two different type of scenarios for the long term
projects: projects with recoverable operational life of the product, and projects with irrecov-
erable operational life of the product, in the event the project completion is delayed. Chapter
4 analysed the scenario for a profit maximizing project manager and a profit maximizing con-
tractor. This section extends that analysis to fairness concerned members. As described in
chapter 4, the profit functions in the centralized setting follows the equations (4.12 and 4.26)
and the first best resource consumption rate λ = λ0 satisfies the requirements in equation
(6.37). In the decentralized setting, the project manager offers a contract P(T,C) to the con-
tractor. Thus, their individual profits follows the equation (6.38) and (6.39). Since the time
based contract, P(T,C) = g-hT is used, the expected value becomes
E{P (T,C)e−αT} = E{(g − hT )e−αT}
= g
∞∫
0
e−αTfλ(T )− h
∞∫
0
Te−αTfλ(T )
= gE{e−αT} − h
∞∫
0
Te−αTfλ(T ) (6.146)
Using this value of E[P(T,C) e−αT ] in the equations (6.38) and (6.39), the following modified
profit functions of the project manager and the contractor in the decentralized supply chain
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are derived
pipm = E(q)− E{(P (T,C)e−αT} − Co
=

q0E{e−αT} − gE{e−αT}+ h
∞∫
0
Te−αTfλ(T )− Co
for recoverable product life
q0[1− ψα + ψαE{e−αT}]− gE{e−αT}+ h
∞∫
0
Te−αTfλ(T )− Co
for irrecoverable product life
(6.147)
pico = E{P (T,C)e−αT} − E(C) = g{e−αT} − h
∞∫
0
Te−αTfλ(T )− kλ
n
α
[
1− E{e−αT}]
(6.148)
The E{e−αT} values follow the values calculated in the E{e−αT} in the equation (4.25). For
calculation simplicity, it is assumed that E(e−αT ) = E, and
∞∫
0
Te−αTfλ(T )dT = I . The
expected cost becomes E(C) = kλ
N
α
(1 − E). It is further assumed E(C) = Cµ. Using
these notations, the centralized profit, the project manager’s decentralized profit, and the
contractors’ decentralized profit become
pi0 =
q0E − Cµ − Co for recoverable product lifeq0[1− ψα + ψαE]− Cµ − Co for recoverable product life (6.149)
pipm =
q0E − gE + hI − Co for recoverable product lifeq0[1− ψα + ψαE]− gE + hI − Co for recoverable product life (6.150)
pico = gE − hI − Cµ (6.151)
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Fairness Concern Contractor and Profit Maximizing Project Manager
If the contract is fairness concerned, then he selects a resource consumption rate λ in the
decentralized setting which maximizes his utility function as below
Uco =

[gE − hI − Cµ]− αco[γ {(q0E − gE + hI − Co} − {gE − hI − Cµ}]+
−βco[{gE − hI − Cµ} − γ {(q0E − gE + hI − Co}]+
for recoverable product life
[gE − hI − Cµ]− αco[γ
{
q0[1− ψα + ψαE]− gE + hI − Co
}− {gE − hI − Cµ}]+
−βco[{gE − hI − Cµ} − γ
{
q0[1− ψα + ψαE]− gE + hI − Co
}
]+
for irrecoverable product life
(6.152)
Similar to the case of short term project, this utility function can be broken into two cases.
The disadvantageous inequity occurs when

{gE − hI − Cµ} − γ {q0E − gE + hI − Co} ≤ 0
for recoverable product life
{gE − hI − Cµ} − γ
{
q0[1− ψα + ψαE]− gE + hI − Co
} ≤ 0
for irrecoverable product life
(6.153)
The utility function becomes Uco = Uco1, where
Uco1 =

[gE − hI −−Cµ]− αco[γ {q0E − gE + hI − Co} − {gE − hI − Cµ}]
for recoverable product life
[gE − hI − Cµ]− αco[γ
{
q0[1− ψα + ψαE]− gE + hI − Co
}− {gE − hI − Cµ}]
for irrecoverable product life
(6.154)
For an offered value of P(T,C) = g-hT, the fairness concerned contractor selects a resource
consumption rate λ that maximizes the utility mentioned in the equation (6.154). Thus, the
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selected λ satisfies the following
dUco1
dλ
=

(g dE
dλ
− h dI
dλ
− dCµ
dλ
)− αco[γ(q0 dEdλ − g dEdλ + h dIdλ)− (g dEdλ − h dIdλ − dCµdλ )] = 0
for recoverable product life
(g dE
dλ
− h dI
dλ
− dCµ
dλ
)− αco[γ(q0
(
ψ
α
)
dE
dλ
− g dE
dλ
+ h dI
dλ
)− (g dE
dλ
− h dI
dλ
− dCµ
dλ
)] = 0
for irrecoverable product life
(6.155)
In order to coordinate the supply chain, this selected λ should be at least equal to the first best
solution λ0 i.e. λ = λ0. Now λ0 should satisfy the equation (6.37). Replacing the abbreviated
version in the equation (6.37)
dpi0
dλ
=
q0
dE
dλ
− dCµ
dλ
= 0 for recoverable product life
q0(
ψ
α
)dE
dλ
− dCµ
dλ
= 0 for recoverable product life
(6.156)
Thus replacing the values of dCµ
dλ
from the equation (6.156) in the equation (6.155) and rear-
ranging the terms, the following conditions are derived
dUco1
dλ
=

(1 + αco + γαco)(g
dE
dλ
− h dI
dλ
− q0 dEdλ ) = 0 for recoverable product life
(1 + αco + γαco)
dI
dλ
(g dE
dλ
− h dI
dλ
− q0ψ
α
dE
dλ
) = 0 for irrecoverable product life
(6.157)
Again, for simplicity of calculation, it is assumed dE
dλ
= E ′ and dI
dλ
= I ′. As mentioned before,
it can be shown that dE(e
−αT )
dλ
> 0 for the uniform, gamma, beta and Weibull distributions.
From the equation (6.157), the g values are derived as below
g =
h
I′
E′ + q0 for irrecoverable product life
h I
′
E′ + q0(
ψ
α
)
(6.158)
The offered contract should also ensure a non-negative utility i.e. Uco ≥ 0.
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Thus,
Uco1 =

[gE − hI − Cµ]− αco[γ {q0E − gE + hI − Co} − {gE − hI − Cµ}] ≥ 0
for recoverable product life
[gE − hI − Cµ]− αco[γ
{
q0[1− ψα + ψαE]− gE + hI − Co
}− {gE − hI − Cµ}] ≥ 0
for irrecoverable product life
Replacing the value of g from the equation (6.158) in the above equation and rearranging the
terms,
Uco =

(h I
′
E′E − hI)(1 + αco + αcoγ) + q0E(1 + αco + αcoγ)− Cµ(1 + αco)
−αcoγq0E + αcoγCo ≥ 0 for recoverable product life
(h I
′
E′E − hI)(1 + αco + αcoγ) + q0(ψα )E(1 + αco + αcoγ)− Cµ(1 + αco)
−αcoγq0[1− ψα + ψαE] + αcoγCo ≥ 0 for irrecoverable product life
or
Uco =

(h I
′
E′E − hI)(1 + αco + αcoγ) + pi0(1 + αco) + Co(1 + αco + αcoγ) ≥ 0
for recoverable product life
(h I
′
E′E − hI)(1 + αco + αcoγ) + pi0(1 + αco)
+q0(
ψ
α
− 1)(1 + αco + αcoγ) + Co(1 + αco + αcoγ) ≥ 0
for irrecoverable product life
Rearranging the values, h values are derived as below
h ≤

pi0(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)(I− I′E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′E′E)
for recoverable product life
pi0(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)( I′E′E−I)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′E′E)
Co
(I− I′E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.159)
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The contractor experiences the disadvantageous inequity when the following is satisfied
(gE − hI − Cµ)− γ(q0E − gE + hI − Co) ≤ 0 for recoverable product life(gE − hI − Cµ)− γ(q0(1− ψα + ψαE)− gE + hI − Co) ≤ 0 for irrecoverable product life
Replacing the value of g from the equation (6.158) and using the observation from the equa-
tion (6.149)−h(I −
I′
E′E)(1 + γ) + pi0 + (1 + γ)Co ≤ 0 for recoverable product life
−h(I − I′
E′E)(1 + γ) + pi0 + q0(
ψ
α
− 1)(1 + γ) + (1 + γ)Co ≤ 0 for irrecoverable product life
or
h ≥

pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
for recoverable product life
pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+
q0(
ψ
α
−1)
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.160)
Given the requirements from the equations (6.158), (6.159), and(6.160), the optimization
problem of the contractor becomes
max
g,h
: Upm = pipm =
q0E − gE + hI − Co for recoverable product lifeq0[1− ψα + ψαE]− gE + hI − Co for recoverable product life
(6.161)
Sub. to
g
h
I′
E′ + q0 for recoverable product life
h I
′
E′ + q0(
ψ
α
) for irrecoverable product life
(6.162)
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h ∈

[
pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
, pi0(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)(I− I′E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
]
for recoverable product life[
pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+
q0(
ψ
α
−1)
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
, {pi0}(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)(I− I′E′E)
+
q0(
ψ
α
−1)
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
]
for irrecoverable product life
(6.163)
It can easily be shown for any values of γ > 0, that

pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
< pi0(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)(I− I′E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′E′E)
for recoverable product life{
pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+
q0(
ψ
α
−1)
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
}
<
{
{pi0}(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)(I− I′E′E)
+
q0(
ψ
α
−1)
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′E′E)
}
for irrecoverable product life
Since dUpm
dh
= I , it is positive, otherwise the expected value of the offered contract would
be negative. Hence, the project manager would select the maximum value of h, given the
constraint in the equation (6.163). These above observations are summarised in the following
lemma
Lemma 28. The time based contract P(T,C)=g-hT ensures the contractor to earn the optimal
utility and λ = λ0 in a supply chain with profit maximizing project manager and a fairness
concerned contractor experiencing disadvantageous inequity if the following are satisfied
g =
h
I′
E′ + q0 for recoverable product life
h I
′
E′ + q0(
ψ
α
) for irrecoverable product life
(6.164)
h =

pi0(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)(I− I′E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
for recoverable product life
{pi0}(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)(I− I′E′E)
+
q0(
ψ
α
−1)
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.165)
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On the contrary to the disadvantageous inequity, if the contractor experiences the advan-
tageous inequity, then her utility function becomes
Uco2 =

[gE − hI − Cµ]− βco[{gE − hI − Cµ} − γ {q0E − gE + hI − Co}]
for recoverable product life
[gE − hI − Cµ]− βco[{gE − hI − Cµ} − γ
{
q0[1− ψα + ψαE]− gE + hI − Co
}
]
for irrecoverable product life
(6.166)
Again for a given contract of P(T,C)=g-hT, the contractor selects a λ that maximizes his utility
in the equation (6.166). Thus, it should satisfy the following
dUco2
dλ
=

{gE ′ − hI ′ − C ′µ} − βco
[{gE ′ − hI ′ − C ′µ} − γ{q0E ′ − gE ′ + hI ′}]
for recoverable product life = 0
{gE ′ − hI ′ − C ′µ} − βco
[{gE ′ − hI ′ − C ′µ} − γ{q0 (ψα)E ′ − gE ′ + hI ′}] = 0
for irrecoverable product life
(6.167)
For the purpose of coordination, λ = λ0. Thus, it should also satisfy first order condition
in the equation (6.156). Thus replacing the value of C ′µ from this first order condition to the
equation (6.167).
dUco2
dλ
=
{gE ′ − hI ′ − q0E ′} − βco [{gE ′ − hI ′ − q0E ′} − γ{q0E ′ − gE ′ + hI ′}] = 0
for recoverable product life
{gE ′ − hI ′ − q0
(
ψ
α
)
E ′} − βco
[{gE ′ − hI ′ − q0 (ψα)E ′} − γ{q0 (ψα)E ′ − gE ′ + hI ′}] = 0
for irrecoverable product life
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or
dUco2
dλ
=

{gE ′ − hI ′ − q0E ′}(1− βco − βcoγ) = 0
for recoverable product life
{gE ′ − hI ′ − q0
(
ψ
α
)
E ′}(1− βco − βcoγ) = 0
for irrecoverable product life
It is assumed that 1− βco − βcoγ 6= 0. Thus, from the above equation, the can be shown
g =
h
I′
E′ + q0 for recoverable product life
h I
′
E′ + q0
(
ψ
α
)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.168)
The offered contract should ensure the contractor a non-negative utility i.e. Uco ≥ 0. Thus,
Uco2 =

[gE − hI − Cµ]− βco[{gE − hI − Cµ} − γ {q0E − gE + hI − Co}] ≥ 0
for recoverable product life
[gE − hI − Cµ]− βco[{gE − hI − Cµ} − γ
{
q0[1− ψα + ψαE]− gE + hI − Co
}
] ≥ 0
for irrecoverable product life
Replacing the values of g from the equation(6.168)
[h( I
′
E′E − I)(1− βco − βcoγ) + q0E(1− βco − βcoγ)
−Cµ(1− βco) + γβcoq0E − γβcoCo] ≥ 0 for recoverable product life
[h( I
′
E′E − I)(1− βco − βcoγ) + q0
(
ψ
α
)
E(1− βco − βcoγ)
−Cµ(1− βco) + γβcoq0
{
1− ψ
α
+ ψ
α
E
}− βcoγCo] ≥ 0 for irrecoverable product life
Using the value of pi0 from the equation 6.149 and rearranging the variables in the above
232
equation
h ≤

pi0(1−βco)
(I− I′
E′E)(1−βco−βcoγ)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
for recoverable product life
pi0(1−βco)
(I− I′
E′E)(1−βco−βcoγ)
+
q0{ψα−1}
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
The contractor experiences advantageous inequity if the following is satisfied
(gE − hI − Cµ)− γ(q0E − gE + hI − Co) ≥ 0 for recoverable product life(gE − hI − Cµ)− γ {q0 (1− ψα + ψαE)− gE + hI − Co} ≥ 0 for irrecoverable product life
Using the value of g from the equation (6.168)

h( I
′
E′E − I)(1 + γ) + q0E(1 + γ)− Cµ − γq0E + γCo ≥ 0
for recoverable product life
h( I
′
E′E − I)(1 + γ) + q0
(
ψ
α
)
(1 + γ)E − Cµ − γq0
(
1− ψ
α
+ ψ
α
E
)
+ γCo ≥ 0
for irrecoverable product life
Replacing the value of pi0 from the equation 6.149 in the above condition and rearranging the
variables
h ≤

pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
for recoverable product life
pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
Summarising these above observations, the optimization problem for the project manager
becomes
max
g,h
: Upm = pipm =
[q0 − gE + hI − Co] for recoverable product life[q0(1− ψα + ψαE)− gE + hI − Co] for irrecoverable product life
(6.169)
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Sub. to
g =
h
I′
E′ + q0 for recoverable product life
h I
′
E′ + q0
(
ψ
α
)
for irrecoverable product life
h ≤ min

{
pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
, pi0(1−βco)
(I− I′
E′E)(1−βco−βcoγ)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
}
for recoverable product life{
pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
, pi0(1−βco)
(I− I′
E′E)(1−βco−βcoγ)
+
q0{ψα−1}
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
}
for irrecoverable product life
(6.170)
Now for the case of the projects with products whose operational life can be recovered upon
completion in the event of any delay.[
pi0(1− βco)
(I − I′
E′E)(1− βco − βcoγ)
+
Co
(I − I′
E′E)
]
−
[
pi0
(I − I′
E′E)(1 + γ)
+
Co
(I − I′
E′E)
]
=
[
pi0γ
(I − I′
E′E)(1 + γ)(1− βco − βcoγ)
]
Thus, if (1− βco − βcoγ) < 0 i.e. βco > 11+γ , then project manager selects
h =
pi0(1− βco)
(I − I′
E′E)(1− βco − βcoγ)
+
Co
(I − I′
E′E)
Thus, the profit of the project manager becomes
pipm = q0E − gE + hI − Co
= q0E − h I
′
E ′
E − q0E + hI − Co
=
pi0(1− βco)
(1− βco − βcoγ)
Since βco < 1 and as assumed that (1 − βco − βcoγ) < 0, the profit for the project manager
becomes negative. Similarly, for the projects with products whose operational life could not
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be recovered upon completion in the event of the delay, the project manager earns a negative
profit if βco > 11+γ . Hence, the cases with βco >
1
1+γ
are not considered any more.
On the contrary, if βco < 11+γ , then h ≤ pi0(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
(for recoverable product
life) or h ≤ pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
(for irrecoverable product life). Since dUpm
dh
=
I > 0, the project manager would select the maximum value of h given the constraint in
equation (6.170). Summarising all the above arguments, the following lemma is derived.
Lemma 29. The time based contract P(T,C)=g-hT ensures the contractor to earn the optimal
utility and λ = λ0 in a supply chain with a profit maximizing project manager and a fairness
concerned contractor (the contractor experiencing advantageous inequity with βco < 11+γ ) if
the following are satisfied
g =
h
I′
E′ + q0 for recoverable product life
h I
′
E′ + q0(
ψ
α
) for irrecoverable product life
(6.171)
h =

pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
for recoverable product life
pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.172)
Now for the value of E follows the equation (4.25). Replacing the value of θ in terms of
λ (As shown in chapter 4), the E’ values are as follows
E ′ =

(1−e−αθ)AλA−1
2µ1α
− (Ae−αθλ−1) for uniformly distributed time
Aww+1αµ1λAw−1
(wλA+αµ1)w+1
for gamma distributed time
∞∑
m=1
[
−(mA){µ1 (u+vu )}m 1λmA+1 { m∏
i=1
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
}{
(−α)m
m!
}]
for beta distributed time
∞∑
m=1
[
−(mA)
{
µ1
Γ(1+ 1s)
}m
1
λmA+1
{
Γ
(
1 + m
s
)}{ (−α)m
m!
}]
for Weibull distributed time
(6.173)
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The value of the I is for different distributions are as follows
I =
∞∫
0
Te−αTfλ(T )dT
=

λA
2µ1α2
{
1− e−αθ(αθ + 1)} for uniform distributed time
µ1
{
λAwww+1
(αµ1+wλA)w+1
}
for gamma distributed time[ ∞∑
m=1
{
µ1(u+v)
uλA
}m{ m∏
i=1
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
}{
(−α)m−1
(m)!
}]
for beta distributed time
∞∑
m=1
{
µ1
λAΓ(1+ 1s)
}m
Γ
(
1 + m
s
){ (−α)m−1
(m−1)!
}
for Weibull distributed time
(6.174)
The values of I’ for different distributions are as follows
I ′ =
dI
dλ
(6.175)
=

A
2µ1α2λ
[
λA
{
1− e−αθ(αθ + 1)}− 2µ1αe−αθ(αθ + 1) + 2µ1αe−αθ] uniform distributed time
Aµ1ww+2λAw−1(αµ1−λA)
(wλA+µ1α)w+2
gamma distributed time
∞∑
m=1
[
−(mA){µ1 (u+vu )}m 1λmA+1 { m∏
i=1
u+i−1
u+v+i−1
}{
(−α)m−1
(m−1)!
}]
beta distributed time
∞∑
m=1
[
−(mA)
{
µ1
Γ(1+ 1s)
}m
1
λmA+1
{
Γ
(
1 + m
s
)}{
(−α)m
m!
}]
Weibull distributed time
(6.176)
From the proof of lemmas 1 and 2 from chapter 4, it can be shown that
I ′
E ′
=

λA0 {1−e−αθ(αθ+1)}−2µ1α2θe−αθ
α{(1−e−αθ)λA−2µ1αe−αθ} for uniform distributed time
w(µ1α−λA)
α(wλA+µ1α)
for gamma distributed time
(6.177)
Similarly, using the value of E from the equation (4.25) and using the observations from the
proof of the lemmas 1 and 2, it can be shown
(
I − I
′
E ′
E
)
=

e−αθ(αθ−1−e−αθ)
(1−e−αθ)λA0 −2µ1αe−αθ
for uniform distributed time
ww+1λAw+A0
α(wλA+αµ1)w+1
for gamma distributed time
(6.178)
As shown in chapter 4, the values of E take no -closed form for beta and Weibull distributed
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time. Thus, it can be easily shown that the values of I, I’, E’, I
′
E′ , and I − I
′
E′E are also
non-closed form.
Earlier it was assumed that(1 − βco − βcoγ) 6= 0. If this assumption is relaxed, then the
equation 6.170 becomes
h ≤ min

{
pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
, ∞
}
for recoverable product life{
pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
, ∞
}
for irrecoverable product life
(6.179)
However, for (1− βco − βcoγ) = 0 i.e βco = 11+γ , dUcodλ = 0 even if {gE ′ − hI ′ − q0E ′} 6= 0
(for recoverable product life) or
{
gE ′ − hI ′ − q0
(
ψ
α
E ′
)} 6= 0 (for irrecoverable product life.
Hence, summarising the findings from lemmas 28 and 29, and from the above observations
the following is proposed
Proposition 25. The supply chain with a fairness concerned contractor and a profit maxi-
mizing project manager can be coordinated using a time based contract P(T,C) = g- hT if the
following are satisfied
1. if the contractor experiences an disadvantageous inequity
h =

pi0(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)( I′E′E−I)
+ Co
( I′E′E−I)
for recoverable product life
{pi0}(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)( I′E′E−I)
+
q0(
ψ
α
−1)
( I
′
E′E−I)
+ Co
( I′E′E−I)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.180)
or
2. if the contractor experiences an advantageous inequity with disutility per unit is not
high i.e. βco ≤ 11+γ and the following are satisfied
h =

pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
for recoverable product life
pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.181)
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and
g =
h
I′
E′ + q0 for recoverable product life
h I
′
E′ + q0(
ψ
α
) for irrecoverable product life
(6.182)
It was shown earlier that pi0
( I
′
E′E−I)(1+γ)
< pi0(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)( I′E′E−I)
. Hence, the the following
corollary is deduced based on this finding
Corollary 3. Comparing the two options from the findings of the proposition 25, it can be
shown that the option 2 for the optimal of h is unlikely to be offered by the project manager.
This is because the optimal value of h would be higher in option 1 (because pi0
( I
′
E′E−I)(1+γ)
<
pi0(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)( I′E′E−I)
), and the project manager’s profit is increasing in h.
Fairness Concern Contractor and Project Manager
This subsection explores how the optimal condition changes when both the project manager
and the contractor are fairness concerned. Again, the coordination problem is solved using
the backward induction method. The contractor would select the resource consumption rate
λ that maximizes his utility in the equation (6.152). Thus, as mentioned earlier for the case
of profit maximizing project manager and the fairness concerned contractor , the contractor
selects λ = λ0 in the case of disadvantageous inequity if the conditions in the equations
(6.162) and (6.163) are satisfied.
The contractor selects λ = λ0 for the case of advantageous inequity if the values of the
contract parameters satisfy the equations (6.170) . The project manager earns a negative profit
for the values of βco > 11+γ (as shown for the case with a fairness concerned contractor and
a profit maximizing project manager ). Hence, these cases are not considered again. Thus,
the contractor would select λ = λ0 if βco < 11+γ and if the contractual parameters satisfy the
equations (6.171) and (6.172).
Unlike the profit maximizing project manager, the fairness concerned project manager
maximizes her utility mentioned in (6.5). Now replacing the values of pipm and pico from the
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equations (6.150) and (6.151), the utility function becomes
Upm =
[q0E − gE + hI − Co]− αpm [δ {gE − hI − Cµ} − {q0E − gE + hI − Co}]+
−βpm [{q0E − gE + hI − Co} − δ {gE − hI − Cµ}]+
for recoverable product life[
q0
{
1− ψ
α
+ ψ
α
E
}− gE + hI − Co]
−αpm
[
δ {gE − hI − Cµ} −
{
q0[1− ψα + ψαE]− gE + hI − Co
}]+
−βpm
[{
q0
{
1− ψ
α
+ ψ
α
E
}− gE + hI − Co}− δ {gE − hI − Cµ}]+
for irrecoverable product life
(6.183)
As discussed before, if δγ > 1 i.e. ECCP > pi0, the supply chain is considered as acrimo-
nious channel. On the contrary, if δγ ≤ 1 i.e. ECCP ≤ pi0, the supply chain is considered
as harmonious channel (Cui et al. 2007).
Project manager disadvantageous inequity, contractor disadvantageous inequity
When the following are satisfied, the project manager experiences a disadvantageous inequity
{q0E − gE + hI − Co} − δ {gE − hI − Cµ} < 0 for recoverable product life{q0 {1− ψα + ψαE}− gE + hI − Co}− δ {gE − hI − Cµ} < 0 for irrecoverable product life
(6.184)
Then, the the project manager’s utility becomes
Upm1 =

[q0E − gE + hI − Co]− αpm [δ {gE − hI − Cµ} − {q0E − gE + hI − Co}]
for recoverable product life[
q0
{
1− ψ
α
+ ψ
α
E
}− gE + hI − Co]
−αpm
[
δ {gE − hI − Cµ} −
{
q0[1− ψα + ψαE]− gE + hI − Co
}]
for irrecoverable product life
(6.185)
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If the contractor experiences a disadvantageous inequity, then the optimization problem for
the fairness concerned project manager becomes
max
g,h
: Upm = Upm1 in equation (6.185) (6.186)
Sub. to
• g satisfying the condition in the equation (6.162)
• h satisfying the equation (6.163)
Again, the project manager will select a value of h that maximizes her utility function Upm1.
Thus, the first order condition of λ should satisfy
dUpm1
dh
= I + αpm(δ + 1)I > 0 (6.187)
The project manager’s utility is an increasing function of h. Thus, applying the constraint of
the constraint in the equation (6.163), the project manager would select the maximum value
of h given the constraint; so, the optimal value of h would satisfy
h∗a =

pi0(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)(I− I′E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
for recoverable product life
{pi0}(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)(I− I′E′E)
+
q0(
ψ
α
−1)
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.188)
The optimal value of g∗a should satisfy the condition in the equation (6.162). Replacing these
values of g∗a in the expression (6.184)
[
q0E − q0E − h∗a
(
I′
E′E
)
+ hI − Co
]− [δ(q0E + h∗a ( I′E′E)− hI − Cµ})] < 0
for recoverable product life[
q0
(
1− ψ
α
+ ψ
α
E
)− q0 (ψα)E − h∗a ( I′E′E)+ hI − Co]
− [δ(q0 (ψα)E + h∗a ( I′E′E)− hI − Cµ})] < 0
for irrecoverable product life
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orh
∗
a
(
I − I′
E′E
)
(1 + δ)− Co(1 + δ)− δpi0 < 0 for recoverable product life
q0
(
1− ψ
α
)
(1 + δ) + h∗a
(
I − I′
E′E
)
(1 + δ)− Co(1 + δ)− δpi0 < 0 for irrecoverable product life
Now replacing the values of h∗a from (6.188) in the above condition
pi0(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)
(1 + δ)− δpi0 < 0 for recoverable product life
−q0
(
ψ
α
− 1) (1 + δ) + {pi0}(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)
+ q0(
ψ
α
− 1)− δpi0 < 0 for irrecoverable product life
or
pi0 {1 + αco(1− δγ)}
1 + αco + αcoγ
< 0 (6.189)
The above expression is negative only if δγ > 1. Hence, like the previous cases, the project
manager experiences disadvantageous inequity in the acrimonious supply chain and advan-
tageous inequity in the harmonious supply chain. The contractual parameters should also
ensure the project manger to earn a non-negative utility.
Upm1 =

[q0E − gE + hI − Co]− αpm [δ {gE − hI − Cµ} − {q0E − gE + hI − Co}] ≥ 0
for recoverable product life[
q0
{
1− ψ
α
+ ψ
α
E
}− gE + hI − Co]
−αpm
[
δ {gE − hI − Cµ} −
{
q0[1− ψα + ψαE]− gE + hI − Co
}] ≥ 0
for irrecoverable product life
(6.190)
Using the optimal value of g from the equation (6.162) and the observation from the condition
in (6.189)
[
h
{
I − I′
E′E
}− Co]− αpm pi0{−1+αco(−1+δγ)}1+αco+αcoγ ≥ 0 for recoverable product life[
q0{1− ψα}+ h
(
I − I′
E′E
)− Co]− αpm pi0{−1+αco(−1+δγ)}1+αco+αcoγ ≥ 0 for irrecoverable product life
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Using the value of h = h∗a from the equation (6.188), the following condition can be derived[
pi0(1 + αco)
(1 + αco + αcoγ)
]
− αpmpi0 {−1 + αco(−1 + δγ)}
1 + αco + αcoγ
≥ 0
for both recoverable product life and irrecoverable product life
Since αco > 0 and δγ > 1, so if pi0(1 + αco) − αpm {−1 + αco(δγ − 1)} ≥ 0 then αpm ≤
(1+αco)
−1+αco(δγ−1) . It was assumed earlier that αpm > 0. Thus, it can be shown αco >
1
δγ−1
Project manager disadvantageous inequity, contractor advantageous inequity
As mentioned earlier, the contractor selects λ = λ0 if the optimal contractual parameters
satisfy the conditions in the equations (6.170). Moreover, to avoid any negative profit for
the project manager, βco ≤ 11+γ . Thus, the optimization problem for the project manager
becomes
max
g,h
: Upm = Upm1 mentioned in the equation (6.185) (6.191)
Sub. to
• βco ≤ 11+γ
• g and h satisfying the conditions in (6.170)
As shown before dUpm1
dh
> 0. Thus, the project manager selects the maximum value of h given
the constraint in the equation (6.170). Hence, the optimal condition for the g and h should
become
g∗a =
h
I′
E′ + q0 for recoverable product life
h I
′
E′ + q0
(
ψ
α
)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.192)
h∗a =

pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
for recoverable product life
pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′
E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.193)
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Using these optimal values in the condition (6.184),
pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
(I − I′
E′E)(1 + δ) +
Co
(I− I′
E′E)
(
I′
E′E − I
)
(1 + δ)− Co − δ(q0 − Cµ) < 0
for recoverable product life
−q0
(
ψ
α
− 1) (1 + δ) + pi0
(I− I′
E′E)(1+γ)
(I − I′
E′E)(1 + δ) +
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′
E′E)
(I − I′
E′E)(1 + δ)
+ Co
(I− I′
E′E)
(I − I′
E′E)(1 + δ)− C0 − δ
{
q0
(
1− ψ
α
+ ψ
α
E
)− Cµ} < 0
for irrecoverable product life
or
pi0
(1 + γ)
(1 + δ)− δpi0 < 0 for both recoverable product life and irrecoverable product life
or
pi0(1− δγ)
1 + γ
< 0 for both recoverable product life and irrecoverable product life (6.194)
Thus, again the project manager experiences disadvantageous inequity if δγ > 1 i.e. in an
acrimonious supply chain.
The offered contract must ensure a non-negative utility for the project manager. Thus,using
the values of g∗a from the equations (6.192) and the observations from the condition (6.194),
in the conditions mentioned in (6.190), the following are derived

[
h
(
I − I′
E′E
)− Co]− αpm [pi0(δγ−1)1+γ ] ≥ 0 for recoverable product life[−q0 (ψα − 1)+ h (I − I′E′E)− Co]− αpm [pi0(δγ−1)1+γ ] ≥ 0 for irrecoverable product life
Replacing the value of h∗a from the equation (6.193) in the above condition.
pi0 − αpmpi0(δγ − 1)
1 + γ
≥ 0 for both recoverable and irrecoverable product life
Thus, αpm ≤ 1δγ−1 . From the above observations, the optimal condition for the project
manager is summarised in the following lemma
Lemma 30. If both the project manager and the contractor both are fairness concerned,
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the supply chain is coordinated with the time based contract below with cash-flows are dis-
counted exponentially ( the project manager experiences disadvantageous inequity in an ac-
rimonious supply chain) if
1. when the contractor experiences disadvantageous inequity and the following are satis-
fied
h∗a =

pi0(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)( I′E′E−I)
+ Co
( I′E′E−I)
for recoverable product life
{pi0}(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)( I′E′E−I)
+
q0(
ψ
α
−1)
( I
′
E′E−I)
+ Co
( I′E′E−I)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.195)
δγ > 1, αpm ≤ 1+αcoαco(δγ−1)−1 , and αco > 1δγ−1
2. when the contractor experiences advantageous inequity and the following are satisfied
h∗a =

pi0
( I′E′E−I)(1+γ)
+ Co
( I′E′E−I)
for recoverable product life
pi0
( I′E′E−I)(1+γ)
+
q0(ψα−1)
( I′E′E−I)
+ Co
( I′E′E−I)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.196)
with βco ≤ 11+γ , δγ > 1, and αpm ≤ 1(δγ−1)
and
g∗a =
h
∗
a
I′
E′ + q0 for recoverable product life
h∗a
I′
E′ + q0(
ψ
α
) for irrecoverable product life
(6.197)
Project manager advantageous inequity, contractor disadvantageous inequity
On the contrary to the disadvantageous inequity, when the following is satisfied, the project
manager experiences advantageous inequity when
{q0E − gE + hI − Co} − δ {gE − hI − Cµ} ≥ 0 for recoverable product life{q0[1− ψα + ψαE]− gE + hI − Co}− δ {gE − hI − Cµ} ≥ 0 for irrecoverable product life
(6.198)
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The contractor selects λ = λ0 if he experiences disadvantageous inequity and if the condi-
tions in the equations (6.162) and (6.163) are satisfied. Thus, the optimization problem of the
project manager becomes
max
g,h
: Upm2 =

{q0E − gE + hI − Co} − βpm [{q0E − gE + hI − Co} − δ {gE − hI − Cµ}]
for recoverable product life[
q0{1− ψα + ψαE} − gE + hI − Co
]
−βpm
[{
q0[1− ψα + ψαE]− gE + hI − Co
}− δ {gE − hI − Cµ}]
for irrecoverable product life
(6.199)
Sub. to
1. g satisfies the conditions in the equation (6.162)
2. h satisfies the conditions in the equation (6.163)
The project manager would select the contractor parameters that maximizes her utility in
the equation (6.199) given the constraints of g and h in the equations (6.162) and (6.163).
The value of g has a equal sign in the constraint and it depends on h. The value of h has
inequity in the constraint equation. Now, the values of dUpm2
dh
= (I − βpmI − βpmδI). Thus,
if (I − βpmI − βpmδI) > 0, i.e. βpm < 11+δ then the utility of the project manager would be
an increasing function of h. Hence, the project manager would select a maximum value of h
given the constraint in the condition in (6.163). Thus, the optimal conditions are mentioned
in the following lemma
Lemma 31. If both (the project manager and the contractor) are fairness concerned, with
the contractor experiences disadvantageous inequity, the optimal contractual conditions in a
harmonious supply chain are as follows if βpm < 11+δ .
g∗ad =
h
I′
E′ + q0 for recoverable product life
h I
′
E′ + q0
(
ψ
α
)
for recoverable product life
(6.200)
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h = h∗ad =

pi0(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)(I− I′E′E)
+ C0
(I− I′E′E)
for recoverable product life
pi0(1+αco)
(1+αco+αcoγ)(I− I′E′E)
+ C0
(I− I′E′E)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.201)
On the contrary, if (I − βpmI − βpmδI) < 0 , i.e. βpm > 11+δ , then the project manager’s
utility would be a decreasing function of h. However, the profit of the project manager is still
increasing in h. Thus, the project manager would select the lowest possible value for h in
the constraint condition in the equation (6.163) if that ensures a positive profit for the project
manager. The lowest possible value in that constraint should be
h =

pi0
(I− I′E′E)(1+γ)
+ Co
(I− I′E′E)
for recoverable product life
pi0
(I− I′E′E)(1+γ)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.202)
For this value of h, and g satisfying the equation (6.200), the profit value of the project
manager is
pipm =
h
(
I − I′
E′E
)− C0 for recoverable product life
−q0
(
ψ
α
− 1)+ h (I − I′
E′E
)− C0 for irrecoverable product life
=
pi0
1 + γ
> 0
It can be easily shown that pico = γpi01+γ . Thus, any further increase in h would reduce the value
of the profit of the project manager and it would attain a negative value after certain increase
in h value. Moreover, these values of h would never be able to allocate the fair profit for the
contractor. Thus, these values are not considered in this case.
Hence, for βpm > 11+δ , the project manager would select the above mentioned h value.
The optimal conditions are summarised in the following lemma
Lemma 32. If both (the project manager and the contractor) are fairness concerned, with
the contractor experiences disadvantageous inequity, the optimal contractual conditions in a
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harmonious supply chain are as follows if βpm > 11+δ .
g = g∗ad =
h
I′
E′ + q0 for recoverable product life
h I
′
E′ + q0
(
ψ
α
)
for recoverable product life
(6.203)
h = h∗ad =

pi0(1+αco)
(1+γ)(I− I′E′E)
+ C0
(I− I′E′E)
for recoverable product life
pi0(1+αco)
(1+γ)(I− I′E′E)
+ C0
(I− I′E′E)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.204)
Project manager advantageous inequity, contractor advantageous inequity
If the contractor experiences an advantageous inequity, then he would select λ = λ0 as
long as the contractual parameters g and h satisfy the conditions in the equation (6.170).
As shown earlier (with the fairness concerned contractor and the profit maximizing project
manager), if βco > 11+δ , then
pi0
(I− I′E′E)(1+γ)
+ Co
(I− I′E′E)
> pi0(1−βco)
(I− I′E′E)(1−βco−βcoγ)
+ Co
(I− I′E′E)
for projects with recoverable prdocut life
pi0
(I− I′E′E)(1+γ)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′E′E)
Co
(I− I′E′E)
> pi0(1−βco)
(I− I′E′E)(1−βco−βcoγ)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′E′E)
for projects with irrecoverable prdocut life
For βco > 11+γ , then the project manager earns a negative profit and hence, these cases are
rejected. Thus, the optimization problem of the project manager becomes
max
g,h
: Upm = Upm2 as mentioned in the equation (6.199) (6.205)
Sub.to
• g and h conditions satisfy the requirements in the conditions in (6.170) and
• βco < 11+γ
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The project manager again selects a value of h that maximizes her utility which follows the
equation (6.199). Thus, if dUpm2
dh
= (I − βpmI − βpmδI) > 0 i.e. βpm < 11+δ , then the utility
of the project manager increases with h in this case. Thus, the contractor would select the
contractual parameters g and h in the equations in (6.171) and (6.172) when he experiences an
advantageous inequity. It has been shown earlier that the contractor’s utility is non-negative
for the values of the contract parameters in (6.171) and (6.172). The project manager earns a
positive profit of pipm = pi01+γ as it is shown before the lemma 32. The profit for the contractor
becomes γpi0
1+γ
. Hence, the utility of the project manager becomes
Upm2 = pipm − βpm(pipm − δpico)
=
pi0
1 + γ
− βpm
[
pi0(1− δγ)
1 + γ
]
=
{1− βpm(1− δγ)}
1 + γ
It was shown earlier that the project manager experiences an advantageous inequity in the
harmonious supply chain; so δγ < 1. Hence, contractual parameter g and h from the condi-
tions in (6.171) and (6.172), would ensure a non-negative utility for the project manager if
1− βpm(1− δγ) ≥ 0 i.e. βpm ≤ 11−δγ . It can be easily shown that 11+δ < 11−δγ
Hence, the optimal conditions are summarized in the following lemma
Lemma 33. If both the members of the supply chain (the project manager and the contrac-
tor) are fairness concerned, with the contractor experiences disadvantageous inequity, the
optimal contractual conditions in a harmonious supply chain are as follows if βpm < 11+δ
and βco < 11+γ .
g∗aa =
h
I′
E′ + q0 for recoverable product life
h I
′
E′ + q0
(
ψ
α
)
for recoverable product life
(6.206)
h = h∗aa =

pi0
(I− I′E′E)(1+γ)
+ Co
(I− I′E′E)
for recoverable product life
pi0
(I− I′E′E)(1+γ)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.207)
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On the contrary, if (I − βpmI − βpmδI) < 0 i.e. βpm > 11+δ , then the utility of the project
manager decreases in h. Now in the constraint condition for h mentioned in (6.170), has no
lower limit for h. Thus, lowering the h value would keep on increasing the utility. However,
the profit function for the project manager is an increasing function of h. Thus, after a certain
lower value of h is attained, the profit of the project manager would become negative. It is
also not very practical to set a lower limit below the value mentioned for h in the lemma
33. This is because, the contractor would be ensured a fair profit when g and h satisfy the
conditions in lemma 33 and it also satisfies the coordination requirements for the resource
consumption rate i.e.λ = λ0. Thus, even if βpm > 11+δ , the h value need not to be reduced
below the optimal conditions mentioned in lemma in 33. The coordination could be achieved
with this solution as long as βpm ≤ 11−δγ .
Summarising all the findings from the lemmas 30 ,31, 32, and 33, the following is pro-
posed
Proposition 26. In a fairness concerned supply chain (with both project manager and the
contractor are fairness concerned), the project manager can coordinate the supply chain
with the following time based contracts when the cash-flows are exponentially discounted in
the following cases
h∗ =
kNλN+A0
A
and any of the following
1. If both the project manager and the contractor experience disadvantageous inequity
in the acrimonious supply chain, the h satisfying the condition in the equation (6.195)
with δγ > 1, αpm ≤ 1+αco{αco(δγ−1)−1} & αco > 1δγ−1
2. If the project manager experiences disadvantageous inequity and the contractor ex-
periences advantageous inequity in the acrimonious supply chain, the h satisfies the
equation (6.196) with δγ > 1, βco < 11+γ , & αpm ≤ 1δγ−1
3. If the project manager experiences advantageous inequity and the contractor experi-
ences disadvantageous inequity, the h satisfies the equation (6.201) with δγ < 1, &
βpm <
1
1+δ
and h follows (6.204) with δγ > 1, & βpm > 11+δ
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4. If both the project manager and the contractor experience advantageous inequity, then
h satisfies (6.207) with βco < 11+γ & βpm ≤ 11−δγ
Fairness Concerned Project Manager and Profit Maximizing contractor
The game is again solved using backward induction method. For a given value of time based
contract contract P(T,C) =g-hT, the contractor selects a resource consumption rate λ that
maximizes his profit. The project manager would anticipate this value of λ by backward
induction and would offer a contract P(T,C) =g-hT that maximizes her own utility as well as
satisfies the constraint to achieve the λ that maximizes the contractor’s profit.
Similar to the calculation shown in chapter 4, the contractor would the λ that maximizes
the contractor’s profit in equations (6.148) or (6.151). Thus, the following must be satisfied
gE ′ − hI ′ − dCµ
dλ
= 0 (6.208)
Replacing the value of dCµ
dλ
from the equation (6.156) in the above equation, the optimal
condition for g could be derived. This optimal condition is same as derived in the equation
(6.158) or (6.168). Unlike the case of the fairness concern contractor, the optimal condition
for h value would be different. This has to ensure the minimum profit of piout for the contractor
(by individual rationality constraint). Thus, from the equation (6.151), gE−hI−Cµ ≥ piout.
Using the optimal condition for g (As identified same as in the equation (6.158) or (6.168)),
the optimal conditions for h can be shown as
h ≤

(pi0−piout+Co)
(I− I′E′E)
for recoverable product life
{pi0−piout+q0(ψα−1)+Co}
(I− I′E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.209)
The project manager anticipates these optimal conditions required to ensure the participation
of the contractor. Hence, her optimization problem becomes
max
g,h
: Upm =Upm1 as mentioned in the equation (6.185) when the condition in (6.184) is satisfiedUpm2 as mentioned in the equation (6.199) when the condition in (6.198) is satisfied
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St. g following the conditions in either equations (6.158) or (6.168)h following the conditions in equation (6.209)
The project manager would select the contract parameters that maximize her utility in the
equation above, given the constraints of g and h. The value of g has a equal sign in the
constraint and it depends on h.
It was shown in equation (6.187) that Upm1 is increasing in h with the project manager
experiencing disadvantageous inequity. Thus, the project manager would select the maximum
h values as given the constraint conditions above. These h values could be used in the optimal
condition for g to find out the optimal values of g. This is summarized in the following lemma
Lemma 34. The optimal contractual parameters of a time based contract satisfies the fol-
lowing where the cash flows are exponentially discounted. The supply chain consists of a
fairness concerned project manager and a profit maximizing contractor; the project manager
experiences a disadvantageous inequity.
h =

(pi0−piout+Co)
(I− I′E′E)
for recoverable product life
{pi0−piout+q0(ψα−1)+Co}
(I− I′E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.210)
g =

q0 +
(pi0−piout+Co)
(
I′
E′
)
(I− I′E′E)
for recoverable product life
q0
(
ψ
α
)
+
{pi0−piout+q0(ψα−1)+Co}
(
I′
E′
)
(I− I′E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.211)
On the contrary, if the project manager experiences advantageous inequity, then Upm
would decrease or increase in h depending on the value of the βpm. It was shown earlier
that the values of dUpm
dh
> 0 if βpm < 11+δ . Then the utility of the project manager would be
an increasing function of h. Hence, the project manager would select a maximum value of h
given the constraint above. As a result, the situation becomes similar to the explained in the
case of project manager experiencing the disadvantageous inequity. Thus, the optimal solu-
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tions would follow the conditions mentioned in the equations (6.210) and (6.211) in lemma
(34)
Lemma 35. The optimal contractual parameters of a time based contract (P(T,C)=g-hT)
satisfies the conditions mentioned in the equations (6.210) and (6.211) in lemma 34 in a
supply chain with fairness concerned project manager and a profit maximizing contractor.
The project manager experiences an advantageous inequity in this case which is not too high
i.e. βpm < 11+δ .
If βpm > 11+δ , then
dUpm
dh
< 0 (As shown before). From the constraint condition from
(6.209), the h value has an upper limit in the constraint. However, it does not have any lower
bound in the constraint. As shown earlier in similar cases, the utility function of the project
manager would increase with the decrease in the value of h. However, the profit function of
the project manager would still be decreasing with the decrease in h. Thus, after a certain
reduction of h, the profit of the project manager would become negative, but the utility may
be still increasing. This is due to the high inequity aversion compensating the loss of profit
figure in the utility function. Again, this scenario is not favourable as the negative profit is
not considered for this research. Thus, the h value is only allowed to decrease until it assigns
a fair allocation of the profit. With the maximum of current optimal values from the given
constraints in (6.210) and (6.211), the profit of the contractor becomes piout (As shown in
chapter 4). According to the perception of the project manager, she should earn δpico as a fair
share of the profit. Hence, the fair share should be for the project manger δ
1+δ
pi0 and 11+δpi0 for
the contractor. Thus, if piout < pi01+δ , then the project manager could reduce her offer for the h
value in (6.209) when βpm > 11+δ until the profit of the contractor becomes
pi0
1+δ
. Otherwise,
it is not pragmatic to reduce the value below what is mentioned in the condition (6.210).
Lemma 36. The optimal contractual parameters of a time based contract (P(T,C)=g-hT)
satisfies the either of the following conditions in a supply chain with fairness concerned
project manager and a profit maximizing contractor when the project manager experiences a
disadvantageous inequity which is not too low i.e. βpm > 11+δ .
1. If the value of piout ≥ pi01+δ , then the optimal values should satisfy the conditions as
mentioned in the equations (6.210) and (6.211) in lemma 34
252
2. If piout < pi01+δ , then, the optimnal conditions become
g∗a =
h
I′
E′ + q0 for recoverable product life
h I
′
E′ + q0
(
ψ
α
)
for recoverable product life
(6.212)
h∗a =

δpi0
(I− I′E′E)(1+δ)
+ Co
(I− I′E′E)
for recoverable product life
δpi0
(I− I′E′E)(1+δ)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.213)
Proof. To ensure a fair profit for the contractor , the project manager should select a h that
ensures pico = pi01+δ . Thus, using the value of pico, the following can be derived
pi0
1 + δ
= gE − hI − Cµ
Using the value of g from the above lemma in the above equation, the optimal value men-
tioned in above lemma can be easily be found.
Summarising the findings of lemmas 26 and 27, the following is proposed
Proposition 27. A supply chain consisting of a fairness concerned project manager and a
profit maximizing contractor could be coordinated with a time based contract P(T,C) = g-hT,
if
g =
h
I′
E′ + q0 for recoverable product life
h I
′
E′ + q0
(
ψ
α
)
for recoverable product life
(6.214)
and
1.
h =

(pi0−piout+Co)
(I− I′E′E)
for recoverable product life
{pi0−piout+q0(ψα−1)+Co}
(I− I′E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.215)
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when the project manager experiences a disadvantageous inequity or advantageous
inequity with very low utility loss per unit due to earning more than the contractor,
with βpm ≤ 11+δ .
2.
h =

δpi0
(I− I′E′E)(1+δ)
+ Co
(I− I′E′E)
for recoverable product life
δpi0
(I− I′E′E)(1+δ)
+
q0(ψα−1)
(I− I′E′E)
+ Co
(I− I′E′E)
for irrecoverable product life
(6.216)
if 1
1+δ
pi0 > piout and when the project manager experiences a considerable utility loss
per unit due to earning more than the contractor so that βpm > 11+δ .
In the above proposition (24), the first optimal condition can coordinate the supply chain
and ensure the contractor to earn a minimum profit of piout as it was found in the case of
a supply chain without any fairness consideration. In fact, the optimal conditions are same
as found in chapter 4. This certainly can not guarantee the fair solution unless piout = pi01+δ .
In fact in the second case, it was assumed that piout < pi01+δ to allow the project manager to
increase her offer of g in order to improve her utility and pushing the solution to the fair
one. However, if piout > pi01+δ , then the project manager has to offer piout for the contractor’s
participation. This may not guarantee her the fair profit to be earned.
6.4 Fairness and Bargaining
Chapter 5 presented the models of bargaining to show how the win-win situations can be
achieved if the project manager and the contractor engage in negotiation. Two different sce-
narios were presented: both are risk neutral in one scenario;and the project manager is risk
neutral, but the contractor is risk averse in the other scenario.
However, the chapter 5 did not discuss the issues around fairness in bargaining scenario.
Rachmilevitch et al. (2011) mentioned that bargainers have got two main issues to solve
while participating in the bargaining process. These are fairness and efficiency. The authors
also highlighted that these two are in a trade-off. The authors argued that the bargaining
problem is harmonic if the egalitarian solution and utilitarian solution agree with each other.
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The authors further argued that the solution lies between the maximum and the minimum
values of the payoff derived from the egalitarian and utilitarian solution and Nash bargaining
solution balance the trade-off between the fair allocation and the efficiency.
In fact, an Egalitarian approach has been considered as the solution that fairness con-
cerned members prefers in the bargaining if the interpersonal utility comparison is allowed
(Binmore 2014). The author argued this based on experimental evidence. In fact, fairness
motivation has been observed in non-cooperative bargaining approaches such as Rubinstein
bargaining (Camerer 2003). The author argued that the share of the benefits tend to cluster
around equal split even with differential bargaining power due to fairness concern.
Chapter 5 presented how the optimal solutions encourage the risk neutral project manager
and the risk neutral contractor to equally split the benefits derived from the project comple-
tion. Hence, the theories of equal split and achieving fairness have been supported.
On the contrary, the second situation is somewhat different and challenging. The contrac-
tor is risk averse and his utility function takes it into account by incorporating non-linearity.
This research follows the argument proposed by Rachmilevitch et al. (2011) that the fea-
sible fair allocation could possibly lie between the maximum and the minimum solutions
from the Egalitarian solution and the Utilitarian solution. Chapter 5 presented the utilitarian
approach. The egalitarian approach proposed by Kalai (1977) as below
E(Z, d) = max
z∈(Z,d)
:
{
min
(i=pm,co)
(zi − di)
}
(6.217)
Applying this above equation, it can be easily be shown that the utility functions of the project
manager and the contractor would become equal at the optimal solution. This can easily be
achieved for the case when both the members are risk neutral.
However, chapter 5 did not analyse if this Egalitarian approach can be applied for the
case of risk neutral project manager and risk averse contractor. Applying the Egalitarian
optimization condition with the utility functions for cost based contracts from the equations
(5.4) and (5.6) for the cost based contracts
(q − a− bµ) = 1− e−ηaW for W = [eη(1−b)X ] (6.218)
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Differentiating both side with respect to b and rearranging the terms
(
−da
db
− µ
)(
ηe−ηaW + 1
)
=
[
−e−ηadW
db
− µηe−ηaW
]
The above equation is very similar to the observation from the equation (5.58) in section 5.3.2
in chapter 5. The only exception in the equation (5.58) was the normalization term B which
was positive as well. Thus, following the same set of steps (from equation 5.58), it can be
shown that dUpm
db
> 0 and dUco
db
> 0 for 0 ≤ b < 1 and 0 at b =1 .Thus, Upm and Uco are
increasing in b ∈ [0, 1) and attains the maximum at b = 1. Hence, like other bargaining
models, the cost plus contract with b = 1 dominates the solutions for other cost sharing
contracts (0 < b < 1) and for fixed price contracts (b = 1). Similarly, for the time based
contracts, it can be shown that the the solutions for any time based contract is dominated by
the solutions from the fixed price contracts.
It can be very easily shown that this Egalitarian approach is applicable for certain limited
cases with Upm < 1. Moreover, several authors including Birkeland & Tungodden (2014)
raised questions on the applicability of the equal share. The authors argued that the bargainers
may not find equal share to be fair if they have got some initial endowment. This was evident
in some recent experimental studies including the paper of Cappelen et al. (2010). This
encourages the need for a more practical approach of sharing the risk and benefits.
6.4.1 Ex Ante vs Ex Post Fairness Consideration along With Risk Pref-
erence
With risk neutral members(both the project manager and the contractor in this case), the op-
timal solution approaches an equal split of the profit (as shown earlier). Existing literature
considered this as a fair solution in some cases in absence of any initial endowment. How-
ever, things become more complicated in the presence of differential risk preference of the
members of the supply chain.
One school of thought considers the fairness consideration and the risk preference to be
independent (Bolton & Ockenfels 2000, Brennan et al. 2008). However, recent experimental
evidence suggests the existence of a correlation between the fairness consideration and the
risk preference (Krawczyk & Le Lec 2010, Fudenberg & Levine 2012, Brock et al. 2013).
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The fairness consideration discussed so far for these cases (either in this chapter or in chapter
5) considered the fair allocation of risk once it is realized. In the literature, it has been defined
as Ex post fairness (Fudenberg & Levine 2012). On the contrary, the bargainers were found
to have some fairness consideration before the bargaining took place in the experimental ev-
idence of the literature of Krawczyk & Le Lec (2010), and Brock et al. (2013). This fairness
concern was present in the presence of uncertainty about the risk. Lo´pez-Vargas (2014) de-
fined this as the Ex ante Fairness. The reasons behind the existence of these type of fairness
concerns are still at its early stage in literature and subjected to debate (Lo´pez-Vargas 2014).
The scope of the present research is restricted outside this debate. This research incorpo-
rates the Expected Inequality Aversion model proposed by Fudenberg & Levine (2012) to
incorporate any ex-ante fairness consideration along with ex-post fairness consideration.
U = ∆u(E(x, y)) + (1−∆)E(u(x, y)) (6.219)
However, authors suggested to use this model for the cases where u(x,y) follows the inequity
aversion model for fairness suggested by Fehr & Schmidt (1999). This assumption was
extended by Lo´pez-Vargas (2014) with the generalized expected inequality aversion model.
The author suggested the model can be applied with u(.) as a concave function.
The utility function proposed for risk averse contractor in the present research is a concave
function (As shown in the equations 5.6 and 5.9). It was discussed earlier that the project
manager is likely to be risk neutral in practice due to her financial position than in comparison
to the contractor. Thus, the utility function for the project manager would be considered as a
linear function as shown before.
Applying the generalized expected inequality aversion model, the updated utility function
of the risk averse contract becomes
Uco(∆) = ∆Uco(E(z)) + (1−∆)E(Uco(z)) [where z = a− (1− b)X]
= ∆E
[
1− e−ηaeη(1−b)µ]+ (1−∆) [1− e−ηaE{eη(1−b)X}] [where Uco(z) = 1− e−ηz]
= ∆
[
1− e−ηaY ]+ (1−∆) [1− e−ηaW ] [where Y = E{eη(1−b)µ}]
(6.220)
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If the project manager is fairness concerned, her utility function is assumed as
Upm = (q − a− bµ)− αpm [δ{a− (1− b)µ} − {q − a− bµ}]+
− βpm [{q − a− bµ} − δ{a− (1− b)µ}]+ (6.221)
Utilitarian Approach
The utilitarian approach satisfies the equation (5.62). The contractor’s modified utility func-
tion satisfies the equation (6.220). If the project manager experiencing the advantage in-
equity, then the utility of the project manager from the equation (6.221) becomes Upm =
(q − a − bµ) − βpm [{q − a− bµ} − δ{a− (1− b)µ}]. Thus, the optimization problem for
the utilitarian approach becomes
max : U(Z, d) =
(q − a− bµ)− αpm [δ{a− (1− b)µ} − {q − a− bµ}]
+∆ [1− e−ηaY ] + (1−∆) [1− e−ηaW ] for disadvantageous inequity
(q − a− bµ)− βpm [{q − a− bµ} − δ{a− (1− b)µ}]
+∆ [1− e−ηaY ] + (1−∆) [1− e−ηaW ] for advantageous inequity
(6.222)
Thus, the first order condition for a should satisfy
dU(Z, d)
da
=

−(1 + αpm + αpmδ) + ∆(ηe−ηaY ) + (1−∆)(ηe−ηaW ) = 0
for disadvantageous inequity case
−(1− βpm + βpmδ) + ∆(ηe−ηaY ) + (1−∆)(ηe−ηaW ) = 0
for advantageous inequity case
(6.223)
Hence, from the above equation, the optimal value for a becomes
a =

1
η
loge
η{∆Y+(1−∆)W}
(1+αpm+αpmδ)
for disadvantageous inequity case
1
η
loge
η{∆Y+(1−∆)W}
(1−βpm−δβpm) for advantageous inequity case
(6.224)
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To find out the optimal value of b in b ∈ [0, 1], the equation (6.223) is differentiated with
respect to b.
dU(Z, d)
db
=
dUpm
db
+
dUco
db
(6.225)
Now dUpm
db
= (−da
db
− µ){(1− βpm)− βpmδ)} or dUpmdb = (−dadb − µ){(1 +αpm +αpmδ)} and
dUco
db
= ηe−ηa da
db
{∆W + (1−∆)Y } − e−ηa{∆dW
db
+ (1−∆)dY
db
}. Thus, both the derivatives
of the utility functions of the project manager and the contractor depend on the value of da
db
.
The da
db
can be derived as follows
da
db
=
∆dY
db
+ (1−∆)dW
db
η{∆Y + (1−∆)W} (6.226)
Thus, both of the derivatives dUpm
db
and dUco
db
are depended on dY
db
and dW
db
.
The value of dY
db
= −ηµY (Taking derivative of Y both side from the assumption in the
equation 6.220). As discussed earlier in chapter 5, η > 0 and µ > 0. Hence, dY
db
< 0.
Using the value of dW
db
for a gamma distributed cost from the equation (5.32) and the mean
value of gamma distributed cost,
dUpm
db
=
(−
da
db
− µ){(1 + αpm) + αpmδ)} for advantageous inequity cases
(−da
db
− µ){(1− βpm − βpmδ)} for diadvantageous inequity cases
=

[
−−ηµ∆Y−(1−∆)
Wηφω
1−ηφ(1−b)
η{∆Y+(1−∆)W} − µ
]
{(1 + αpm + αpmδ)} for disadvantageous inequity cases[
−−ηµ∆Y−(1−∆)
Wηφω
1−ηφ(1−b)
η{∆Y+(1−∆)W} − µ
]
{(1− βpm − βpmδ)} for advantageous inequity cases
=

[
(1−∆) Wηµ
1−ηφ(1−b)−η(1−∆)Wµ
η{∆Y+(1−∆)W}
]
{(1 + αpm + αpmδ)} for disadvantageous inequity cases[
(1−∆) Wηµ
1−ηφ(1−b)−η(1−∆)Wµ
η{∆Y+(1−∆)W}
]
{(1− βpm − βpmδ) for advantageous inequity cases
=

[
(1−∆)η2Wµφ(1−b)
η{∆Y+(1−∆)W}{1−η(1−b)φ}
]
{(1 + αpm + αpmδ)} for disadvantageous inequity cases[
(1−∆)η2Wµφ(1−b)
η{∆Y+(1−∆)W}{1−η(1−b)φ}
]
{(1− βpm − βpmδ)} for advantageous inequity cases
It was shown earlier in chapter 5 that {1 − η(1 − b)φ} > 0. W, (1-b), and φ are all positive.
It can be very easily shown from the equation (6.224) (1 − βpm) − βpmδ > 0, otherwise the
utilitarian approach can not be applied to this problem scenario. It is assumed that 0 < ∆ < 1,
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otherwise, the Expected Inequity Aversion Model proposed in literature would reduce the
utility of the contractor with the increase ex post fairness concern for sharing the risk. This
is not very practical. Hence, it becomes evident from the above mentioned derivative that
dUpm
db
> 0. Now
dUco
db
= ηe−ηa
da
db
{∆W + (1−∆)Y } − e−ηa{∆dW
db
+ (1−∆)dY
db
}
= ηe−ηa
[
∆dY
db
+ (1−∆)dW
db
η{∆Y + (1−∆)W}
]
{∆W + (1−∆)Y } − e−ηa{∆dY
db
+ (1−∆)dW
db
}
= 0
Hence, the utility of the contractor is unchanged with respect to any change in b.
Egalitarian Approach
As shown earlier, the egalitarian solution satisfies the condition in (6.217). Hence, the fol-
lowing must be satisfied if the contractor has got fairness consideration along with the risk
averse preference and the project manager has got fairness consideration as well
∆(1− e−ηaY ) + (1−∆)(1− eηaW ) =

(q − a− bµ)(1 + αpm)− αpmδ{a− (1− b)µ}
for advantageous inequity cases
(q − a− bµ)(1− βpm) + βpmδ{1− (1− b)µ}
for disadvantageous inequity cases
The optimal value of a should satisfy the above condition. In order to find the optimal value
of b in b ∈ [0, 1], both the sides of the above equation is differentiated with respect to b
ηe−ηa
da
db
{∆W + (1−∆)Y } − e−ηa
{
∆
dY
db
+ (1−∆)dW
db
}
=

(−da
db
− µ) {1 + αpm + δαpm} for disadvantageous inequity cases(−da
db
− µ) {(1− βpm)− δβpm} for advantageous inequity cases
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or
− e−ηa
{
∆
dY
db
+ (1−∆)dW
db
}
− ηe−ηaµ{∆Y + (1−∆)W}
=

(−da
db
− µ) [{1 + αpm + δαpm}+ ηe−ηa{∆W + (1−∆)Y }]
for disadvantageous inequity cases(−da
db
− µ) [{(1− βpm)− δβpm}+ ηe−ηa{∆W + (1−∆)Y }]
for advantageous inequity cases
Again the nature of the derivatives are depended on the values of dY
db
and dW
db
. The dW
db
value
depends on the nature of probability distribution of the cost function.
Using the value of dW
db
from the equation (5.32) for the gamma distributed cost in the last
equation

(−da
db
− µ) [{(1 + αpm) + δαpm}+ ηe−ηa{∆Y + (1−∆)W}] for disadvantageous inequity cases(−da
db
− µ) [{(1− βpm)− δβpm}+ ηe−ηa{∆Y + (1−∆)W}] for advantageous inequity cases
= −e−ηa
{
∆
dY
db
+ (1−∆)dW
db
}
− ηe−ηaµ{∆Y + (1−∆)W}
= e−ηa
{
∆ηµY + (1−∆) Wηφω
1− ηφ(1− b)
}
− ηµe−ηa{∆Y + (1−∆)W}
= ηe−ηaµ
[{
∆Y +
(1−∆)W
1− ηφ(1− b)
}
− {∆Y + (1−∆)W}
]
[where µ = ωφ]
=
e−ηaη2φ(1− b)µ(1−∆)W
1− ηφ(1− b)
Thus, the sign of −da
db
− µ depends on the sign of (1 − ∆) and {(1 − βpm) − δβpm} or
(1 + αpm + αpmδ). It is easy to show that (1 + αpm + αpmδ) > 0.
If this is positive, then −da
db
− µ is also positive. Thus, it can be shown from the optimal
condition of the Egalitarian approach that the dUpm
db
and dUco
db
both become positive for this
case for 0 ≤ b < 1 and zero at b = 1. Thus, again Upm and Uco are increasing in b ∈ [0, 1)
and maximum at b =1 if (1−∆) > 0. This is summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 28. The solution of a cost plus contract (b=1) dominates the solution of any
cost sharing contracts (0 < b < 1) and the solutions of a fixed price contract ( b = 0) in
a bargaining situation with a fairness concerned project manager and a contractor with the
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following conditions are satisfied.
1. The project manager is inequity averse with utility following the condition mentioned
in the equation (6.221). If the project manager experiencing advantageous inequity,
then βpm < 11+δ .
2. The contractor has got both ex ante and ex post fairness concern. The weight assigned
by the contractor on ex ante fairness ∆ should satisfy 0 < ∆ < 1
6.5 Numerical Analysis
6.5.1 For fixed price contracts
As stated earlier in chapter 4, the following values are assumed
• q0 = 30.
• ψ = 0.05
• µ1 = 8
• m = 1
• k=0.2 per unit resource per month
• Co = 15
Using these assumed values, the first best value for resource consumption rate becomes λ0 =
2.74 and the first best profit becomes pi0 = 6.24 (As shown in chapter 4).
In addition, the values δ, γ, αco, βco, αpm, and βpm are assigned as per the case concerned
(Stated accordingly).
The contractor is fairness concerned only
The optimal value of λ is achieved (i.e. λ = λ0) if the relation shown in the equation (6.17)
is satisfied. Assuming γ = 0.8, the optimal βco can be calculated from the equation (6.17) as
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βco = 0.56. On the contrary, it is assumed αco = 0.8 if the contractor experiences disadvanta-
geous inequity. Using these values in the equation (6.55) along with the distribution specific
parameters mentioned in chapter 4, the optimal value of f is derived as f ∗ = 7.15
Using these assumed and calculated values in the equations (6.4), (6.7), and (6.8), the
fairness concerned contractor’s utility and the profit, and the profit of the project manager can
be determined numerically. The results are presented in figure 6.1 and table F.1 in appendix
F.1.
It can be seen from the table F.1, that the contractor selects a zero value of resource
consumption rate if the offered contract is below the optimal value of 7.15. At the optimal
value of 7.15, the resource consumption rate (λ) attains a value of 2.74. Even after the offered
contract value is higher than 7.15, it did not entice the contractor select a different resource
consumption rate (λ) other than 2.74. This was because λ was found to be independent of f
as defined in equation (6.15).
Now, rearranging the right-hand side of the equation (6.9), the utility function of the
contractor becomes
Uco = (f − kλNµ1)(1− βco) + βcoγ{q0 − q0ψE(Tm)− f − Co}]
As λ values are not changing, the cost to the contractor would not change. The value of
the E(Tm) which is depended on λ, is also constant. Thus, dpico
df
= 1 and dUpm
df
= −1.
Hence, any increase in f would increase the profit of the contractor linearly and the project
manager’s profit would decrease linearly by the same amount. It can also be shown that
dUco
dh
= (1− βco− βcoγ) = 0 for βco = 0.56. This would lead to unchanged Uco which can be
found in the fig. 6.1.
Any offer from the project manager less than 7.15 leads the λ = 0 (Mathematically the
solution is negative, but practically that is not possible). Hence, the project manager’s profit
and the contractor’s utility become a large negative number -M. The figure 6.1 does not reveal
the motivation to select λ = λ0. As shown earlier in equation (6.1), the value of λ depends on
the behavioural parameter βco. Hence, the value of the βco is changed and the corresponding
λ values were noted. The results are presented in figure 6.2. From figure 6.2, it was observed
that any βco < 0.56 yields an optimal value of λ < 2.74 (where λ0 = 2.74 is the first best
solution). Any values βco > 0.56, would induce a selection of a high valued λ. This would
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Figure 6.1: Utility or Profit vs f values: Fairness concerned contractor and profit maximizing
project manager in the short term project
Figure 6.2: λ values vs β values for fixed price contracts
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reduce the contractor’s profit below his expected profit. Thus, the supply chain coordination
for this case depends not only on offered fixed price, but also on the disutility of the contractor
per unit. Thus, achievement of coordination and fair allocation is left with the chance of the
behavioural perception of the contractor about the utility.
Keeping the βco = 0.56, changing the λ values, the movement of pipm, pico, and Uco are
noted. The results are presented in figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3: Utility or Profit vs λ values for Fixed price contracts short term projects: Con-
tractor only fairness concerned
It is observed that the project manager’s profit and the contractor’s utility increased in λ
in the beginning, until it reached the value of 2.74 (The first best solution). The contractor’s
profit was found to be monotonously decreasing in λ.
The contractor experienced an advantageous inequity with λ < 2.74. This was because
his profit was higher than her expected fair profit when λ < 2.74. The utility function of the
contractor becomes
Uco = (f − kλNµ1)(1− βco) + βcoγ{q0 − q0ψE(Tm)− f − Co} (6.227)
Thus, dUco
dλ
= (kNµ1λ
N−1)(1 − βco) − βcoγq0ψ dE(Tm)dλ . Since dE(T
m)
dλ
< 0 and βco < 1,
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dUco
dλ
> 0. On the contrary, when λ > 2.74, the contractor’s profit became less than her
expected fair profit. As a result, the contractor experienced a disadvantageous inequity. His
utility function this time is Uco = (f − kλNµ1)(1 + αco) − αcoγ{q0 − q0ψE(Tm)}. From
this, it can be shown dUco
dλ
= −kNµ1λN−1(1 + αco) + αcoγq0ψ dE(Tm)dλ . As shown earlier that
dE(Tm)
dλ
< 0, the dUco
dλ
is negative. Thus, the contractor’s utility starts decreasing in λ when
λ > 2.74. Since αco > βco, the rate of reduction of Uco (when λ > 2.74) is higher than the
rate of increase of Uco (when λ < 2.74).
Based on the findings in the last paragraph, it can be said that the optimal solution of the
resource consumption rate (λ) is 2.74 when βco = 0.56. This is same as the first best solution
of resource consumption rate as derived earlier (λ0 = 2.74). Hence, the contractor would
select this value of resource consumption rate in the decentralized setting when his disutility
per unit due to earning more than his expected fair profit (βco = 0.56).
The Project Manager and the Contractor both Fairness Concerned
As described earlier, the project manager experiences disadvantageous inequity in the ac-
rimonious supply chain. The contractor’s advantageous disutility factor βco is set equal to
optimal required 0.56. δ is assumed as 1.4 and γ is assumed as 0.8. The optimal value of f
is derived as 7.15 from the equation mentioned earlier. The disutility due to disadvantages
inequity incurred by the project manager (αpm) is assumed as 1.20.
Again similar to the case with a fairness concerned contractor and a profit maximizing
project manager, the values of the profits and the utilities are noted for different values of f
with βco = 0.56 and αpm = 1.20. The results are presented in figure 6.4. Again from figure
6.4, any offer from the project manager below 7.15 would not encourage the contractor to
select a non-zero positive resource consumption rate. This is due to the contractor earning less
than in comparison to her expected fair pay-off profit. Anything above 7.15, the contractor’s
profit will increase, but the utility remained the same. This was due to the fact that dUco
df
=
(1 − βco − βcoγ) = 0 for βco = 0.56. However, the project manager’s utility and profit
both started to decrease with any increase in f value after 7.15. From the equation (6.23), the
project manager’s utility can be derived as
Upm = [q0{1− ψE(Tm)} − f − Co](1 + αpm)− αpmδ(f − kλNµ1) (6.228)
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Figure 6.4: f values vs utilities or profits: Fairness concerned contractor and project manager
in the acrimonious supply chain
The first part of the above equation i.e. [q0{1 − ψE(Tm)} − f − Co](1 + αpm)] represents
the project manager’s profit. From the above equation, it can be seen that the project man-
ager’s utility is depended on f, and λ (As rest of the parameters in the above equation can be
reasonably considered as constant). Similar to the case mentioned with a fairness concerned
contractor and a profit maximizing project manager, the λ value was found to be independent
of f and it was found to be controlled by contractor’s disutility per unit βco. Hence, λ and
E(Tm) are constant. As a result, the project manager’s profit becomes a linearly decreasing
function of f. It was also found that the project manager’s utility is decreasing as a function
(1 + αpm + αpmδ)f . This means the project manager’s utility is decreasing linearly with f
at higher rate that the project manager’s profit. It was also observed from the figure 6.4 that
the project manager’s utility has always been less than her profit. Even at f= 7.15, her utility
which is maximum is less than her profit. However, the contractor’s profit and utility are
same at f = 7.15. Since both the contractor and the project manager are fairness concerned
and utility maximizer, the contractual offer f = 7.15 is the optimal solution in this case. The
solution can ensure a fair profit for the contractor. However, the project manager’s profit can
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Figure 6.5: Utility or Profit vs λ values for Fixed price contracts short term projects: Fairness
Concerned Contractor and Project Manager in Acrimonious Supply Chain
never be ensured as the fair in this case.
For a constant βco value, changing λ value is found to have the similar effect as shown in
the case of the contractor is fairness concerned only. The results are presented in figure 6.5.
The project manager’s and the contractor’s profits were found to be monotonously increasing
and decreasing respectively with the increase in λ. The utility function of the project manager
was found to be rapidly increasing in λ until it reached λ = 2.85. The project manager’s
profit was less than her expected fair profit and thus, she experienced a disadvantageous
inequity with λ < 2.85. From the equation (6.228) above, dUpm
dλ
= −q0ψ(1 + αpm)dE(Tm)dλ +
αpmδkNµ1λ
N−1. Since dE(T
m)
dλ
< 0, the term dUpm
dλ
. is positive. Thus, with any increase
in λ, the project manager’s utility increased as well. After λ > 2.85, the project manager’s
profit started to become more than her expected fair profit (δpico). As a result, she started to
experience an advantageous inequity and her utility becomes Upm = [q0{1−ψE(Tm)}−f−
Co](1−βpm)] +βpmδ(f −kλNµ1). From this, it can be shown that dUpmdλ = −q0ψ dE(T
m)
dλ
(1−
βpm)−βpmδkNλN−1µ1. Using the value of dE(Tm)dλ can be derived from equation (6.11) with
m=1, dUpm
dλ
= q0ψ
(
µ1A
λA+1
)
(1−βpm)−βpmδkNµ1λN−1. Numerically, it can be shown that the
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absolute value of the first part of this equation is less than the second part. As a result, λ i.e.
dUpm
dλ
< 0 with λ > 2.85 i.e. Upm is decreasing in this case with the increase in λ as shown
in the figure (6.5). However, due to existence of the first positive term, the rate of decrease in
Upm is not as great as the rate of increase of Upm when λ < 2.85.
The contractor’s utility was somewhat similar to what has been mentioned in the case with
the contractor fairness concerned only, not the project manager. The contractor experienced
an advantageous inequity with λ < 2.74. This was because his profit was higher than her
expected fair profit when λ < 2.74. The utility function of the contractor follows the equation
(6.227). Thus, dUco
dλ
= (kNµ1λ
N−1)(1 − βco) − βcoγq0ψ dE(Tm)dλ . Since dE(T
m)
dλ
< 0 and
βco < 1, dUcodλ > 0. On the contrary, when λ > 2.74, the contractor’s profit became less than
her expected fair profit and he experienced a disadvantageous inequity. His utility function
this time was Uco = (f − kλNµ1)(1 + αco) − αcoγ{q0 − q0ψE(Tm)}. It can be shown
dUco
dλ
= −kNµ1λN−1(1 + αco) + αcoγq0ψ dE(Tm)dλ < 0 (As shown earlier that dE(T
m)
dλ
< 0).
Thus, the contractor’s utility starts decreasing in λ when λ > 2.74. Since αco > βco, the
rate of reduction of Uco (when λ > 2.74) is higher than the rate of increase of Uco (when
λ < 2.74).
At λ = 2.74, the contractor was ensured to earn a fair profit. Hence, he would be tempted
to select this value of λ as the resource consumption rate. However, from figure (6.5), it is
evident that the project manager is not ensured a fair profit at this value of resource consump-
tion rate (λ). For her, the fair profit can be achieved at a higher resource consumption rate
λ = 2.85. This difference is due to the higher expectation from the project manager of the
fair profit (As δ = 1.4). As a result, the total expectation of the fair profit of the project
manager and the contractor is more than the supply chain could produce. Hence, a fair profit
could not be guaranteed to both of them.
On the contrary to the acrimonious supply chain, somewhat different results were ob-
served in the case of harmonious supply chain. Previously, the coefficient (δ) of project
manager’s expectation of fair profit expectation was 1.4. As a result, the total of the expected
fair profits of the contractor and the project manager was higher than the maximum profit the
supply chain could have produced. Now in the harmonious supply chain, the δ = 1.25 i.e.
the project manager’s expectation of the fair profit has now reduced from a previous value.
Similar to the case in the acrimonious supply chain, βco is set as 0.56, γ is assumed as 0.8,
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and αpm is assumed as 1.20. The value of βpm is less than or equal to 11+δ (As per proposition
15). Thus, it is assumed that βpm = 0.44. With these assumed values, the values of the profits
and utilities are derived for different values of f. These are presented in figure 6.6.
Figure 6.6: f values vs utilities or profits: Fairness concerned contractor and project manager
in the harmonious supply chain with δ = 1.25
The contractor’s utility and the profit values followed the same pattern as it was found in
the case of the acrimonious supply chain. The project manager’s profit and the utility function
also followed the similar trend as it was the case in the acrimonious channel. However, unlike
the acrimonious supply chain (making a comparison between figures 6.4 and 6.6), the project
manager’s profit and the utility function coincided at f = 7.15. After that, the project manager
started to earn less than her expected fair profit in a similar way she did in the case of the
acrimonious supply chain. Thus, in the harmonious supply chain, f = 7.15 not only ensured
the a fair profit for the contractor, but it also ensured a fair profit for the project manager
as well. As explained in the case of the acrimonious supply chain in figure 6.5, the optimal
resource consumption rate (λ) selected by the contractor was 2.74 at f =7.15. Thus, this value
of resource consumption rate (λ = 2.74) also ensured the fair profit for the project manager
unlike the case in the acrimonious supply chain where the required resource consumption
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rate, λ = 2.85 ensured a fair profit for the project manager. Hence, the supply chain can be
coordinated as well as it ensured a fair profit for both the members of the supply chain.
If the project manager’s expectation of the fair profit further decreases δ = 1.1, then, the
value of f at which she earns her fair profit further increases. This is presented in figure 6.7.
f=7.35 was found to be the value when the project manager earned a fair profit this time.
Figure 6.7: f values vs utilities or profits: Fairness concerned contractor and project manager
in the harmonious supply chain with δ = 1.1 and βpm < 11+δ
From the figure 6.7, it was found that the project manager earned a profit more than her
expected fair profit for any values 7.15 < f < 7.35. The project manager experienced an
advantageous inequity in this range. However, it was found that the project manager’s utility
was decreasing in f. This was because his dUpm
df
= −1 + βpm + βpmδ = −0.076 < 0 for
βpm = 0.44 <
1
1+δ
. As a result, the project manager would prefer to offer f=7.15 as it is
maximizing his utility. This would ensure a fair profit for the contractor as per his perception,
but the project would experience some advantageous inequity.
On the contrary, if the project manager has a higher disutility per unit for earning more
than her expected fair profit (βpm = 0.53 > 11+δ ), then
dUpm
df
= 0.113. As a result for
7.15 < f < 7.35, the project manager’s utility would be increasing in f and she would be
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Figure 6.8: f values profits: Fairness concerned contractor and project manager in the harmo-
nious supply chain with δ = 1.1 and βpm > 11+δ
tempted to select f=7.35 where her profit becomes exactly equal to her expected fair profit
and her utility is also maximum. The contractor’s utility is maximized at λ = 2.74. Hence,
he would still select this as his resource consumption rate. The results are presented in figure
6.8.
Summarising, the numerical results, some of the important findings from model section
for the fixed price contracts is re- established. It is evident that the fixed price contract is
capable of offering coordination if the contractor is fairness concerned (with profit maximiz-
ing and fairness concerned project manager) and earning at least equal to his expected fair
profit i.e. he is experiencing advantageous inequity. However, this was found to be heavily
depended on the disutility per unit (βco) of the contractor for earning more than his expected
fair profit. This parameter is a behavioural decision making parameter. Hence, the achieve-
ment of coordination is somewhat left on chance.
6.5.2 For time based contracts
Unlike the fixed price contracts, the time based contract used in this research has two com-
ponents: the fixed component (g) and the variable penalty component per unit time (h) (As
discussed earlier in 4). The assumptions made in the beginning of section 6.5.1 remain the
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same.
For the contractor is fairness concerned only
It is further assumed that αco = 0.8 and βco = 0.40. When the contractor experiences
disadvantageous inequity, then optimal h and g values are derived using the observations
from proposition 21. The first best profit (pi0) and first best resource consumption rate (λ0)
have been derived as 6.24 and 2.74 units respectively (This is same as derived in chapter 4).
The optimal g values were found to be 10.40 (if the contractor experienced a disadvanta-
geous inequity) and 11.54 (if the contractor experienced an advantageous inequity) and the
optimal value of h was found to be 1.5 units. Keeping the g value constant at 10.40, any
change in h changed the profit values of the contractor (pico) and the project manager (pipm),
the utility of the contractor (Uco) and the resource consumption rate of the contractor (λ) val-
ues in the decentralized setting. This is presented in figure 6.9 and in table F.3 in appendix.
Figure 6.9: Profit/Utility values vs. h values: The contractor fairness concern only
The movement of pipm and pico are somewhat similar to what has been observed in chapter
4. This was due to the fact that λ is controlled by h as it can be found earlier h = kNλ
N+A
A
. The
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interesting fact is the movement of Uco due to change in h. The project manager experienced
an advantageous inequity for h¡1.20. It was found to have some marginal increase in Uco for
any value below h =1.20. This can be explained from the utility function of the contractor
which is,
Uco = (g − h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1)(1− βco) + βcoγ{q0 − q0ψE(Tm)− g + h µ1
λA
− Co} (6.229)
as derived from the equation (6.80)
Replacing the value of E(Tm) from the equation (4.17) for m=1, it can be shown Uco =
(g − h µ1
λA
− kNλNµ1)(1 − βco) + βcoγ{q0 − q0ψ µ1λA − g + h µ1λA − Co}. From this, the first
order derivative of Uco is derived as dUcodh = {− µ1λA + (hAµ1λA+1 )(dλdh)− kNµ1λN−1 dλdh}(1− βco) +
βcoγ{( q0ψAµ1λA+1 )(dλdh) + µ1λA − (hAµ1λA+1 )(dλdh)}. Using the values of dλdh and h, numerically it can
be shown that the first part of the equation is negative with, but the second part is positive
with marginally lower absolute value due to lower βco. As a result, dUcodh < 0. Hence, the
contractor’s utility was found to be decreasing marginally. Intuitively, it can be said that any
increase in h led to the increase in resource consumption rate, λ and the cost to the contractor.
However, this led to the project manager’s profit increase due to lesser time to complete
the project. Thus, the difference between contractor’s profit and his expected fair profit is
decreasing. This marginal decrease in disutlity was added to the decrease in the contractor’s
profit decrease. As a result, his utility declined marginally. At h=1.20, the contractor’s profit
was exactly same as his expected fair profit.
However, the value of the utility of the contractor dropped sharply for any increase in h
beyond 1.20. This can be accounted due the fact that the contractor was experiencing the
disadvantageous inequity for any increase in h beyond this point. The contractor’s utility can
be shown as
Uco = (g − h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1)(1 + αco)− αcoγ{q0 − q0ψE(Tm)− g + h µ1
λA
− Co} (6.230)
as derived from the equation (6.80)
From the above equationdUco
dh
= {− µ1
λA
+(hAµ1
λA+1
)(dλ
dh
)−kNµ1λN−1 dλdh}(1+αco)−αcoγ{( q0ψAµ1λA+1 )(dλdh)+
µ1
λA
−(hAµ1
λA+1
)(dλ
dh
)}. Using the values of h and dλ
dh
, it can be shown numerically that the first part
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of the equation is negative. However, this time the second part is also negative. As a result, it
can be shown that dUco
dh
< 0 for h > 1.20. The larger disutility per unit due to earning less than
his fair profit is more than the disutlity for earning more than his fair profit i.e (αco > βco).
This is causing a sharp decline. Intuitively, the contractor’s profit was further decreasing with
any increase in h even after h > 1.20. In addition, the difference between his expected fair
profit and his own profit kept on increasing. As a result, his utility started to decline more
sharply. At h=1.50, the contractor selects a resource consumption rate λ = 2.74 and his
utility becomes zero. It was assumed earlier that the contractor would accept the contract
as long as his utility ensures the utility value he could have got by accepting the contractual
offer outside this contract i.e. the utility (Uout) for the profit piout. For the simplification of
calculation, it is assumed Uout = 0. Thus, the maximum value of h that the contractor would
accept is h = 1.50.
Keeping h constant at h=1.5, the g values were changed to observe the movement of Uco,
pico, and pipm. The results are presented in table F.4 and figure 6.10.
Figure 6.10: Profit/Utility values vs. g values: The contractor fairness concern only
It is interesting to see that the contractor’s profit was found to be increasing in g. On
the contrary, the project manager’s profit was found to be decreasing in g. The optimal
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value for g from the equation (6.111) was derived as 11.54. At g=11.54 and h=1.5, the
solutions are coordinating (as λ = λ0 = 2.74)) the supply chain as well as allocating the
profit fairly (As the contractor profit is equal to her expected fair profit). For any value of
g less than 11.54, the contractor’s profit is less than her expected fair profit. As a result, he
experienced a disadvantageous inequity. Thus, dUco
dg
= (1 + αco + αcoγ) > 0. This was
because g did not have any impact on the selection λ and h was constant. Thus, any increase
in g led to increase in the contractor’s utility linearly. Similarly, it can be easily shown that
the project manager’s utility function is a linearly decreasing function of g. At g=11.54,
the contractor’s profit and her expected fair profit were the same. With g > 11.54, the
contractor started to earn more than her expected fair profit. As a result, the contractor earned
an advantageous inequity for g > 11.54. Thus, it can be shown that dUco
dg
= (1− βco − βcoγ).
If the value of (1 − βco − βcoγ) < 0 i.e. βco > 11+γ , then the contractor’s utility would
be an increasing function of g. As argued in proposition 22, the value of βco is assigned as
βco <
1
1+γ
. Thus, the contractor’s utility would be increasing in g, with g ≥ 11.40. As
(1 + αco + αcoγ) > (1− βco − βcoγ), the increase in contractor’s utility with g > 11.54 was
quite lower than in comparison to g < 11.54.
Based in the observations from the figures 6.9 and 6.10, it can said that for g=11.54 and
h=1.5 ensures the fair profit to the contractor as well as the project manager is capable of
coordinating the supply chain. However, the question is whether the project manager would
offer that higher value of g=11.54? It depends on the Uout values. For ease of calculation,
this research assumed that Uout = 0. Hence, as long as the offered contract ensures the
contractor a non-negative utility, he accepts it. This was achieved at g=10.40. Hence, the
project manager won’t have the incentive to offer g > 10.40 as it would reduce his profit. This
further supports the findings from the corollary 1 that existence of solutions in proposition
22 is unlikely. However, if the contractor expects a positive and higher utility outside this
contract, then he might refuse to accept any g which would fail to ensure this minimum
utility. In those cases, the project manager would require to offer g > 10.40. Hence, with the
increase in Uout, the offer g would also required to be increased and it would continue up to
a maximum of g=11.54. If the contractor’s minimum utility expectation outside this contract
becomes 2.77 (based on the results from the table F.4), then the project manage would have
no option but to offer g=11.54.
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Figure 6.11: Profit/Utility values vs. h values: The contractor and the project manager both
fairness concern
For the both the contractor and the project manager are fairness concerned only
Acrimonious supply chain
It is assumed that αco = 9, αpm = 1.5, γ = 0.8 and δ = 1.4. Since γδ > 1, this is called as
an acrimonious supply chain. αco is assigned more than 11−δγ = 8.33 and αpm is assigned as
αpm <
1
δγ−1 .
When the contractor experiences a disadvantageous inequity, then optimal h and g values
are derived using the observations from proposition 23. The first best profit (pi0) and first best
resource consumption rate have been derived as before 6.24 and 2.74 units respectively. The
optimal values of g were found to be 11.37 (if the contractor experiences disadvantageous
inequity) and 11.54 (if the contractor experiences advantageous inequity) and the optimal h
was found to be 1.5 same as before.
Keeping g constant at the optimal value of 11.37, changing h was found to provide similar
results as shown in the case with the fairness concerned contractor and the profit maximizing
project manager. The results are presented in figure 6.11 The profits of the contractor and the
project manager were found to be decreasing and increasing respectively with any increase
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in h. The contractor’s profit was more than his expected fair profit for h < 1.45. As a
result, he experienced an advantageous inequity. His utility was declining at a slower rate
with the increase in h due to the same reason mentioned in the case with a fairness concerned
contractor and a profit maximizing project manager. At h=1.45, the contractor’s profit (pico)
is exactly the same as his expected fair profit (γpipm). For h > 1.45, the contractor’s utility
declined very sharply. The contractor’s profit is less than his expected fair profit. As a result,
he started to experience disadvantageous inequity. His disutility per unit for earning less
than his expected profit is much higher (αco = 9) in comparison to the case with fairness
concerned contractor and profit maximizing project manager (αco = 0.8). As a result, the
contractor’s utility declined at a much faster rate and at h=1.50, it became zero. The project
manager’s profit has monotonously increased with any increase in h. However, it has been
less than his expected fair profit for h < 1.50. Thus, the project manager’s utility function
could be rearranged from the equation (6.112) as below
Upm = {q0 − q0ψE(Tm)− g + h µ1
λA
− Co}(1 + αpm)− αpmδ(g − h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1)
(6.231)
Replacing the value of E(Tm) from the equation (4.17) for m=1, it can be shown Upm =
{q0 − q0ψ µ1λA − g + h µ1λA − Co}(1 + αpm)− αpmδ(g − h µ1λA − kNλNµ1). From this, the first
order derivative of Upm is derived as
dUpm
dh
= {( q0ψAµ1
λA+1
)(dλ
dh
) + µ1
λA
− (hAµ1
λA+1
)(dλ
dh
)}(1 + αpm)−
αpmδ{− µ1λA + (hAµ1λA+1 )(dλdh)− kNµ1λN−1 dλdh}. Using the values of dλdh and h, numerically it can
be shown that the first part of the equation is positive and the second part becomes positive
due to the existence of the negative sign before αpmδ. As a result,
dUpm
dh
> 0. It is interesting
to note that dpipm
dh
= {( q0ψAµ1
λA+1
)(dλ
dh
) + µ1
λA
− (hAµ1
λA+1
)(dλ
dh
)}. Since the second part of the term
dUpm
dh
becomes positive, it can be easily shown that dUpm
dh
> dpipm
dh
. This is why the project
manager’s utility was found to be more rapidly increasing than in comparison to her profit
with any increase in h with h < 1.50 (Please see figure 6.11).
At h=1.50, the project manager’s earned profit (pipm) is equal to his expected fair profit
(δpico). Hence, the project manager needs to offer a higher h value (h=1.50) to achieve a fair
profit than the contractor can achieve one (with h=1.45). This was because her expectation
of the the fair profit was much higher than the contractor’s expectation (δ > γ).
Keeping h constant at the optimal value of h=1.5, changing the g values offered some
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insightful findings. The results are presented in table F.5 and figure 6.12.
Figure 6.12: Profit/Utility values vs. g values: The contractor and the project manager both
fairness concern a
At g=11.37, the contractor’s utility was zero. Any value g offered above 11.37 increased
the contractor’s utility and profit. The contractor’s profit increase was similar to what had
been found in chapter 4. The contractor’s profit was less than his expected fair profit for
11.37 < g < 11.54. Hence, he experienced a disadvantageous inequity in this case. The
contractor’s utility follows the equation 6.230. From, this it can be said dUco
dg
= (1 + αco +
αcoγ), where as rate of change of his profit is dpicodg = 1. It is assumed earlier that αco =
9. As a result, the contractor’s utility increased at a rapid rate with any increase in g. At
g=11.54, the contractor’s expected profit was same as his fair profit. As a result, g=11.54 and
h =1.5, the solutions are coordinating the supply chain as well as allocating the profits fairly
as per contractor’s perception. For any offer after g > 11.54, the contractor’s profit became
more than his expected fair profit. As a result, he started to experience the advantageous
inequity. His utility can be calculated from the equation (6.229); so dUco
dg
= (1− βco − βcoγ).
As assumed earlier, βco < 11+γ , the value of
dUco
dg
is positive. It can be easily shown that
(1 + α+ αcoγ) (1− βco − βcoγ). Thus, the rate of increase in the contractor’s utility was
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very small for g > 11.54.
On the contrary to the contractor’s profit and utility, the project manager’s utility and
profit both the decreased with any increase in g for g > 11.37. In fact the project manager’s
profit was found to be less than her expected fair profit for g > 11.37. Hence, the project
manager’s utility would follow the equation (6.231). From this, it can be found that dUpm
dg
=
−(1 + α + αpmδ) < 0 where as dpipmdg = −(1 + αpm). This is why the project manager’s
utility is decreasing at a higher rate than her profit with any increase in g. This has been true
for a higher value of αpm < 1+αcoαco(δγ−1)−1 = 125 and αpm >
1
δγ−1 = 8.33. For αpm = 10, the
results are more or less similar. However, the reduction of the project manager’s utility with
increase in g for g > 11.37 and increase in project manager’s utility with any increase in h
h < 1.50, both were quite rapid due to higher disutility (αpm).
Based on the discussion above from the figures 6.11 and 6.12, it can be concluded that
the project manager would be tempted to offer the contractor a contract g=11.37 and h=1.50.
This is because it was assumed earlier that the contractor would accept any offer that ensures
Uout = 0. At g=11.37 and h=1.5, the contractor’s utility is zero, the project manager’s utility
was maximum, and the project manager’s profit was ensured a fair profit. Hence, this supports
the findings from corollary 2.
Now if the contractor’s opportunity to earn a better utility from any other contracts im-
proves, then the project manager needs to offer a better contractual offer (either by reducing
h or increasing g). The project manager would not be interested to change h as it would de-
motivate the contractor to select the first best resource consumption rate (λ = λ0). Thus, she
would be increasing the g to meet the contractor’s minimum requirement of Uout > 0. Once
g=11.54, the contractor is ensured a fair profit. However, any of these g values would fail to
ensure the project manager a fair profit. The offered contract could either ensure a fair profit
for the contractor or the project manager depending on what is the value of Uout.
Harmonious supply chain
If the project manager’s or the contractor’s expectation about the fairness profit decreases
such that δγ < 1, then the supply chain becomes harmonious supply chain with a chance to
allocate fair profit. It is assumed γ = 0.8, but δ = 1.25 unlike the acrimonious supply chain
with δ = 1.4. It is also assumed that αpm = 9. However, the project manager experiences an
advantageous inequity this time. In the first case, the βpm is assumed to be not too high and
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Figure 6.13: Profit/Utility values vs. h values: The contractor and the project manager both
fairness concern in harmonious supply chain
βpm <
1
1+δ
= 0.45. Hence, it is assigned as 0.4.
Keeping g constant at 11.37, and changing h was found to have similar results as found
previously. It was again found to be controlling λ, pipm and pico. The results are presented
in fig 6.13. Similar to the case of acrimonious supply chain, the project manager and the
contractor’s profit increased and decreased respectively with any increase in h. The project
manager’s profit was less than her expected fair profit for h < 1.445 and she experienced a
disadvantageous inequity. Thus, her utility function would again follow the equation (6.231)
mentioned in the case of acrimonious supply chain. From this equation it can be again shown
dUpm
dh
> dpipm
dh
> 0. Due to this, similar results were found as it was found in the case of
acrimonious supply chain.
The values of h=1.445 and g= 11.37 ensured the fair profit to both the contractor and
the project manager. However, this would fail to ensure the first best resource consumption
rate to be selected by the contractor as λ = λ0 at h=1.50 (As shown in chapter 4). For any
h < 1.50, λ < λ0. Hence, g=11.37 and h=1.445 ensured fair profit for both the members, but
it failed to coordinate the supply chain.
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For h > 1.445, the project manager started to experience an advantageous inequity.
Hence, her utility function becomes
Upm = {q0 − q0ψE(Tm)− g + h µ1
λA
− Co}(1− βpm) + βpmδ(g − h µ1
λA
− kλNµ1)
(6.232)
the first order derivative of Upm is,
dUpm
dh
= {( q0ψAµ1
λA+1
)(dλ
dh
) + µ1
λA
− (hAµ1
λA+1
)(dλ
dh
)}(1 − βpm) +
βpmδ{− µ1λA + (hAµ1λA+1 )(dλdh)− kNµ1λN−1 dλdh}. Using the values of dλdh and h, numerically it can
be shown that the first part of the equation is positive and the second part is negative and
overall the right hand side becomes marginally positive As a result, dUpm
dh
> 0. This is why
the project manager’s utility was increasing very marginally for h > 1.445.
The utility of the project manager is higher with g=11.37 and h =1.5 than at g=11.37
and h=1.445. This motivates the utility maximizer project manager to change the offered the
contract. The project manager won’t offer any h more than 1.50 as this would fail to ensure
the contractor a non-negative utility. Now keeping h constant at h=1.5, g values are changed
and the corresponding utility and profit values are observed. The results are presented in table
F.6 and figure 6.14.
For 11.37 < g < 11.54, the contractor’s profit was less than his expected fair profit. As
a result, he experienced a disadvantageous inequity. Hence, his utility could be derived from
the equation (6.230). Hence, dUco
dg
= (1 + αco + αcoγ) which is much higher than dpicodg due to
high αco. As a result, the contractor’s utility increased at a a higher rate than his profit with
increase in g (11.37 < g < 11.54). At g=11.54, the contractor’s profit became equal with
his expected fair profit. From figure 6.14, it can also be shown that at g=11.54, the project
manager’s profit equals with his expected fair profit. Similar to the case in a acrimonious
supply chain, the project manager’s profit and utility both were found to be decreasing in
any increase in g. However, unlike the acrimonious supply chain, the project manager was
experiencing an advantageous inequity for 11.37 < g < 11.54 this time. From the equation
(6.232), it can be found dUpm
dg
= −1 + βpm + βpmδ. Since the value of βpm is assigned a
low value of 0.4 (βpm < 11+δ ), the value of
dUpm
dg
is negative. Hence, her profit would be
decreasing in any increase g when h is fixed at 1.50. Since, the project manager would try
to maximize her utility, she would have limited motivation to increase g to 11.54 as it would
reduce her utility.
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Figure 6.14: Profit/Utility values vs. g values: The contractor and the project manager both
fairness concern harmonious supply chain a
Now if the contractor’s disutility factor for the advantageous inequity is not too small,
then results were found as somewhat different for changing g while keeping h=1.5. It is
assumed that βpm = 0.7 i.e. 11+δ < βpm <
1
1−δγ , then the solution achieved not only can
coordinate the supply chain, but also achieves the fair allocation. The contractor’s profit is
exactly same as the his expected fair profit. This was because dUpm
dg
= −1 +βpm +βpmδ > 0.
As a result, the project manager’s utility was increasing in g with 11.37 < g < 11.54. This
motivated the project manager to increase g from 11.37 to 11.54. At g=11.54 and h=1.5, the
project manger and the contractor both had their profit equal to their expected fair profit. At
the same time the supply chain was coordinated as well. The results are presented in table
F.7 and figure 6.15.
For the project manager is fairness concerned only
In lemma 26 and in proposition 24, it was shown if the project manager experiences disad-
vantageous inequity, then her utility and profit both decreases in g. Hence she would offer
the minimum possible value to ensure the contractor’s participation. The results are the same
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Figure 6.15: Profit/Utility values vs. g values: The contractor and the project manager both
fairness concern harmonious supply chain b
as what have been presented in chapter 4.
Now if the project manager experiences an advantageous inequity, then two situations are
considered. In the first case, the project manager’s disutility is not too large and βpm < 11+δ =
0.44 with δ = 1.25. In the second case, the beta is set higher than this value of 0.44.
Using the models from the proposition 24, the optimal value of h is found to be 1.5. The
optimal g value was found to be 10.56 when the βpm = 0.4. The optimal g value becomes
11.26 with βpm = 0.5.
Keeping g constant at 10.56 and changing h values, the changes in the contractor’s and
the project manager’s profits, and the project manager’s utility function were observed. The
results for the case with βpm = 0.4 are presented in figure 6.16 and in table F.8. The con-
tractor’s profit was found to be decreasing in any increase in h. The project manager’s profit
was found to be less than her expected fair profit for h < 1.195 and she experienced a disad-
vantageous inequity. Her utility function would follow the equation (6.231). At h=1.195, the
project manger profit becomes exactly equal to her expected fair profit. For h > 1.195, the
project manager’s profit was found to be more than her expected fair profit. For, h > 1.195,
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Figure 6.16: Profit/Utility values vs. h values: The project manager fairness concern only a
the project manager’s utility follows the equation (6.232) . From the equations (6.231) and
(6.232), it was shown earlier that dUpm
dh
> 0 for both the cases of disadvantageous inequity and
advantageous inequity when βpm = 0.4. It was also shown earlier that
dUpm
dh
was higher when
the project manager experienced a disadvantageous inequity than when she experienced an
advantageous inequity. That’s why her utility was increasing at a faster rate for h < 1., 195
than for h > 1.195. Since, dUpm
dh
> 0, the utility maximizing project manager would be in-
terested to increase the value from h=1.195 even though h=1.195 ensures a fair profit. Now
the contractor’s profit decreases with increase in h. He would accept the offer as long as it
ensures a minimum profit of piout = 1.80. At h=1.50, his profit becomes 1.80. Thus, the
project manager would increase the profit upto h=1.50.
Keeping h constant at the optimal value of h=1.5, changing g values have offered some
interesting insights. The results are presented in table F.9 and in figure 6.17. The project
manager’s profit was higher than her expected fair profit at g=10.56 and h=1.50 and she
experienced an advantageous inequity. The project manager’s utility and profit both were
found to be decreasing in g for the βpm = 0.4 < 11+δ . This was because
dUpm
dg
= −1 + βpm +
βpmδ = −0.1 < 0 (As it can be derived from the equation 6.232). At g=11.54, the project
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Figure 6.17: Profit/Utility values vs. g values: The project manager fairness concern only for
small advantageous disutility
manger’s profit was found to be same as her expected fair profit. After that, her profit started
to decline sharply. This was because she started to experience a disadvantageous inequity for
g > 11.54 and dUpm
dg
= −1−αpm−αpmδ = −2.8 < 0. Summarising the above observations,
the project manager’s utility would be decreasing with any increase in g. Thus, she wouldn’t
be interested to offer g > 10.56. As a result, the optimal solution becomes g=10.56 and h=1.5
when βpm < 11+δ . This would ensure a coordinated supply chain, but fails to ensure any fair
profit.
On the contrary, with h = 1.50, the project manager’s utility function was increasing with
any increase in g if βpm = 0.7 > 11+δ . This was because
dUpm
dg
= −1 + βpm + βpmδ =
0.575 > 0. This increase in her utility continued until g=11.54. At g=11.54, the project
manager’s profit was found to be exactly same as his expected fair profit i.e. pipm = pi01+δ . For
g > 11.54 where, the project manager’s utility started to decline. This was because the project
manager’s profit had started to decrease below her expected fair profit δpico and her rate of
change of utility was quite faster (dUpm
dg
= −2.8 < 0). The results are presented in figure
6.18 and table F.10. Summarising these observations, it can be said that the project manager
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now has got the incentive to increase g from 10.56 to 11.54. The contract with g=11.54 and
h=1.50 can ensure the project manger a fair profit and her utility is also maximum.
Figure 6.18: Profit/Utility values vs. g values: The project manager fairness concern only for
considerable advantageous disutility
6.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter addressed the third objective of this research i.e. to investigate the issues of
fair allocation of risk and benefits of supply chain coordination. The definition of fairness
has been found to be multifaceted. However, considering the context of this research, the
definition by Fehr & Schmidt (1999) has been selected. This is based on the premise of
inequity aversion which has been used in the literature of Cui et al. (2007), and Caliskan-
Demirag et al. (2010). This chapter is an extension to their work in the project supply chain
setting.
The benefits of the presence of fairness concern, is the ability of the fixed price contract
to achieve coordination (Cui et al. 2007). However, this has not been completely true for
the supply chain under consideration in this research. The fixed price contract could have
coordinated the supply chain only when the contractor was fairness concerned (either with a
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profit maximizing project manager or with a fairness concerned project manager). Moreover,
he required to be earning more than his expected fair profit i.e. the coordination was possible
only with the advantageous inequity case. If the contractor was offered less than his expecta-
tion of the fair profit, then the fixed price contract failed to encourage the contractor to select
any non-zero positive resource consumption rate. More interestingly, the selection of global
optimal resource consumption rate in the decentralized setting was also found to be depended
on the disutility factor of the contractor per unit (βco = 11+γ ). The numerical analysis on this
further highlighted some interesting facts about it. It was found that anything below or above
of this condition for βco failed to achieve the coordination for the resource consumption rate
(λ0).
In the case with both of the members of the supply chain (the project manager and the
contractor) become fairness concerned, the coordination and achievement of fair allocation
of profit was found to be depended on the interaction of the parameters of their expectations
about the fair profit and on the disutility values per unit. If the project manager was the
only fairness concerned member of the supply chain, then the fixed price contract failed to
coordinate the supply chain.
In short, it can be said that the fixed price contract performed better in the case of the
supply chain members having some fairness concern than in the supply chain with only profit
maximizing members. However, it is still limited by the nature of the individual decision
making or behavioural variables. These limitations were somewhat found to be overcome by
the time based contracts P(T,C)= g-hT.
The time based contract was found to offer more cases where the supply chain could have
been coordinated than the fixed price offered, if either or both the members of the supply
chain were fairness concerned.
When the contractor was the fairness concerned member, then the project manager achieved
coordination with a contract parameter slightly higher than what she needed to offer for the
profit maximizing contractor (comparing the g value, it was required to be 10.56 in the case
of profit maximizing contractor, whereas in the case of fairness concern contractor, it became
11.37). However, the project manager was not found to offer any value of g which assures
the contractor to earn a fair profit.
When the project manager became fairness concerned, then the nature of her offer was
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depended on the interaction of her expected fair profit proportion (δ) and the contractor’s
expected fair profit proportion (γ). It is defined in literature of Cui et al. (2007), the supply
chain fails to allocate everyone their expected fair proportion when δγ > 1. The project
manager was found to experience a disadvantageous inequity. Again, the results were found
to be somewhat similar to what has been observed in the case with contractor being the only
fair member. The project manager could coordinate the supply chain with a certain optimal
solution, but that could not ensure the fair profit for the contractor.
On the contrary, when δγ < 1, the supply chain was capable of allocating fair share of
the profit to everyone. The project manager experienced advantageous inequity. However,
the contractor receiving the fair profit or not was found to be depended on the disutility of the
project manager. If the disutility factor βpm was not too high (βpm < 11+δ ), then the results
were found to be more or less similar to what was just explained in the last few cases. Only
when the project manager had an considerably higher βco, the utility increased in the contract
parameters and she offered a contract that not only ensured the coordination, but also assigned
a fair profit for the contractor. Thus, summarising the findings of the time based contracts,
it can be said that it performed better than the fixed price contracts. However, the existence
of the optimal solutions were still found to be depended on parameters which are more of
behavioural in nature.
Finally this chapter also used the bargaining approaches generally used in literature for
allocating the risks and benefits in a fair way. This research also used the expected inequality
aversion model proposed by Fudenberg & Levine (2012). This has allowed this research to
incorporate risk aversion and fairness in the same bargaining model following the improvisa-
tion on the original model by Lo´pez-Vargas (2014). This chapter used the utilitarian approach
and the egalitarian approach for this. The results are similar to what has been found in chap-
ter 5. Again, the contractor was found to be indifferent between the fixed price and any cost
based contract for the utilitarian approach. However, the project manager was found to be
better off with cost plus contract.
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Chapter 7
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
This research has addressed the supply chains coordination issues in a project setting. This
chapter summarizes the findings, discusses the implications (both academic and practical) of
the findings, and delineates the future research directions.
7.1 Overview and Implication of the findings
The introduction chapter (chapter 1) introduced the readers to the importance of supply chain
and highlighted how supply chains can suffer from sub-optimal performance (especially in
terms of cost and profit). It also highlighted how organizations in supply chains are exposed
to external risks such as natural and man-made disasters to a greater degree in the absence
of supply chain coordination. One of the main motivations was the failure to coordinate the
supply chains despite its importance. This is mainly due to the presence of several barriers to
the supply chain coordination as argued in several works of literature highlighted in chapter 1.
This was further elaborated in chapter 2 with the detail literature review. A literature search
framework was created in fig. 2.1. This framework helped this research to classify how the
existing studies on supply chain coordination have addressed the barriers of supply chain
coordination. The literature review suggested certain key research gaps which have been less
addressed in the literature, but that are of considerable importance in practice. These research
gaps helped to formulate the research question addressed in fig. 2.7. This research question
is answered with three objectives. These three objectives have been addressed the chapters 4,
5, and 6.
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7.1.1 Implications for Objective 1
Chapter 4 of this research presented the contractual solution to the problems of non-coordination
in a project supply chain in the take it or leave it type of situation. Decision making problems
in these type of situations are often solved to as an ultimatum games (Osborne 2004) . This
research solved this with the help of Stackelberg leader-follower ultimatum games with the
project manager as the leader and the contractor as the follower. The proposed models were
extensions of the models proposed by Bayiz & Corbett (2005) and Kwon et al. (2010). One
of the main contributions was the enhancement of the models to cover distributions more
commonly used for project completion times (Uniform, Gamma, Beta, and Weibull). Bayiz
& Corbett (2005) used normal distributed time, whereas Kwon et al. (2010) used an exponen-
tial distributed time. Chapter 4 highlighted how project completion time can take different
forms of probability distributions (Golenko-Ginzburg 1988, Abdelkader 2004, Roy & Roy
2013, Lee, Arditi & Son 2013). Another notable highlight was the derivation of the models
for short-term projects with polynomial reduction of project reward with respect to time. This
was an extension to the linear reduction of the model by Bayiz & Corbett (2005).
For the long term projects, the basic models of (Kwon et al. 2010) was extended. Apart
from the use of different distributions, the polynomial reduction of project reward was also
considered alongside the exponential discounting. The discounting of any cash flow becomes
significant in the longer run of the projects. The prevailing discount rate is around 4 % in the
UK (Cabinet Office 2015). Thus, in the short run, the impact of this on the cash flow could be
so small that it is effectively negligible. Hence, the discounting is considered for the long term
projects only. As explained in chapter 4, some of the projects have the product outputs whose
operational life is not much affected by any delay in the project completion. Any revenue
loss can be recovered over the course of its operational life such as Power plant Projects.
Thus, there is no need for assigning any penalty in either linear or polynomial form to take
into account of the revenue loss. There would be still the loss value of the project reward due
to the time value of money. Thus, this was addressed with the exponential discounting. On
the contrary, some of the projects have the product outputs whose operational life can not be
recovered in the event of a delay such as software projects. Due to stiff market competition
and the short nature of the operational life, any delay in the project completion means there
would be considerable revenue loss which could not be recovered. These cases have both the
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element of project value reductions: revenue loss due to delay in project and loss of project
value due to the time value of money. These type of cases were not explored in the literature
of Kwon et al. (2010). Hence, this research contributes to this. One of the notable features of
this case is the dependency on the ratio of ψ
α
, where ψ is the reduction factor of the project
value per unit time to take into account any revenue loss and α is the prevailing discounting
factor for the cash flows. If ψ ≤ α, the impact of revenue loss would become very small and
it can be neglected.
The fixed price contracts failed to coordinate (in any of the cases explored in this research)
the supply chain under consideration in Stackelberg game settings. This finding supports the
findings of Kwon et al. (2010). However, the fixed price contracts are still very popular in
practice due to their simplicity in application. These may work reasonably well when the
risk associated with the project is very small. Although not very common, linear time-based
contracts have been used in practice such as after the Northridge earthquake in 1994, the City
of Los Angeles offered a time-based contract to Clint Meyers (Kwon et al. 2010). The linear
time-based contract in the form P(T,C)=g-hT was found to coordinate the supply chain under
consideration in the majority of the cases.
Changing the shape parameters of some distributions (gamma and beta) was found to shift
the expected completion time towards the left or right tail. A decrease in the first best profit
was observed with the movement of the expected value towards the right. Thus, a proximity
of the expected completion time and worst case time is detrimental for the first best profit.
Project management literature has heavily emphasized on the use of beta distribution for
completion time (Roy & Roy 2013). This is due to its nature as a family of distributions.
From this distribution, the other form of distributions such as triangular and uniform can be
developed as special cases. Another notable characteristic of the proposed models is the use
of parameters specific to the distribution type. The biggest question is how to estimate the
values of these distribution specific parameters? For uniform distribution, usually, two pa-
rameters are required: a most optimistic estimation and the other one worst case scenario.
This research assumed the most optimistic value to be zero for the simplification of calcu-
lation. The other parameter θ determines the scale or stretch of the distribution. At the
time of contracting, the project manager and the contractor both make some estimates about
these two completion times. In literature and practice, project evaluation review techniques
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(PERT) have been a frequently used tool to have an estimate for these two completion times.
The same is the case for the beta distribution as well. Summarizing the project management
literature, it can be said that the beta distribution is combined with PERT techniques to de-
rive the most optimistic, most likely and worst-case times (Davis 2008). The author derived
conditions to show that the sum of the parameters of the beta distribution (u and v) should
satisfy the condition 4 ≤ (u + v) ≤ 8 . Using this condition, the proposed model with the
beta distribution can be used in practice. In order to use the proposed models of this research
in practice, the user needs to assign the values of the model parameters. The value of α, q(T )
and piout can be estimated from usual practice.
Despite this wide range of applicability of the beta distribution as a form of project com-
pletion time, it has got certain limitations for the proposed model in this research. The present
research failed to derive a closed form solution for coordination models with beta and Weibull
distributed time if the cash flows are discounted. This was due to the non-existence of a closed
form moment generating function for the beta and Weibull distributions.
Some interesting results were observed from the numerical analysis section of chapter
4. The applicability of the models is dependent on the power of the polynomial reduction
(m) of the project value with respect to time. This was observed in the case of short-term
projects without any discounting of the cash flow. The first best solution was found to be
negative in most of the cases for higher values of m. It was also found that the proposed
models can achieve 100 % efficient solution mathematically. However, from an applicability
point of view, these model would be difficult to be implemented in those cases. One probable
explanation for this type of limitations is the higher requirement of the resource consumption
in order avoid rapid reduction of the project value with respect to time.
7.1.2 Implications for Objective 2
This objective investigated how to reach the optimal solution with negotiation between the
project manager and the contractor. This optimal solution should be a win-win for both mem-
bers. This is an extension of the game setting considered in the objective 1. In objective 1, the
members of the supply chain (the project manager and the contractor) were not allowed to go
for a negotiation if the contractual agreement was not successful at the first attempt. This was
the reason why these types of games were called ultimatum games. These types of ultimatum
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games are considered as a special case of the bargaining games. Objective 2 addressed the
issues of achieving win-win solutions using bargaining games. Hence, objective 1 can be
considered as a special case of objective 2 in some way. There is a distinguishable difference
between these two objectives. This research used a sequential mover leader-follower game
i.e. Stackelberg Games for addressing the coordination problem in objective 1. However, this
research used simultaneous mover bargaining games for objective 2.
This research extended the models proposed by Lippman et al. (2013). the authors used
a normal distributed cost and Nash Bargaining approach to find out the win-win solution.
However, a normally distributed cost is very unlikely in practice (Back et al. 2000). One of
the main contributions of this research is the use of various skewed distributions (gamma,
exponential, beta, and Weibull) for project completion cost. In addition, this research also
investigated the bargaining solutions using the approach proposed by Kalai Smorodinsky
bargaining and Utilitarian approach alongside the Nash bargaining.
The models were prepared for two different situations: with both the members are risk
neutral, and with one risk neutral and one risk averse member. In the second situation, the
contractor was considered risk averse and the project manager was considered risk neutral.
It is more likely that the contractor would be a part of a small scale organization (in terms
of financial size) in comparison to the project manager’s organization. As discussed in the
chapter 2, the existence of supply chain coordination models which consider the differential
risk preference of the members of the supply chain is limited. The proposed models in chapter
5 were the attempts to bridge this research gap.
Optimal results indicated an equal share of the total benefit between the project manager
and the contractor if both of them are risk neutral. This has been found as true for fixed price,
any cost-based and any time-based contracts. Due to the simplicity of application, fixed price
contracts are likely to be the preferred form of contract in this case.
One of the notable features of the risk averse member is the nature of utility function con-
sidered. A linear form of the utility function is a very common form for risk neutral members,
whereas a concave form is used to represent the risk averse member’s utility. This is to make
sure the risk averse member has a diminishing marginal return (Haugen 2001, Levy & Levy
2002, Davies & Satchell 2007). Various forms of utility functions for risk-averse members
have been considered in the literature such as hyperbolic functional form, an exponential
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form,and a quadratic form. However, a majority of the models in the literature used exponen-
tial form (Corner & Corner 1995). This may be due to the fact of having a constant absolute
risk aversion ratio. This avoids the need for an increase in any risk premium with the increase
in the wealth value. Thus, this research also used this form for the utility function to repre-
sent the risk averse contractor’s utility. Results were found to be different when the contractor
became risk averse than in comparison to results for a risk neutral contractor. The solutions
from fixed price contracts were found to dominate the solutions from a time-based contracts.
However, the solutions of the cost plus contract were found to dominate the solutions of any
other contract. The project manager’s profit from the cost plus contracts dominated the profits
derived from the other contracts. However, the contractor’s profit was better for the case of
fixed price contracts than the cost plus or any cost-sharing contracts. It was the effect of risk
aversion which changed the preference of the contractor in situation. Due to the uncertainty
of the completion cost, the contractor has got the least amount of risk bearing from the cost
plus contract. The contractor’s utility function changed accordingly to reflect the risk aver-
sion. The win-win solution for the project manager is in terms of the expected profit and for
the contractor, it is in terms of the risk exposure.
There is a minor exception to the results explained in the last paragraph. For the case
of utilitarian bargaining, the contractor’s utility was found to be independent of the type of
contract. Since contractor’s risk exposure is same for the cost based and fixed price contract,
he may prefer a fixed price contract. However, the project manager was found to be better off
with the cost plus contract.
Bargaining and negotiation are in existence in real life project setting. Bajari et al. (2009)
found half of the private sector building contracts in north Carolina were negotiated. Post
economic downturn, the building contracts in Dubai were also negotiated (Bertenshaw 2012).
There could be much more examples of contract negotiation in a project setting.
7.1.3 Implications for Objective 3
This objective investigated fairness in the allocation of risk and benefits of the supply chain
coordination as one of the behavioural issues. Chapter 6 presented the detailed analysis
of this. Several laboratory experiments have confirmed undesirable results such as early
termination of contracts when there is a lack of fairness in allocation (Katok & Pavlov 2013).
295
This has been true in practice as well such as the contractual termination between Walmart
Canada and Lego group (Georgiades 2008), and the contractual termination between Chinese
home appliance retailer Gome and air conditioner manufacturer Gree (Liu et al. 2012). The
literature review also revealed a limited attention on the issues of fair allocation of risk and
benefits in supply chain literature despite its importance. The objective 3 was an attempt to
bridge this gap.
This research extends the approach proposed by Cui et al. (2007). The authors used the
inequity aversion model proposed by Fehr & Schmidt (1999) for a product supply chain along
with the supply contract. This research extended this to the project setting.
The first part of chapter 6 presented the analysis for the case of the take it or leave it
situations. Similar to chapter 4, the coordination problem in the take it or leave it the situation
was addressed using Stackelberg games with the help of backward induction. Again the
project manager was considered as the Stackelberg leader moving first and the contractor was
considered as the Stackelberg follower moving second. Similar to the findings of Cui et al.
(2007) and Caliskan-Demirag et al. (2010), the fair allocation of profit in the coordinated
supply chain depends on the disutility factors of the members of the supply chain (the project
manager and the contractor in this case).
Similar to the case of product supply chains (Cui et al. 2007), the project supply chain
can be coordinated with fixed price contracts in the presence of fairness consideration of the
members of the supply chain. However, this research found several limitations to this. The
fixed price contract failed to coordinate if the contractor earned a profit less than his expected
fair profit i.e in the case of the contractor experiencing disadvantageous inequity. Even when
the contractor is experiencing advantageous inequity i.e. his profit is more than his perception
of fair profit, it depends on the disutility factor he assigns. If it is too small, then neither the
coordination nor the fair allocation is possible. Moreover, the fixed price contracts failed to
coordinate the supply chains if only the project manager is fairness concerned, but not the
contractor.
In order to overcome these above shortcomings of the models using fixed price contracts,
this research also investigated if the presence of fairness concerns can change the results
for the models with time-based contracts. Unlike, the case with the fixed price contracts,
the time-based contracts are able to coordinate the supply chain when the contractor earns a
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profit less than his expected fair profit (i.e. when he experiences disadvantageous inequity).
This was true when only the contractor was fairness concerned or both of them were fairness
concerned. However, the time-based contract failed to ensure the allocation of profit which
is fair according to the contractor except in one case. The exception was the case when the
contractor experienced disadvantageous inequity, and the project manager experienced an
advantageous inequity which is not too small (βPm ≤ 11+δ ).
Unlike the case with fixed price contracts, the time-based contracts were also found to be
capable of coordinating the supply chain when the contractor was not fairness concerned, but
the project manager was. If the project manager experiences disadvantageous inequity, then
the offered contract was found to ensure the minimum profit expectation of the contractor
(piout) and thereby coordinate the supply chain. However, it was not sure if the profit earned
by the contractor was meeting the fairness requirement or not. The same was the case with the
project manager experiencing advantageous inequity and her disutility per unit due to inequity
was not too large (βco < 11+δ ). The things were different when the project manager’s disutility
per unit is not too low (βpm ≥ 11+δ ) and the project manager experiencing advantageous
inequity. If the minimum profit that the contractor can earn outside, is more than the project
manager’s fair profit expectation about the contractor, then the offered contract was found to
ensure a profit of piout to the contractor. This is more than the project manager’s expectation
of the fair profit of the contractor. Hence, the project manager would not be able to earn the
fair share in this case. On the contrary, if the minimum profit the contractor can earn outside
is less than the project manager’s fair profit expectation about the contractor, then the higher
disutility parameter of the project manager enticed her to offer a contract which ensures a fair
allocation for both the project manager and the contractor.
The models were also derived for the case of bargaining games. Authors including Bin-
more (2014) highlighted that egalitarian approach of bargaining tends to offer a solution
which is often accepted as the fair solution by the members of the supply chain. This re-
search found that the fair solutions using this egalitarian and other bargaining approach tend
to approach an equal share of the overall risk and benefits. This was found to be true with
both the project manager and the contractor are risk neutral. It was also found that alloca-
tions changed if the contractor had some impacts from another behavioural decision-making
variable namely the risk perception. This research found very limited research in this area
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where the authors considered both the fairness concern and the risk preference of the mem-
ber in the supply chain transactions. Thus, this research used the expected inequity aversion
model proposed by Fudenberg & Levine (2012) and improvised by Lo´pez-Vargas (2014).
This allowed the present research to combine the definition of fairness proposed by Fehr &
Schmidt (1999) along with the risk aversion of the contractor. The utilitarian approach and
the egalitarian approach have been used to see how these models work. The solutions were
found to be dependent on the values of the disutility parameters of the project manager αpm
or βpm and the contractor’s relative weightage between the ex-ante fairness perception and
ex-post risk sharing mechanisms.
7.2 Limitations and Future research avenues
The main aim of this research has been achieved with certain restrictive assumptions. Some
of these assumptions may offer certain limitations to the scope of this research.
One of the main limitations of the models proposed in this research is the structure of the
supply chain. This research only considered a dyadic supply chain with a project manager
and a contractor. In addition, the information symmetry of certain variables and parameters
can pose certain limitations to the applicability of the findings of the research. This informa-
tion symmetry means that the decision variables and parameter values are known to all the
participating members of the supply chain. This includes the assumptions about time, cost,
risk preference of the participating supply chain members, and the parameters pertinent to
the fairness perception of the member of the supply chain (γ, δ, αco, αpm, βco, and βpm).
The proposed models failed to offer any coordinating solution in certain cases such as
fixed contract failed to coordinate the profit maximizing supply chain. Other instances in-
clude the unavailability of closed form solutions with beta and Weibull distributed project
completion times. However, the fixed price contracts are still very popular in practice due to
the simplicity of applications.
The other notable limitations include simplification of any context-specific decision-making
characteristics. Few of the issues have been assumed in this research as given or the decision
maker makes a rational decision. It is assumed that the members of the supply chain would
use the bargaining power rationally and chances of a dictator game are very less likely. This
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was based on the premise of thought that all the participants in any economic transaction have
got some degree of fairness. However, there is a contradictory school of thought in practice
specially in construction projects. It is often believed based on the common practice that less
powerful members (in terms of bargaining power) often receive the least possible pay-off in
construction projects. The two situations of having to sign contracts with other project man-
agers or not having any other options outside the one on hand may have different motivations
for the contractors. This research has assumed the contractor would participate in the game
if the current contractual offer is better than the rest. It would be interesting explore how a
contractor makes the decision on whether to participate or not, and to prioritize his fairness
concern along with profit maximizing concerns or not considering these.
Use of various fairness reference point (definition of fairness) for different context may
generate different results. Du et al. (2014) used Nash bargaining solution as the fairness
reference point to propose a fair allocation mechanism for the supply chain members in a
newsvendor setting. The insightful findings was the inability of the wholesale price (an equiv-
alent of fixed price) contracts to coordinate the supply chain. Thus, it is intriguing to test the
proposed models using various other reference point. Moreover, in the bargaining situation,
this research assumed the idea proposed by Binmore (2014) that egalitarian approach tends
to be the fair solution. However, in the presence of initial endowment, these may not be the
feasible solutions. Any loss of efficiency due to the fairness concern could be the other area
which requires further attention.
Another limitation stems from the applicability point of view. The proposed models are
generalizable due to a greater extent. However, it would be interesting to explore if any
additional challenges arise in its application phase and if these can be overcome using more
rigorous empirical foundations.
These limitations are not the end of the world. Rather, these have highlighted the oppor-
tunities for future research to generate new ideas and theories. The future research avenues
may include the following but not limited to
• Derivation of models with information asymmetry
• models with variable resource consumption rate (λ)
• Incorporation of the learning effect of the contractor on the resource consumption rate
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(λ)
• Incorporation of the bargaining power of the members of the supply chain and their
impact.
• Derivation of the models with more complex structures with more than two members
• Application of heuristics and meta heuristics techniques to propose solutions where
normal mathematical techniques failed offer any closed form solution
• Use of other fairness reference points
• Use of Shapley values, α fairness and other methods to analyse the trade-off between
the fairness and the efficiency
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Appendix A
Dissemination arising from this thesis
Conferences Attended/Papers Presented
• Presented a paper on: Challenges and Mechanisms for Decentralized Supply Chain
Coordination at White Rose Doctoral Conferences, University of York, 2014.
• Presented a paper on: Coordination of project supply chains at WRSSDTC Business
and Management Pathway Sustainability Conference, University of Sheffield, 2015.
• Presented paper on: ”Modelling Supply Chain Coordination using Project Based
Contracts” at European Operations Management Association Conference, 2015 (EU-
ROMA, 2015) at University of Neuchatel, Switzerland.
• Presented paper on ”Fairness in Profit Allocation in a Coordinated Supply Chain”
at 27th European Conference on Operational Research, 2015 (EURO, 2015) at Univer-
sity of Strathclyde, United Kingdom.
• Presented paper on: ”Fairness and Project Supply Chain Coordination” at 58th An-
nual OR Society Conference, 2016 at the University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom
Submitted Items for Publication
Some of the findings from chapter 4 of this thesis has been submitted to Annals of Opera-
tions Research for Publication (Under review).
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Appendix B
List of Acronyms
B.1 For chapter 4
• T = Effective Project Completion Time
• λ= Resource Consumption Rate
• λ0= First best Resource Consumption Rate
• pi0 = First best Profit
• pipm = Project manager’s profit
• pico = Contractor’s profit
• piout = Contractor’s minimum profit outside this contract
• k = Resource price per unit of resource per unit time
• C = Cost
• Co = Cost that is independent of λ
• q0 = The project value at the beginning of the project
• ψ = The decreasing parameter of project value per unit time (For the polynomial dis-
counting case)
• q(T ) = Effective project value upon completion
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• g and h : Contract parameters of the time based contract
• f: fixed price contract parameter
• θ = Scale parameter
• (u and v): Shape parameters of beta distributed time ”T”
• w: Shape parameter of gamma distributed T
• s: Shape parameter of Weibull distributed T
• fλ(T ) = Probability Density Function for T
• µ1 = Mean completion time when one unit of resource is deployed
• α = Exponential discounting factor
B.2 For chapter 5
• All the items are applicable what has been assumed for chapter 4 as applicable
• η = Degree of risk aversion with η > 0
• Upm =The project manager;s utility
• Uco= The contractor’s utility
• a and b: The fixed and variable parameters of the cost based contract with b ∈ [0, 1]
• µ = Expected value of random variable cost X
• µT = Expected value of completion time T
• φ = Scale parameter of a cost distribution
• ω = Shape parameter of a gamma distributed cost
• c and d = The shape parameters of the beta distributed cost
• S= Shape parameter of the Weibull distributed cost
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• W= The contractor’s expected risk exposure due to cost uncertainty
• WT= The contractor’s expected risk exposure due to time uncertainty
• N(a,b) or N(g,h) = Nash product for the cost based contract or time based contract cases
• K(Z,d) = Kalai Smorodinsky maximum individually rational pay-off
• U(Z,d)= Utilitarian sum
• Z= feasible set of the solutions for the bargaining approach
• d = disagreement point pay-off
B.3 For chapter 6
• All the items are applicable what has been assumed for chapter 4 as applicable
• δ = The project manager’s expectation of fair profit with respect to the contractor’s
profit
• γ = The contractor’s expectation about the fair profit with respect to the project man-
ager’s profit
• αco = The contractor’s disutility per unit due to earning less than his expected fair profit
• βco = The contractor’s disutility per unit due to earning more than his expected fair
profit
• αpm = The project manager’s disutility per unit due to earning less than her expected
fair profit
• βpm = The project manager’s disutility per unit due to earning more than her expected
fair profit
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Appendix C
Glossary of Terms
• Ultimatum Games: Mostly suited for take it or leave it type of offering scenario. If
the offer is rejected by the respondent, then the game terminates.
• Stackelberg game principles: A type of leader follower game often used in ultima-
tum. The leader enters the game with an offer. The follower then decides whether to
accept or reject. If accepted, the game continues, otherwise it terminates in the ultima-
tum game scenario. Thus, its a sequential mover game (Cachon and Netessine, 2004,
Osborne, 2004)
• Backward Induction Methods: A type of techniques often used in leader follower
games. The leader analyses all the possible ex post decisions and associated pay offs
from an ex ante point of view. (S)He anticipates the best ex post alternative the follower
is likely to implement in response to his /her offer and accordingly finds his or her best
response. This best response is the offer that the leader is likely to make.
• Pareto Optimal Results: An allocation set where it is impossible for any individual
player to be better off without making others worse off (Cachon and Netessine, 2004;
Osborne, 2004)
• First best solution: For the centralized supply chain, the profit function has been
differentiated with respect to the resource consumption rate and set equal to zero. From
this the resource consumption rate can be solved which is called the first best solution.
Using this first solution in the profit equation gives the first best profit.
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• Supply Chain Coordination Working Definitions:
– If the sum of individual profits in the decentralized setting is same as the first best
profit and every individual earns at least his or her minimum possible earning
outside this offer (based on Cachon, 2003). In other words, the solution would
reach the Pareto optimal solution.
– A win-win approach: This ensures that the players/members of the supply chain
both are better off by participating in the game (contractual agreement) than not
participating
– Chapter 4 used the definition of Cachon (2003). In chapter 5 and 6, this research
used certain other behavioural variables (Risk preference in chapter 5 and fair-
ness in chapter 6). A win-win approach best explains the optimal equilibrium
solutions.
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Appendix D
Results For Chapter 4
Table D.1: Results for Coordinating conditions for Models without Cash Discounting
[with λ0 = 2.74 and pi0 = 6.24]
λ g h pico pipm pitotal Efficiency =
(
pi0−pitotal)
pi0
)
0.00 10.56 0 - - - -
1.73 10.56 0.6 5.02 0.28 5.30 84.99
1.87 10.56 0.7 4.58 1.02 5.59 89.67
2.00 10.56 0.8 4.16 1.64 5.80 93.00
2.12 10.56 0.9 3.78 2.17 5.95 95.39
2.24 10.56 1 3.41 2.65 6.06 97.10
2.35 10.56 1.1 3.06 3.07 6.13 98.31
2.45 10.56 1.2 2.73 3.46 6.18 99.12
2.55 10.56 1.3 2.41 3.81 6.21 99.64
2.65 10.56 1.4 2.10 4.13 6.23 99.92
2.74 10.56 1.5 1.80 4.44 6.24 100.00
2.83 10.56 1.6 1.51 4.72 6.23 99.93
2.92 10.56 1.7 1.23 4.99 6.22 99.72
3.00 10.56 1.8 0.96 5.24 6.20 99.42
3.08 10.56 1.9 0.70 5.47 6.18 99.02
3.16 10.56 2 0.44 5.70 6.15 98.54
3.24 10.56 2.1 0.19 5.92 6.11 98.01
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Table D.2: The values of λ0, pi0, g and h for different values of m
Distribution m λ0 pi0 g h
Uniform
1 2.74 6.24 10.56 1.50
2 5.43 1.97 19.17 5.89
3 7.33 -0.63 25.24 10.73
Gamma
1 2.74 6.24 10.56 1.50
2 5.65 1.45 19.87 6.38
3 8.11 -2.30 27.74 13.15
Beta
1 2.74 6.24 10.56 1.5
2 5.31 2.25 18.80 5.65
3 7.12 -0.19 24.59 10.14
Weibull
1 2.74 6.24 10.56 1.5
2 5.34 2.17 18.91 5.72
3 7.24 -0.45 24.97 10.49
Table D.3: Results for coordinating conditions for models with exponential discounting for
products with recoverable product life: Uniform distributed time
g h λ pico pipm pitotal Efficiency = pi0−pitotalpi0
1.55 0.04 1.43 0.64 0.07 0.704 91.41
1.55 0.06 1.57 0.54 0.19 0.733 95.24
1.55 0.08 1.70 0.45 0.30 0.752 97.74
1.55 0.10 1.83 0.37 0.39 0.764 99.21
1.55 0.12 1.96 0.29 0.48 0.769 99.89
1.55 0.13 2.05 0.25 0.52 0.770 100.00
1.55 0.14 2.09 0.22 0.55 0.769 99.97
1.55 0.16 2.20 0.14 0.62 0.766 99.59
1.55 0.18 2.32 0.07 0.69 0.761 98.85
1.55 0.20 2.43 0.01 0.75 0.753 97.84
Table D.4: Results for coordinating conditions for models with exponential discounting for
products with recoverable product life: Gamma distributed time
g h λ pipm pico pitotal Efficiency = pi0−pitotalpi0
1.54 0.04 1.42 0.08 0.65 0.722 92.00
1.54 0.06 1.55 0.20 0.55 0.750 95.51
1.54 0.08 1.68 0.30 0.47 0.768 97.83
1.54 0.10 1.81 0.39 0.38 0.779 99.22
1.54 0.12 1.94 0.48 0.31 0.784 99.88
1.54 0.13 2.02 0.54 0.25 0.785 100.00
1.54 0.14 2.06 0.56 0.23 0.785 99.98
1.54 0.16 2.17 0.62 0.16 0.782 99.65
1.54 0.18 2.28 0.69 0.09 0.777 98.97
1.54 0.20 2.39 0.75 0.02 0.770 98.03
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Table D.5: Results for coordinating conditions for models with exponential discounting for
products with irrecoverable product life: Uniform distributed time
g h λ pico pipm pitotal Efficiency = pi0−pitotalpi0
1.72 0.10 1.89 0.51 0.08 0.582 95.96
1.72 0.12 2.02 0.43 0.17 0.595 98.10
1.72 0.14 2.14 0.35 0.25 0.603 99.36
1.72 0.16 2.25 0.28 0.32 0.606 99.92
1.72 0.17 2.32 0.25 0.36 0.607 100.00
1.72 0.18 2.36 0.21 0.39 0.606 99.96
1.72 0.20 2.47 0.15 0.46 0.604 99.57
1.72 0.22 2.58 0.08 0.52 0.599 98.82
1.72 0.24 2.68 0.02 0.57 0.593 97.80
Table D.6: Results for coordinating conditions for models with exponential discounting for
products with irrecoverable product life: Gamma distributed time
g h λ pipm pico pitotal Efficiency = pi0−pitotalpi0
1.71 0.10 1.87 0.08 0.52 0.598 96.06
1.71 0.12 1.99 0.17 0.44 0.611 98.10
1.71 0.14 2.11 0.25 0.37 0.618 99.33
1.71 0.16 2.22 0.33 0.30 0.622 99.91
1.71 0.17 2.29 0.37 0.25 0.623 100.00
1.71 0.18 2.33 0.39 0.23 0.622 99.98
1.71 0.20 2.43 0.46 0.16 0.620 99.64
1.71 0.22 2.54 0.52 0.10 0.616 98.97
1.71 0.24 2.64 0.57 0.04 0.610 98.03
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Appendix E
Results for Chapter 5
E.1 Results for Nash Bargaining
Table E.1: Results from Nash’s bargaining for gamma distributed cost
b a W Upm Uco N
0.00 7.28 2.78 2.72 0.36 0.95
0.50 4.74 1.56 3.26 0.39 1.29
1.00 2.60 1.00 3.40 0.41 1.38
Table E.2: Results from Nash’s bargaining for exponential distributed cost
b a W Upm Uco N
0.00 8.98 5.00 1.02 0.17 0.17
0.50 4.94 1.67 3.06 0.38 1.16
1.00 2.59 1.00 3.40 0.41 1.38
Table E.3: Results from Nash’s bargaining for beta distributed cost
b a W Upm Uco N
0.00 6.95 2.50 3.04 0.38 1.15
0.50 4.61 1.50 3.38 0.40 1.36
1.00 2.60 1.00 3.40 0.41 1.38
Table E.4: Results from Nash’s bargaining for Weibull distributed cost
b a W Upm Uco N
0.00 7.22 2.73 2.77 0.36 0.98
0.50 4.73 1.60 3.05 0.38 1.15
1.00 2.43 1.00 3.14 0.39 1.21
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E.2 Results from Kalai Smorodinsky Bargaining
Table E.5: Results from Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining for gamma distributed cost
b a W V Upm Uco K
0.00 6.99 2.78 2.78 3.02 0.31 0.50
0.50 4.50 1.56 2.78 3.50 0.36 0.58
1.00 2.37 1.00 2.78 3.63 0.38 0.61
Table E.6: Results from Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining for exponential distributed cost
b a W V Upm Uco K
0.00 8.48 5.00 5.00 1.52 0.08 0.25
0.50 3.82 1.67 5.00 4.17 0.22 0.70
1.00 1.42 1.00 5.00 4.58 0.25 0.76
Table E.7: Results from Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining for beta distributed cost
b a W V Upm Uco K
0.00 6.78 2.50 2.50 3.22 0.36 0.54
0.50 4.48 1.50 2.50 3.51 0.38 0.59
1.00 2.47 1.00 2.50 3.53 0.40 0.60
Table E.8: Results from Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining for Weibull distributed cost
b a W V Upm Uco K
0.00 6.44 2.73 2.73 3.56 0.25 0.76
0.50 4.50 1.60 2.73 5.06 0.34 1.08
1.00 2.84 1.00 2.73 6.27 0.44 1.34
E.3 Utilitarian Bargaining
Table E.9: Results from Utilitarian bargaining for gamma distributed cost
b a W Upm Uco U
0.00 1.24 3.69 3.75 0.17 8.92
0.50 0.61 1.73 3.99 0.17 9.15
1.00 0.15 1.00 4.04 0.17 9.21
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Table E.10: Results from Utilitarian bargaining for exponential distributed cost
b a W Upm Uco U
0.00 2.83 25 2.17 0.17 2.33
0.50 0.69 1.92 3.90 0.17 4.07
1.00 0.15 1.00 4.05 0.17 4.21
Table E.11: Results from Utilitarian bargaining for beta distributed cost
b a W Upm Uco U
0.00 1.05 2.94 3.94 0.17 4.12
0.50 0.58 1.67 4.02 0.17 4.18
1.00 0.15 1.00 4.05 0.17 4.24
Table E.12: Results from Utilitarian bargaining for Weibull distributed cost
b a W Upm Uco U
0.00 1.06 2.99 3.94 0.17 4.10
0.50 0.54 1.60 4.10 0.17 4.26
1.00 0.15 1.00 4.13 0.17 4.30
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Appendix F
Results for Chapter 6
F.1 With fixed price contracts
Table F.1: Results for f values vs. pipm, pico, and Uco
f λ pico Uco pipm
6.50 0.00 6.50 -M -M
7.00 0.00 7.00 -M -M
7.15 2.74 2.77 2.77 3.46
7.25 2.74 2.87 2.77 3.37
7.50 2.74 3.12 2.77 3.11
7.75 2.74 3.37 2.77 2.87
8.00 2.74 3.62 2.77 2.62
Table F.2: Results for f vs. pipm, pico, Uco, and Upm
f λ pico Uco pipm Upm
6.50 0.00 6.50 -M -M -M
7.00 0.00 7.00 -M -M -M
7.15 2.73 2.77 2.77 3.46 1.80
7.25 2.73 2.86 2.77 3.36 0.78
7.50 2.73 3.11 2.77 3.11 -1.87
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F.2 For time based contracts
Table F.3: Results for Profit/Utilities vs h with time based contracts: The contractor fairness
concerned only
h pico pipm Uco
1.00 3.24 2.81 2.85
1.10 2.89 3.24 2.77
1.15 2.74 3.41 2.74
1.20 2.56 3.62 2.29
1.30 2.24 3.97 1.49
1.40 1.93 4.30 0.73
1.50 1.64 4.60 0.00
Table F.4: Results for Profit/Utilities vs g with time based contracts: The contractor fairness
concerned only
g pico pipm Uco
10.40 1.64 4.60 0.00
10.60 1.84 4.40 0.49
10.80 2.04 4.20 0.98
11.00 2.24 4.00 1.47
11.20 2.44 3.80 1.95
11.40 2.64 3.60 2.47
11.54 2.77 3.47 2.77
11.80 3.04 3.20 2.85
12.00 3.24 3.00 2.90
12.20 3.44 2.80 2.96
Table F.5: Results for Profit/Utilities vs g with time based contracts: The contractor and the
project manager both fairness concerned in an acrimonious supply chain
g pico pipm Uco Upm
11.37 2.61 3.63 0.00 3.62
11.40 2.64 3.60 0.44 3.51
11.45 2.69 3.55 1.30 3.28
11.50 2.74 3.50 2.16 3.06
11.54 2.77 3.46 2.77 2.88
11.60 2.84 3.40 2.79 2.61
11.65 2.89 3.35 2.80 2.39
11.70 2.94 3.30 2.82 2.17
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Table F.6: Results for Profit/Utilities vs g with time based contracts: The contractor and the
project manager both fairness concerned in harmonious supply chain a
g pico pipm Uco Upm
11.37 2.61 3.63 0.00 3.48
11.40 2.64 3.60 0.44 3.48
11.45 2.69 3.55 1.30 3.47
11.50 2.74 3.50 2.16 3.47
11.54 2.77 3.46 2.77 3.46
11.60 2.84 3.40 2.78 3.28
11.65 2.88 3.35 2.80 3.15
11.70 2.94 3.30 2.82 3.00
Table F.7: Results for Profit/Utilities vs g with time based contracts: The contractor and the
project manager both fairness concerned in harmonious supply chain b
g pico pipm Uco Upm
11.37 2.61 3.63 0.00 3.37
11.40 2.64 3.60 0.44 3.39
11.45 2.69 3.55 1.30 3.42
11.50 2.74 3.50 2.16 3.44
11.54 2.77 3.46 2.77 3.46
11.60 2.84 3.40 2.78 3.28
11.65 2.89 3.35 2.80 3.14
11.70 2.94 3.30 2.82 3.00
Table F.8: Results for Profit/Utilities vs h with time based contracts: The project manager
fairness concerned
h pico pipm Upm
1.00 3.41 2.65 1.36
1.05 3.23 2.87 1.93
1.10 3.06 3.07 2.47
1.15 2.89 3.27 2.99
1.20 2.74 3.44 3.43
1.25 2.57 3.63 3.46
1.30 2.41 3.81 3.49
1.36 2.22 4.01 3.51
1.40 2.10 4.13 3.53
1.45 1.95 4.29 3.55
1.50 1.80 4.44 3.56
1.55 1.66 4.58 3.58
1.60 1.51 4.72 3.59
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Table F.9: Results for Profit/Utilities vs g with time based contracts: The project manager
fairness concerned a
g pico pipm Upm
10.56 1.80 4.44 3.56
10.70 1.94 4.30 3.55
10.80 2.04 4.20 3.54
10.90 2.14 4.10 3.53
11.00 2.24 4.00 3.52
11.20 2.44 3.80 3.50
11.30 2.54 3.70 3.49
11.40 2.64 3.60 3.48
11.50 2.74 3.50 3.47
11.54 2.78 3.46 3.45
11.60 2.84 3.40 3.28
11.70 2.94 3.30 3.00
11.80 3.04 3.20 2.72
Table F.10: Results for Profit/Utilities vs g with time based contracts: The project manager
fairness concerned b
g pico pipm Upm
10.56 1.80 4.44 2.90
10.70 1.94 4.30 2.98
10.80 2.04 4.20 3.04
10.90 2.14 4.10 3.10
11.00 2.24 4.00 3.16
11.20 2.44 3.80 3.27
11.30 2.54 3.70 3.33
11.40 2.64 3.60 3.39
11.50 2.74 3.50 3.44
11.54 2.78 3.46 3.45
11.60 2.84 3.40 3.28
11.70 2.94 3.30 3.00
11.80 3.04 3.20 2.72
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